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DllASA International lnstitu~ for Applied Systems Analysis C A-2361 Laxenburg C Austria Telephone: (02236)71521•0 C Telex: 079137iiuaa C Telefax: (02236)71313 
Dear Participant , 
WELCOME to the IIASA-Conference on "Future Changes in Population Age Structure" . In 
this brochure we tried to include all the material that is of general interest to you: the 
agenda, the programs of the sessions, the organizers' survey statements, one invited paper per 
session, the abstracts of the contributed papers that were sent to llASA by IO October 1988, 
and finally the list of participants. 
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For any questions on the scientific program, please contact the session organizers or me. For 
practical questions you will get help at our registration desk by Susanne Stock, Judith Hi.ill , 
and Tibor Asboth. llASA will carry the cost of your accommodation and regular meals; other 
expenses (e.g. long distance calls, extra drinks) should be paid directly to the hotel. Breakfast 
is generally served between 7:00 and 9:00; lunch and dinner will be after the sessions or as 
indicated in the agenda. 
For tonight (Monday) after dinner you are all invited to a welcome party ("POPNET-Mixer") 
in the conference room. 
Hoping that you will have an interesting and enjoyable time at this conference. 
Yours, 
Wcuy;~ 
Wolfgang Lutz 
for the Organizing Committee 
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AGENDA 
Monday 17 Oct. 21:00-23:00 p '"POPNET-Mixer'" (Welcome Party) 
Tuesday 18 Oct . 9:00-10:15 p Opening Session {Keyfitz, Klinger, Calot, Lutz) 
10:30-12:30 p The Future of Reproduction 
{Session 2, Part A) 
14:00-18:00 S2 Future of Reproduction 
{Session 2, Part B) 
SI Models and Methods to Project 
the Future Population Composition (Session 1) 
Wednesday 19 Oct. 9:00-12:00 p The Future of Mortality 
(Session 4, Part A) 
13:30-16:30 Sl The Future of Mortality 
(Session 4, Part B) 
S2 Analysis of Discontinuities in 
Age Patterns (Session 6) 
17:00 Tour of Sopron, organ concert, reception 
Thursday 20 Oct. 9:00-12:00 SI Future Structures of Families 
and Households (Session 3, Part A) 
S2 The Youth Cohort: Economics, Sociology , Politics 
{Session 7) 
14:00-17:00 SI Future Structures of Families 
and Households (Session 3, Part B) 
S2 The Future of Regional 
Differentials in Growth and the 
Composition of the Population (Session 5) 
17:30-18:00 p Closing of Conference 
Friday 21 Oct. 8:30 Busses from Sopron to IIASA, Laxenburg 
11:00-12:00 (at IIASA) Survey of Research 
Activities at IIASA's Population Program 
12:30 Lunch in the Schloss Restaurant 
14:00 Tour of Laxenburg Castle and Park, Presentation 
of the '"Dialog'" - Multistate Model 
about 16:30 Departure of busses to Vienna and Budapest 
P =plenary; Sl, S2 = aeparated rooms 
10.10.88 
Scientific Program 
Session 1: 
Models and Methods to Project the Future Population Composition 
Organizer: Shunichi Inoue 
Population Division 
United Nations 
New York, NY 10017 
USA 
N &me and address 
John F . Long 
Population Division 
US Department of Commerce 
Bureau of the Census 
Washington, D.C. 20233 
USA 
Anatoli Ya.shin 
Institute for Control Sciences 
USSR Academy of Sciences 
Profsoyuznaya 65 
117806 Moscow 
USSR 
Janina Jozwiak 
Institute of Statistics 
a.nd Demography 
Al. Niepodleglosci 162 
02-554 Warsaw 
Poland 
Oleg Sta.roverov 
Central Economic and 
Mathematical Institute (CEMI) 
Krasilova Street 32 
117418 Moscow 
USSR 
V.l. Orlov 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR 
Inatitute of Economics and 
Forecasting of Scientific and 
Technological Progress 
32, Kruikova Str. 
117418 Moscow 
USSR 
Invited paper: Nico Keilman 
NIDI 
P.O. Box 11650 
2502 AR The Hague 
The Netherlands 
Title of contributed paper 
The relative effects of fertility, 
mortality, and migration on pro-
jected population age structure 
Heterogeneity and prediction: 
how individuals' variety influences 
population forecast 
Application of the fundamental 
matrix to analyzing population 
structure 
Problems of population simulation 
Migration models and estimation 
of uncertainty for projections of 
population age structures in 
different regions 
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Name and address 
Istvan Monigl 
Central Statistical Office 
Demographic Research Institute 
Semmelweis u . 9, Pf. 78 
H-1364 Budapest V 
Hungary 
Tomas Kucera 
Faculty of Sciences 
Albertov 6 
128 43 Praha 2 
Csechoslovakia 
Wolfgang Lut& 
Sergei Scherbov 
Babette Wils 
Doug Wolf 
Population Program 
IIASA 
A-2361 La.xenburg 
Austria 
William J. Serow 
David F . Sly 
Gabriel Alvarez 
Center for the Study of Population 
653 Bellamy Building 
Florida State University 
Tallahassee, FL 32306-4063 
USA 
Otto Hellwig 
Technische Hochschule Darmstadt 
Statistik und Okonometrie 
Residenzschloss 
6100 Darmstadt 
GFR 
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Form of the presentation of contributed papers: 
Title of contributed paper 
Main characteristics of long-term 
population trends in Hungary 
between 1880 and 2050 
On the structure of inaccuracy 
problem in population forecasting 
and possibilities how to solve it 
Scenarios for future population 
patterns in Europe to the year 
2000 
The oldest-old : 
comparisons 
Micro-analytical 
estimation of 
mobility using 
micro-data 
cross national 
modeling and 
inter household 
croe1-1ection 
Each contributed paper will be presented by the author in 15 minutes or less. 
-
" 
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Session 2: 
The Future of Reproduction 
Organizer: Andras Klinger 
Demographic Statistics Dept. 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
Keleti-Karoly utca 5/7 
H-1525 Budapest 
Hungary 
Invited paper: Charles W estoff 
Office of Population Research 
Princeton University 
21 Prospect Avenue 
Princeton, New Jersey 08540 
USA 
N &me and address 
N. Barkalov 
Faculty of Economics 
Moscow State University 
Moscow 
USSR 
Kali! Katus 
Faculty of Economics 
Moscow State University 
Moscow 
USSR 
loop de Beer 
Dept. for Population Statistics 
Netherlands Central Bureau 
of Statistics 
P .O . Box 959 
2270 AZ Voorburg 
The Netherlands 
Hans van de Giessen 
Dept. for Population Statistics 
Netherlands Central Bureau 
of Statistics 
P.O. Box 959 
2270 AZ V oorburg 
The Netherlands 
Vladimir Roubicek 
Laboratory of Demography 
Prague School of Economics 
13067 Prague 3 
Csechoalovakia 
Title of contributed paper 
Fertility: from age-specific to par-
ity progression rates 
Fertility in central Asian republics 
Methods for projecting age-specific 
fertility: comparison of forecast 
accuracy 
Birth expectations as a guide for 
fertility hypotheses in population 
projections 
Cohort fertility analysis a.s a ha.sis 
for the estimation of future 
Name and address 
Gustav Feichtinger 
Institut fQr Unternehmensforschung 
Technische Universitat Wien 
Argentinierstrasse 8/ 119 
A-1040 Vienna 
Austria 
Paula Ranta.kallio 
Antero Myhrman 
Oulun yliopisto 
kanaanterveystieteen laitos 
Aapistie 3 
90220 Oulu 
Finland 
Zden~k Pavlfk 
Faculty of Science 
Albertov 6 
128 43 Praha 2 
Csechoslovakia 
Fernando Rajulton 
Dept. of Sociology 
The University of Western Ontario 
London, Ontario N6A 5C2 
Canada 
Jaroslav Kraus 
Population Division 
Feder&l Statistic&] Office 
Sokoloska 142 
Praha 8 
Csechoslov akia 
Peter Zvidrins 
Latvian State University 
Chair of Statistics and Demography 
19, Rainis Boulevard 
Riga 226098 
Latvian SSR 
Griffith Feeney 
Population Institute 
East-West Center 
1777 East-West Road 
Honolulu, Hawaii 96848 
USA 
Charlotte H6hn 
Bundeainstitut fQr Bev6lkerungs-
forachung 
Guatav-Stresemann-Ring 6 
6200 Wiesbaden 1 
GFR 
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Title of contributed paper 
Modeling the impact of possible 
Easterlin cycles 
The effect of liber&l abortion law 
in the rate and ratio of unwanted 
and wanted pregnancies 
Gener&l and specific features of the 
reproduction after demographic 
revolution 
Developments in nuptiality and 
fertility in Canada 
The future of reproduction -
comparison of Czechoslovak pro-
jection in Mid-European region 
Patterns of population reproduc-
tion in the countries of the Baltic 
region 
Comparative structure of low fer-
tility in Japan and the United 
States 
The role of population-relevant 
policies on future fertility in aging 
1ocieties 
i 
Name and address 
Cha.rles A. Calhoun 
Population Program 
IIASA 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
Austria 
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Form of presentation of contributed papers: 
Title of contributed paper 
Do excess and deficit fertility 
really offset one another? Some 
econometric evidence from the 
United States 
Short presentations by the authors. An exact timing schedule will be given by the organ-
izer later on. 
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Session 3: 
Future Structures of Families and Households 
Organizer: Louis Roussel 
INED 
27, rue du Commandeur 
75675 Paris Cedex 14 
France 
Name and address 
Pavel Kitsul 
Institute of Control Sciences 
USSR Academy of Sciences 
Profsoyuznaya 65 
117806 Moscow 
USSR 
Robert A. Horvath 
Nyul u. 13/ a 
H-1025 Budapest II 
Hungary 
Laszlo Cseh-Szombathy 
Hegyalja Street 5 
H-1016 Budapest I 
Hungary 
King-Mei Tsay 
Institute of American Culture 
Academia Sinica Nankang 
Taipei 11529 
Taiwan 
Rudolf Andorka 
University of Economics 
Pf . .(89 
H-1828 Budapest 5 
Hungary 
Klaus-Peter Moller 
lnstitut fQ.r angewandte 
Systemforschung und Prognose e.V. 
KOnigstrasse SOA 
D-3000 Hannover 1 
GFR 
Ma.rt& Sougareva 
Bulga.ri&n Academy of Sciences 
Institute of Sociology 
Moekovska, 13-a. 
Sofia. 
Bulgaria 
Invited paper: Herve LeBras 
INED 
27, rue du Commandeur 
75675 Paris Cedex 14 
France 
Title of contributed pa.per 
Conditional Markovian model to 
forecast the family dynamics 
Future structures of families and 
households - the point of view of a 
population economist 
Survival of kinship relat ions in t he 
industrialized countries 
Changes in living arrangements of 
Asian immigrants in the United 
States 
Roles and structures of families 
and households in Hungary: 
disappearance or revival? 
Long-term population trends in 
northern Europe: simulation of 
future household formation in 
W eat Germany 
Desire for children and the future 
of the family 
J 
I 
Na.me and address 
Jan N eliBBen 
Ad Vossen 
Department of Sociology 
Tilburg University 
P.O. Box 00153 
5000 LE Tilburg 
The Netherlands 
Michael Bracher 
M.G. Santow 
Research School of Social Sciences 
The Australian National University 
7 Liversidge Street 
GPO Box 4 
C&11berra, ACT 2601 
Auatralia 
Jacques Legare 
Nicole Marcil-Gratton 
Departement de demographie 
Universite de Montreal 
C .P. 6128, Succ. A 
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7 
Canada 
Kilman Szab6 
Central Statistical Office 
Demographic Research Institute 
V. Veres PaJ.ne u . 10 
H-1047 Budapest 
Hungary 
Viviana Egidi 
A. Tomassetti 
University of Rome 
Via Nomentana 41 
l-00161 Rome 
Italy 
Andrej Boozin 
Computing Center 
USSR Academy of Sciences 
Vavilova, 40 
117967 Moscow 
USSR 
Michael Wolfson 
Social &11d Economic 
Studies Division 
Statistia C&11ada 
Holl&11d Avenue 
Ottawa, Ontario KlA OT6 
Canada 
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Form of presentations of contributed papers: 
10-minute presentations by authors. 
Title of contributed paper 
Applying a microsimulation model 
to project the future structure of 
families and households 
Changing family composition from 
life history data 
Human network surrounding 
future older people: what can we 
expect from kinship support? 
Changes of family and household 
composition in Hungary 
A method for projecting families : 
some demographic and economic 
consequences of Italian trends 
Demographic consequences of con-
sanguineous marriages in small 
populations 
Union formation propensities &11d 
lifecycle family structures 
Part A: Kitsul, Horvath , Cseh-Szombathy, Sougareva, Nelissen/Vossen , 
Bracber/Santow, Lindgren, Szabo, Boozin, Wolfson. 
Part B: Szabo, Tsay , Andorka, Moller, Legare, Egidi, Tomassetti . 
Session 4: 
The Future of Mortality 
Organizer: Tapani Valkonen 
Department of Sociology 
University of Helsinki 
Franzeninkatu 13 
00500 Helsinki 50 
Finland 
Invited paper: Gerhard Heilig 
Universitat Bamberg 
8600 Bamberg 
GFR 
(after December 1988: 
Population Program 
IIASA 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
Austria) 
Name and address 
Josianne Duch@ne 
Guillaume Wunsch 
Institute of Demography 
Universite Catholique de Louvain 
1, Place Montesquieu - bte 17, B 
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve 
Belgium 
Peter Findl 
Osterreichisches Statistisches 
Zentralamt 
Hintere Zollamtsstra.sse 2B 
A-1033 Vienna 
Austria 
Otto Andersen 
Da.nmub Statistik 
Sejrogade 11 
2100 Copenhagen 0 
Denmark 
Tuija Mutelin 
Department of Sociology 
University of Helsinki 
Helainginkatu 34 C 
SF-00530 Helsinki 
Finland 
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The impact of AIDS 
on future mortality 
Title of contributed paper 
Life tables, maximum life span, and 
population aging 
A cohort model for mortality pro-
jection in Austria 
Reduction of mortality among the 
occupational active population in 
the Nordic countries: effect on life 
expectancy and number of deaths 
Trends in elderly mortality in the 
Nordic countries 
I: 
N&me a.nd address 
Muek Kupiszewski 
Wiejska 9/ 48 
00-480 W usaw 
Poland 
Lincoln H. Day 
Dept. of Demography 
Reaeuch School of Social Sciences 
Australian N a.tional University 
G.P .O. Box 4 
Canberra., A.C .T . 2601 
Australia. 
Ms. Eta. Du6czi 
Centre for Regional Studies 
Pf. 48 
H-1251 Buda.pest 11 
Hungary 
Emil V alkovics 
Demographic Research Institute 
Central Statistical Office 
Veres Paine u . 10 
H- 1053 Budapest V 
Hungary 
Dhruva. Nagnur 
Statistics Canada. 
Holland A venue 
Ottawa., Ontario KlA OT6 
Canada. 
Thomas Klein 
Universitit Karlsruhe 
lnstitut !fir Soziologie 
Poetfach 6380 
D-7500 Karlsruhe 
BRD 
Aslak Herva. 
University of Joensuu 
P .O . Box 111 
SF-80101 Joensuu 
Finland 
Peter Josan 
Central Statistical Office 
Keleti Karoly u. 5-7 
H-1026 Budapest 
Hungary 
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Form of presentation of contributed papers: 
20 minutes (including discussion for each presentation) . 
Part A: Klein, Day, Duchene/ Wunsch, Martelin . 
Title of contributed paper 
Spatial aspects of changes of life 
duration in the light of single- and 
multiregional life tables: a case 
study of Pola.nd , 1977-1995 
Upper-age longevity in low-
mortality countries: a dissent ing 
view 
Checking the stability of spatial 
variations in mortality for estimat-
ing future trends of mortality in 
Hungary (together with Emil Val-
kovics) 
(paper with Ms . Eva. Dar6czi above) 
Cause deleted ent ropies a.nd fut ure 
course of cause specific mortali ty for 
Canada. 
On future possibilities of extending 
the huma.n life span 
The future of cancer mortality in 
North Karella. Province in Finland 
The national health promotion pro-
gr&mme and the future trends in 
mortality in Hungary 
Part B: Kupiszewski, Dar6czi/ Valkovics, Andersen , Nagnur, Herva, Findl , Jozan. 
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Session 5: 
The Future of Regional Differentials in Growth and 
the Composition of the Population 
Organizer: Antonio Golini 
National Institute for 
Population Research 
viale Beethoven, 56 
00144 Rome 
Italy 
N&me and address 
Alex&nder H&nika 
Osterreichisches Statistisches 
Zentralamt 
Hintere Zollamtsstrasse 2B 
A-1033 Vienna 
Austria 
Wolfgang Lutz 
Sergei Scherbov 
Population Program 
IIASA 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
Austria 
Mauri Nieminen 
H&nnu Himiliinen 
Central Statistical Office of Finland 
Box 504 
SF-00101 Helsinki 
Finl&nd 
J&nez Mala6l 
B. Kidril Faculty of Economics 
Kardeljeva ploAfad 17 
61000 Ljublj&na 
Yugoslavia 
W. W a.rd Kingkade 
Soviet Branch 
Center for International Research 
United States Dept. of Commerce 
Bureau of the Census 
Washington, DC 20233 
USA 
John F. Long 
US Department of Commerce 
Bureau of the Census 
Washington, D.C. 20233 
USA 
Invited paper: Frans Willekens 
NIDI 
P.O. Box 11650 
2502 AR The Hague 
The Netherlands 
Title of contributed paper 
Projected population structure of 
Vienna u compared to other Aus-
trian provinces 
Scenarios for future regional distri-
butions in the Soviet Union 
Regional development of the eld-
erly people in Finland 
Population age structure and the 
demographic transition of the 
population of Kosovo 
Differential fertility and the future 
ethnic composition of the USSR 
Time aeries forecasting of inter-
atate migration flows 
I ., 
I "') 
N&rne and address 
Robert Thormer 
Altademie der Wissenschaften der DDR 
Institut fQr Geographie und 
GeOOltologie 
Georgi-Dimitroff-Platz 1 
7010 Leipzig 
GDR 
Ch. Eichperger 
Nation&l Physical Planning Agency 
Willem Witsenplein 6 
2596 BK Den Haag 
The Netherlands 
Maria L. Redei 
Central Statistical Office 
Demographic Research Institute 
Semmelweis u . 9, Pf. 78 
H-1364 Budapest V 
Hungary 
George N. Tziafetas 
National Technical University of Athens 
Stenon Porta.a St. 6 
Athens 161 21 
Greece 
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Form of presentation of contributed papers: 
Title of contributed paper 
BEVO - a geographically oriented 
model to project regional differ-
ences in the composition of the 
population 
Future regional differentials in the 
growth and composition of the 
population in the Netherlands 
The main results and cha.ra.cteris-
tics of the regional estimation for 
Hungary 
Regional population projection: 
the case of Greece 
Six papers will be selected by the organizer for a presentation; the others will be summar-
ized by the organizer. 
I _j 
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Session 6: 
Measuring and Projecting Discontinuities in Age-specific Growth 
Patterns and Decomposing them into Fertility and Mortality Effects 
Organizer: Nathan Keyfitz 
Population Program 
IIASA 
A- 2361 Laxenburg 
Austria 
Name and address 
Alicia M. Bercovich 
Alameda Lorena, 1041 Apto. 114 
Cerqueira Cesar 
01424 Sao Paulo - SP 
Brazil 
Karol J. Krotki 
Department of Sociology 
The University of Alberta 
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4 
Canada 
Roberto Ham-Chande 
P.O. Box L 
Chula Vista, CA 92012 
USA 
Ching-lung Tsay 
The Institute of Economics 
Academia Sinica 
Nankang, Taipei 11529 
Taiwan, ROC 
Shiro Horiuchi 
Population Division 
United Nations 
New York 10017 
USA 
Yeun-Chung Yu 
Population Division 
United Nations 
New York 10017 
USA 
Feng Shan 
Dept. of Automatic Control 
Research Institute of 
Systems Engineering 
Huazhong University of 
Science a.nd Technology 
Wuhan, Hubei 
P .R. China 
Title of contributed paper 
Age-sex structure in Brazil: 
apparent contraditions 
Quasi-stability is still valid for 
LDCs 
Age structure and other differen-
tials at the US-Mexico border 
The changing pattern of age struc-
ture in Taiwan 
Measurement and analysis of 
changes in cohort size 
The estimation of put age distri-
butions using age-specific growth 
rates 
Age distribution changes in China 
/ -.. 
Name and address 
Jean Bourgeois-Pichat 
CICRED 
27, rue du CommiLJldeur 
75675 Pa.ris Cedex 14 
France 
Zenji N&njo 
Kuumua Kobayashi 
Fukushima Medical College 
Fukushima City, 960 
Jap&n 
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Form of presentations: IS-minute statement by authors. 
Title of contributed paper 
The age distribution of the world 
as a whole (1950-2025) 
A method of measuring demo-
graphic discontinuity 
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Session 7: 
Economic, Social, and Political Consequences the Youth Cohort has bad and 
will have on Societies: Country Case Studies and General Considerations 
Organizer: Nathan Keyfitz 
Population Program 
IIASA 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
Austria 
Name and address 
Henk J. Heeren 
10 Vogelaanglaan 
3571 ZM Utrecht 
The Netherlands 
Felicia R. Madeira 
Av. Prof. Francisco Morato, 1565 
Caixa Postal 11478 
05513 Sao Paulo - SP 
Brazil 
P&ida Ra.machandran 
D. Usha Rani 
Population Studies Center 
Sri Venltateswra University 
Tirupati - 517 502, A.P. 
India 
Mesbah-us-Saleheen 
Department of Geography 
J&hangirnagar University 
Savar, Dhaka 1342 
Bangladesh 
Ashish Bose 
Population Research Centre 
Institute of Economic Growth 
University Enclave 
Delhi ll0007 
India 
Goran Penev 
Demographic Research Centre 
Institute of Social Sciences 
Ul. Narodnog fronta 45 
11000 Belgrade 
Yugoelavia 
Howard Wriggins 
5240 Sycamore Avenue 
Bronx, New York 10471 
USA 
Form of presentations: 15-minute statement by authors. 
Title of contributed paper 
Cohorts or generations: the 
absence of a youth cohort in the 
Netherlands 
Youth cohort in Brazil: demo-
graphic dynamics and new 
approaches to the analysis of its 
economic, social and political 
consequences 
Socio-economic and demographic 
implications of youth in India 
The present trends of youth cohort 
and its socio-economic consequen-
ces in Bangladesh 
Some upects of the economic, 
social and political implications of 
youth cohorts in India 
Social and economic consequences 
of demographic explotion in Koso-
vo (Yugoslavia) 
Marked changes in age cohort size 
and political stability: hypotheses 
on intervening variables 
~ 
' I 
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SESSION 1 
Models and Methods to Project 
the Future Population Composition 
Organizer: Shunichi Inoue 
Organizer's statement 
Invited paper: 
Jj 
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MQDLES AND METHODS TO PROJECT THE ruTURE POPULAT!ON COMPOSlT!O~ 
Shuni chi Inoue 
United Nations Population Division* 
Introduction 
If we limit our attention to the "realistic" projection of population 
compositions, iS against purely theoretical or hypothetical population 
projections or projections of a total population without age-se ~ 
sub-divisions, available models and methods for this purpose are limited 
to two broad categories: variants of the cohort component projection 
method and those of the micro-simulation method. The word "realistic'' to 
describe a certAin group of population projections was used by the United 
Naitons in 1~73 to differentiate them from "benchmark" projections and 
"analytical" projections. l/ ee·nchmark projections are designated to 
illustrate the demographic consequences of certain events which are 
admittedly not expected to happen during the period covered by the 
projections. "Analytical" projections are used to study the influence of 
changes in the components of growth on the structure of the population 
regardless of the extent to which these changes are related to reality. 
The "realistic" projections thus represents assessment of future 
demographic change that demographers are trying to predict. 
*The views expressed in this paper are of author's and not necessarily of 
the United Nations. 
- ~ -
Some demographers seem to be uncomfortable wit h the use of t he word 
prediction or forecast and prefer to sti ck t o the wc•rd "pr ojecti on" 
because of the fear that a forecast will never be possible. Despite st rong 
demands for a reliable forecast of future population and its composition 
from policy makers, administrators of governments, business circles, 
researchers and so on, a population forecast is only possible t o a limited 
extent, for a limited span of time and with a certain mar gi n of ~r rors. 
Examples of forecast errors in the areas of whether, ec onomy and pol it ics 
are too familiar to everyone, but population forecasts have not been too 
much better either than the other areas of forecast, if the t ime s cal es 
involved are adjusted for comparability. Recent development of the theory 
of chaos indicates that precise forecast of events are impossible when 
many factors are involved in the whole process, like in the case of 
population changes. However, populat ion pro jections have not yet been a 
total failure because some of the demographic changes are fairly 
predictable. ror e xample, if we have an accurate data on t he curr ent 
population structure and the prevailing mortality conditions, it is not 
too difficult to project with a certain degree of confidence the structure 
of surviving population in the near future under the "normal" 
circumstances. rrom this projection, we can predict fairly accurately when 
the next babyboom will begin due to the increase in the number of women in 
the reproductive ages or when the elderly population will begin to swell 
or shrink due to the different chohort sizes, etc. 
Methods of population projections adopted by the developing countries 
are not precisely known. (More information is ava i lable fo r developed 
countries and that will be the thesis of Dr. Keilman's paper ) . At present 
only less than a half of developing countries repor t to the Uni ted Nations 
Z I 
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Stat i s!i cal Offic e or: t heir cur re:it popl ati on es t imatE:.':; . It :s n::it I: ;;:-.,..;;, 
ho1Jever, what kind of method was used to derive the current populat i c1n 
estimates in those countries. Presumably, it is a mi xt ure of var ious 
methods including a simple extrapolation of the past growth trend, 
estimation based on the demographic equation <adding the number of birt hs 
and subtracting the number of deaths from the benchmark population) , or 
projections by a component method, etc. In any case, the c~oice of the 
method of projection is largely determined by the avai lab l e data and 
computational resources, if not by the insuffi cient know ledge of 
demographi c dynamics. 
In t he following, some of the pr oblems of poulat ion pro j ect ions f or 
the developing countries will be discussed referring t o the methods used 
by the United Nations Population Division and the World Bank respect ively , 
both of wh i ch are continuously ma king population projecti ons for 
developi ng countries despite the severe constraints of available data as 
the countries themselves must be facing. 
Types of projections 
In the cohort component method of projection, future fert i lit y, 
mortality and ~igration, among others, must be provided as the input 
assumpti ons. The success of a "realistic" projection largel y depends on 
the goodness of the assumptions on these components of populat i on 
changes. In other words, the critical element needed t o accur ately pro j ect 
the future population structure is how better to project the future trends 
of fertility, mortality and migration (in addition to the assessment of 
current population structure). 
2 z 
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Generally speaking, a projection is a extenti on of t he ob ie rved t r ends 
into the future. It can be done either mechanically or more methodi c a l l ~ 
by taking the major determining factors of the trends into consideration. 
Although the complexity of the methodology does not guarantee the success 
of a projection, a mechanical projection of a component of demographic 
dynamics often errors becuase (1) the observed trends are not well 
established and/or (2) assumptions tend to be influenced t.oo much by the 
recent fluctuations of data, especially when sound theoretical 
understanding is lacking. When observed demographic trends are not clear 
enough to enable us to make mechanical extraporations or when t here ar e 
reasons to question the validity of such a mechanical extraportation, a 
more complex method can provide better solutions. As fertility, mortality 
and migration are determined through different ways and can be pr ojected 
differently, projections of the each component will be discussed 
separately below. 
It should be mentioned here about the question of whether or not we 
can forecast a sudden change of demographic dynamics which will cause, 
among other things, a discontinuity in population structure. When a 
declining fertility will hit the bottom before turning to increase: When 
some medical breakthrough will take place, suddenly raising the life 
expectancy of population( These are certainly interesting and important 
questions. In the report of the Club of Rome, for example, a collaps of 
population growth trends was projected due to the environmental 
constraints. However, there are too many unknown factors in the model that 
the conclusions drawn should be taken as a speculation. ror the purpose of 
making a "realistic" projections, it seems but impossible to predict the 
unpredictable. 
- ~ -
rert i litx projections 
In many instances of preparing fertility assumptions for a pr oject i on, 
including the early practices at the United Naitons, the past trend of 
fertility is firstly assessed and then projected into the future by more 
or less mechanical mannor. The indices used are either crude birth rate, 
total fertility rate, gross reproduction rate, net reproduction rate, or 
general ferility rate, etc. Depending on the situation, pr ojected future 
paths may follow a straight line at a fixed level or with a fi xed amount 
of change, or a non-linear line with an assumed rate of change, or 
following more sophisticated curves. The general guidance appli cable to 
this approach has been to seek some analogies to demographic histories of 
other populations. The theory of demographic transition which was 
originally derived from the observations of demographic histories in the 
western nations has been quite useful in this respect. Experiences 
indicate that this simple method has not always been without some success. 
However, as Leon Tabah argued some years ago, there are significant 
differences in demographic dynamics among different populations and 
therefore a simple analogy is often misleading. ZI Suffice to say that 
the social and economic conditions of today's developing countries are so 
different from the conditions of the developed countries in the past with 
respect to many areas including economy, available technologies, life 
styles, contraceptive devices, government's policies, etc. Thus when one 
wants to predict the speed, timing and modes of future changes of 
fertility, he is left with no real precise guidelines to follow. 
The natural development of projection methodology thus leads to the 
attempt to relate fertility changes to their determinants. The effects of 
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risin~ income on fe r tility were studies by econ~mi~ts t ~ e ~pla i ~ t h£ 
discrepancies between their generally positive correlation at the mi cro 
level and the negative correlation at the macro level . Urbani:ation, 
industrialization, education, women's status and their work participati on , 
family planning prcgrammes and government's population policies have also 
been studied as a possible factors to affect fertility changes. However, 
efforts to identify any one of those external factors as~ major 
determinant of fertility and to use the relationship in fertility 
projections were generally unsuccessful. 
ror example, figure 1 was drawn in a recent study conducted at the 
United Nations in relation to the analysis of the relat ionship betweEG 
population aging and urbanization. ~/ The data used were based on the 
joint work of the UN, ILO and rAO to produce a set of comparable estimates 
and projections of population, labour force and agricultural population, 
among others. ii In this study, the percentage of non-agricultural 
population, that was used as a proxy of the level of industrialization, 
was found to provide a very good explanation for the advancement of 
urbanization in the major regions of the world. As will be shown later, 
the proportion of non-agricultural population was also found to be closely 
related to the increase of life expectancy at birth. But i t was not when 
it comes to fertility trends. In figure 11 the relationship between the 
total fertility rate and the percentage of non-agricultu ral population 
were plotted over the period of a half century for si x major regions of 
. the world separately and shown together in the same graph. It clearly 
shows that fertility changes are only partially related to the increasing 
proportion of non-agricultural population, 
At a comparable level of industrialization (represented by proportion 
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of non-agricultural population>, Africa maintains a more or less constant 
high le \ el of fertility, wher eas East and Soutl1 Asia show a rapid decline. 
Latin America and Oceania which used to have relatively high fertility are 
in the middle of rapid change. On the other hand, Europe including USSR 
has maintained relatively low fertility at successive levels of 
industrialization. All these "deviations" from the global average pattern 
indicate that more than just economic structure is at wor~ to bring about 
fertility decline. Obvious factors that should be responsible are 
socio-cultural conditions including education, availability of family 
planning methods, government's policies and programmes on fertility, among 
other things. To be realistic, a fertility projection must take those 
factors into account. 
The methods of fertility projection adopted by the United Nations and 
the World Sank are more or less similar. Although the methods are rapidly 
evolving from year to year, both agencies tries to estimate the year or 
period in which fertility level reaches the replacement level on the basis 
of analysis of the past trends of fertility and the current socioeconomic 
and policy factors. At the United Nations, several model schedules of 
fertility decline whose total duration of transition from the tradition&l 
high to the modern low is assumed to vary from 30 to 70 years are 
constructed and choices are made for each country to find a suitable model 
schedule <or a fe~ for different variants of projections) on the basis of 
analysis on the past fertility trends and the present soico-economic 
development, policy and cultural background of respective countries. ~/ 
Similarly at the World Bank it is assumed that "in all countries the NRR 
will reach unity sometime during 2000-~0," taking into account the level 
of mortality, recent levels and trends of fertility and the status of 
- 9 -
f ~~i!y pl~~ning programme i n eac h ~ountry. ~/ Although soicoeconomic 
factors are not explicitely mentioned, mortality cond itions that are 
emphas iz ed by the World Bank usually reflect socioeconomic conditions of a 
country. The paths through which fertility reaches the replacement levels 
are drawn slightly differently by the two agencies but the differenc~s do 
not seem to matter as much as the choice of the terminal year for the 
assumed fertility transition. 
What paths should be followed if one wants to improve fertility 
projections? One t l~ ing common t o the United Nations and Worl d Bani: methods 
seems to be its reliance on case-by-case judgements by indi vi dual 
projectionists on the possible demograph ic i mpact s of socio-economic and 
policy factors. One direction that may be followed is to make the 
formulation of fertility assumption more explicit and systematic i n 
relation to the socioeconomic and policy factors. By doing so, it would 
become possible to review them critically and find ways to improve them. 
There have been several attempts to build a model comprising demographic, 
social and economic factors such as the Club c•f Rome models and BACHUE 
models. Though such a total model might be an ideal goal to reach, there 
are inherent difficulties with such ambitions. 
The difficulties to relate the socio economic factors to fertility 
trends are due to the fact that Cl) soc i oeconomic conditi ons are by itself 
diffcult to predi ct and C2> the exact relationship between such conditions 
and fertility is not very clear. Although the first of the difficulties 
may not be solved i n the near future, the second diffi culties may be 
reduced by further research. One of the areas to be investigated is the 
mechanism through which soicoeconomic and policy fact or s influence 
fertility. This is the second direction that might be contemplated for the 
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~~provernant of fertility pro jecti on . 
Level and t r ends of fert i lity are basically determined by t he 
biological reproductive capacities of the human being and the environment 
that regulates them through the layers of intermediate fac tors. As already 
mentioned, the m•cro environment•l f•ctors th•t regul•te fertility include 
•conomic, social and cultural factors, available technologies to control 
or enh•nce hum•n reproduction and government's policies to.ward them. These 
macro environmental factors c~n influence fertility only through one or 
more of the lnte rmdiate fad.:.rs. Although the intermediate factors are 
o fte~ considered ident ical t o the reproductive behavior al factor s (such as 
t he proximate dete r minants named by John Bongaarts ) , there is another kind 
of the intermidiate factors at the level of human perception that are 
perhaps leading the reproductive bahavi or . The typical of suc h percepti ve 
factors is the desired number of children, desire for additional child, 
desire for spacing of child births, desire to get married, etc. It seems 
logical to assume that external conditions will firstly affect the human 
perceptions about the family formation and then the latter will affect the 
individual reproductive behavior. After that the biology takes charge and 
leads to conceptions and births culminating in human fertility. 
In f~ct, research has been progressing on both levels of intermediate 
factors. Empirical researches on the proximate determinants are for one, 
~nd various model building efforts on family formation ar e for ancther . 
Efforts are needed to ut i lize the relevant findings from these researches 
f.:.•r the imprc•vement c•f ff:'rti lit;- prc1jectic1n. 
In a recent study of the United Nations, it was found that a decline 
of infant mortality rate may or may not affect fertility dependi ng on 
whether or not the number of surviving children is greater than the number 
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des ir ed. ZI In a numbe r of Afr i can countries, sever al surveys indicate 
that the average des ired number of children, though it is on t he decline , 
is much higher t han the surviving number of children. Under such 
circumstances, demographers are facing a tough question: when African 
fertility will begin a sustained decline. One clue to answer that question 
is to watch the changes in the deseired number of children among African 
populations and study the socio-economic and policy factor• that influence 
them. 
Mortality projections 
The methods or mortality projection used at the United Naitons are 
basically the extraporation of the average trends of life expectancy at 
birth among nations. Under normal circumstances a quinquennial increment 
of 2.S years appear s to have been what can be expected in most countries 
in the recent years. Despite the recent rather significant increase in 
life expectancy among the wetern industrialized countries, the 
quinquennial increment is smaller when the life expectancy moves up beyond 
a certain level, say, 60 or 65. Economic, social or political adversities 
are assumed to retard the improvement in this respect, although after the 
difficulty is over, the recovery appears to be quickening. Demographers at 
the United Natic•ns are thus paying a close attention nc•t c•nly tc• the 
latest mortality statistics but also soicoeconomic and political 
conditions of each and every countries . 
The World Bank, on the other hand, tried to apply the relationship 
between the increments in life expectancy and the femal primary school 
enrollment in their latest mortality projections. a1 It was found that the 
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re lation~f 1 ip appears ~ o differ between the gr cu~ of countri~~ ~ith l ow 
primar y school enrollment Cwhere the relation is rep r esented by a linear 
regression line ) and the group of countries with high enrol l ment Cwhere 
the relation is represented by a quadratic curve), The results seems, 
however, rather similar to the United Nations model. 
Theoretically speaking, the life expectancy of a population can be 
affected by three factors: medical technologies, public he.alth measures 
and individual health care. The breakthrough in the medical technolog i es 
that may elimi nate or drastically reduce chances of getting and dying of 
certain diseases may come at anytime but it is i mpossible t o predi ct when. 
The progress in the public health measures depends largely on the wealth 
of a country as well as the political will of government which decides the 
priority for the resources allocation among competing needs. At the 
individual level, the quality of health care including the provision of 
nutrition and personal hygiene is mostly affected by family income and 
education. Although it is not easily possible to separate the 
contributions of each factor to the improvement of mortality condition, 
the most predictable and basic element affecting mortality seems to be 
eonomic growth. 
rigure 2 shows the average trends of life expectancy at birth for the 
eight major regions of the world for 50 year period from 1~50 to 1000 
(part of which is of course projections) in conjunction with the level of 
industrialization measured by the proportion of non-agricultural 
population. Data are taken from the same United Nations study quoted in 
the discussion of fertility projections. ~/ ror the comparable levels of 
the proportion of non-agricultural population, East Asia has shown a 
remarkably rapid improvement in life expectancy in th recent past. The 
S I 
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p!~~ress in South Asia and Africa ar e als~ fas ter than what mi~ht be 
expected from the global experiences. Latin America and Oceania are moving 
fast to catch up the gap to reach the world "norm '', whereas USSR has been 
losing its advantageous position in recent periods. In Northern America 
and Europe, the advancement of life expectancy appears to be taking place 
•head of, or independently from, the already high level of 
industrialization. 
This graph shows clearly that economic progress is an important, but 
not the sole, determinants cf the inr~a~ing life expectancy in various 
parts of t h ~ wor ld. App li cation of modern med ic al technologies and 
political systems a r e apparently at wcrk. But it is the economic progress 
that seems to be most responsible for the improvement of mortality 
conditions in the past as well as in the futrue, barring unpredictable 
medical breakthrough and political upheavals. 
Migration proiections 
At the national level, it is the volume and composition of 
international migranti on that affects the population structure of a 
country. The effects of international migration on national population are 
negligible for most countries exc ept for thos~ of recei vi ng a relatively 
large number of immigr ants . Resear ch ~n the demographic structure of 
~igrants is limited due to the scarcity of data and the exi stence of large 
number of refugees an~ und0cume~ted mi grant s . At the Uni ted Nations 
efforts have been made to collect as m~ch data as possible and analyse the 
patterns. As the results, several age-sex pattern of net migration have 
been identified and used in the latest round of th~ global population 
projections. lQ/ 
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Particular difficulty with th£ projection of intern~tiona! rni ~ r ati ~~ 
is tha fact that it changes volumes and directions very quic kly and there 
seems to be not clue as to the prediction of such abrupt changes. The 
general approach thus taken so far is, with the exception of a few 
countries with sustained immigration, to assume a diminishing volume of 
net migration in the future. This is a typical area in which a forecast is 
totally powerless. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
AU statistical agencies of developed countries which routinely produce nat ional 
population projections apply the cohort-component method. The model involved 
is basically a demographic accounting framework that allows the forecaster to 
assess the cpnsequences of an assumed set of cohort-specific fertility, mortality 
and migration parameters {Long and Mc Millen, 1984; Land, 1986). However, in 
spite of this common framework, actual practice differs widely among developed 
countries. 
This paper discusses methodological issues of current national population projec-
tions in the 29 developed countries that participated in a survey in early 1988. 1) 
The aim of this survey was to collect information on methodological aspects of 
national population projections in industrialized countries -information which is 
most often contained in local sources, unaccessible for the international scientif-
ic forum. The international comparison in this paper includes the demographic 
characteristics of the future populations; the various approaches to extrapolate 
fertility, mortality and external migration {aggregation levels in the formulation 
of assumptions, period or cohort approach, variant assumptions); the time 
horizon of the projection results; and a discussion of the projection model's 
equations. 
Some clarification is needed on the words "projections" and "forecasts". Most 
national agencies claim to produce projections, that is calculations which show 
what would happen if certain assumptions as to fertility, mortality, and 
migration were borne out. By definition, a projection is conditional, and it must 
be correct unless arithmetical errors are made. But projections are used as 
forecasts, showing the most likely future population trends. Moreover, demogra-
phers don't choose unlikely future fertility, mortality or migration trends - unless 
they explicitly state so. No condition is implicit in this definition of a forecast, 
although it should be understood that each forecast is based on our present 
knowledge, and therefore population forecasts have limited reliability and 
1) Information on population projections was given by the statistical agencies of 
the following 29 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, 
France, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Yugoslavia. 
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durability - just like weather forecasts. Although we shall use t he terms 
"projection" and "forecast", our interpretation for both is that attached to the 
latter. 
2. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROJECTED POPULATION 
It is standard practice in the cohort-component approach to distinguish the 
projected population by age and sex. The age detail varies considerably over the 
29 countries included in the survey, see table 1 1)_ First we note that five 
countries apply five year age classes, and 24 use one year age classes. More 
variation is shown in the highest open-ended age class, which falls between 85(+) 
and 100(+) for most countries. The age column reveals a strong preference for 
the psychological barrier of 100 years. Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic 
of Germany apply a highest age group which is closed: no one survives beyond 
this one year age class. 
Many countries distinguish their future population not only by sex and age, bu t 
also by region of residence. Nearly half of the countries indicated that they do so 
within the framework of national population forecasts. The regional detail may 
show considerable variation - compare, for instance, the three countries involved 
in the UK-forecasts (England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) and t he 
100 or so regions in the Norwegian forecasts. As the survey focused on 
projections at the national level, this regional aspect cannot be explored much 
further here. 
Other characteristics than sex, age and region are rarely used in national 
forecasts. Belgium, the FRG, Luxembourg and Switzerland work with nationality, 
and marital status is employed by Ireland (females only), the Netherlands and the 
UK. The USA distinguishes the projected population by race. 
Several points are important when a forecaster considers the characteristics by 
which the future population should be distinguished (see also Brass, 1974, 537). 
1. The purpose of the forecasts and the user's requirements could indicate which 
population categories might be relevant. 
2. Theories explaining demographic behaviour (childbearing, migration) may 
reveal homogeneous population subgroups, whose behaviour is relatively easy 
1) It should be noted that the tables in this paper may contain some erroneous 
information for some countries, because countries participating in the survey 
have not yet had an opportunity to check these tables. 
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to interpret. This could ease the extrapolation of the future behaviour of that 
category. 
3. The available data may constrain the number and type of population 
categories to be distinguished. 
4. Random fluctuations could occur, when too detailed a classification were to 
be used, .and cell-counts were to become too small. 
CJearly, age and · sex are included in all forecasts because of the first and the 
second consideration given here. For the fourteen countries that work with 
marital status or region of residence, the reason is probably most often that of 
the user's needs - see, for instance, the statements on marital status for the UK 
(Haskey, 1988, 30) and the Netherlands (NCBS, 1984, 25). The second reason, that 
of demographic theory, would imply a breakdown of fertility, mortality and/or 
external migration by marital status, region of residence or nationality. Howev-
er, table 2, which is to be discussed in more detail in section 3, reveals that 
among the twelve countries which break their population down by region, 
Belgium and the UK are the only ones that work with region specific fertility; 
among the three countries that use marital status, only Ireland distinguishes 
between legitimate and illegitimate fertility. For the characteristics of national-
ity and race, the corresponding proportion is two out of five. 
3. THE PROJECTION OF FERTILITY, MORTALITY, EXTERNAL MIGRATION 
AND OTHER COMPONENTS 
The cohort-component approach involves forecasting with a model without 
behavioural equations. All our assumptions about the (future} behaviour of the 
population are expressed by the trends in exogenous parameters, i.e., the 
fertility rates, the death probabilities, the numbers of migrants, and so on. 
Together with the fact that we have to select, from a whole range of alternative 
futures, those trends that we consider the most probable ones, this means that 
the stage of the selection of parameter values is the most crucial one in the 
entire process of population forecasting. Proper assumptions are more important 
for the success of a forecast than a sophisticated model (Ascher, 1978). 
Therefore, a great deal of attention will be given to questions related to the 
projection of the components of population change. 
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3.1. Which components? 
Any national population may change due to the three basic phenome na of 
fertility, mortality and external migration. Fertility and mortality are routinely 
included in all 29 forecasts, but external migration is left out by the GDR, 
Greece, Hungary, Malta, Romania and Spain. Following the definition of a 
population forecast given in section 1 this means that a net migration of zero in 
all male and female age classes is regarded as the most likely future migrat ion 
pattern for those countries. 
Of the 12 countries that work with region of residence, 8 include the component 
of internal migration. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom break their population down by region without explicitly dealing with 
migration between these regions. For the UK probably three distinct forecasts 
are made: one for England and Wales one for Scotland, and one for Northe rn 
Ireland. The other three countries probably follow a ratio-type of approach. 
The Netherlands and the UK, while applying a marital status breakdown of the 
future population, include marriage and marriage dissolution in their set of 
components. When marriage, divorce and transition to widowhood are treated for 
both males and females, this raises some technical difficulties. This so-called 
two-sex problem may be the reason for the fac t that the third country that 
breaks its population down by marital status, viz. Ireland, only does so for 
females. Moreover, female nuptiality processes are not considered in the Ir ish 
projections. 
Finally, three out of the four countries that break their future population down 
by nationality (FRG, Luxembourg and Switzerland), also consider changes in 
nationality, viz. naturalization. The fourth one (Belgium) arrives at such a 
breakdown without the formal use of naturalization, probably by employing a 
ratio-type of approach. 
3.2. Levels of aggregation 
Given the key role that fertility, mortality and migration parameters play in 
population forecasting, a systematic approach may be useful when choosing their 
values. It is useful to distinguish several levels of aggregation for these 
parameters (see also Pittenger, 1977, 365). 
1. Detailed assumptions apply to the future trends in age specific fertility rates, 
death probabilities by age and sex, emigration rates by age and sex, numbers 
of immigrants by age and sex, etc. 
.5 
2. Summarizing assumptions are formulated for summary indicators which 
aggregate the detailed parameters for fertility, mortality and migration. For 
instance the total fertility rate, the mean age at childbearing, t he expecta-
tion of life at birth, the total number of immigrants. 
3. General assumptions are statements of a socio-demographic as well as a more 
general {social/economic/cultural/political/legal} nature. For instance, the 
assumption that the role of the family will become less dominant, or t ha t 
legal regulations will have a limited impact on immigration. 
4. Disclaimers, which state that the forecasts are not valid in the event of war, 
natural disaster or major economic crises. 
The discussion will be limited to levels 1-3. 
In many situations, it may be useful to start the assumption making on level 3. 
Next, a qualitative assessment of the level 2 parameters may be given (rapid 
increase, stabilization and the like). After quantification, the resulting summary 
indicators may be disaggregated into detailed parameters at level 1, using 
standard age schedules. 
Table 2 reveals that for the 28 countries for which we have information on 
fertility assumptions, one third formulates these assumption on the general level 
(level 3). The remaining good twenty five per cent includes those countries t hat 
keep currently observed fertility rates constant for the entire projection period. 
It should be mentioned that the levels given here are the highest ones obtained 
from the questionnaire: a country with one fertility variant's assumpt ions 
formulated at level I, and those of two other variants at level 2, was classified 
as level 2. 
Mortality assumptions show a much stronger concentration on level 2 than 
fertility assumptions. Twenty out of the twenty-eight countries for which 
information is available work at level 2, most often with life expectancies. 
General assumptions (level 3) are formulated by three countries. A somewhat 
Jess pronounced distribution than that for mortality is found for external 
migration. 
3.3. Period approach or cohort approach? 
The choice between a period approach and a cohort approach in the analysis and 
extrapolation of demographic components is largely an unresolved issue. Cohort 
figures, in particular the summary indicators, are relatively easy to inte rpret and 
they show less variation than the corresponding period figures. On the other 
t../ I 
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hand, a period analysis requires shorter time series, it results in more up-to-date 
information and (sometimes) in a more stable short-term trend. How are the 
preferences for the two approaches distributed among national forecasters? 
Table 2 reveals a strong preference for a period approach when extrapolating 
fertility. More than two thirds of the countries stated that they adopt a period 
approach. O.nly one country, viz. the UK, applies a cohort perspective, while the 
remaining eight countries have a mixed period/cohort approach: five emphasize, 
however, the cohort perspective, and three the period perspective. 
A cross-classification by type of approach (period, cohort, mixed) and level of 
assumption making 0-3) reveals some interesting patterns, as shown in the text-
table below. Countries that apply a period approach show a more even distribu-
tion over assumption levels than average, while a mixture of cohort approach and 
period approach, with the emphasis on the former, is used at relatively high 
levels of assumption making. In other words, a cohort (type of) approach is not 
considered very useful at the level of very detailed age specific fertility rates. 
Mortality and external migration are, almost without exception, extrapolated 
using a period perspective. 
3.4. Variant assumptions 
As early as 19 33, Thompson and Whelp ton published several variants of their 
estimates of the future population growth in the United States because they 
were not sure about the course the demographic components would take. Ever 
since, this has become common practice, stimulated, amongst other, by the 
United Nations. 
Countries by type of approach (P, C, P/c, C/p) and level of assumption making 
0-3), fertility projections 
Period Cohort Period/cohort Cohort/ period Total 
1 7 0 0 0 7 
2 6 1 3 2 12 
3 6 0 0 3 9 
Total 19 1 3 5 28 
'-f 2 
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Two points should be taken into consideration when choosing the components for 
which to formulate more than one assumption. 
1. The significance of each individual component for the results of the fore-
casts. A 1096 variation in the average number of children per woman 
generally results in greater fluctuations in the forecasting results than a 1096 
variation in the life expectancy at birth. 
2. The past course of the components. The more erratic the observed develop-
ment of a given phenomenon, the more difficult it is to estimate its future 
course. 
The first consideration may be used when the outcome of a sensitivity analysis is 
known. The second consideration results from our ignorance about the quantita-
tive relations between the demographic components and the underlying social, 
economic, cultural, political and technological factors. Here, we are interested 
in quantitative answers to questions such as: 
how does the increased emancipation of women influence the number of 
children a woman will bear? 
in which way does technological development influence mortality? 
to which extent will be demographic behaviour of ethnic minorities presently 
living in many western countries differ from that of the total population in 
the future? 
In short, these questions relate to the translation of verbal level 3 assumptions 
into quantified level 2 assumptions. 
Table 3 indicates that 23 countries compute more than one variant of their 
forecasts. At least 17 countries formulat several variants for fertility, and at 
least 11 do so for external migration. 
The distance between corresponding variables in the high(est) and in the low(est) 
variant is indicative of the degree of uncertainty of the phenomenon in question. 
We computed for each country the relative range between the two extreme 
variants for fertility, mortality and external migration. For fertility, the relative 
range is defined as the difference between the TFR-values in the two extreme 
variants, as a percentage of the simple average of the two extreme TFR-values. 
Table 3 shows a clear pattern for the range between fertility variants in the year 
2000. Three groups of countries can be distinguished. One group of 9 countries 
displays a relative fertility range between 896 and 1696, with an average value of 
1296. In these countries fertility appears to be relatively easy to predict, 
compared with a second group of 6 countries having relative fertility ranges 
between 3296 and 4596, with an average value of 4096. The US and the 
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Netherlands forms an intermediate group, with values of 25% and 24% respec-
tively. 
The first two groups neatly reflect two common interpretations of the notion of 
a variant. One interpretation, wich leads to narrow relative ranges is that there 
is only one demographic future, for which assumptions can be formulated at level 
3. However, to translate these level 3 assumptions into level 2 summary 
indicators (such as the TFR) introduces uncertainty, to be expressed by more 
than one variant. Hence such variants can be called "uncertainty variants" or 
"probability variants" in this interpretation. When more than just a single level 3 
assumption is drawn up, we may speak of "alternative futures". In this second 
interpretation, the gap between the two extreme variants will be much larger 
than that in the first interpretation. It should be stressed that the "uncertainty 
variants interpretation" is much more compatible with our definition of a 
forecast - "... the most realistic future population trend .•• " - than the 
"alternative futures interpretation". 
A cross-classification of the 17 countries for which we computed relative 
fertility ranges by level of fertility range (low, intermediate, high) and extrap-
olation perspective for fertility (period, mixed period/ cohort with the emphasis 
on the former, cohort, mixed period I cohort with the emphasis on the latter) 
reveals that the 9 countries with a narrow fertility range are evenly distributed 
over the variable which indicate the extrapolation perspective. On the other 
hand, all 6 countries with a broad fertility range apply e ither a period approach, 
or they emphasize the period perspective in a mixed approach. Indeed, a period 
perspective tends to go together with difficulties in extrapolation. This, in turn 
leads relatively often to a broad range between the fertility variants. 
The relative range of mortality, defined as the high (male) life expectancy minus 
the low life expectancy, as a percentage of the average of the two life 
expectancies shows in general much lower values in the year 2000 than the 
relative fertility range. This reflects the common belief among demographers 
that mortality is easier to predict than fertility. Similarly, external migration is 
thought to be much more difficult to predict than fertility, which is confirmed 
by the relative range of external migration in the year 2000 (defined with the aid 
of the net-number of immigrants). 
When determining the width of the interval between the high and the low 
variant, one must bear in mind that a wide margin gives more reliable forecast 
results, but that it doesn't give as precise information as a small margin 
9 
forecast. "In 1989 the TFR will be between 1 and 2.5" is a statement which will 
most probably come true, but for the user it will not lead to a very valuable 
forecast. One of the most difficult tasks facing the forecaster is to arrive at an 
acceptable compromise between precision - the distance between the variants -
and reliability - the probability that a forecast comes true. One possibility to 
avoid the d~lemma is to work with confidence intervals, thus expressing the 
chance that the true value will fall between the high and the low value. 
3.5. Projection method of fertility, mortality and external migration 
Participating countries were asked which method(s) they use to project (ex-
trapolate, or interpolate between current and ultimate levels) fertility, mortality 
and external migration. More than one answer could be given, and the text-table 
below shows the distribution over the various categories. "Constant" implies that 
future rates (fertility, mortality) or parameters in general (external migration) 
are set equal to currently observed values for the entire projection period. "Age 
parameters0 denotes the extrapolation of parameters of age schedules for the 
three components. "Time-regression" involves the extrapolation of relevant 
parameters using a regression model with time as the independent variable. 
With fertility, working with age schedules is the most popular projection 
technique. Unfortunately, no information is available as to the type of schedule: 
analytical (e.g. Gamma, Hadwiger, Coale-Trussel) or relational (e.g. Brass' 
double log model). Some countries keep observed rates constant for one variant, 
and use a different technique for other variants. Formal time series methods 
were reported only once, and the use of explanatory models is absent. 
Projection method of forecast components 
Constant Graphical Age Time Other Total 
Fertility 
Mortality 
External migration 
12 
4 
12 
9 
8 
8 
parameters regression 
17 
12 
5 
2 
7 
4 
J J 
4 
44 
42 
29 
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The "other" - category for mortality includes the use of model life tables (7 
answers) and the logit model (1 ). Keeping observed mortality rates constant is 
rarely applied, perhaps due to steadily improving life chances in most countries 
in the long run. 
A general conclusion that emerges is that the bulk of analytical demographic 
techniques that can be found in the literature has not made its way to projection 
techniques actually in use in official national forecasts. Keyfitz (1982) arrived at 
a similar conclusion for demographic theories. His analysis into the reasons for 
this gap between the practices of forecasters and those of other demographers 
should be carried out for the quantitative techniques of this section too. 
4. TIME HORIZON OF PROJECTION RESULTS 
The question on the length of the projection period produced a very regular 
pattern, see the text-table below. There is a strong preference among developed 
countries to project their national population 30-50 years ahead. The issue of the 
time horizon of the projection results raises some problems as to the realiability 
of these results. 
In an empirical analysis of ex-post errors in total population growth rates for 
1100 national forecasts made between 1939 and 1968, Keyfitz (1981, 583) came 
to the general conclusion that " ••• relatively short-term forecasts, say up to ten 
or 20 years, do tell us something, but that beyond a quarter-century or so we 
simply do not know what the population will be ••• ". Empirical analyses of errors 
in fertility projections for the United States, Norway and the Netherlands tend 
to support this conclusion (Ahlburg, 1982; Brunborg, 1984; Keilman and Schreurs, 
1988). And findings for Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands show that for the 
aged population (ages over 75) considerable errors arise in forecasts over a 
period of more than 10 years (Leeson, 1981; Brunborg, 1984; Keilman and 
Schreurs, 1988). 
Countries by length of projection period in years 
10-19 20-29 30-49 50-74 75+ 
4 5 12 7 1 
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Hence, our interpretation of a forecast as giving the most realistic future 
population trends can only be valid over a period of 10 to 15 years. Beyond that 
period, we can just speak of a mere projection. The plausibility of these long-
term demographic trends can hardly be discussed. In other words, many long-
term alternative futures can be drawn up, aJl of which would be equaJly 
imaginable ~t present. 
In summary, most population forecasts lose their unconditional character after 
some 15 years ahead, and after that they gradually turn into conditional 
projections. 
5. PROJECTION MODEL 
An important feature of the cohort-component projection model is that it is 
based on the life table. For projection purposes, this, however, has two 
drawbacks. 
1. The life table contains information on individuals classified by exact ages. 
Thus, a cohort-observational plan is employed. In such a plan, when an 
individual experiences an event, his cohort is recorded as weJl as his age in 
completed years at the time of the event. In the Lexis diagram of figure 1, 
the cohort-observational plan is indicated by the parallelogram QSVP. It 
extends over two calendar years. However, for a projection model, the 
cohort-observational plan is not very appropriate. Such a model describes the 
future number of persons belonging to a certain cohort and experiencing a 
given event between two successive points in time, not between two exact 
ages. This calls for a period-cohort-observational plan, of which parallelo-
gram QRSV in figure 1 is an example. This observational plan covers two age 
classes. 
11+ I 
11 
/ T 
O '----~~~~~M~· ~-·-N~ 
1 - 11 - I 1-11 1 - I 1+ 1 
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Starting the construction of a projection model from the Hf e-table approach 
means that the cohort-observational plan of this approach should be trans-
formed into the period-cohort-observational plan of the model. This leads to 
unnecessary complications, as compared with an approach which immediately 
starts from a period-cohort perspective. 
2. The life. table contains information on the behaviour of a fixed set of 
individuals as they grow older (and possibly pass through several classifying 
states when the model includes region of residence or marital status). People 
may leave the system that is described by the information in the life table, 
because of death or emigration, for instance. But immigations are not 
allowed. For some countries this may be a reasonable assumption. However, 
other countries gain a substantial number of immigrants each year. In that 
case the life-table-based population projection model has to be supplemented 
with a variable describing immigration from outside the region in question. 
The approach frequently adopted involves two stages (see PoJ1ard, 1973, 50). 
First, the population represented in the system at the beginning of the unit 
projection interval is assumed to 'survive' to the end of the interval. Second, 
a stock of immigrants is added to this result. 
With this approach, however, all immigrants are assumed to enter the country 
at one particular moment. Hence, they cannot experience the relevant events 
during the projection interval. For unit intervals of one year, or for countries 
where migration can be neglected, this is often probably quite a realistic 
assumption. But in projection models with a five year unit interval (e.g. 
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Malta and Yugoslavia), or for countries where 
migration is important, relative to natural growth, this assumption may be 
questioned. 
As an alternative to the life-table based approach for the construction of cohort-
component projection models, consider the aproach recently adopted in multi-
dimensional projection models. This approach may be applied to multiregional 
and marital status population projection models. However, application of its 
principles to the relatively simple projection model which includes age and sex 
only may also solve the two problems mentioned here, that are inherent to the 
classical cohort-component model. 
The main characteristic of the multidimensional approach is that the model's 
starting point is a given set of occurrence/exposure rates (fertility rates, 
mortality rates) defined upon a period-cohort observation criterion, and a set of 
corresponding accounting equations. By simply solving for the population at the 
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end of the interval, a completely valid projection model is constructed. This 
means that such a model may exactly simulate the behaviour of the population in 
a known period. An extensive discussion of this approach is given elsewhere 
(Willekens and Drewe, 1984; Keilman, 1985). Here we give a simple illustration, 
using one population category, and two events. 
Let us suppose that Ko and Kh denote the size of a certain population at the 
beginning and at ·the end of a particular period, respectively. The population may 
experience the events of death and immigration during the interval (0, h). The 
number of persons that die in the interval is denoted by D, m is the corre-
sponding death rate, and I is the number of immigrants. The three variables D, m 
and I are all defined upon a period-cohort criterion of the Lexis-diagram. When 
deaths and immigrations are assumed to occur uniformly distributed over the 
interval, then m may be written as m = 20 I (h (Ko + Kh)). The corresponding 
accounting equation is Kh = Ko - D + I. Eliminating D and solving for Kh yields 
Kh = Ko 1 - i hm + I. 1 
1 + t hm 1 + i hm 
(1) 
Expression (1) states that a proportion p = (1 - i hm) I (1 + i hm) of the original 
population Ko survives until the end of the interval. Analogously, a proportion 
1 I (l + i hm) of the immigrants survives until time h. When expression (1) is 
written in terms of the death probability q (defined upon a period-cohort 
criterion), with q = 1-p = 2 hm I (2 + hm), we arrive at 
Kh = Ko 0-q) +I (1-}q), (2) 
The factor "i" appears in expression (2) as a result of the fact that immigrants 
are assumed to enter the country evenly distributed over the period (O,h). On 
average, they arrive at time th. Or, half of the immigrants may be thought of as 
having arrived at time O, the remaining half at time h. 
Expression (2) is not valid for the youngest age group (those born during (O,h)), or 
for the highest, open-ended age group. It only applies to intermediate ages. For 
the youngest age group (denoted by an upper index 0) it can be proven that 
K~ = (B + 10) (1 - f qO) (3) 
where B is the number of birth during (O,h), 10 is the number of children who 
enter the country during the period (O,h) in which they were born, and qO is the 
death probability of these children. 
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For the highest, open-ended age group (with an upper index z), the group of 
survivors K~ at time h z or higher at time O, and those who belonged to the one-
but-last age group z - h at time 0. Hence, we find for age group z in 
straightforward notation 
K z Kz (l z) 1z (l 1 z) K~-h (l z-h) 1z-h (l 1 z-h) h= -.·o -q + -.,.q + . u -q + - 1 q • (4) 
Equations (2) - (4) represent a model which could be used as an alternative to the 
Hf e-table based type of models. In particular, the model proposed here takes due 
account of the interaction between immigration and mortality. 
Of the 24 countries that include external migration in their forecasts, 7 informed 
us about their projection model. Of these 7, Australia, the FRG, the Netherlands, 
the UK and the US take account of mortality among external migrants, whereas 
Canada and Denmark don't - probably because the latter two countries work with 
a unit projection interval of one year. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The previous sections have shown that, in spite of the cohort-component model 
as a common framework, much variation can be observed in current national 
forecasting techniques in developed countries. Of the 29 countries for which we 
have detailed information about their most recent forecasts, six exclude the 
component of external migration, 12 include region of residence, and four work 
with nationality. Fertility assumptions are formulated at several levels of 
aggregation. One-third of the countries involved starts at the general social and 
social-demographic level, and about forty per cent work with summary indicators 
(e.g. TFR). As to mortality assumptions, most of the countries start with the life 
expectancy, and break that indicator further down into mortality rates. There is 
a strong preference to apply a period perspective when projecting fertility. Only 
six countries use a cohort perspective, or a mixed cohort/perspective with the 
emphasis on the former. Two-thirds of the countries formulate more than one 
variant for the future course of fertility and eleven do so for external migration. 
The range between the high(est) and the low(est) fertility variant indicates the 
uncertainty that individual countries attach to this component in the future. 
About half of the countries that use more than one variant keep the interval 
between high and low fertility relatively narrow, thus indicating that their 
variants should be interpreted as "uncertainty" or "probability" variants. And 
({J 
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about one third shows a large gap between the two extreme fertility variants, 
reflecting an "alternative futures" interpretation. As to the techniques t hat are 
used to project (extrapolate) fertility, mortality and external migration 
parameters, one may conclude that these techniques are relatively simple, 
compared with techniques that are described in literature on analytical demogra-
phy. To wha~ extent the latter techniques are inappropriate for forecasting, is an 
issue which is open for further research. Although national population forecasts 
give reliable results for a period of 10-15 years only, most countries compute 
outcomes for at least 30 years ahead and sometimes even much further . Finally 
some contries take account of a modelling issue often neglected in the cohort-
component approach: the interaction between external migration on the one hand 
and mortality and fertility on the other, for example mortality among immi-
grants in the year of immigration. As simple alternative of the life-table based 
model equations was proposed. 
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Table I. Population characteristics and components of change 
Characteristics Components 
J. Australia 
2. Austria 
3. Belgium 
4. Canada 
5. Cyprus 
6. Czechoslovakia 
7 Denmark 
8. Fed. Rep. of Germany 
9. Finland 
IO.France 
11. German Dem. Rep. 
12. Greece 
13. Hungary 
14. Iceland 
15. Ireland 
16. Italy 
17. Luxembourg 
18. ~aJta 
19. Netherlands 
20. Norway 
21. Poland 
22. Portugal 
23. Romania 
24. Spain 
2.5. Sweden 
26. Switzerland 
27. United Kingdom 
28. United States 
29. Yugoslavia 
I) Other than age and sex. 
Age 
85+ 
95+ 
99+ 
90+ 
75+(5) 
100 
109+ 
99 
90+ 
100+ 
JOO+ 
85+(5) 
85+ 
100+ 
85+rn 
90+ 
95+ 
99+(.5) 
99+ 
99+ 
80+ 
85+ 
85+ 
JOO+ 
95+ 
99+ 
90+ 
JOO+ 
6.5+(5) 
Other I) 
region, nationality 
region 
region 
nationality 
region 
region 
marital status 
region 
nationality 
marital status 
region 
region 
region 
region 
nationality 
region, mar. status 
race 
region 
External 
migration 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
2) Other than fertility, mortality and external migration. 
Table 2. Aspects of fertility, mortality and external migration 
Fertility detail Aggregation level 
Other 2) 
l 
2 
internal migr. 3 
internal migr. 4 
5 
6 
7 
naturalization 8 
9 
JO 
internal migr. 11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
internal mi gr. 16 
naturalization 17 
18 
nuptiality 19 
internal migr. 20 
internal migr. 21 
22 
23 
internal migr. 24 
25 
naturalization 26 
nuptiality 27 
28 
internal migr. 29 
Fertility by 
period or by 
Age Other Fert. Mort. Ext. migr. cohort" 
1. Australia 5 2 2 2 pc 1 
2. Austria l 2 2 2 p 2 
3. Belgium I region, nationality 3 2 2 p 3 
"· 
Canada I 3 2 3 p 4 
5. Cyprus 5 2 2 2 p 5 
5. Czechoslovakia I I 2 2 p 6 
7. Denmark I 3 2 2 cp 7 
a. Fed. Rep. of Germany I 1 2 3 p 8 
9. Finland I I I 2 p 9 
IO.France I 2 2 I pc 10 
11. German. Dem. Rep. I 1 1 p II 
12. Greece 5 2 2 pc 12 
13. Hungary I 2 2 cp 13 
Ill. Iceland I 3 2 3 p 14 
1.5. lreland 5 marital status 3 2 3 p 15 
16. Italy .5 l 2 1 p 16 
17. Luxembourg I 2 I 2 p 17 
ta. Malta .5 ? ? ? 18 
19. Netherlands I birth order 3 3 3 cp 19 
20. Norway I 1 2 2 p 20 
21. Poland 5 2 2 2 p 21 
22. Portugal .5 2 2 I p 22 
23. Romania I 2 2 p 23 
24. Spain 5 1 I p : 4 
2.5.Sweden I 2 1 2 cp 25 
26. Switzerland I 3 3 3 p 26 
27. United Kingdom I birth order 2 2 2 c 27 
21. United States I race 3 3 3 cp 28 
29. Yugoslavia .5 .3 2 l p 29 
;Lj 
Table 3. Output var iants, range bet..,een high and low variants and projection horizon 
No. of Relat ive range in 2000 (i ) Projection 
output 
var 1ants Fert. ~lort. Ext . migr. horizon (yrs) 
1. Australia 3 &.9 2&.6 30-119 I 
2. Austria 7 39.7 50- 7'1 2 
3. Belgium 1 30-49 3 
"· 
Canada u 44.4 66.7 30-49 11 
.5. Cyprus 2 8.4 30-49 .5 
.5. Czechoslovakia 3 12.2 3.6 200 20-29 6 
7. Denmark 2 12..5 30-49 7 
a. Fed. Rep. of Germany 3 37.6 116.6 30-49 8 
9. Finland 1 .50-74 9 
10. France a 4.5.0 .50-74 10 
l I. German. Dem. Rep. 1 20-29 l 1 
12. Greece 1 20-29 12 
13. Hungary 
" 
11.3 3.6 30-49 13 
14. Iceland 3 39. J ? 30-49 14 
1.5. Ireland 6(2) 12.1 U .7 30-49 1.5 
16. Italy 2 ? 20(.50) 16 
17. Luxembourg ? 31.9 600 .50-74 17 
18. \1aJta l 20-29 18 
19. Netherlands 3 24.2 1.3 35.7 .50-74 19 
20. Norway 2 66.7 .50-74 20 
21 . Poland 3 11.7 ~.6 10-19 21 
22. Portugal 6 ? ? ? 10-19 22 
23. Romania 4 ? ., ? 10-l 9 23 
24. Spain I 30-49 24 
2.5. Sweden 6 11.6 100 30-49 2.5 
26. Switzerland 3 100 30-49 26 
27. United Kingdom .5 l.5.6 3 • .5 .50-74 27 
28. United States 30 2.5.0 5.6 90.9 > 7.5 28 
29. Yugoslavia 3 ? ., ? 10-19 2<J 
N&IDe: Laszlo Hablicsek and Istvan Monigl co-author 
Title of Paper: Major characteristics of the long term population development 
in Hungary in the period between 1880 and 2020. 
SUJDJDary: In the study the authors research the long term population develop-
ment in Hungary within the frame of the demographic transition, from the 
aspect of reproductive behaviour.In this basis they draw conclusions towards 
future development of the population.The basis of their calculations is a 
system - looking far back and having beEn perfected - of the general fertili-
ty and mortality parameters. 
The following characteristics of the reproduction of the Hungarian popula-
tion has been analysed as components of reproductive behaviour: 
-the structure of the actual and the stacioner population; 
-the net reproduction and the intrinsic growth rat_fH 
-the total extent of the real and the fictitio~1t~~orts (number of the 
years they have passed ). 
The interrelations of the demographic transition has been illustrated by 
model-calculations, starting the calculations from the end of the last 
century. 
It is stated in the study that the low level of reproduction is a dominant 
feature of the demographic transition in Hungary . This feature originates 
from the fast decrease in the fertility level, from the given stage of the 
increase in the population-number, from the fact that the age-structure of 
the actual and stacioner population show more similarities, and especially 
from the low level of the net reproduction indicators of birth cohorts. 
The second feature of the demographic transition in Hungary covers the 
relative stability of the total extent of the real and fictitious birth 
cohorts ( number of the years they have passed ) , which stability appeared 
rather early, in the early twentieth century. This empirical interrelation 
between the development of the fertility and mortality carries high import-
ance towards theoretical works and future development as well. 
On the basis of the model-calculations the future trend of the population 
development which is the most probable to follow in the given way of the 
dzmagraphic transition can be well depicted. This mentioned trend would 
be described by : - a lower than the current level of the population 
number, showing relative stability; 
- a new, considerable decrease in mortality, paralel with 
a IOClderately low level of fertility; 
- extension of the age-pyramid. 
This picture of the future is instable and having different periods due to 
normal flow of the phenomena, therefore the increase of the level of the 
social consciousness in the near future is of high importance . 
Name: Janina Jozwiak 
Title of Paper: Applica tior: of the fundamenta l ma tri:;.~ to the 
Summary: 
analysis of chan_sing popul a tion st r ucture 
rhe aim of the paper is to present a proposal for application 
of the fundamental matrix of the multistate population projec-
tion model to the evaluation of the population structure,Pro-
perties of the fundamental ma t rix allow to derive characteris -
tics describing the multistate population sys t em.I.a.,the ex-
pected time s pent by an individual in the s pecified s tat es and 
the variance of this time may be calculated by use of t h e fun -
damental matrix. Tae present ed in t he paper application Ol.. L; _1e 
fundamental matrix is bas ed on the rea soning similar t o the 3.~ ­
proach of the potential demography.In t he potential demo3raphy 
it is assumed that elements of t he population are not equivG.len,,, 
A wei ,;ht which is numerically expressed by the expectation of 
life is assi :;ned to every individual . 'i1~1is wei0h t is called t_~e 
life potential of the individual. I n t he mul t is tc. te demo .:;r ap:iic 
analysi s it seems to be justifi ed to take into account the co::-
tribution of the individuals in different states i nto t he popu-
lation systen instead of considering the num ber of t l1 e indivi -
duals in these states. '£his contri bution may be measured by tl1e 
time s pent by the individuals i n t he states. i'his approach gives 
possibility of assessing the virtual value of t11e disti11;uis:·1ec 
states for the multistate population system. The f undamen".;al ma-
trix is used to the numerical evaluation of this value.Conse-
quently, the dynamic analysis of the changing multi state popula -
tion structure is possible in which the sojourn time is taken 
into account as the weight for individuals. The numerical ex~a ­
ple refers to the two-region structure of the Poland's popul a -
tion/urban-rural/. It reveals significant differences be tween 
dynamics of the actual structure and the weighted one - for 
various nigration and survivorship schedules. 
Name: Will iam J. Serow, David F. Sly and Gabriel Alvarez 
Title of Paper: The Oldest-Old:Cross National Comparisons 
Summary: 
This paper analyzes trends in the age and gender structure 
of the older population of presently developed countries for 
the periods from 1950 to 1985 and from 1985 to 2020. The 
emphasis placed in the paper is on the role which changes in 
mortality between these periods, coupled with past levels of 
fertility and immigration (leading to differences in the 
size of cohorts entering in to the "older" population), play 
in determining prospective changes in the s true tu re of the 
population aged 60 and, especially, aged 75 and over. All 
da t!l are taken from the most recent population proj ec ti ons 
of the United Nations ("World Population Prospects as As-
sessed in 1984"). For purposes of this analysis, the more 
developed countries are considered as a whole and are 
further divided into the following regional groups: North 
America (Canada and US); Japan; Oceania (Australia, New 
Zealand); the Soviet Union; and Europe, both in its entirety 
and further divided into its Eastern, Northern, Southern and 
Western portions. 
During the entire period under consideration there have been 
notable changes in the share of total population accounted 
for by older persons, with extremely dramatic changes most 
evident for the case of Japan. In all instances, relative 
increases in numbers were greatest among very old persons: 
SHARE OF POPULATION AGED 60+ AND AGED 75+ 
Total 
N.America 
Japan 
Europe: 
Total 
Eastern 
Northern 
Southern 
Western 
Oceania 
Soviet Union 
1950 1985 2020 
60+ 75+ 60+ 75+ 60+ 75+ 
11 • 4 
1 2. 1 
1.6 
12.9 
1 1 • 0 
14.9 
1 1 • 1 
14.8 
12.6 
8.9 
2.4 
2.5 
1. 2 
2 . 7 
2. 1 
3.4 
2.4 
3.2 
2.6 
1 • 9 
15. 8 
16.2 
14.4 
17.6 
15.6 
20.3 
16.3 
18.7 
14.2 
1 3. 1 
4.6 
4.6 
3.7 
5.4 
4.6 
6.2 
4.5 
6.3 
3.7 
3.7 
22.3 
22. 1 
26.1 
23.8 
21.6 
24.5 
22.4 
26.8 
20.6 
19. 5 
6.3 
5.6 
8.8 
6.9 
5.7 
7.3 
6.6 
8.0 
5.4 
5.2 
Most of the increase in the number of older persons during 
the next 35 years is attributable to increases in the size 
of newly entering cohorts. However, forecast reductions in 
the level of mortality account for 9 percent of the increase 
in the size of the 60+ population and nearly 10 percent of 
the increase among those aged 75+. The role of mortality is 
appreciably greater in Japan and in the comparatively high 
mortality regions of Southern and Eastern Europe as well as 
the Soviet Union. 
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Name: Otto He l lwi g 
TitleofPaper: Micro-analy tical Mo de lli ng a n d Estimat ion o f 
Inter househol d Mobility using Cro ss Sec tion 
Summary: Mi croda t a 
We have differentiated inter household mobility w ith respect to the status 
(household head or not) and the marital status . Through thi s i t became 
obvious that most types of mobility are induced by the standard demograph i c 
processes death , birth, marriage and d ivorce . We concentrated on a fift h 
process : leaving home of single persons . Depending on the a vail ab le dat a 
(panel data, sequences of c r oss sect ions . cross sect ion s v. i t h add i tion al 
time-ser ies information, cross section data only) approaches of est 1mat1 ng 
transition probabi lities were described . Of course , more ass ump t ions are 
necessary for calculat ion, if less information are ava il able . Us ing th e ex amp le 
of marriage probabi l i t ies we demonstrated that su ch t r an si t ion pr obab ili tes 
can be est imated fairly accurately, even though only cr os s s ec t ion data ar e 
available . 
An empirical investigation of the process of leav in g ho me showed th e rel e-
vance of age, sex, income and work force part ic ipa t10" . Ho w e ver some 
results do no seem to be plaus ible wh ich lead s to the con c lu s ion th a t add 1t10 -
nal expla i ning var iables should be included . Furthermore sma ll group frequen -
cies cause some problems at estimat ion . Alternatively to the group appr oach 
used we suggest trying the AID method or log i t . regress ions . W hi le cal c u la-
t ing probabilities of leavinghome using two different assumpt ions and c r os s 
sect ion data we showed the strong impact of weak representat iv i ty of the 
data on the estimates . 
Name: 
Title of Paper: 
Summary: 
D.Wolf. B.Wils. W.Lutz. S.Scherbov 
Population Futures for Europe: An An alysis of 
Alternative Scenarios to the year 2050 
This paper looks at not impossible future sce nari o s for the 
population of Europe (excluding the Soviet Union). Th e sce narios 
are not meant to represent the actual. or even like ly. futur~ . 
but are thought to be instructive about what the future may hold 
in store and point out the consequences of possib l e alternative 
developments. We base our alternative scenarios on the observed 
age-structure of the population in 1985 in four reg ions of Euro~e 
(source of data: UN). For these four region six different 
scenarios are defined. drawing from the analysis of past trends 
and assuming different future paths of devel opment in fert ility. 
mortality, and migration: the set of assumptions used for the 1.1N 
medium variant is called the baseline scenario: we also assume a 
further fertility decline for Europe down to a TFR of 1.4 in 2 0 ~'5 
<about 1.8 currently) and alternative l y a new baby boom peaking 
in 2000 with a TFR of 2 . 8: concerning mortality we assume a 
"magic drug" that is introduced in 200 0 a nd reduces mortality 
rates above age 60 by 50% or alternatively a new major e p1dem1c 
<such as AI DSl that ultimately affects ha l f of the population 
aged 3 0-50: with respect to migration we assume a new wave of 
immigration to Europe over the 10 years 1995-2005. 
The consequences of these scenarios on total popu lation s i ze a nd 
the proportion above age 60 are illustrated be low. 
Total Popu l ation Size 
;io;:-.:u~ c-!' 
• : . c~:. ::-: 
t.ee,--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--. 
-
-
Proportion above Age 60 
""' .. I ~ ~~:, ~,_, 
S"' ~ r~;:,~~ ::~ 
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Outlining 
difficult 
the future of reproduction is perhaps the most 
task of population pr ojec ti ons. Even the full 
comprehension 
present has 
determining 
of the fertility pro cesse s of the past and 
not been achieved as nobod y knows the motives 
the fertility beha viours of indi vidual perso ns 
or families. Thus, we are not in a posit ion to provide an 
unambiguous description of the reasons which have brought 
about the fertility changes over the past decades, the 
movements of the reproduction process in different 
directions during the period following World War II. It is 
especially during the past few years that unforseen a nd 
consequentl y absent from earlier projections changes ha ve 
taken place making it e ven more difficult to f or m a reliabl e 
picture of the future. And no wonder, as even if the present 
relationship s between socio-economic processes and the 
number of children born were known the picture of the future 
would remain nevertheless unsure . Namely, we do not know the 
ways in which the society, the economy and world polic y will 
de ve lop during the decades to come and even less is known 
about the possible impact of these uncalculable changes on 
the decisions of people regarding the size of the ir 
families. 
Nevertheless, in spite of all these difficulties our task is 
to outline a picture of the future from the point of view of 
the expected development of fertility. This time th e 
intention is not to assess the fertility conditions of a new 
population projection but to produce a summary using 
available projections. 
Our intention is to make the subject somewhat simpler by 
limiting its scope to the economically developed countries 
as the fertility in developing countries covers e ven greate r 
uncertainties. In this respect the definition adopted by the 
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United Nations Organization is used according to which t he 
concept of "more developed region" relates to the European 
countries, the Soviet Union, the United Stat es, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan. In the presentation the 
usual subregional totals are also used differentiating four 
parts within Europe (Eastern, Northern, Southern and 
Western). Without singling out the countries with the least 
population numbers during the presentation with regard to 
"countries" 31 units will be differentiated. 
Of the several possible measures - similarly to the practice 
followed in most publications on the subject - primaril y 
one, total fertility rate ( TFR) will be used. It is thi s 
measure which indicates most simply the reproduction 
behaviour during a concrete year (period ) and in future 
calculations it can be abstracted practically from calendar 
effects as it can be regarded also as a cohort indicator. 
However, exactly in order to eliminate calendar effect s 
cohort indicators - primarily the completed cohort fertilit y 
rate but also other similar indicators fash i oned otherwise 
(such as the ultimate expected number of children calculated 
on the basis of sample survey results ) - are also used 
additionally in case of countries for which such data are 
available. 
Though past and present fertility processes by themselves do 
not determine the future it is nevertheless regarded a s 
necessary to present, in th first place, the changes having 
taken place in more developed countries over the most recent 
several decades. 
1. The evolution of fertility, 1950-1987 
If the evolution of TFR is examined with regard to the 
economically developed countries as a whole over the pa s t 
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25-30 years a significant general fall can be observed. 11 
The latter is caused also by the fact that in the earl y 
1960s in a part of the developed countries - in the wake of 
the period of the baby-boom - fertility was still high but 
even more by the fact that the drop in the number of 
children in the families accelerated generally in the second 
half of the seventies and even more until now in the 
eighties. 
On the average of the 31 countries examined TFR was still 
around 2,7-2,8 in the fifties and in the early sixties which 
by a quarter surpassed simple reproduction level. In the 
second half of the sixties the decrease was still only 
slight but it accelerated at slower rates in the seventies 
and at a greater pace in the eighties. At present in the 
developed countries TFR is, on the average, only around 1,9 
which is by one child less than it was 25 years ago, i.e. 
now the fertility rate is, in general, by 30 per cent lower 
than in the first half of the sixties. 
When examined by subregions the situation is not so uniform. 
The fall was the least - with regard to its two final points 
- in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union and in Japan; it 
was the most significant in the two North American countries 
and in two countries of Oceania where the baby-boom was 
still strong at the beginning of the period under survey and 
where now TFR is, on the average, the half of what it was at 
that time; but it decreased by about 40 per cent and by 36 
per cent in Western and Southern Europe and, respectively, 
in NortJern Europe. 
1/ See Table 1. 
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When TFR values of the first half of the sixties and, 
respectively, of the second half of the eighties are 
examined again by subregions, it is to be seen that 25 years 
ago TFR was still higher in the Southern and Northern 
regions of Europe (2,7-2,8) and almost equal to that in the 
Northern region of Europe (2,6) while it was lower in the 
countries of Eastern Europe (2,3). TFR was also relatively 
low in the Soviet Union (2,5) and already very low in Japan 
(2,0). However TFR was outstandingly high in the other 
developed countries outside Europe (Canada, New Zealand: 
3,6-3,8, USA, Australia: 3,3) . As a consequence of 
evolutions in opposing directions this picture has turned 
face-about by the recent years. Now it is the Soviet Union 
where TFR is the highest (2,4); of the European subregions 
it is Eastern Europe which has the highest value (a round 2 
on the average ) ; TFR is around 1,7-1,8 in the other European 
regions and the situation is similar to the latter also in 
the developed countries outside Europe. 
Naturall y , the individual developments of the 31 countries 
differ, in 
respectively, 
subregions. 
the average 
manycases, from the general trends and, 
from those characteristic of the respecti ve 
If the last known TFR values are compared with 
of the years 1960-1965 there is one country 
where even an increase can be found. This country is 
Roumania where at that time a very low value was measured 
(from the high level in the fifties fertility had decreased 
to 2 and now it is again somewhat higher: 2,2); the 
situation is slightly similar to that in Hungary where no 
change can be found between the two final points (the value 
is around 1,8 in both cases but behind it there was a bottom 
of reproduction in the early sixties followed by a rise in 
the early seventies and by a new decline recently ); but the 
situation is strongly similar in other Eastern European 
countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland) and in the 
Soviet Union and also in Japan where reproduction level has 
dropped but slightly, though from a level lower already in 
sixties. 
As it has been 
found in Canada 
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indicated, the greatest decline has been 
(by 55 per cent) but the present TFR is 
hardly the half of what it was 25 years again still 7 other 
countries (New Zealand, Austria, the Netherlands, Ital y, 
Portugal, Spain and also in Albania whose situation is 
completely different and where the fertility - though still 
high as in the developing countries - has dropped from 5,8 
to 3). Considerable, over 40 per cent, is the decline in 5 
further countries (Norway, Belgium, USA, Australia, FRG; but 
it hardly falls behind in Ireland (where it has dropped from 
4 to 2,4), in the United Kingdom, Luxemburg and Switzerland. 
The level of TFR, in the early sixties was still over 3 in 8 
countries (and as we have seen above it was 5,7 in Albania 
and 3,5-3,6 in Canada and Ireland), between 2,5 and 2,9 in 
the major part of the countries (in 15 countries ) and th e 
lowest in Hungary (1,8). According to the available data for 
the most recent period, i.e. for 1987 or - if the y are 
missing for 1985-1986 TFR is over 3 already only in one 
country (Albania) being already 2,4 in the two countries 
following it ( USSR, Ireland ) . The rest of the countries have 
strongly "slided down" as far as the fertility value is 
concerned : there are 8 countries where TFR is 1,5 or lower 
and in 1987 the lowest value was measured in Italy (1,27 ) . 
It is worthwhile considering developments in the eighties so 
far 1/ because they are rather different by themselves by 
groups of countries. In the countries of Eastern and 
Northern Europe as well as in the developed overseas 
1/ See Table 2. 
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countries the situation has stabilized: TFR has not chang ed 
since 1980. The only exception is Ireland where the strong 
decrease started during this period ( from 3,2 to 2,4 between 
1980 and 1986). However the decline is considerable in most 
countries of Southern Europe (with the exception of 
Yugoslavia 
fertility 
where fertility is rather stable - around 2,1 ) : 
has dropped from 1,7 to less than 1,3 in Italy, 
from 2,2 to 1,6 in Greece and Portugal and to 1,5 in Spain. 
Some countries of Western Europe have stabilized their -
already low - fertility levels ( Luxembuerg , the Netherlands, 
Switzerland ) ; fertility has continued to decline now at a 
lower pace in France, Belgium and in the GFR and at a 
somewhat higher pace in Austria (from 1,7 to 1,4 ). 
If the trend of reproduction is to be examined not by TFR 
but by completed cohort fertility the picture is not fully 
identical but has similar feature s in man y re s pects . 
Naturally, it is not pos s ible to giv e a full picture from 
this point of view because the respective data are not 
available for all countries but for 23. In case of 5 
countries of the latter group changes can be studied only 
beginning with the fertility of the female cohort born in 
1930 while in case of the rest of the countries in th is 
group they can be followed beginning with the cohort born in 
190o. 1 1 
If the developments between two cohorts, i.e. the changes in 
completed fertility between the female cohorts born in 1900 
and in 1930 and, respectively, in 1930 and in 1955 ( in the 
case of the latter assessing childbirths over the age of 30 
with an error margin of 5 per cent) are to be studied, the 
countries examined may be divided into four groups: 
1/ See Tables 10, 11. 
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A significant increase between the cohorts of 1900 and 
1930 but there is a decrease between the cohorts of 1930 and 
1955. In four countries belonging to this group (France, 
Norway, England and Sweden) the increase during the first 
period is 12-25 per cent and the decline during the second 
is 10-22 per cent and, in total, for example in France 
completed fertility had increased from 2,1 to 2,6 and then 
fell back again to 2. The situation is similar in Norway and 
England where the initial value was the same while the 
maximum was only 2,5 and 2,4, respectively. In Sweden 
completed fertility had increased only from 1,9 to 2,1 and 
then dropped back to the same value. The tendency is similar 
also in 5 further countries (Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, 
Ireland and perhaps Austria) but the increasing trend is 
more moderate (by 8-10 per cent) and the decline is greater 
(by one quarter). 
The situation is stable with regard to the change s 
between the female cohorts of 1900 and of 1930 and there is 
a decline thereafter. This situation is characteristic of 3 
countries (GFR, GOR and the Netherlands). This is the most 
conspicuous in the Netherland: the average number of 
children was 2 '9 in the case of the beginning cohort and 
then fell back to 2 '7 in the case of the cohort of 
1930 while the youngest females gave birth only to 1'8 
children on the average. 
A gradual decrease over th whole period. It is sure that 
this phenomenon has taken place in five countries (Finland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece) and it is probable that 
the same applies also to two further countries (Yugoslavia, 
Poland). The greatest drop in completed fertility took place 
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in Finland and in Italy: females born in 190 0 still gave 
birth to 3,2 children on the average while those of the 1955 
cohort to only 1,7. 
Finally, a decrease in fertility between the female 
cohorts of 1900 and of 1930 with a stabilization of the 
situation thereafter. This situation is characteristic of 
Czechoslovakia and of Hungary. In the former the average 
number of children fell back from 3 to 2,4 and there has 
been almost no change after that while in the latter as 
against the average 2,7 children in the case of the 1900 
cohort females belonging to the 1930 cohort gave birth to 2 
children on the average and those belonging to later cohorts 
also to about 1,9 children. The situation is probably the 
same in Bulgaria and Roumania. The average number of 
children of the 1930 cohort was 2 in the former and 2,3 in 
the latter and this has not changed since then. 
Summing up the developments over recent decades on the basis 
of the above two indicators one has to establis h tha t - with 
different variations in the majority of the developed 
countries fertility has gradually declined while in the rest 
of them low level stabilization has taken place. 
2. The future of fertility, 1987-2025 
In the approximation of the problem of the future of 
reproduction in the countries of the more developed region 
considering past trends and using a logical approach, 
generally speaking, there are several possibilities: 
1/ One may assume that the decline in fertility was periodic 
and that the present reproduction level - much lower than 
simple reproduction level cannot be lasting and that a 
Jc 
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gradual increase will take place in the countries which will 
reach simple reproduction level (a value around 2,1 as 
against the present 1,9 ) by the end of the projecti on 
period, i.e. by 2020-2025. 
2/ Fertility will not increase in the near future but will 
remain essentially at its present level until the end of the 
twentieth century or will change only slightly (upwards or 
downwards) and a slight increase will start only during the 
first decades of the next century, especially in th ose 
countries where at present reproduction le ve l is the lowe st. 
Thus a certain equalization will take place among the 
fertility levels of the countries: the fertility of the 
countries who are in the middle will not change essentiall y 
while that of those with high fertility levels will even 
decline and, consequently, the present level of fertilit y 
will hardly rise and only its di s persion will be les s . 
3/ The change in fertility cannot be asses se d and, 
consequently, the present level is projected by countrie s 
and it is only in the case of some areas with outstandingly 
high fertility that some decline i s pro j ected. The final 
result of this presumption does not show any significant 
change compared with the present level of 1,9 either but, 
according to it, the present differences with the 
exception of the outstandingly great ones - will remain. 
4/ The declining trend of the fertility level of the mo s t 
recent period will continue and, consequently, the fertility 
level in every country will be lower than at present and 
this declining variant projects a TFR of 1,6 for the whole 
of the developed countries by the end of the projection 
period. 
7-1 
- 10 -
Each of the assumptions of these four vari ants figures in 
one or other of the population projections made during the 
past few years by international organizations or by 
individual countries. 
The two official population projections recently published 
by the United Nations Organization1/ depart from the 
assumption that the fertility of more developed regions will 
increase Cl-assumption type ) . If, for example, the 1984 
assessment is adopted as a basis the fertility rate of the 
whole developed world will increase from 2,0 in 1980-85 to 
1,8-2,3 in 2000-05 ( medium variant: 2,0,i . e . unchanged ) , but 
to 1 , 9-2,4 in 2020-25 ( medium variant: 2,1, i.e. an increase 
to simple reproduction le ve l ) . 
On the other hand the 1988 UN 
2-assumption type 21 as it 
fertility: the level of TFR 
projection corresponds to the 
expects hardly an y rise in 
will essentiall y remain at the 
present value of 1,9 until 2000 and will increase only a bit 
by 202C-25; the minimum and the ma ximum values at the tw o 
final points 
respectively . 
projects TFRs 
of the calculations would be 1 , 7 and 2,2, 
Thus, the assumption of the assessme nt 
for 2000 and 2020 by 6 and, respectively, by 9 
per cent lower than the two previous variants. 
1/ World Population Prospects, Estimates and Projections as 
assessed in 1982, United Nations, New York, 1985, 
(Population Studied No, 86) and World Population Prospects, 
Estimates and Projections as assessed in 1984, United 
Nations, New York, 1986 (Population Studies, No . 98 ) . 
2/ World Population Prospects: 1988, United Nation (under 
publication ). 
72 
The 
in 
assumption 
international 
- 11 -
of constant fertilit y is used not generall y 
assessments but the 1988 UN assessment 
alread y uses this assumption in the case of a numbe r of 
countries ( accordingl y, in the case of already 5 of t he 31 
countries under survey fertility will not change betwee n 
2000 and 2020 ). However, this 3-assumption type is the basi s 
of projection in the case of 7 of the 22 available national 
population projections for the whole period ( i.e. the TFR of 
the year of the projection is projected unchanged ) and i n 
the case of 9 of the remaining national projections an 
unchanging level of fertility is assumed alread y for the 
period after 2000. The assumption is similar i n the 
population projection made by the World Bank in whi c h the 
present fertility level is prognosticated for 2000. 1/ 
The use of the declining variant - 4-assumption t ype wa s 
proposed at the European Population Conference of 198 7 . 21 
Calculating it for the whole de veloped region in term s of 
TFR results in a decline of fertility to 1,7 and to 1 ,6 by 
2000 and by 2020, respectively. 
If the results of these assumptions for the developed 
countries as a whole are compared the differences are not so 
great by themselves but the values are extended along a 
rather broad scale. The summarized results of the different 
projections for 2000-05 and, re~~ectively, for 2020- 25 in 
diminishing order look as follows: 
1/ World Development Report 1987, published for the World 
Bank, Oxford University Press, Table 28 . 
2/ M. Macura and J. Malacic: Population Prospects for 
Europe, European Population conference 1987, Plenaries, 
IUSSP-EAPS-FINNCO, Helsinki, 1987. 
3/ See Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 . 
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TFR 
Projection 2000-05 2020-25 
UN-84-high 2,27 2,30 
UN-88-high 2,14 2,22 
UN-84-medium 2,04 2,12 
World Bank-87 2,00 
UN-B4-medium 1,90 1'9 4 
National-B7/8-medium 1,90 1,90 
UN-B4-low l,B2 1, 92 
UN-BB-low 1,73 1, 65 
Declining-BB 1,70 1,60 
Thus, in the light of the different projections TFR, which 
is 2 at present, may be between 1,7 and 2,3 by 2000-0 5 and 
between 1,6 and 2,3 by 2020-25. The difference between the 
highest and lowest values is rather significant: 33 per cent 
in 2000 and already 43 per cent in 2020. However, even if 
the assumption of the 19B4 UN assessment is overlooked - as 
it was actually withdrawn by the 19BB UN assessment - TFR 
may nevertheless be, during the period to come, first 
between 1,7 and 2,1 and later between 1,6 and 2,2. Thu s , the 
difference may drop to 26 per cent by 2000 and to 3B per 
cent by 2020 but even in this case it will be between rather 
broad limits. 
It is difficult to answer the question which picture of the 
future may be regarded as the most realistic. Perhaps, it 
may be taken for sure that the former assessments assuming 
increasing fertility were too optimistic and the UN was 
right in switching over to the assumption of smaller change, 
of almost constancy. Even in the case of it the "high" 
variant seems to be too high and its materialization is not 
very probable. One may imagine the future at best between 
the "medium" and "low" assumptions and the latter hardly 
- 13 -
differs from the assessment of the "declining" projecti on. 
From the point of view of realistic limits, by around 200 0 
TFR may be between 1,7 and 1,9 and by 2020-25 between, 1,6 
and 1,9 and in this case the dispersion will already drop to 
12 per cent and to 19 per cent, respectively . 
The developed countries - by the development up to now and 
the future perspective of their fertility and on the basis 
of the 1988 UN medium projection - may be divided into four 
groups (on the basis of their TFRs): 11 
1/ Most numerous (12 of 31) are the countries where over the 
past 25 years the decline in fertilit y has been rather 
strong and, consequently where the level of fertilit y is 
rather low also at present, in whose case the projection 
foretells a considerable increase by 2025. To this grou p 
belong almost all Western European countries ( the 
Netherlands, Austria, the GFR, Belgium, Luxemburg , 
Switzerland), most Southern European countries (Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece) and two Northern European countries 
(Denmark and Sweden ) . 
In the case of some countries this considerable increase is 
rather doubtful. For example, in the case of the GFR a 25 
per cent increase in the TFR (1,4 at present ) is projected 
(to 1,7), though it is true that this prognosis is more 
cautious than the 1984 UN assumption which projected an 
increase to 2,0 by 2025. The most recent national projection 
assumes a stabilization at the present level. The situation 
is similar also in Italy, in Portugal and in Greece where 
national projections assume stabilization while the UN 
medium projections prognosticate increases of 10 and 18-1 9 
1/ See Tables 7, 8. 
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per cent, respectively. In the case of the rest of the 
countries belonging to this group the directions of national 
and international projections and the assumed increases ma y 
be regarded as identical. Perhaps it is only in the case of 
Spain that the UN projection foretelling an increase of 28 
per cent (from the present 1,5 to 1,9) seems to be 
exaggerated and in the case of Belgium it is the national 
projection which assumes a much greater rise than the UN 
projection does (by 2025 the national projection hopes for 
an increase from the present 1,5 to 2,1 while the UN 
projection assumes an increase to only 1,8). 
2/ An other big gro~p of countries (9 countries) - after the 
strong or medium decline in fertility ma y hope for 
stagnation or for a smaller increase if the · UN projection 
materializes in the 40 year period to come. To this group 
belong the greater part of the oerseas developed countries 
(Canada, New Zealand, USA, Australia) 3 Northern European 
countries ( the United Kingdom, Norway and Finland ) , France 
and the GOR. 
The assumed tendency is the same also in the national 
projections. Perhaps it is necessary to call the attention 
only to the differences in the size of the increases: in the 
French national projection TFR is assumed to rise from 1,8 
to 2,1 by 2025 (an increase of 17 per cent) while according 
to the UN projection the French TFR will increase by 2025 to 
only 1,9, i.e. the rise would be smaller. The assumed 
increases are greater in the UN projections than in the 
national ones also in the case of the United Kingdom and the 
USA. 
77 
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3/ In each of the 7 countries belonging to the third group 
according to the UN projection - the stagnation, resp., the , 
low decline, which have taken place so far, will continue 
also during the next 40 years. Thus, in the five Eastern 
European countries, in the Soviet Union and in Japan 
fertility would but hardly decline between the 1960s and the 
2020s, i.e. between the two final points of time of the 
period under survey. It is perhaps only in Poland and in 
Czechoslovakia that the declines would be greater (but their 
size of 20 per cent dwindles down when compared with the 
decline by half to be expected in some Southern and Western 
European and overseas countries). 
In some ca s e s the assumed slight decline during the next 40 
years may, to a certain estent, be questioned. Thu s , in in 
the Soviet Union, where fertilit y is now high, perhap s a 
more considerable decline may be expected than that 
prognos ticated by the UN (from 2,4 to 2,1, i.e. only a 
decline of 10 per cent). The same idea may come up also in 
th e case of Bulgaria and Roumania. On the other hand, the 
Hungarian national projection prognosticates a slight 
increase (from 1,8 to 2,1) as against an unchanged le vel 
assumed by the UN and the Polish national projection assumes 
a stagnation at the present · le~el of 2,2 as against a 
decline of 17 per cent (to 2,05) prognosticated by the UN. 
4/ A special group may be assigned . to those 3 countries 
where the decline has been and will remain very considerable 
up to now and, respectively , during the period to come. 
Naturally, to this group belong those European countrie s 
where in the past fertility had been at an outstandingly -
perhaps "developing" level: Albania and Ireland. In the 
first TFR has declined by half since the 1960s and acco rding 
to the projection it will decline by a further o ne third 
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while in the latter the decline up to now has been by almost 
40 per cent and the UN projects a further 16 per cent 
decrease for the next 40 years which is in accordance wit h 
the national projection. Yugoslavia is also near to these 
countries: there by now the value of TFR has decreased by 30 
per cent and a further 10 per cent decline is still expected 
to come. 
It seems that if the UN picture of the future would 
materialize in general the value of TFR in the countries of 
the more developed region would be on a somewhat higher 
level. There would be no single country where the value of 
TFR would be equal to or lower than 1,6 ( at present there 
are 12 such countries) and in the 7 countries wit h the 
lowest value of TFR (Denmark, Italy, Austria, the GFR, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Switzerland) TFR would be 1,7 on 
the average for 2020-25. It is to be noted that of these 
countries for the same period the national projections of 
the GFR and Italy and Austria assume 1,3-1,4 and 1,6, 
respectively, while the assumptions of the rest of the 
countries are similar to those of the UN. The country with 
the highest fertility would be Albania also in 40 years but 
with a TFR of 2,2. At present - besides Albania - there are 
still four countries with such or higher TFRs. The 
difference between the maximum and the minimum today is 3,4 
to 1,3 (i.e. 370 per cent), in 40 years it would be 2,2 to 
1,7 (i.e. 130 per cent). One may rightly put the question 
whether the rapprochement will indeed be so great. 11 
Naturally, the prognosticated differences in the fertilit y 
rates have a strong impact on the sizes of the generations 
1/ See Table 9. 
- 17 -
to be born and in this regard the results of the differen t 
projections show already much greater variations than th e 
TFRs assessed on the basis of the yearly data of one or 
another hypothetical cohort. 
Thus, 
whole 
if the more developed regions are considered as a 
on the basis of the 1984 UN medium assessment 633 
million livebirths could be projected for the period between 
1990 and 2025. The 1988 UN assessment already projects 592 
million livebirths, i.e. by 7 per cent less for the same 35 
year period which actually represents a proportionall y 
smaller population. However, if the assessment of the 
"declining" variant would be adopted the expected number of 
births during the 35 years would fall back alread y to 520 
million which is by 18 per cent and by 12 per cent lower 
than the results of the 1984 and 1988 UN medium projections, 
respectively. In terms of figures it means also that if the 
declining tendency will remain dominant by 2025 in the 
developing countries as a whole by 114 million and , 
respectively, 72 million fewer children will be born. 
If the last five years of the period of projection - 2020-25 
are considered the differences are greater. Namel y , 
according to the 1984 UN assessment there should be 93 
million livebirths during five years but according to the 
1988 UN assessment the respective number is already 86 
million but according to the declining variant this number 
will be 70 million which will be by 25 per cent and by 18 
per cent lower than the results of the former and later UN 
assessments, respectively. 
IJ 
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Finally, the question arises in what distribution o! the 
number of children the average fertility values will 
materialize, i.e. how the change in the general level of 
fertility will impact the distribution of families by the 
number of children and, respectively, the distribution of 
females by the number of children born to them. 
It is rather difficult to give a uniform answer to this 
question because already at present the differences between 
the developed countries regarding the types of fertility by 
the number of children are very great. By the same average 
family-size the differences between the countries are very 
considerable . The differences appear especially in the 
proportions, on the one hand of females who have given life 
to no child or only to one child and of those with big 
families on the other. 
On the basis of such a differentiation it is possible to 
form groups of countries: by a simple approach one part of 
the countries independently from the level of general 
fertility - are rather heterogeneous from the point of view 
of the fertility model: by relatively many childless females 
and perhaps females with one child the proportion of females 
with two children is relatively less but the proportion of 
those with three children is higher and the proportion of 
females with four or more children is outstandingly high. In 
the other group of countries childless females are fewer, 
those with one child are more, the proportion of females 
with two children is outstandingly high, that of females 
with three children is lower and there are very few families 
with four or more children. In the countries belonging to 
this group the family-building model is relatively more 
homogeneous. 
• 
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It is rather difficult to present comparable data to prove 
that this picture is correct. However, wit h regard to 19 
countrie s the age- and birth order-specific livebirth-rates 
are available and with their help it is possible to 
construct on the basis of the data of the gi ven year, in 
most cases, of that of 1985 - TFRs by birth order and to 
calculate the distribution of completed total fertilit y by 
the number of children. These data refer to all births and 
in most cases birth order also refers to all births up to 
now. (In some countries similar data refer only to 
"legitimate" fertility and, respectively, to the birth order 
of those born in wedlock and in the case of these countries 
neither completed fertility nor - consequently - calculated 
completed fertility can be produced. ) 11 
If now countries are to be qualified wi th th e help of these 
data, according to the above, the following countries may be 
assigned to the two group s : 
1/ The most typical representative of the heterogeneous 
fertilit y group is Ireland where by a 28 per cent proportion 
of childl ess females 36 per cent of females have four or 
more children and only 15 per cent of them have two childre n 
(this represents the average of 2,7). Similar to this is t he 
situation of Portugal Cat proportion of 24 per cent of 
childless females theh proportion of female s with four or 
more children is 22 per cent). Less typical are already th e 
USA and Canada but in those countries the proportion of 
childless females is also high (24 and 29 per cent, 
respectively), the proportion of females with three children 
is higher (17 per cent ) while the proportion of females with 
1/ See Table 13. 
RI 
- 20 -
four and more children (10 and 7 per cent, respect iv e ly) ma y 
be regarded as somewhat outstanding when compared to a vera ge 
fertility ( 1,8 and 1,6, respectivel y) . 
To this group may be assigned also those further 6 countrie s 
where- though the proportion of childless females is high 
(between 26 and 34 per cent) because of low average 
fertility the proportion of females with four or more 
children is already small (4-6 per cent and only in two 
countries 8 per cent) but there are generally many mothers 
with three children (14-15 per cent but in two countries in 
Sweden and in Japan 21-22 per cent ) . Besides three 
Northern European countries ( Finland, Denmark, Swede n) 
Italy, the Netherlands and Japan are assigned t o this group . 
2/ Of the countries showing a more homogeneou s fertilit y 
picture Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are the most t ypi c al. 
Namely, in those countries the pr oportion of childless 
females is rather low ( 7-8 per cent ) , females with four or 
more children are hardly to be found ( 5-8 per cent ) but the 
overwhelming majority have two children (59 and 48 per cen t, 
respecti vely). The situation is similar also in Hungar y 
though the proportion of childle s s females is somewhat 
higher ( 14 per cent ). 
The assignment to this group may already be only partial in 
the case of Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia where - thoug h 
the proportion of childless females is not very high (9 -14 
per cent) because of the higher average fertility the 
proportions of females with three and, respectively, with 
four children are already higher. 
The assignment to this group is also partial in the case of 
three other countries : the GDR and Greece ( where though the 
• 
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proportion of chidless females is somewhat higher / 16 per 
cent and 19 per cent, respectively/ mothers with two 
children are many and those with four and more children are 
few / 5-6 per cent / ) and Australia where though the 
proportion of childless females is low (6 per cent ) , that of 
females with two children is not outstanding while the 
proportion of mothers with three and four and more children 
is relatively higher. 
The previous picture is essentially strengthened by the 
cohort fertility data of the population censuses. In this 
respect the possibility of presentation is somewhat scarce 
as the number of countries inquiring after the number of 
children at population censuses is relatively small, 
(especially recently and the comparison in this field too is 
rendered difficult by conceptual differences (data refer 
mainly to the married female population ) .An effort wa s made 
to compare five cohort-groups whose fertility behaviour 
completed between 1950 and 1980. If not each of them but for 
2-3 of them (sometimes for all of them) data were availabl e 
from 16 countries. 
The distribution by the number of children constructed this 
way 11 also shows the significant differences in the 
family-building of the female cohorts of developed countrie s 
up to now as well as the changes which have taken place in 
the number of those with big families because of the decline 
in the fertility level. 
With regard to the distribution by the number of children of 
last completed female cohorts born in 1930-1934 and,if these 
1/ See Table 15. 
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data are missing, in 1920-1924 also the differences in the 
aaoportions of childless females and, respectively, of 
females with fourand more children are the most noteworth y . 
There are counteies where the proportion of childless 
females especially if the data refer to married females 
are practically approaching already the level of infertility 
(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Japan but similar 
data referring to all females, i.e. including also the 
never married - were found in the GOR, in Yugoslavia and in 
the USA). But for example in Switzerland this proportion is 
20 per cent, in spite of the fact that the Swiss data refer 
to "ever-married" females. As far as the proportion of 
females with big families is concerned in the case of the 
last comparable female cohorts it varies between 8 and 9 per 
cent (Hungary, Bulgaria) and between 25 and 37 per cent 
(Poland, Portugal, Spain, USA, Japan). 
Besides, it is noteworthy that the differences in extreme 
values are reflected also by the general widespreadness of 
the two-child ideal. The proportions of those with two 
children are 55 per cent and Bulgaria and 42 per cent 
respectively, in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary in the case 
of the last observable cohorts but only 21-24 per cent in 
Belgium, in France (it is true that here the data of the 
1910-14 cohort are available), in Poland, in the USA and in 
Japan. 
Essentially the same results are shown by the data of the 
ultimate number of expected children of different fertility 
studies. 1/ By themselves they cannot be compared with the 
former picture, not only because of the sampling but also 
1/ See Table 12. 
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because these data refer to married females and as 
"expectations" they hardly contain any desires to have "O" 
child. Thus the basic differences may be shown with regard 
to expecting two and, respectively, four and more children. 
Consequently, the two groups of countries may be constructed 
also with the help of these data too: 
1/ Countries with a heterogeneous distribution where 
expectations to have two children are relatively fewer but 
there are more expectations to have four or more children. 
To this group belong France (where only 41 per cent expected 
to have two children but 15 per cent expected to have four 
and more children), 
respectively), the USA 
and Belgium (Flemish) (43 
Finland (45 and 14 per cent, 
(43 and 18 per cent, respecti vel y) 
and 13 per cent, respectively ) , 
2/ Countries belonging to the homogeneous group where 
expectations to have two children are very nemerous but th e 
proportion of those planning big families is low. To this 
group belong unequivocally Hungary (with 64 and 4 per cen t , 
respectively), Czechoslovakia (with 55 and 9 per cent, 
respectively), Poland (with 50 and 13 per cent, 
respectively) and the UK (with 50 and 13 per cent, 
respectively). 
If these great differences are considered fertility models 
for the future showing the distribution of certain average 
size families by the hypothetical number of children can be 
constructed. 11 Naturally, numberless such distributions 
can be imagined even at a given average number of children 
and so the calculated and presented models are only of 
illustrative value and show the completed fertility 
distributions which can be imagined as theh most frequent 
and still perceived as realistic. 
1/ See Table 14. 
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Taken at random at the present rather frequent average 
fertility of 1,8 it is possible to have a distribution wher e 
the proportion of the childless is 10 per cent but also one 
where the respective proportion is 20 per cent and the 
proportion of those with three and more children may vary 
from 15 to 25 per cent. At the value of 1,3 regarded as the 
lowest the two extreme distributions vary between 25 and 35 
per cent and 5 and 10 per cent, respectively . But in this 
latter case it is still possible (though not practiced) to 
imagine a proportion of 45 per cent of the childless if that 
of those with three and more children remains at the level 
of 20 per cent. All this only underlines that the fertilit y 
rates figuring in the population projections may materialize 
in many kinds of distributions of the number of children and 
also show a possibility that the expected fertilit y average s 
which are thought to be the lowest may materialize in the 
future by a distribution of the number of children whi ch 
seems to be realistic. 
s~ 
1. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE AS ASSESSED IN 1988 IN MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Country . ?5 5- 1960- 1965- 1970- 197 5- 1980- 1985- 1990 - 199 5- 2000- 20 10 - 2020 -
l ,JJ 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 200 5 2015 2025 
Easte rn Euro12e 
H l,95 l,95 2,00 2,10 2, 20 2 , 20 
Bulgaria 2,50 2,28 2,19 2,16 2,17 2,25 2 ,Ol M 1,90 1,80 l,Bo 1,85 l , 90 1. 90 
L 1,80 1,70 1, 65 1,60 1,60 1,60 
H 2,05 2,10 2,15 2,20 2,20 2,2 0 
Czechoslovakia 2,89 2,58 2,40 2 ,08 2,34 2 t 36 2 ,09 M 2 ,00 1,95 1,90 1,90 1,90 1,90 
L 1,95 1,80 1,70 1,65 1,60 1 , 60 
H 1,75 1,80 1,90 2 ,00 2,10 2 , 10 
Germ3n DR 2 t 37 2,25 2,45 2,29 l, 71 1,81 1,83 M 1,70 1,65 l, 70 1,75 1,80 1, 80 
L 1,60 1,50 1,50 1,50 1,50 l,5 0 
H 1,83 1,95 2,05 2,10 2,10 2 ,10 
Hungary 2,72 2,21 1,82 1,97 2 ,08 2 ,11 1,80 M 1,75 1,75 1,80 1,80 1 , 80 1 , 80 
L 1,70 1,60 1,55 1,50 1,50 1, 50 
H 2,25 2,25 2,25 2,30 2,30 2 ,30 
Poland 3,62 3,29 2,65 2,27 2,25 2,26 2,33 M 2,20 2 , 10 2,05 2,05 2 , 0 5 2 , 05 
L 2,10 1 ,95 1,85 1,80 1,80 1, 80 
H 2,25 2,10 2,05 2,05 2,15 2 , 20 
Romania 2,87 2,62 2 ,01 3,06 2,63 2,55 2,22 M 2,15 2,00 1,90 1,85 1,90 l , 90 
L 2,10 1,90 1, 75 1,65 1, 60 1, 60 
H 2,09 2 , OB 2 , 11 2,16 2 , 20 2 , 22 
Total 2,95 2,67 2,33 2, 37 2,23 2,25 2t13 M 2,02 l, 94 1,91 1,91 1, 93 1, 9 4 
L 1 , 94 1,80 1, 72 1,67 1,65 1 , 65 
Country 1950- 19 55 - 1960 - 196 5- 1970 - 197 5- 1980 19 85 - 1990 - 199 5- 2000- 2010- 202 0-
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 19 90 19 95 2000 2005 2015 2025 
Northern Euro12e 
H 1,48 1,60 l, 70 1,80 2 , 00 2,10 De nmark 2,53 2,5 3 2,58 2,24 1,96 l, 70 1,42 M 1,45 1,50 1,55 1,60 l, 70 1, 70 
L 1 ,4 0 1,40 1,40 1,40 1,40 1 , 40 
H l , 7 3 1,80 1,90 2, 00 2, 10 2 ,10 Fi nland 2,98 2,78 2,58 2,06 1,62 1,64 1,69 M 1,65 1,6 5 1,70 l , 7 3 1, 7 8 1 , 80 
L 1,60 l,5 5 l,50 1 , 50 1, 50 1, 50 
H 2,60 2,50 2,40 2 , 35 2 ,30 2 , 30 Ire land 3, 37 3,67 3,96 3,86 3,80 3,46 2,87 M 2,50 2, 35 2,20 2, 10 2, 05 2 , 05 
L 2,40 2 , 20 2,00 1,85 l, 80 1 ,80 
H l, 7 3 1,85 1,95 2 , 05 2, 10 2 ,10 
Norway 2,60 2,84 2,90 2 , 72 2,25 1,81 1,69 M 1,69 1,69 1, 7 3 1,75 1, 80 1, 80 
L 1,65 1,60 1,55 1, 50 1, 50 1, 50 
Sweden H 1,70 1,80 1,90 2 ,00 2, 10 2 , 10 2,21 2,23 2,33 2,12 1,89 1,65 1,66 M 1,65 1,65 1,70 1,73 1, 78 1, 80 
L 1,60 1,55 1,50 1,50 1,50 1, 50 
H 1,83 1,90 2, 00 2,05 2, 15 2,20 UK 2,18 2,50 2 , 82 2,52 2,04 1,72 1,80 M 1,80 1,80 1,82 1 ,85 1,90 l , 90 
L 1,75 1,70 1,65 1,60 1,50 1, 50 
H 1,82 1,89 1,98 2,04 2, 14 2 , 18 
Total 2,32 2,55 2,78 2 ,49 2,07 1,78 1,79 M 1,78 1,78 1,80 1,82 1,87 1 ,88 
L 1,73 1,68 1,62 1,58 1,51 1, 51 
Country 
Southern Europe 
lllbania 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Yugoslavia 
1'0tlll 
Country 
we stern Europe 
Austria 
Be lgiuin 
France 
German FR 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Total 
EUROPE 
1950 - 1955 - 1960- 19 6 5- 197 0 - 1975- 1980 -
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
5,6 0 5,98 5,76 5,11 4,66 4,20 3,40 
2,29 2,27 2,20 2, 39 2, 32 2, 32 1,97 
2,32 2 ,35 2,55 2,49 2,27 l,92 1,55 
3,05 3,04 3,09 2,86 2,76 2,42 l,99 
2,57 2,75 2,89 2,93 2,89 2,63 l,83 
3,69 2,82 2,70 2,49 2,32 2 ,20 2,08 
2,G9 2,62 2,72 2,66 2,52 2,26 1,81 
1950- 1955- 1960 - 196 5- 1970- 1975- 1980 -
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
2,09 2,52 2, 78 2,53 2,01 1,64 1,61 
2,34 2,51 2,66 2,34 l,94 l,71 1,59 
2,73 2,71 2,85 2,61 2,31 1,86 1,87 
2,08 2,32 2,48 2,33 1,62 1,44 1,36 
l,97 2,22 2,38 2,22 1,96 l, 54 l,46 
3,06 3,09 3,12 2, 74 1,97 l,58 l,51 
2,28 2,34 2,51 2,27 1,82 1,52 l,53 
2,39 2,53 2,68 2,47 l ,94 l,63 1 , 56 
2, 59 2,59 2,63 2,50 2, 19 l,96 1,81 
1985- 1990 - 1995 - 2000- 20 10 - 2020 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2015 2025 
H 3,15 
M 3,00 
L 2,80 
H l, 75 
M l,70 
L l,65 
H 
M 
L 
H 
M 
L 
l,50 
1 ,45 
1,40 
1,80 
1,75 
1,65 
H l, 75 
M l, 70 
L l,60 
H 2,00 
M l,95 
L 1,90 
H 1, 72 
M 1 1 67 
L l,60 
3, 00 
2, 70 
2,40 
1,75 
l,65 
1,60 
1,60 
1,50 
l,40 
1,80 
l,70 
l,60 
l,75 
1,65 
l,60 
1,95 
l,87 
l,80 
1 , 76 
1,68 
l,57 
2,85 
2,55 
2,25 
l,80 
l, 70 
l,60 
l,70 
l,55 
1,40 
1,90 
l, 75 
1,60 
l,85 
l, 70 
l,60 
l,95 
1,82 
1, 70 
1,84 
1,69 
1,56 
2, 70 
2, 40 
2,15 
1,80 
1,75 
1,60 
1,80 
1,60 
1,40 
2,00 
l,80 
1,60 
l, 95 
1, 75 
1,60 
2 ,00 
1,82 
1,65 
1,92 
1, 7 3 
1,55 
2, 50 
2,2 5 
2 , 00 
2, 10 
1,85 
1,60 
2,00 
1, 70 
1,40 
2 ,1 5 
1,90 
1,60 
2 ,15 
1 , 85 
1,60 
2,16 
1,90 
1 , 60 
2,1 0 
l,82 
l,54 
2. 40 
2. 20 
2 , 00 
2 , 20 
1, 90 
1 ,60 
2, 10 
1, 70 
1,40 
2, 20 
1,90 
1,60 
2,20 
1,90 
1,60 
2,20 
1,90 
1,60 
2 . 17 
l . 84 
1,5 5 
1985- 1990- 199 5- 2000- 20 10 - 2020-
1990 1995 2000 2005 20 15 2025 
H 
M 
L 
H 
M 
L 
H 
M 
L 
H 
M 
L 
H 
M 
L 
H 
M 
L 
H 
M 
L 
H 
M 
L 
H 
M 
L 
1,55 
1,50 
1,45 
1,60 
l,55 
1,50 
1,88 
1,85 
1,82 
1,40 
l,38 
l,36 
1,48 
1,45 
l,40 
1,51 
l,45 
1,40 
1,58 
l,55 
l,50 
l,61 
1,58 
1,55 
1,78 
1, 74 
l,68 
l,60 
1,50 
1,40 
l, 75 
1,60 
1,50 
l, 93 
l, 84 
1,75 
1,50 
1,43 
l,36 
1,60 
l,50 
1,40 
1,55 
1,47 
1,40 
1,65 
1,55 
1,45 
1,69 
1,60 
1,52 
1,83 
1,72 
1,63 
1, 70 
l,55 
1,40 
1,95 
1,70 
1,50 
2,00 
1,85 
l, 70 
1,65 
1,50 
1,36 
l, 70 
1,55 
1,40 
1,65 
1,50 
1,40 
1,70 
1,57 
l,40 
1,80 
1 , 65 
1,50 
1,91 
l, 75 
1,59 
1,80 
1,60 
1,40 
2,05 
l,75 
1,50 
2 , 05 
1,87 
1,65 
1,80 
1,60 
1, 36 
1,80 
1,60 
1,40 
1,75 
1,55 
1, 40 
1,80 
1,60 
1,40 
1,91 
1, 71 
1,49 
1,99 
1, 78 
l,56 
2,00 
1,70 
1,40 
2,10 
1, 80 
1 , 50 
2 , 15 
1,90 
1,55 
2 , 00 
1, 70 
l,36 
2,00 
1, 70 
l,40 
l,95 
1,65 
1,40 
2,00 
l, 70 
1,40 
2,06 
1,78 
1,45 
2,12 
1,84 
1,54 
2,10 
1, 70 
l,40 
2,10 
1,80 
1,50 
2 ,20 
1,90 
1, 50 
2,10 
l, 70 
1,36 
2,10 
1,70 
1,40 
2,10 
1, 70 
1,40 
2,10 
l, 70 
1,40 
2,14 
1,79 
1,44 
2,18 
1,66 
1 ,54 
.. 
2J 
Country 1950- 1955- 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2010- 2020-
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2015 2025 
H 2,40 2,35 2,35 2,35 2, 30 2 , 30 
USSR 2,82 2,81 2,54 2,42 2,44 2,34 2, 35 M 2,38 2,30 2,25 2,20 2,10 2,10 
L 2, 35 2,25 2 ,15 2,05 1 ,90 1,90 
H 1, 70 1,80 1,90 2 ,oo 2,15 2 , 20 
Canada 3,70 3,90 3, 61 2,51 1,97 1,77 1,66 M 1,65 1,66 1,70 1,75 1,80 1,80 
L 1,60 1,55 1,50 1,45 l,40 1 ,40 
H 1,88 2,00 2,10 2,20 2,25 2,25 
USA 3,45 3,71 3,31 2,55 l,97 l,93 1,82 M 1,83 1,85 l,88 1,90 1,95 1,95 
L l, 77 l, 70 1,65 l,60 1,60 1,60 
H 1,95 2,00 2,05 2,10 2,20 2,2 0 
Australia 3,18 3,41 3,28 2,87 2,54 2,09 1,93 M 1,85 1,80 l,82 1,85 1,90 1, 90 
L 1,75 1,65 l,60 1,60 1,60 1,60 
H 2,00 2,05 2,10 2,15 2,20 2,2 0 
New Zealand 3,54 3,93 3,79 3,22 2,79 2,20 1,96 M l,90 1,85 1,87 l,90 1,90 1, 90 
L 1,80 1,70 l,65 l,60 1,60 1,60 
H 1,80 1,90 2,00 2,10 2,10 2,10 
.Japan 2,75 2,08 2,01 2,00 2,01 1,81 l,76 M 1,70 l,80 l,80 l,80 1,80 1,80 
L 1,65 1,60 l,55 1,50 1,50 1,50 
H l,95 2,00 2,07 2,14 2,20 2,22 
More develo12ed 2,84 2,82 2,69 2,44 2,20 2,08 1,93 M 1,90 1,89 1,90 1,91 1,94 1 ,94 
total L 1,85 1,78 1, 73 1,69 1, 64 1,65 
Source: World Population Prospects: 1988, prepared by Estimates and Projections Section, Populati on 
Division, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations /under 
publication/ 
Ii = high variant - M "' medium variant - L = low variant 
2. Total fertilitv rates, 1980-1987 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Eastern Euro12e 
Bulgaria 2, 05 2 ,Ol 2,02 2,00 1,99 l,97 
Czechoslovakia 2,16 2,10 2,10 2 ,08 2 ,07 2,06 
German Dem.Rep. l,94 l,86 l,86 l,79 l,74 1,74 
Hungary 1,91 l,88 1,79 l, 73 1, 7 3 1,83 l,83 l,81 
Poland 2 ,26 2,22 2,34 2,40 2,37 2,33 2,21 
Romania 2,43 2,37 2 , 15 2,00 2'19 
Northern Eurooe 
De.'lmark 1,55 l,44 1,43 1,38 l,40 l,45 l,48 
Finland 1,63 1,64 1,72 l ,7 4 l, 70 l,64 l,65 
Ireland 3,23 3 , 08 2,96 2,51 2,58 2,49 2,43 
Norway 1,72 l, 70 l,71 l,66 l,66 l,68 1, 71 
Sweden 1,68 1,63 l,62 1,61 l,66 l,57 l,59 
United Kingdom 1 , 79 l,81 l, 78 l ,77 1, 77 l,80 1, 78 
Southern Euro12e 
Greece 2,21 2,10 2,03 l,94 l,85 l,68 1,61 
Italy l,66 1,57 1,57 l,51 1,50 l,41 l, 32 l,27 
Portugal 2,19 2,14 2,07 l,95 l,87 l,70 l,61 
Spain 2,16 l,99. 1,87 l,71 l,65 l,57 l,49 
Yugoslavia 2,13 2,07 2,08 2 ,12 
Western Eurooe 
Austria l,65 l,67 l,66 l,56 l,53 l,48 l,45 l,43 
Belgium l,67 l,67 l,61 l,56 1,52 l,49 1,53 
France l,9 5 1 , 95 l,91 l,79 l ,81 1,82 1,84 l,82 
German Fed.Rep. l,45 1,44 l,41 l,33 1,29 1,28 l,35 1,37 
Luxemburg l,49 1,53 1,49 1,45 1,4 3 1,39 1,44 
Neth.er lands l,60 l,56 l,50 1,47 1,49 l,51 l,55 
Switzerland 1,55 1,54 l,55 1,51 l , 52 1,51 1,52 
~ 2,26 2,25 2,29 2 , 37 2,41 
USA 1,83 1,81 1,83 1,80 1,81 
Canada l, 70 l,67 1,66 l,64 1,65 1,63 
Australia l,92 l , 99 1,94 l,93 
New Zealand 1,94 
Japan 1,74 1,71 1,74 1, 77 1, 78 l, 7 3 
Source : UN Demographic Yearbbok& INED /Projet International 
D'Analyse Demoqraphique Conjoncturelle/ 
J. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE IN EUROPE /\NO IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIOt!S 4. TOTAL FERTILITY R.ATE IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS 
/UN projections - different variants - as assessed in 1982, 1984, 1988/ /UN projections - medium variants - as assessed in 1982,1984 , 1988[ 
Region, Total fertility rate In the 1 of Region , 
Total fertility rate /medium variant{ 
variant, 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2010- 2020- 198 2 proj. year of projection 1980- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2010- 2020- In th.e i of 
year of projection 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2015 2025 2000- 2020- 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2015 2025 1982.proj. 
2005 2025 2000- 2020-2005 2025 
EUROPE Eastern Europe 
H.191\ variant 1982 2,17 2,15 2,09 2,01 2,06 
2,09 2, 14 100 100 
1984 2,18 2,14 2,10 2,09 2 ,01 2,07 2,12 100 99 
1982 2,04 2,05 2,12 2,20 2,24 2,30 2,34 100 100 1988 2,13 2,02 1,94 1,91 1,91 1,93 1,94 93 91 
1984 1,88 2,04 2, 12 2,20 2,24 2,30 2,34 100 100 Northern Europe 1988 1,81 l, 78 1,83 1,91 1,99 2,12 2,18 89 93 198 2 1,78 1,75 1,75 1,76 1,81 1,92 2 ,03 100 100 
Medium variant 19 84 1,86 1,75 1,75 1,78 1,81 1,92 2,03 100 100 
1982 1,90 1,86 1,85 1,87 1,89 1,98 2,08 100 100 1988 1,79 1,78 1,78 1,80 1,82 
1,87 1,88 101 93 
1984 1,88 1,83 1,84 1,85 1,87 1,94 2 ,05 99 99 Southern Europe 
1988 1,81 1,74 1, 72 1,75 1,78 1,84 1,86 94 89 1982 2,12 2 ,04 1,99 l,97 1,99 2 , 02 2,04 100 100 
Low variant 1984 1,93 1,84 1,93 1,93 1,93 1,97 
2,03 97 100 
1988 1,81 1,67 1,68 1,68 l, 73 1,82 1,84 B7 90 
19B2 1,81 1,68 1,65 1,65 1,68 1,75 1,83 100 100 
1984 l,87 1,68 1,64 1,64 1,66 1,71 1,81 99 99 Western Europe 
198B 1,81 1,68 1,63 l, 58 1,56 1,54 1,54 93 85 1982 1,58 1,57 1,64 1,65 
1,71 1,87 2,05 100 100 
1984 1,63 1,58 1,60 1,66 1,68 1,83 2,00 98 98 
MORE DEVEilOPEO 1988 1,58 1,58 1,60 1,65 1,71 
1,78 1,79 100 89 
REGIONS Europe total 1982 1,90 1,86 1,85 1,87 1,89 1,98 2 , OB 100 100 
Hi§h variant 1984 1,88 1,83 1,84 l,85 1,87 1,94 2 , 05 99 99 
I 82 2,09 2,14 2,20 2,26 2,28 2 ,32 2,34 100 100 198B 1,81 1,74 1, 72 1,75 1,70 l,B4 l,B6 94 87 
19B4 2,00 2,11 2,17 2,22 2,27 2,30 2,30 100 9B 
19BB 1,93 1,95 2,00 2,07 2,14 2,20 2 ,2 2 94 95 USSR 1982 2,36 2,36 2,34 2,34 2,29 2,25 2,25 100 100 
Medium variant 1984 2, 35 2, 37 2,33 2,29 2,29 2,27 2,25 100 100 
1982 1,98 1,97 2 ,00 2,03 2,04 2,08 2,13 100 100 198B 2,35 2,38 
2,30 2,25 2,20 2,10 2,10 96 93 
1984 1,97 1,97 2,00 2,04 2,04 2 , 07 2,12 100 100 Nortl\ern · America 
1988 1,93 1,90 1,89 1,90 1,91 1,93 1, 94 94 91 19B2 1,85 1,90 2,01 2,07 2,08 2 ,09 2,10 100 100 
Low variant 
19B4 1,83 1,89 2 ,Ol 2 , 07 2 ,OB 2 ,09 2 ,10 100 100 
198B 1,80 1,81 1,83 1,86 1,88 1,94 1,94 90 9 2 
1982 1,89 1,81 1,79 1,79 1,81 1,85 1,92 100 100 Australia + 
1984 1,94 1,85 1,82 1,82 1,83 1,86 1,92 101 100 New Zealand 
1988 1,93 1,85 1,78 1,73 1,69 1,64 1,65 93 86 1982 1,97 1,92 1,94 2,00 2,06 2,14 2,16 100 100 
1984 1,95 1,90 1,89 1,89 l,B9 l,B9 1,89 92 8B 
19B8 1,94 1,88 1,81 1,83 l,B8 1,90 1,90 91 BB 
Japan 
1982 1,71 1,71 1,77 1,83 1,86 2 ,01 2 , 01 100 100 
1984 1,79 1,83 1,87 1,92 1,98 2 , 07 2 , 09 106 101 
1988 1,76 1,70 1,80 1,80 1,80 1,80 1,80 97 87 
Mo· developed total 
J8 2 1,98 1,97 2 , 00 2 ,06 2 , 0 4 2 , Oil 2 ,13 100 100 
19B4 1,97 1,97 2,00 2 ,02 2,04 2 , 07 2 , U 10 0 100 
1988 1, 9 3 1,90 1,89 1,90 1,91 l , 9 J l ' 9 4 94 91 
\...._ 0. 
C~) 
' 
, 
Country 
Austria 
Australia 
Belgium 
Canada 
czecho-
s lovakia 
Denmark 
Finnland 
· ranee 
German 
Fed.Rep. 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzer-
land 
UK 
5. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE IN DIFFERENT PROJECTIONS 
1985-
1987 
llat l,.f 
UN 1,5 
Nat 1, 9 
UN 1,9 
Nat 1,5 
UN 1,6 
Nat 1,6 
UN 1, 7 
Nat 2,1 
UN 2,0 
Nat 1,5 
UN 1,5 
Nat 1,7 
UN 1, 7 
Nat 1,8 
UN 1,9 
Nat l,.f 
UN 1,4 
Nat 1,6 
UN 1, 7 
Nat 1,8 
UN 1,8 
Nat 2,4 
UN 2,5 
Nat 1,3 
UN 1,5 
Nat 1,6 
UN 1,5 
Nat 1,7 
UN 1 , 7 
Nat 2,2 
UN 2,2 
Nat 1,6 
UN 1,8 
Nat 1,5 
UN 1,7 
Nat 1,6 
UN 1, 7 
Nat 1,5 
tm 1,6 
Nat 1,8 
UN 1,8 
High. 
1,9 
1,8 
2,1 
2,1 
2,1 
2,0 
2,1 
2,2 
1,8 
2,0 
2,4 
2,1 
1,8 
1,8 
2,0 
2,1 
2, .. 
1,8 
1,8 
1,8 
2,1 
2,3 
2,3 
2,0 
2,0 
1,9 
2,0 
1,8 
2,2 
2,1 
2000-05 
He- Low 
di um 
1,6 1,3 
1,6 1 , 4 
2,0 
1,9 
2,0 
1,8 
1,7 
1,8 
2,0 
1,9 
1,7 
1,6 
1,7 
1,7 
2,1 
1,9 
1,4 
1,6 
1,6 
1,7 
1,9 
1,8 
2,1 
2,1 
1,3 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1,7 
1,8 
2,2 
2,1 
1,6 
1,8 
1,7 
1,8 
1,8 
1,7 
1,5 
1,6 
1,9 
1,6 
1,5 
1,5 
1,9 
1,7 
1,4 
1,5 
1,5 
1,7 
1,4 
1,6 
1 , 8 
1,5 
1,9 
1,4 
1,5 
i,4 
1,5 
2,0 
1,8 
1,6 
1,6 
1,7 
1,5 
1,4 
2 ,0 1, 7 
1,9 1,6 
Dec- WB 
lining 
High 
1, 3 1 ,9 
1,5 
1,4 
1,4 
1,9 
1,4 
1,4 
1,4 
1,3 
1,4 
1,7 
2,1 
1,3 
1,3 
1,4 
2,0 
1,4 
1,3 
1,3 
1,4 
1,7 2,1 
2,1 
1,7 
1,8 
2,0 
1,6 
1,8 
2,1 
1,5 
1,9 
1,8 
2,0 
1,7 
1,7 
1,8 
2,1 
1,9 
2,1 
1,8 
1,7 
2 , 1 
2,2 
2,1 
2,2 
2,2 
2,1 
2,1 
2,4 
2,2 
2,1 
2,2 
2,1 
2,1 
2,3 
2,1 
1,9 
2,1 
2,1 
2,3 
2,3 
2,2 
2,2 
1,9 
2,1 
2,1 
2020-2 5 
Me- Low Dc c -
d ium lining 
1 ,6 1,3 1, 3 
1,7 1,4 
2, 0 
1,9 
2,1 
1,8 
1,7 
1,8 
1,8 
1,9 
1,7 
1,7 
1,7 
1,8 
2,1 
1,9 
1,4 
1,7 
1,6 
1,9 
2,0 
1,8 
1,8 
2,1 
1,3 
1,7 
1,7 
1,7 
1,7 
1,8 
2,2 
2,1 
1,6 
1,9 
1,7 
1,9 
1,8 
1,8 
1,7 
1,7 
1, 9 
1,6 
1, 5 
1,4 
1,6 
1,4 
1,5 
1,5 
1, 5 
1,4 
1,6 
1,8 
1,5 
1,8 
1 , 4 
1,5 
1,4 
1,5 
1,9 
1,8 
1,6 
1,6 
1 , 7 
1 ,5 
1 , 4 
1,4 
1, 3 
1, 3 
1, 6 
1, 3 
1, 3 
1,4 
1,3 
1,3 
1, 4 
1, 8 
1 ,2 
1,2 
1,3 
1,8 
1, 3 
1,2 
1, 2 
1, 3 
1,6 
1,8 
2,2 2,0 l, 8 l ,4 
2,2 1, 9 1 ,5 
US I\ Nat 1,8 2,0 1,5 2 ,0 1,4 
UN 1,8 2,2 1,9 1, 6 1,9 2,3 2 ,0 1, 6 
Na t = Nat i o nal projections publishe d in 1986 or 1987 or 988 - UN = lln1tNl 
Na ti ons project ion a ssessed in 1988 - WP = World Development Report l 'J87 
6 . TOTAL FERTILITY RATE IN MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
/medium variants of different projections/ 
Country 
Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Total 
Northern Europe 
Denmark 
? inland 
Ireland 
Norway 
Sweden 
UK 
Total 
Southe r n Europe 
.lbania 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Yugoslavia 
Total 
Western Europe 
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
German Fed.Rep. 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Total 
Europe total 
SSR 
Canada 
USI\ 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Japan 
More developed 
t ota l 
UN 
1 ,9 
2,0 
1,7 
1 , 8 
2,2 
2,2 
2,0 
1,5 
1,7 
2,5 
1,7 
1,7 
1,8 
1,8 
3, 6 
1,7 
1,5 
1,8 
1,7 
2,0 
1,7 
1,5 
1,6 
1,9 
1,4 
1,5 
1,6 
1,6 
1,7 
2,4 
1,7 
1,8 
1,9 
1,9 
1,7 
1, 9 
1985-87 
Nat. WB 
2,0 
2 ,1 
2,1 
1,8 
2,2 
2,2 
2,1 
1,5 
1,7 
2,4 
1,7 
1,6 
1,8 
1,8 
3 , 2 
1,6 
1,3 
1,6 
1,5 
2,1 
1,6 
1,4 
1,5 
1 , 8 
1,4 
1,6 
1,5 
1,6 
1,7 
2,4 
1,6 
1,8 
1,9 
1,9 
1,7 
1,8 
2 ,o 
2,1 
1,8 
1,7 
2,3 
2,1 
2,1 
1,4 
1,7 
2,6 
1,7 
1,7 
1,8 
1,8 
3, 4 
2 , 0 
1, 5 
2 , 0 
2 ,0 
2 ,1 
1, 9 
2,1 
1, 6 
2,0 
1,3 
1,5 
1,5 
1 , 9 
1,9 
2,3 
1,7 
1,8 
2,0 
2,1 
1,8 
2 ,0 
Dec 
2,2 
2,1 
1,8 
1,8 
2,3 
2,3 
2,3 
1,4 
1,7 
2,5 
1, 7 
1,7 
1,9 
1, 9 
3,0 
1,6 
1,4 
1,7 
1,6 
2,1 
1,9 
1 ,5 
1,6 
1,9 
1,4 
1,6 
1,5 
1,8 
1,9 
2,3 
1,7 
1, 8 
2 , 0 
2,0 
1, 8 
2, 0 
UN 
1,9 
1,9 
1,8 
1,8 
2,1 
1,9 
1,9 
1,6 
1,7 
2,1 
1,8 
1,7 
1,9 
1,8 
2,4 
1,7 
1,6 
1,8 
1 , 8 
1,8 
1,7 
1,6 
1,8 
1,9 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1,8 
2,2 
1,8 
1,9 
1,9 
1 ,9 
1,8 
1,9 
2000-05 
Nat. WB 
2,0 
1,9 
2,2 
2,1 
1,7 
1,7 
2,1 
1,7 
1,8 
2,0 
1,9 
1,6 
1,3 
1,6 
1,7 
1,5 
1,6 
2 ,o 
2,1 
1,4 
1,6 
1,5 
1,7 
1,8 
1,7 
2,0 
2,0 
1,9 
2 ,0 
2 ,0 
1,9 
1,8 
2 ,1 
2,0 
2,0 
1 , 6 
1,8 
2,0 
1,8 
1,8 
1,8 
1,7 
2,4 
1,9 
1,7 
1,9 
2,1 
2,1 
1,9 
1,7 
1,7 
2,1 
1,5 
1,7 
1,7 
1,8 
1,9 
1,8 
1,9 
2,1 
1,9 
1 ,9 
2,0 
Dec 
2 ,0 
1,9 
1,7 
1, 7 
2, 0 
2 , 0 
1,8 
1,4 
1,4 
2,1 
1,4 
1,3 
1, 6 
1,6 
2,4 
1,4 
1, 3 
1,4 
1, 3 
1,8 
1,7 
1, 3 
1,4 
1,4 
1, 3 
1, 3 
1,4 
1,4 
1 ,6 
1,4 
1 ,5 
1,5 
1, 5 
1,5 
1 ,7 
2020- 25 
UN ::at. 
1,9 
1, 9 
1,8 
1,8 
2,1 
1, 9 
1, 9 
1,7 
1,8 
2,1 
1,8 
1,8 
1, 9 
1, 9 
2 , 2 
1,9 
l ,7 
1,9 
1,9 
1, 9 
1,8 
1,7 
1, 8 
1 ,9 
1,7 
1,7 
1,7 
1,7 
1 ,9 
2,1 
1.8 
2 , 0 
1,9 
1. 9 
1, 8 
1,9 
1,8 
2,0 
2 , 2 
2 , l 
1,7 
1. 7 
l , 8 
1. 7 
1,8 
2 ,0 
1.9 
1, 6 
1,3 
1,6 
1. 7 
1.6 
1,6 
2 '1 
2 'l 
1, 4 
1 ,7 
1, 7 
1. 7 
1,8 
1, 7 
2, 0 
2 ,0 
1. 9 
Nar = National projections published in 1986 or 1987 or 988 - UN = United 
Nations pr ojection assessed in 1988 - WP = World Development Report 1987 
Dec. 
1, 7 
1 ,6 
1, 4 
1. 4 
1, 8 
1,8 
1, 6 
l, 3 
1. 3 
1 , 8 
1,3 
1, 2 
1,4 
1,4 
2,2 
1, 3 
1,2 
l, ) 
l. 2 
1, 5 
1,5 
1. 3 
1.) 
l. 4 
l . 3 
1,2 
l, 3 
1 , 3 
1,5 
l,3 
1. 4 
1, 4 
l. 4 
1,4 
1 , 6 
L'4 
-· 
7. INDICES OF TOTAL FERTILITY RATES 8. Group of countries in the change of /calendar I total fer : ility 
rates 
Country 1985-87 2000-05 2020-25 Indices between the periods of 
in the percentage of 1985-87: 2020-25: 2020-2 5 : 
1960-65 1985-87 2000-05 1960-64 1985-87 1960 - 6 4 
UN Nat . UN Nat. 
medium projections 1. Sharp decrease before 1985-87; high increase predicted until 2020 - 25: 
Eastern EuroEe 1. Italy so 110 54 
Bulgaria 90 97 103 2 . Nether lands 50 110 54 
Czechoslovakia 86 95 95 100 92 3. Austria Sl 119 61 
GDR 71 103 103 4 . Spain 52 128 66 
Hungary 99 103 104 100 104 5. Portugalia 52 119 61 
Poland 83 93 97 100 100 6. GFR S5 124 69 
Romania 109 86 . 88 7. Denmark 57 115 66 
Total 87 95 . 101 8. Belgium 58 118 68 
Northern Europe 9 • Luxemburg 61 118 
71 
10. Switzerland 61 112 68 
Denmark 57 110 115 106 100 11. Sweden 68 113 77 
Finland 64 105 100 104 100 12. Greece 73 118 86 
Ireland 61 84 86 98 83 
Norway 59 104 97 103 100 2 . Sharp or moderate decrease before 1985-87; stagnation or low increase 
Sweden 68 105 114 104 100 1. Canada 45 108 so 
UK 63 103 112 103 100 2. New-Zealand so 97 so 
Total 64 102 103 3. USA S5 107 59 
Southern Euro~ 4 . Australia S8 98 SB 
Albania 52 80 92 
5 . Norway 59 105 62 
6. UK 63 107 67 
Greece 73 103 100 109 100 7. France 64 104 67 
Italy 50 110 104 106 100 8. Finland 64 109 70 
Portugal 52 103 100 106 100 9. GDR 71 103 73 
Spain 52 103 116 109 100 
Yugoslavia 72 93 104 3. Stagnation /or low decreases{ during the period before and after 
Total 6.1 104 106 1985-87 
Western Euro~ 1. Romania 109 87 95 
Austria 51 107 109 106 100 2 . Hungary 99 99 99 
Be.lgium SB 113 121 103 108 3. USSR 95 89 83 
France 64 101 115 102 100 4. Bulgaria 90 96 87 
German Fed.Rep. 55 116 102 106 100 5. Japan 88 102 90 
Luxemburg 61 110 127 106 104 6 . Czechoslovakia 86 92 79 
Neth.er lands so 107 106 110 100 7 . Poland 83 83 7 7 
Switzerland 61 103 100 106 113 
Total 59 108 lOS 4. 4. Sharp decrease during the period before and after 1985-87 
Euroee total 66 102 105 1. Albania 52 65 38 
95 92 95 
2 . Ireland 61 84 52 
USSR 3 . Yugoslavia 72 90 70 
USA 55 104 110 100 100 
Canada 4S 106 102 10 3 100 
Australia 58 100 107 10 3 100 
New Zealand 50 100 100 
Japan 83 104 100 
More develoee d 
r e gi o n s t.>t al 70 100 10 1 
u;. 
f', 1 
':' rR 
5.' 
<.6 
3 . 9 
l,6 
l, 5 
l, 3 
l, l 
• ,9 
2. 8 2.' 
2 ,6 
2,S 
2 • • 
2. 3 
2 ,2 
2 ,l 
2 ,0 
l ,9 
l, 8 
l, ' 
l ,6 
l, 3 
Country 
Austria 
Be lgi um 
Bulgar i.i 
Czechoslovakia 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Gcrm<in Dem. Rep. 
German Fed.Rep. 
Greece 
llungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzer land 
UK: England and W. 
Yugoslavia 
9. :::\- !":':"7::..:7Y :>.; .. ::: :..,. ""Oit! :!'·:~;..c;!: :. CC:.:::: : :~ .. ::.:::·.:: ; ~·.:.!"· 
1960-6 ~ 1570-7 C n:o-: :: 
l. .\ l t.o~.! Ji 
2. C&:.•a.J. 
.J. l:-el.l:-.c! 
" 
us;. 
5 . Austra! i a 
6 . r-: • ., :. • .a !~·~ 
7 . ~t.~e= :a~.::s 
8 . Pc:-:. .:c:al 
9. Sc~"'!" 
lo. rra:-.c-~ 
ll. \,")\ 
12. Aust:-:...a 
ll. Yuc;e s.:. a v.a. a 
14 . Polal"ld 
15. DC :".."'='C'k 
16. T! :'l l a nC 
17 . k lc:...:.."":I 
18. lt.aly 
19 . USS• 
20. Spun 
21. Sv.a.u .. e rland 
22. er~ 
23. c;D• 
24. Caechoalovak.LA 
25. 1.wcenib-.ir9 
26. Sweden 
27. C:reece 
28 . Bulqe.ria 
29. .Ja pi&n 
30. RO:ti&."'lh. 
l. :.:b.l:.:.b 
: . Irel a:'ic 
c . tto:w.n i a 
5. Auat.raha 
' • .Spai.."'l 
7 . USSR 
I . Yuqoalavia 
' . I t a ly 10. Pola!'\d 
11 . Nor"'•)' 
12 . Trance 
13. New Z.ea.land 
lC, CreeC• 
15 . 8 ul9a ru. 
lfi . Hunquy 
1 7. Ciee:ioslovak i.a 
11 . .Jap a n 
19. Uk 
20. USA 
21 . Auatrh 
22 . Ne ther l a nds 
2 3. Canada 
24. Lwce~..bu:9 
25. Be lq iu_""\ 
26. t>e:v.-.a.rk 
27. Swden 
28. S witzerla nd 
29. c;DR 
)0. CFR 
31. Finland 
2. USSR 
l . lr• l&nd 
.. Ro:u..n1• 
s. Poland 
'· 
Yu90 1 l avia 
'. C1echo1 lov&k 1a 
8. 9 ulqar1• 
9. Australia 
10. Naw iealand 
11. USA 
12. Hunoary 
13 . .Ja.p a r. 
l C. France 
lS. UK 
16. Ct>R 
1 7. Finland 
18 . Morvay 
19 . C&.nada 
20. S\iteden 
21. Net.h•r lands 
22. Greece 
23. Port.uqal 
H. Sw.i. t.zerl and 
25. ael o1~-i 
26 . Sp.Hn 
27. Oenr-ia r)-
28 . L\u,el'\b .: rc 
29. /\us::.r la 
30. crn 
ll. I t.>l y 
l. Alban.a.a 
2. USSR 
J. Irel•:-i~ 
.. Pola :'IC 
!>. Austral:.• 
6. N~w 2.eah.!'.! 
' . cs;. 
8. Ciec~os lova.ioa 
9. rra!'lce 
10 . 81,;lccia 
ll. tx · 
12. JtC:~·•:--.!.a 
13. H:J~~ a!"y 
lC . .;a?a:: 
15. C::lR 
16. Norwa y 
17, 9e lgH!~ 
18. Ca.na~a 
19 . Yuqos l a v::. a 
20. Port.uoa .:. 
21. cre ece 
22 . Spal.n 
23 . S weden 
2C . T1:'1.la l"lc! 
2S. C!'R 
26. t>enrurk 
27. t.:eth~r l ~"'ld~ 
28. l t.a ly 
29. A.!.1St:-1a 
JO. Ll.L.'Cetr.t..urc 
ll. Sw1tzC!rhnC 
l. 
2. 
3. 
. . 
s. 
6 . 
7. 
8 . 
L 
l C'. 
11. 
:u:. 
lL 
l<. 
l!. 
H. 
l; . 
l8. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23 . 
24. 
2S. 
26 . 
27 . 
28. 
29. 
3C. 
)l. 
10. COMP LCTED COHORT FERTILITY IN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
1900 1910 
2,10 2 , 05 
3,02 3, 0 4 
2,20 2,24 
3,16 3,18 
2,12 2,27 
2, 41 2,40 
2,12 2,06 
3,50 
2,66 2. 36 
3,26 3,31 
3,14 2 ,74 
2,86 2,84 
2,07 2,04 
3,52 3,23 
3,28 2,89 
1,88 1,88 
1,99 2,03 
1,96 1,82 
Mothe rs birth cohort 
1920 1930 1940 1950 
Children born per women 
2,32 2, 14 l,87 
2,13 2 I 21 2,12 1,79 
2 ,07 2,06 2 , 09 
2,8 5 2 I 36 2,2 2 2,16 
2,36 2 I 39 2,21 1,89 
2,98 2,.4 5 2 ,05 l, 78 
2,51 2,64 2,41 2,09 
2 I 3.4 2,19 l,98 1,79 
2,05 2, 14 1,97 1,68 
2,60 2,21 2,07 l,99 
2,22 2,03 1,88 1,92 
3,.47 3,51 3,2 5 3,04 
2, 36 2,30 2,15 l,88 
2 ,91 2,69 2,21 l,89 
2,22 2,49 2,45 2,07 
2,81 2,39 2,25 
3,00 2, 87 2,53 2,00 
2 , 29 2 ,44 2, 43 
2,56 2,59 2 ,5 9 2,25 
2 ,04 2,11 2 , 05 1,96 
2 , 21 2,18 2,09 1,77 
2 ,03 2, 35 2 ,36 2,04 
2 , 63 2 ,3 5 2,15 
1955 
l,75 
1,69 
2,02 
2,12 
1, 76 
1,69 
2,05 
1,83 
l,54 
1,93 
l,88 
2,65 
1, 70 
1, 83 
1,94 
2,25 
1, 9 4 
2. 32 
1, 98 
1,90 
1,6 5 
1 ,95 
2 , 08 
'19 60 
2 , 09 
l,68 
1,65 
2,01 
l,85 
1,88 
2 , 30 
l,76 
1, 9 3 
Alb&r.i.a 
l.'SSi' 
Ire:z.:"I~ 
Po!a::. : 
USJ.. 
A.:.st.:-.?: .:.a 
Ne ·• ::ea. a:--.~ 
C :-ee c:e 
C:z:e::!'":.cs!ov aitla 
r:-~:"".ce 
e u1;a:-:.a 
er 
Ro:"'la:. :.a 
Pe"!':.:.::a.l 
Spa.:.:"" 
Yuqcs!zs.:.a 
H~nca :-) 
J • ?•:-
co. 
No:-..:.? ·.· 
Bel c~:....-
Car.a: 6 
T!.r.:a !"I: 
Sw•C.•:-. 
Oen:-.i.:- ~ 
It.a l:: 
Aus:. :- .:.a 
er• 
Lu)le:-.= .... :- e 
Nit t.:-.e ; .::-.d 
Sw~t:e:-.a nc 
1930 
birth 
1900 
108 
78 
109 
78 
125 
91 
101 
76 
108 
73 
94 
120 
82 
79 
112 
110 
120 
19 55 
cohort 
19 30 
75 
7 4 
98 
90 
7 4 
69 
78 
84 
72 
87 
93 
75 
7 4 
68 
78 
Bo 
68 
101 
76 
90 
76 
83 
79 
Source: UN Demographic Yearboolts INED /Projet Internationa l D'Analyse oe.cigraphique Conjoncturelle/ 
'J 5 
19 55 
in t of 
1900 
80 
i O 
80 
53 
97 
76 
73 
7 1 
81 
54 
64 
94 
55 
60 
10 1 
83 
99 
11. Group of countries in the change of cohort fertility 
1. Increase between 1900 and 1930 birt•cohort, decrease between 
1930 and 1955 
1900-1930 1930 -1955 total 
increase decrease change 
1. France 125 78 97 
2. Norway 120 78 9 4 
3. England 120 83 99 
4. Sweden 112 90 101 
5. Switzerland 110 76 83 
6. Denmark 109 74 80 
7. Belgium 10 8 74 80 
8. Ireland 108 75 81 
probably: 
9. Austria 75 
2. Stable between 1900 and 1930 birth cohort, decrease after: 
1. GFR 101 72 73 
2. GDR 91 84 76 
3. Netherlands 94 68 64 
3. Continous decrease: 
1. Finland 78 69 53 
2. Italy 73 74 54 
3. Portugal 82 68 55 
4. Spain 79 76 60 
5. Greece 63 8 7 55 
probably: 
6. Yugos lavia 79 
7 . Poland 80 
4. Decreases be tween 1900 and 1930, stabilization after: 
1 . Czechoslovakia 78 90 70 
2. Hungary 76 93 71 
probably : 
3. Bulgaria 98 
4 . Romania 101 
12. Ultimate expected number of children 
/based on family planning surveys/ 
Year of Percentage distribution of Average 
country survey married women by ultimate ultimate 
expected number of children expected 
nwnber of 
0 l 2 3 4 5+ children 
aelgiwn 1966 4 20 33 21 13 8 2,50 
1975 4 19 4 3 21 9 4 2 , 25 
Cze c ho- 1970 l 9 58 23 5 4 2 ,37 
slovakia 1977 l 8 55 27 6 ) 2,40 
Denmark 1970 3 8 43 31 11 4 2,55 
1975 3 9 50 26 8 3 2,36 
Finland 1971 ) 10 47 23 10 5 2,55 
1977 ) 10 45 28 10 4 2 ,46 
France 1971 3 14 40 25 11 7 2,55 
1977 3 13 41 28 8 7 2,54 
Hungary 1966 2 20 53 16 5 3 2,14 
1977 2 15 6 4 15 3 1 2,08 
Nether lands 1975 
Poland 1972 l 9 43 27 11 8 2, 71 
1977 1 10 50 26 8 5 2,50 
UK 1967 8 19 4 1 18 8 5 2 , 21 
1976 4 12 50 21 9 4 2,31 
USA 1970 4 7 35 26 16 13 2,95 
1976 4 10 4 3 25 10 8 2,60 
Yugo- 1970 
~ lavia 1976 
Fertility Behaviour in the Context of Development United Nations, 
New York, 1987 , 362-363 p. 
~ 
Average 
number o f 
live birth 
/standar-
di zed I 
2,10 
1,79 
1,96 
1,96 
2, 0 4 
2 , 00 
2,04 
1 ,86 
2 , 12 
2 , 01 
1,68 
1,64 
1,51 
2,21 
2 ,07 
1,81 
1,83 
2 , 32 
2,08 
2 , 13 
2,17 
'-.J:.;.. 
.z 
lJ. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE BY llVE-BIRTH ORDER 
Country, 
year 
HR From this by live-
bi rth order 
Bulgaria 
19S5 2261 840 
1960 2104 854 
1970 217B 966 
1980 2055 992 
19B5 1976 917 
Czechoslovakia 
1960 226B B41 
1970 2072 900 
19BO 215} 906 
1984 2071 927 
Denmark 
1950 
1960 
1970 
19BO 
19B5 
Finland 
19so 
1960 
1970 
19BO 
19B5 
German OR . 
195S 
1960 
1970 
19BO 
19B5 
Greece 
~
1960 
1971 
19BO 
19B4 
Hun~ary 
195 
1960 
1970 
1980 
19B5 
Ireland 
1961 
1970 
1980 
19BJ 
2671 761 
2637 741 
1967 786 
15.\2 711 
1439 670 
30B7 905 
2669 879 
1B27 B56 
1633 771 
16.\0 659 
2209 807 
2209 BOJ 
2170 971 
1965 101 
1757 840 
2290 855 
2115 B59 
2J22 970 
2225 987 
1B25 711 
2676 
1BB5 
196} 
1925 
1B32 
929 
7BO 
9}6 
908 
B57 
3764 777 
J85B 950 
J22B B54 
2705 720 
.!!!il 1981 15.\0 71) 
776 
915 
915 
6 7B 
656 
Netherlands 
19 50 J065 
1960 J07J 
197 0 25BJ 
19BO 1600 
198 5 1511 
2 3 •• 
405 307 409 
765 228 257 
BIO 256 146 
772 1B6 105 
775 183 101 
726 JU 357 
705 258 209 
809 299 1)9 
750 270 12.\ 
747 451 512 
760 4BO 456 
700 Jll 170 
571 194 66 
52B 1B4 57 
802 555 825 
700 4)0 640 
5JB 234 199 
572 196 94 
5B6 26B 127 
6B6 J64 352 
632 )67 407 
661 300 2}B 
70B 157 6) 
647 194 76 
6U 334 455 
66B 300 2BB 
897 )0) 152 
8)6 28B 115 
698 224 92 
800 417 530 
575 252 27B 
677 lBl 169 
724 190 IOJ 
676 19B 101 
6B9 618 11B9 
799 652 1457 
754 6)0 990 
66 7 522 796 
546 195 86 
741 5}1 1017 
BJB 520 BOO 
868 4)7 )6) 
592 224 106 
5)7 212 10 6 
Distribution of 
live-birth (\) 
)7 
41 
u 
48 
46 
J7 
.\J 
42 
45 
Jl 
JO 
40 
46 
47 
29 
)) 
47 
•7 
40 
)7 
)6 
45 
52 
4B 
)7 
41 
42 
44 
44 
)5 
41 
48 
.\7 
46 
21 
25 
27 
27 
46 
25 
JO 
JS 
42 
4) 
2 
)2 
J6 
37 
JB 
)9 
J2 
)4 
JB 
)6 
JO 
JI 
)6 
)7 
)7 
26 
26 
29 
)5 
36 
Jl 
29 
JI 
)6 
37 
2B 
J2 
J9 
JB 
JB 
JO 
31 
35 
JB 
38 
18 
21 
2J 
25 
J6 
24 
27 
J4 
J 7 
J6 
) 
14 
11 
12 
9 
9 
15 
lJ 
14 
lJ 
18 
20 
16 
lJ 
lJ 
18 
16 
lJ 
12 
16 
17 
17 
14 
B 
11 
15 
14 
lJ 
lJ 
12 
16 
lJ 
9 
10 
12 
16 
17 
20 
19 
13 
I 7 
I 7 
I 7 
I 4 
14 
4+ 
IB 
12 
7 
5 
5 
16 
10 
6 
6 
21 
19 
B 
4 
II 
27 
24 
11 
6 
B 
16 
18 
II 
4 
4 
20 
14 
7 
5 
5 
20 
15 
9 
5 
s 
45 
JB 
J I 
29 
6 
)3 
26 
14 
7 
7 
Distributi on of 
final fe r til i t y 
( \ ) 
0 1 2 J 4• 
16 14 40 14 17 
15 9 54 12 II 
J 16 55 19 7 
I 22 59 l J 6 
B 14 59 1 J 5 
16 12 38 19 IS 
I 0 20 4 5 16 I 0 
9 10 51 22 B 
7 I B 48 19 B 
2 5 JO 21 2 4 
24 28 24 24 
21 9 J9 20 11 
29 14 JB 15 5 
J3 Ill 40 14 4 
10 10 2S 2J J2 
12 IB 27 IB 25 
14 J 2 JO lJ I 0 
2 J 20 JB 14 s 
34 7 J 2 19 B 
1912J21917 
20 17 2 7 I B 19 
J J l J 6 17 I J 
29 S 5 11 5 
16 19 45 15 5 
14 22 JI 15 18 
14 19 J7 17 lJ 
} 7 59 22 9 
I IS SS 21 B 
19 11 47 17 6 
7 1) JB 20 22 
22 21 32 14 11 
6 26 50 11 7 
9 lJ SJ 14 5 
14 IB AB 14 6 
22 9 7 IJ 49 
5 1S l 5 l 7 4B 
IS 10 12 21 42 
28 s 15 16 36 
29 I 7 J 5 I 5 S 
26 21 19 35 
9 B 32 22 30 
9 5 43 25 18 
J 2 9 37 16 6 
JA 12 22 I S 6 
Poland 
rrs.,.--
1960 
1970 
19BO 
19B 5 
Portugal 
1951 
1960 
1970 
19BO 
1985 
Romania 
1962 
1970 
19BO 
1984 
Sweden 
mo-
1985 
Yu~oslavia 
19 0 
1961 
1970 
1982 
Canada 
~
1960 
1970 
19BO 
19B 5 
USA 
mo 
1960 
1972 
1980 
1984 
~ 
19 50 
1960 
1970 
1980 
19B5 
Australia 
19BJ 
J524 977 
2B65 892 
2232 849 
2275 907 
2}4 2 907 
2814 710 
J092 950 
2881 970 
2067 89B 
1701 764 
1874 740 
28BB . 
2452 965 
2193 B5B 
l6BO 715 
1735 710 
3710 960 
26J6 BJ2 
2290 870 
2071 BBJ 
)))7 867 
J7J4 BBB 
225B 821 
1710 74B 
1627 711 
2823 826 
)404 772 
2021 750 
1BJ9 76B 
1803 756 
)604 B42 
1994 B5B 
2068 900 
1746 770 
172B 745 
1927 9JB 
922 
BOO 
654 
774 
BOl 
S46 
6J2 
697 
654 
542 
54B 
740 
697 
626 
618 
BBB 
6BJ 
6B4 
72B 
B57 
BB2 
623 
59J 
576 
862 
BS7 
5Bl 
5B4 
590 
956 
64'1 
B2J 
694 
681 
567 
711 914 
512 661 
3J 7 J92 
3J2 262 
368 266 
42B llJO 
427 IOBJ 
J76 BJB 
2 J4 28 I 
202 19J 
24) 21B 
34 J 404 
JlO JJB 
248 89 
296 llJ 
5BO 890 
J7B 74J 
2B4 452 
2J2 2J9 
5BO 1033 
698 1266 
J66 46B 
251 11 B 
2)7 lOJ 
509 626 
70J 1072 
JIJ 377 
284 20) 
277 lBO 
610 1196 
286 20J 
280 65 
233 49 
25B 44 
281 161 
Source : UN Demographic Yearbooks 
28 
JI 
JB 
40 
J9 
25 
31 
)4 
4) 
45 
40 
)9 
)9 
4) 
41 
26 
J2 
)8 
42 
26 
24 
J6 
46 
46 
29 
2J 
J7 
42 
42 
2) 
4) 
46 
46 
4J 
49 
26 
28 
29 
)4 
)4 
19 
20 
24 
J2 
J2 
29 
JO 
32 
J7 
)6 
26 
26 
JO 
J5 
26 
24 
28 
J 5 
)5 
)l 
25 
29 
32 
J) 
27 
)J 
60 
60 
J9 
29 
20 
18 
15 
15 
16 
15 
14 
lJ 
11 
12 
1) 
16 
14 
15 
17 
16 
14 
12 
11 
17 
19 
16 
15 
15 
18 
21 
16 
15 
15 
l7 
16 
16 
lJ 
15 
15 
26 
2J 
lB 
12 
11 
40 
J5 
29 
14 
11 
IB 
16 
15 
5 
7 
J5 
2B 
20 
12 
JI 
34 
20 
7 
6 
22 
J2 
19 
11 
10 
33 
10 
J 
J 
3 
7 
B 21 29 4J 
11 9 29 22 JO 
I 5 20 32 16 IB 
9 1) 44 20 l 4 
9 11 4) 21 16 
29 16 12 10 J J 
5 J 2 21 lJ 30 
} 27 32 lJ 24 
10 24 42 I J II 
24 22 }4 12 9 
26 19 JI 12 lJ 
4 2) 40 14 21 
14 16 )9 14 17 
29 9 JB I B 6 
29 9 J 2 21 B 
5 7 J l 19 J9 
17 15 32 13 24 
13 19 40 l J 16 
12 16 SO 14 IO 
14 
12 
IB 20 
25 16 
29 14 
14 
14 
25 17 
23 18 
24 17 
4 
14 21 
10 B 
23 B 
26 6 
2B 23 35 
IB 211 46 
26 I B 19 
}4 18 7 
}4 17 7 
35 25 26 
15 25 45 
27 15 17 
30 17 11 
3 I 17 10 
35 19 42 
37 I B II 
54 23 5 
46 20 3 
4 2 2 2 4 
6 3 7 29 I B I 0 
~ 
""I 
14. COMPLETED FERTILITY MODELLS OF HYPOTETICAL COHORTS 
Average Distribution of women by children /in %/ 
number of 
children 0 1 2 3+ 
2,00 10 20 so 20 
10 15 so 25 
10 lS so 25 
10 25 40 25 
1,90 10 lS 60 20 
10 20 so 20 
15 15 55 25 
20 15 40 25 
1,60 10 25 so 15 
10 30 40 20 
lS 20 4S 20 
20 20 3S 25 
10 1,70 10 20 60 
10 25 SS 10 
lS 20 so 15 
20 lS 4S 20 
1,60 10 30 so 10 
10 3S 40 15 
lS 2S 4S 15 
20 2S 3S 20 
1,50 10 3S so s 
lS 30 45 10 
20 2S 45 10 
25 20 40 15 
1. 40 15 40 40 5 
20 30 45 5 
20 35 35 10 
25 25 40 10 
25 30 40 s 1,30 
30 20 45 5 
30 25 35 10 
35 15 40 10 
1,20 30 25 40 5 
35 25 30 10 
35 20 40 5 
40 15 35 10 
v 
15. Completed cohort fertility by number of children bo rn 
(at age 45-49; based on population census data ) 
Type Ave rage Percentual distribution 
Country, of number of of women by number of 
birth cohort data children children born 
0 l 2 } 4+ 
1900-04 cohorts 
France 3 2.~20 11 28 25 15 21 
GFR 3 2, 170 21 2) 24 14 18 
Hungary 3 3,120 15 16 20 15 }4 
Norway } 2,281 15 21 27 17 20 
Portugal l J,166 20 15 16 12 }6 
Spain 2 J,427 16 10 16 16 42 
Switzerland } 2,JOO 22 18 23 15 22 
Yugoslavia l l, 160 18 9 11 11 51 
USA 2 2 ,696 15 17 19 15 }4 
Japan } 6,766 9 9 B JO 64 
1910-14 cohorts 
Al bania l 6,048 
Belgium 2 2,080 16 26 2) 14 21 
Bulgaria 2 2,6)6 7 17 }5 19 22 
Czechoslovakia 1 2,}26 15 18 JO 16 19 
France ) 2. 390 15 2} 24 16 22 
GOR ) 2,020 27 2} 25 13 12 
GFR 2 1,935 18 26 28 15 13 
Hungary 3 2,642 14 20 25 16 25 
Ireland 3 },912 13 
Norwa y 3 2. 314 14 
Netherlands J J,206 14 
Poland 2 J,128 9 14 21 20 37 
Portugal 2 ),537 12 
Spain 2 J,062 13 13 21 18 )5 
Switzerland ) 2. 370 20 
Yugoslavi a I J,521 14 12 18 13 41 
USA 2 2,402 18 19 25 16 22 
Japan ) 3,916 8 10 11 15 56 
1920-24 cohorts 
Belgium 2 2, 187 l} 26 24 15 22 
Bulgaria 2 2 ,368 4 19 46 16 15 
Czechoslovakia J 2,J5J JO 17 }5 20 18 
GOR J l. 861 19 26 29 14 12 
GFR 2 l, 9)1 16 27 29 15 13 
Hungary J 2. 324 JO 22 32 18 18 
Ireland 3 4,285 
Poland 2 J, 125 6 12 24 23 }5 
Portugal l 2,91} 17 19 20 I 3 31 
Romania 1 2, 465 15 21 25 15 24 
Spain 2 2. 920 JO I 3 26 20 31 
Yugoslavia I J. 521 14 15 25 17 29 
USA J 2,854 11 14 27 20 28 
Ja pan 3 2,760 8 JI 24 28 29 
..__\.'. 
(' 
1930-34 cohorts 
Belgi um 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslo vakia 
GOR 
GFR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Portuga l 
Romania 
Spain 
Yugoslavia 
USA 
1940-44 cohorts 
Bulgaria 
Czeches l ovakia 
GOR 
Hungary 
Portuga l 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
USA 
2 
2 
3 
l 
2 
3 
2 
l 
l 
2 
l 
l 
(estimated 
2 
3 
l 
3 
l 
l 
l 
l 
2,uo 
2,073 
2,245 
2,251 
2,350 
2,024 
2,930 
2,712 
2,297 
3 , 100 
2,457 
) , 106 
10 
3 
7 
11 
10 
7 
2 
14 
13 
7 
12 
11 
from fertility 
2 ,070 3 
2, 130 5 
1,925 B 
1 , 900 10 
2,510 12 
2 ,450 10 
2,430 11 
2 ,570 13 
23 
24 
17 
23 
24 
27 
14 
21 
23 
13 
19 
9 
28 
55 
42 
30 
33 
42 
35 
26 
29 
33 
34 
21 
of 35-39 
22 57 
17 50 
29 40 
26 46 
20 36 
21 33 
18 44 
13 31 
Source: UN Demographic Yearbooks, 1954-4986 
Type of data : 
l : All wome n 
2 Ever-married wome n (married, widowe d, d ivor ced ) 
3 : Marr ied women 
18 
10 
21 
18 
18 
15 
23 
14 
16 
23 
15 
22 
years ) 
11 
20 
15 
12 
16 
17 
14 
23 
22 
8 
13 
18 
15 
9 
26 
25 
19 
24 
20 
37 
7 
8 
8 
6 
16 
20 
17 
20 
THE RETURN TO REPI.ACEMENT FERTILITY: A MAGNETIC FORCE? 
Charles F . Westoff 
Office of Population Research 
Princeton University 
August 15 , 1988 
\.lhen the theory of the demographic transition was first advanced in the 
1930s, the final stage envisioned was one in which population had stabilized 
following the achievement of a very civilized balance of low mortality and low 
fertility. Sustained periods of below-replacement fertility, leading 
ultimately to declines in population growth, were not conceived as the next 
stage . There seemed to be a metaphysical assumption that some homeostatic 
device would operate to maintain the nice balance; somehow it was unthinkable 
that women would not bear two children on the average . 
A half century later , the latest UN fertility projections for Europe, 
following the medium trajectory, seem to make the same mystical assumptions 
(Figure 1). Their projected total fertility rates plateau at 1 . 8 and then, at 
the turn of the century, reassuredly begin to rise again to a level of 2.0 by 
the end of the first quarter of the 21st century. This is the UN's medium 
variant, which they state "represents the most plausible course of population 
trends in the future" (UN, World Population Prospects, New York, 1986, p. 1 ). 
The projections for Eastern Europe are even more revealing of this evident 
divine intervention: the decline in fertility is arrested at 2 . 1 in 1985-90 
and remains unchanged thereafter. In Western Europe, a TFR of 1. 8 is the 
lowest level portrayed, with the reversal in the curve heading back toward 
replacement beginning in 2010-15. Even West Germany, currently with the 
lowest TFR (1.4), begins to reverse its decline in the next five years and 
climbs back to near-replacement by 2020-25. The only countries failing to 
reach replacement by that time are Denmark, Finland, and Sweden , but the 
projected reversal in direction is clear there as well . 
The United States is yet another example of what might be described as 
the UN' s institutional optimism . In the U.S. the TFR , which has languished 
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unchanged at 1.8 for more than a decade , becomes rev italized in the next year 
or two, and then marches back to replacement in the next ten years and rema i ns 
at the magnetic pole of 2.1 thereafter . 
Indeed, it seems like a compass-like magnetic force that pul ls these 
countries out of their flirtations with population decline and restores 
demographic equilibriwn . ( It is noteworthy that none of these projections i n 
the mediwn series goes above a TFR of 2.1.) 
Quite aside from considerations of what motivates the UN's choice of this 
projection , the projected return to replacement provokes the question of the 
plausibility of such an asswnption. Period measures can be notorious ly 
unreliable guides that should warn us that the recen t precipitous declines i n 
annual fertili ty rates may be deceptive. The fundamental questions relate to 
the social trends that have been unfolding over a century or longer and their 
course in the future. 
Social Trends and Causes 
It would be comforting to look at the fut ure of reproduction with a clear 
understanding of exactly what caused the past decline of fertility . But the 
easy generalizations that seemed to serve so well have been made suspect by 
the findings of the European Fertility Study, which indicated that t he 
declines in fertility in the 19th and 20th centuries followed somewhat 
different paths in different places. There are no easy generalizations that 
can be supported unequivocally by empirical evidence. Nevertheless, several 
social trends have occurred over the past century or so that are difficult to 
dismiss as irrelevant to the broad sweep of historical decline in levels of 
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reproduction , despite the numerous particular exceptions and our inability to 
demonstrate their scientific validity. 
The decline of fertility in the West has been unfolding for a century or 
longer; it is not a phenomenon of the mid- or late-twentieth century. Th is 
means that its roots are not to be sought in the development of moder n 
contraceptive technology or in the legalization of abortion , howeve r much they 
may have facilitated the process in recent decades. 
Despite our inability to quantify the connections, the following , now 
familiar, his torical social changes labelled "modernization" seem to have 
played an important role in the third stage of the demographic transition: 
• the weakening of the family by the erosion of basic social functions 
it once performed -- most impor tantly, the economic and educational 
functions that were once the internal province of the famil y ; 
• the related transformation of a subsistence agrarian economy to an 
industrial and service economy, featuring a shift from a rural to an 
urban society, all of which contributed to a reduction in the 
economic value of children; 
• the spread of mass education and the reduction of illiteracy, 
exposing increasing proportions of people to modern ideas; 
• the decline of traditional religious authority and the increasing 
secularization of values; 
4 
• an ethos of rationality and individualism and a decline of fatalism; 
• the changing status of women as indexed by increasing employme nt 
outside the home and by their growing economic independence; 
• the growth of materialism and its modern form, consumerism; 
• the weakening of marriage, as indexed by the increase in divorce, 
cohabitation outside of marriage , and recent evidence of declining 
proportions ever marrying. This process -- a result of the social 
changes just enumerated - - has no doubt been accelerated by the 
increasing economic independence of women , which has loosened one of 
the primary rationales for marriage (viewing marriage as an exchange 
of male economic support for women's childbearing, childraising , and 
domestic services). 
The net result of these social changes has been the rationalization of 
reproduction, a process greatly facilitated by modern contraceptive technology 
and the availability of legal abortion. The small family norm that emerged 
diffused with varying time lags out from cities and across social classes , 
gathering a momentum of its own. Both structural and cultural forces have 
combined to transform the reproductive institution. 
5 
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The Future of Reproduction 
If one accepts these social changes as fundamental for the decline of 
fertility, it is instructive to raise the question of whether any of these 
trends shows signs of reversing direction, or whether there may be other 
social changes that would suggest a rise in fertility. Of course, many of 
these changes relate to the 19th century and earlier and have run their 
course, but some are more recent in origin and are still in process . 
There is certainly no expansion of the functions of the family, there is 
no return to a rural society, mass education is not declining, and religion in 
the West is not becoming more important. We may or may not hav e seen the end 
of rising divorce rates or of the postponement of marriage . Although informal 
cohabitat ion can be regarded as a functional substitute for some aspects of 
marriage, these certainly do not include fertility. 
Perhaps the most important social change that has not yet run its course 
and which seems incompatible with increases in childbearing is the growing 
economic independence of women. Although the rate of increase of female labor 
force participation is undoubtedly declining, the equalization of income of 
men and women still has some distance to go. As men and women become more 
equal economically, one important rationale for marriage will be further 
weakened. 
In addition, there will undoubtedly be further technological advances in 
contraception, the most recent of which is the French product RU-486. An 
analysis of the demographic effects of improvements in contraceptive practice 
on the fertility rates of several European countries suggests that fertility 
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could fall by as much as an additional ten percent b y the prevention of 
unwanted births alone. 
What social changes are occurring or are likely to occur that might 
reverse the downward slide of fertility? After all, we are not expecting any 
return to pre-transition levels; most concerned parties would be gratified by 
some assurance of replacement fertility. 
One response has been an accelerating program of government famil y 
allowances, many of which aim at reducing the costs of reproduction. These 
involve a variety of financial incentives for childbearing, housing and credi t 
programs, child care arrangements, maternity leaves, and so on . Although 
there have been increases in period fertility, especially in some Eastern 
European countries, that might reasonably be attributed to such government 
benefits, the conventional wisdom seems to be that the effects are on the 
timing and not on the ultimate number of births, and that the public soon 
takes such measures for granted. One can imagine a society in which public 
revenues are increasingly directed toward facilitating marriage and 
childbearing, but the best guess is that massive infusions of revenue will be 
required, with the demographic outcome still uncertain. 
Despite the various assaults on the institution of the family , it 
continues to survive. Divorced persons continue to remarry, and people still 
usually expect to marry and have children. Behavior does not always 
correspond with social norms, however; the proportions ever marrying are 
declining in some countries, and the proportions remaining childless or having 
only one child are increasing. The behavioral model that seems to be emerging 
is for young people to delay marriage until their late twenties, for the wife 
to work , and for childbearing to be postponed with effective contraception and 
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perhaps abortion until the mid- thirties . At that age, the var ious costs of 
children have increased , and many will stop at one or back into childlessness. 
It is not that women expect to remain childless, but rather that as fertility 
is postponed to later ages, the costs of childbearing increase; later does 
mean fewer. 
Abortion has played an important demographic role in several countries 
such as Japan and Rumania in earlier decades . It currently plays an important 
role in the U . S ., especially among young women with high rates of unintended 
pregnancy. The subject of abortion remains as controversial as ever, even 
though the rhetoric has now become quite predictable on both sides. There is 
no guarantee that liberal abortion policies will not be reversed in some 
countries and that some significant number of pregnancies might continue that 
would otherwise have been interrupted . But unless this happens in a country 
with little available contraception , the fertility impact is not likely to be 
great. 
Perhaps at the heart of the issue in the middle classes is whether modern 
couples will grow tired of consumerism and material advancement and invest in 
children . The answer does not seem positive , but modern society is highly 
vulnerable to changes in fashion, and having children could "catch on" again. 
Conclusion 
The bulk of the evidence points to the conclusion that fertility will 
remain low; indeed, it may even decline further. We began with the question 
of whether there is some built-in mechanism that magnetically will return 
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b e low- replacement fertility to the replacement level; the negative answer 
seems s e lf-evident . How low it will go is a question about which we can only 
speculate. West Germany has demonstrated that ve r y low leve ls o f period 
fertility can be realized . Negative rates of natural increase are indeed a 
reality . The theory of the demographic transition has to b e extended to 
include a fourth stage in which zero growth yields to population decline. 
Whether this is the final stage is the unanswerable question, since we are now 
moving into uncharted territory. 
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Table 1. UN Projections of Total Fertility Rates for Developed Countries.* 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020 
-55 -65 -75 -85 -90 -95 -2000 -05 -15 -25 
Developed Countries 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2 1 
Europe 2.6 2.6 2.2 1. 9 1. 8 1. 8 1. 9 1. 9 1. 9 2.0 
Eastern Europe 2.9 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2. 1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Northern Europe 2.3 2.8 2.0 1. 9 1. 8 1. 8 1. 8 1. 8 1. 9 2.0 
Southern Europe 2.6 2.7 2.5 1. 9 1. 9 1. 9 1. 9 1. 9 2. 0 2.0 
Western Europe 2.4 2.7 1. 9 1. 6 1. 6 1. 6 1. 6 1. 7 1. 8 2.0 
Australia 3.2 3.3 2.5 2.0 1. 9 1. 9 1. 9 1. 9 1. 9 1. 9 
United States 3.5 3.3 2.0 1. 8 1. 9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Canada 3.7 3.6 2.0 1. 7 1. 8 1. 8 1. 8 1. 9 2.0 2.1 
* 
Source: United Nations, World Demograt!hic Estimates and Projections. 19 50-2025. 
New York , 1988. 
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Paula Rantakallio, Antero Myhrman and Irma Moilanen 
Nr.me: Department of Public Health Science, University of Oulu , 
Oulu, Finland 
Title of Paper: 
Liberal abortion law and the wantedness of pregnancies 
Summary: 
The wantedness of pregnancies has been studied in .two birth 
cohorts in Northern Finland, before and after the introduc-
tion of the liberal abortion law of 1971 in order to deter-
mine the effect of the law on the number of wanted and un-
wanted deliveries. The two birth cohorts concerned represent 
96% of ~11 births in the region in 1966 (12 068 mothers) and 
99% (9 362 mothers) in 1985-86. 
The pregnancy was wanted in 62.9% of cases in 1966 and 91.8% 
in 1985-86. Wantedness was connected with age, in that the 
age groups in which childbearing was most frequent had the 
highest incidence of desired pregnancies. These age groups 
were 20 - 25 years in 1966 and 26 - 30 years in 1985-86. 
Each age group except that of mothers under 20 years had a 
higher percentage of wanted births in 1985-86 than in 1966. 
The percentage of wanted births was also higher in 1985-86 
than in 1966 in each parity group. In spite of the fact that 
there were 1.44 times as many births per women aged 15-49 
years in the former cohort, more wanted children were born 
to the age group 25 - 34 years in the latter cohort. 
This increase in wanted births is a sign of a successful 
family planning programme. Simultaneously with the change in 
the abortion law, more care was also taken through the 
maternal care system to prevent unwanted conceptions. About 
one sixth of all pregnancies were terminated by legal 
abortion during that period. 
Table. Induced abortions per women aged 15 - 49 years in 
Northern Finland in 1966 and 1984 
Year Number of Number of 
abortions women per 10.000 
1966 323 148248 22 
1984 1693 158334 107 
Name: Zden~k P a v 1 i k 
Title of Paper: General and specific features of the reprod1J.ct ::. on 
after demographic revolution 
Summary: 
The differences and specificities of the process of 
demographic revolution in individual countries and resion.s, 
in to-day developed and developing countries, have served 
often for denying the regularity and universality of this 
process. Such specificities are not surprisins if t~e dif-
ferent conditions, i.e. traditions, level of eco.r' O!".lic and 
social development, cultural background, religions, soci~l 
homogeneity or heterogeneity ••• , are taken into considera-
tion. The social factors (conditions) have increased their 
weight considerably during the decographic revolution. 
THe most important general feature has been the revo-
lutionary change in the approach to the nll!!lber of children. 
If only a few individuals before the demographic revolution 
willingly controlled the nwi:ber of their children, the hu:_;e 
majority of population do so deliberately after this pro-
cess. 
!OJ 
The demographic revolution is a relatively indepenient 
process and at the same time a part of mµny revolutionar~l 
changes in all social (incl. econoz::uhc) spheres which ca_~ 
be naraed as a global revolution of modeJ;n era. \'Ii th the 
CDR arround 10 per thous. in the world s average in 1988 , 
expectation of life at birth arround 60 years, the CBR 28 
per thous. and the world natural incre~se arround 17-18 per 
thous., the demographic revolution is in its second phase 
taking the world as a whole. 
The end of the demographic revolution in demograph i ca-
lly developed countries has created a completely new si t•'a-
tion ,never known before. A few authors contended already in 
1960 s that the countries after demographic revolution would 
face the depopulation but the probability of the rather 
stable replacement levelhas been accepted by the majority of 
them. Such an opinion has been sustained by the post-war 
baby boom in m~ countries. However, the constant decrees 
in the fertility levels in the G.FR, Austria, Netherla~ds 
and recently in Italy led several authors to seek the deeper 
conditions for it than it was previously admitted. This new 
demographic situation was even labelled as the second demo-
graphic transition. In spite of the considerable changes in 
the value system, to equal these changes with the first de-
mographic transition or the demographic revolution ( I am 
accepting them as synonyms. ) is the evident exageration 
which would never happen if the first demographic transition 
has been called more properly as a revolution taking into 
consideration revolutionary both quantitetive and qualita-
tives changes in the human reproductive behaviour. 
Name: PETER ZVIDR!iS 
Title of Paper: PATTERNS OF POPULATION REPRODUCTION IN THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE BALTIC REGION 
Summary: This research aims to specify the differentiation and 
tendences of population reproduction in three Soviet Baltic re-
publics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and the countries of the 
Baltic region (the GDR, Poland, West Germany, Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark) in the postwar period, as well as to draw prognozes in 
this field. For purposes of comparison data about Norway are also 
used. 
In the postwar period both the general and the specific fer-
tili ty rates were the highest in Poland, Finland, Lithuania and 
Norway. Intensity of population reproduction and natural increase 
were also the highest in these countries. Since the beginning of 
the 50ies, Latvia gives low fertility rate which is below the 
replacement level. Only a little higher it was in Estonia. Yet, 
as a result of a more active demographic policy it has noticeab~ 
ly increased (esp. in Latvia) and lately net reproduction coef-
ficient fluctuates around one (in view of real generations a 
little below). Irrespective of a lower mortality rate in the ca-
pitalist countries of the region, reduced population reproductioJ 
takes place during the last two decades. In West Germany and 
Denmark the net reproduction coefficient has fallen to o.6-0.7, 
which has resulted into a negative balance of natural population 
movement. Only slightly higher it is in the other capitalist 
countries of the region and the GDR. This indicator was above 
1.0 in the postwar period only in Poland and Lithuania, and even 
in Lithuania during last years extended population reproduction 
is not ensured" 
The existing very low fertility rate with a high level of 
population ageing will inevitably lead to a negative balance of 
natural population movement in all the capitalist countries of 
the region in the future. Therefore, it is not only in West Ger-
many and Denmark, but also in all Nordic countries that the most 
reliable prognosis is a decrease of absolute number of popula~ 
tion: in Sweden and Finland in the end of this century, in Nor-
way - at the very beginning of the next century. 
Population growth and fertility level are recognized{l987) 
as too low in the GDR and West Germany (in Sweden - only the 
fertility level), but the government of the GDR alone intends to 
stimulate the fertility and population increase actively. Also 
in the Baltic Soviet republics a complex of measures has been 
worked out to stimulate the natural population growth. The first 
complex demographic purpose-program in the USSR has been accep-
ted by the government of Latvia. Therefore it reasonable to 
prognose that in nearest futere essential differences in the 
levels of population reproduction intensity wilthremain: in all 
the socialist countries up to the end of the 20 century it 
will be close to simple replacement level (net reproduction 
coefficient from 0.9 to 1.1), while in the capitslist countries 
there will be a reduced reproduction level (0.7 - 0.9)o 
Name: Joop de Beer , Netherlands Central fureau of Statistics 
Title of Paper: TIME-SERIES MIITHODS FOR PROJECTIOO AGE- SPECIFIC FERTILITY 
Summary: 
Statistical time-series models can be used for projecting the annual 
total number of births from its own past. As this approach ignores 
changes in size and distriootion of the pop.llation affecting total 
numbers of births , time-series models may be applied to total fertility 
rates instead . In that case, however, no attention is paid to the 
difference between changes in fertility caused by a changing average 
family size and those caused by a changing age pattern of fertility . 
Hence it is useful to look at separate age-specific rates . 
Recently several models have been suggested for projecting a complete set 
of age-specific rates simultaneously. Thompson et al. (1987 ) suggested to 
describe the age pattern of fertility in successive calendar years by 
Ganma functions . The parameters of these functions can be projected by 
using statistical time-series models , such as ARIMA-models. De Beer 
(1985) developed the CARIMA-model which is capable of describing both 
changes in fertility rates between cohorts and between ages. Willekens 
and Baydar (1984) decompose the observations into age- , perioo- and 
cohort effects . ARIMA-models can be used to project the separate effects . 
One advantage of the APC-model is that the estimated parameters seem 
better suited for demographic interpretation. However, due to incomplete 
fertility of recent cohorts the interpretation is not without problems. 
The forecasting perfonnance of the CARIMA-model and the APC-model is 
examined for IXrtch age-specific fertility rates in the perioo 1971-1984. 
In projecting total fertility rates up to five years ahead the average 
errors of the two models do not differ very much . Both models perform 
slightly better than ARIMA-models directly applied to series of total 
fertility rates . If parity-specific rates are used, the projections of 
the CARIMA-model are more accurate than those of the APC-model . 
Statistical time-series models such as the ARIMA model describe local 
trends. The forecasts of these models are mainly determined by changes in 
the observations at the end of the observation perioo . Therefore these 
models are especially useful for short-zun forecasting. 
Alternatively, the forecasts of dete:nninistic models describing global 
trends, emphasize the importance of developnents in the medium or long 
zun. A problem in using such models is the selection of the correct 
model . The forecasts depend heavily on the choice of the model. For 
forecasts in the medium tenn this problem may be solved by using linear 
spline functions which are appropriate for describing strongly different 
developnents. 
Linear spline functions can be used for projecting separate age-specific 
fertility rates . However, if fertility rates for different ages are 
projected independently, the forecasts may not be consistent . For that 
reason a new model is introduced in which the age pattern of the 
coefficients representing the changes in the fertility rates between 
successive calendar years or cohorts is described by a cubic spline 
function. This model is capable of describing widely varying patterns. By 
way of an illustration the model is applied to age-specific fertility 
rates for a number of countries . 
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N&me: Hans van de Giessen , Netherlands Central :&lreau of Stat istics 
Title of Paper: BIRTII EXPECTATIONS AS A GUIDE FOR FERTILITY HYPOTHESES IN 
POPULATION PROJECTIONS 
Summary: The use of birth expectations for fertility hypotheses in 
population projections is not a new idea. Since the fift ies 
demographers (especially in the United States ) have been 
asking women in surveys their intentions with respect to 
having children and have been trying to use their answers as a 
guide to forecast fertility. 
The degree of success of these attempts depends strongly on 
the reliability of such expectations. Past experience has 
taught us that on average women overestimate their future 
num"'ber of children . In the sixties and seventies in particular 
forecasters all tut lost their confidence in the predictive 
power of birth expectations . Obviously, at the time women 
included in the surveys who had to state their expectations 
did not anticipate the dramatic fertility decline that was to 
occur in almost all Western countries in that period . 
Nevertheless some demographers continued to "'believe in the 
potential predictive power of birth expectations . Arrong them 
were the researchers of the Department for Po:E=Ulation 
Statistics of the Netherlands Central B..lreau of Statist i cs . 
This department prepares the national population forecasts for 
the Netherlands and organized fertility surveys including 
questions about birth expectations in 1975 , 1977, 1982 (wi t h a 
f ollow up in 1985) , and 1988. A research project studying the 
reliability of birth expectations and the use of birth 
expectations for population projections started in 1979 . 
Some results so far are presented in this paper. 
From the study of the reliability and stability of bi r th 
expectations it turns out that nowadays D .. rtch women, afL.a 
group. provide fairly accurate forecasts. This conclusion, 
that has to "be monitored each time new survey data come 
available , does not mean that there will "be no overest imat i on 
at all any more. In order to make the expectations suitable 
for forecasting p.irposes, some adjustments have to "be made. 
Three adjustment methods that have been developed .at the 
Department are discussed . Applied to the 1982 and 1985 surveys 
an average expected number of life-time births to women born 
in the early 1960' s of around 1.6 results . If alreaqy 
available the adjusted results from the most recent'survey 
(1988) will "be presented too. 
The overall conclusion of the paper will be that, provided t he 
questioning in the survey is right, provided the interviewers 
know their job, and provided nonresponse will not influence 
the results too iruch, birth expectations from surveys can be , 
with some adjustments, a useful source of information f or 
forecasting fertility, perhaps the only one we really have. 
In addition, however, f orecasters should always be attentive 
to possible societal changes affecting reproductive behaviour 
that will not be foreseen by respondents in surveys . 
Name: Ing. Jaroslav Kraus 
Title of Paper: 
Summary: 
The Future of Reproduction - Results of 
Czechoslovak Projection 
In the first half of 1987 the statistical bodies ela-
borated the projection of the Czechoslovak population, an 
important basis for preparation of socio-economic prognosis. 
The projection was computed by sex, age units and in one years 
steps to 2010 but the computation was prolonged up to 2030. 
Population projection was calculated - contrary to previous 
project~ons - in the three variants: hight, medium and low. 
The results of the three variants are commented together with 
input pararnetres and problems of methodology. The projection 
was compiled in territorial classification for Czechoslovakia, 
the Czech and the Slovak republics and for regions and districs 
of Czechoslovakia. The input parametres takes into acco unt 
the further, however, very slight decline of realized fertilit y 
and a certain improvement of mortality conditions. In the 
migrations balance between the Czech and the Slovak Socialist 
Republics there is apparent a further equalizing of the national 
economics. By the results of the low projection variant ·the 
number of the Czechoslovakia population will reach the peak 
after 2000 and then it will start to decrease slighly . From 
the result of high variant of the projection there is on the 
contrary issues a significant - and continuous growth of the 
number of the population in Czechoslovakia. The population 
development after 2010 is characterized by considerable diver-
sity: by the results of a low variant of the projection the 
number of Czechoslovak : population will decline under 15 million: 
in 2030 and by results of a high variant of the projection 
it will grow above 17.5 millions of inhabitans, 16.5 millions 
being however the most probable results in 2030 /medium 
variant/. 
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Fernando Kajulton and T.q. Balakrishnan 
Developments in Nuptiality and Fertility in Canada 
l~ith total fertility rates in many develoned countries stabilized 
around the replacement level for more than a decade, research interests 
naturally shift from investi9ation of summary measures such as mean number 
of births to a more relevant investigation of chan~es in timin9 of fertility 
and their deoendence on chanqes in marital patterns. This oaper exemplifies 
one such investioation, making use of the marital and fertility histories 
obtained throunh the Canadian Fertility Survey 1984, and examines the trends 
over cohorts in timin~ and type of transitions amon9 marital and parity 
states. 
The anal ysis is carried out first throu9h a semi-Markovian framework 
built on samole paths of women . An exami nation of a0e-and-duration-s recific 
transition probabilities in a system of marital and parity states for three 
aqe-cohorts of women in the sample reveals that the most conspicuous change 
over cohorts lies in the very first transition made in marital / reoroductive 
life after aae 15 - either to first marriaqe or to first cohabitation. This 
leads to investi9atina further how the first transition affects subseouent 
transitions. Towards this end, the semi-Markov model is refined to consider 
chanqes in a system of couoled and dynamicall y interdependent states. In 
fact, this attempt leads to the snecification of a non-Markovian model, as 
past transitions have to be necessarily included in the calculation of 
transition probabilities. 
The first transition after age 15 does indeed affect the timin~ and 
intensity of births, and throws liaht on the chanqes in fertility behavi our 
runninn parallel to changes in marital behaviour. To spell out a f ew 
salient features of t his anal ysis : (i) Thou0h cohabitation still larqel y 
serves as a prestaqe to marriage, youn~er women are showin9 a deviatin9 
trend in the sense that first births, if not subseouent births also, are 
more likely to occur in cohabitation. (ii) Acceatance of new marital 
patterns is revealed by the fact that cohabitin9 
women are at ease to continue chi ldbearinn C cohort 15-24 
in cohabitation as those in mari ta 1 uni on DD cohort t's- 34 
do . However, the oroporti on of women who • cohort 3,~ 49 have their second/third births is much less 
amono cohabitinn women than amonq the marr-
; ed.. (iii) An examination of cornbi ned pro-
babi 1 i ti es of typical sequences of transitions 
(presented in the accomoanyinq dia9ram in the 
case of first births) reveals that 40% of first 
births will take place in the traditional manner 
in marriage but will be flanked by births resul-
tin9 from the new life style of cohabitation 
as an authentic state in itself 
or as a prestage to marriage. 
(iv)Hiaher order births will be the 
orivileae of women who follow the 
traditional norm of fertility i:1 
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Title of Paper: Do Excess And Deficit Fertility Really Offset One Another? 
Summary: 
Sollle Econometric Evidence Fran The United States 
Studies of the validity of survey data on expected or desired fertility 
have generally concluded that positive and negative errors lll9de by indivicUils 
Wien predicting their own fertility are offsetting, so that aggregate measures 
of average desired f1111ily size or expected canpleted fertility are still 
useful for population forecasting. This paper considers the ~stion of 
offsetti~ errors in the context of a 111.Jltivariate model of desired family 
size and children ever born for a ~le of "'1ite Nrried women fran the Panel 
Study of lncane Dynamics in the lklited States. The lllOdel corrects for the 
censoring of desired f1111ily size by attained f1111ily size to prcdJC:e the 
lllderlying distribution of c1.111.1lative and desired fertility in the s~le. 
This distribution is used to calculate the percent and average rurber of 
excess and deficit births for women classified by age, ed.Jcation, merital 
duration, residence, income, ~loyment status, work experience and re li gion. 
Particular attention is given to the distributions of excess ard deficit 
fertility for women near the end of childbearing. 
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Projections des menages et des families 
un etat de la question 
Les effets de la demographic se sont longtemps consacres en priorite a 
)'analyse des phenomenes qui reglaient )'evolution globale de la population, fe-
condite et mortalite, nuptialite aussi dans la mesure ou celle-ci etait liee a la fecon-
dite, migrations, enfin interdependance de ces facteurs. L'etude de la repartition 
de cette population en unites primaires de residence n'etait pas totalement negli-
gee, mais clle apparaissait commc unc annexe sans grande importance de la demo-
graphic veritable. On s'y bomait generalement a des constats. Seules, semblait-il , 
des taisons administrativcs justifiaicnt apres chaque reccnsement une serie de ta-
bl!!au;; regroupes en deux parties, l'une sur !cs families, l'autre sur les menages. 
On y trouvait generalement peu d'infonnations sur la structure interne de 
ces ldites. Pour l'essentiel , Jes donnees etaient analysees suivant les caracteri s-
fr~ues demo-economiques des "chefs de menages". Une distribution des menages 
suivar1i: leur taille, par groupe d'age du "marqueur", constituait la donnee la plus 
utile sans doute pour l'utilisateur administratif. 
Quant a J'idee de calculer des projections de menages ou de familles. elle sem-
blait a beaucoup un exercice methodologiquement difficile et pratiquement gra-
tuit. Au demier colloque des demographes franc;ais (Grenoble, 1987), qui portait 
pourtant sur "Les perspectives" unc communication seulement traita des me-
nages 1. 
La situation pourtant avait commence a changer depuis 1975. A partir de cette 
date, mais surtout apres 1980, la frequence des recherches et des publications sur 
!'evolution de la structure des menages ct des famillcs augmenta considerable-
mcnt. 11 n'cst pas question d'en faire ici unc liste meme approximative. Le nombre 
des communications prescntees a ccttc seance temoignc quc cet interet est loin 
d'avoir cede. Indiquons en passant quclqucs-unes des organisations qui 
s'cfforcerent de coordonncr la rcchcrchc dans cc domaine le CICRED au debut de 
la prescntc deccnnic (reunions l Paris de 1982 ct 1984) ; l'IUSSP avec la creation de 
dcux comites succccssifs sur l'cvolution rccente et future de la Camille ; et mainte-
1 Claudie Louvot, Projection du nombrc des menages jusqu'en l'an 2010. VIII~me Colloque 
National de Demographic, Les projections demographiques, Actes du colloque, tome I, 
Paris, PUF, 1987, 135-150. 
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nant l'llASA. Simultanement, mais de maniere dispersee, des efforts etaient faits 
un peu partout par les demographes pour renouveler les methodes de projection. 
Le memorandum prepare en 1987 par Heeren et Keilman foumit sur ce point une 
excellente documentation dont ii est inutile de reprendre ici le contenu 1. Plus re-
cemment encore le livre edite par Keilman, Kuijsten et Vossen apporte une sorte 
de syn these des progres methodologiques realises au cours des recentes annees 2 . 
Pour qui s'interesse a la question, i1 est difficile de ne pas consulter ces deux do-
cuments. De meme, lira-t-on avec profit le rapport du comite organise par l'IUSSP 
sur la demographic formclle de la famille 3. Notre intention n'cst pas de reprendre 
cc qui a deja etc excellement dit, mais de tenter de comprendre, tres partiellement, 
lcs ressorts de cette evolution : "Pourquoi ce sursaut recent ? Pourquoi aussi la 
longue stagnation anterieure ?". 
I - Un territoire enclave et delaisse 
Plusieurs raisons rendent compte de !'hesitation des demographes a traiter 
des donnees collectives et a fortiori a tenter, dans ce domaine, des projections. La 
premiere est sans doute que la formulation des concepts et la construction des ty-
pologies etaient, d'un pays a l'autre, tres diffcrentes. Comment, sans comparaisons 
possibles, depasser la description d'une situation particuliere, celle d'un pays ? Le 
livre de Le Bras sur ce sujet temoignait bien de la surprise et du desarroi du demo-
graphe lorsqu'il tentait simplement d 'etablir une certaine comparabilite entre des 
donnees radicalement hetcrogenes 4 . Recemment encore, Wall faisait, Jui aussi, 
l'cxperience de ces difficultcs S . 
Par ailleurs on voyait mal comment articuler menages et families : i1 y avait 
des menages a plusieurs familles, d'autres sans famille ; on rencontrait des me-
nages formcs de la seule famille ; d'autres qui accueillaient un ou plusieurs h6tes 
permanents. Ne s'engageait-on pas ici sur un terrain mouvant, ou ii ctait difficile 
de trouver en itincraire sur ? 
1 H. Heeren et N. Keilman, Proposal for an international comparative study among IIASA 
member countries, The Hague, Octobre 1987. 
2 N. Keilman, A. Kuijsten, A. Vossen, Modeling household formation and dissolution, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988. 
3 J. Bongaarts, Family demography : methods and their application, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1987. 
4 Herve Le Bras, L'enfant et la famille, Paris, OCDE, 1979. 
5 R. Wall, Behond the nuclear family, in Demography of the family, Paris, CICRED, 1984. 
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Une autre difficulte, et elle subsiste toujours, venait du fait que certains me-
canismes qui reglent la formation et la transformation des menages relevent non 
des facteurs demographiques mais de contraintes cconomiques ou de mouvements 
culturels . On voit bien que l'etroitesse du pare de logements influence la structu re 
des menages, mais il est difficile de preciser !'incidence exacte de ce facteur. Plus 
delicat encore pour un demographe, d 'integrer dans ses projections !'evolution a 
terme de cc pare . De meme les normes de decohabitation ou de re -cohabitati on 
cntre parents et enfants sont-elles influencecs a la fois par des contraintes eco-
nomiques comme le chomage et par des tcndanccs a caracteres culturels, comme le 
desir d'acquerir le plus vite possible et de garder le plus longtemps possible son 
autonomic residcntielle. Ccs "extcrnalites" etaient pour les demographes des causes 
d'incertitudes et, sans doute, des motifs suffisants pour se mefier de cc champ de 
recherche . 
A notre avis pourtant, la raison essentielle de leur reticence etait le senti -
ment que cc territoire n 'appartenait pas a la veritable demographic. Plus precise-
ment peut-etre etaient-ils convaincus que les progres qui pourraient et re fait s 
dans le domaine des donnees collectives ne retentiraient pas sur l'analyse des 
comportements individuels. Qucls rapports existaient entre ces distributions de la 
population en un ites elementaires et les problemes centraux de la fecondite et de 
la mortalite ? Qui aurait songe a une enquete mondiale sur les menages ? 
D'ou vint le renouveau d'interet pour cc theme ? Incontestablement, Jes de-
mandes de la pu issance publique furent ici decisives . Celle-ci avait desormais be-
soin d'informations sur Jes donnees collectives, ou plutot elle voyai t soudain com-
bien ces donnees lui etaient indispensables. Plusicurs raisons Jui donnerent 
conscience de cettc neccssite. La premiere tient desormais au besoin de planifica-
tion du budget social. Deux sous-populations semblaient se developper d'une ma-
niere rapide : celles des personnes igees beneficiaires de pensions, mais aussi de 
services medicaux dont le cout augmentait avec l'ige ; celle enseuite des famill es 
atypiques, economiquement fragiles, et en paniculicr, les menages monoparen-
taux . 
Dans le second cas, le poids relatif de ces menages etait longemps demeure a 
peu pres constant. Les penurbations dcmographiques observces depuis 1965 
avaient rompu cette stabilitc. D'autre pan, au moment ou les besoins devena ient 
plus imponants. les ressources de l'Etat ctaient affectees par une crise economique 
qui ne fut pas tenue longtemps pour conjoncturelle. Les administrations res sen-
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taient done l'urgente necessite de projections sur la repartition des menages et des 
families. 
Autre facteur favorable, et celui-la decisif : au moment ou la demande se fai-
sait pressante, l'ordinateur paraissait apporter le moyen d'y repondre et, de fait, 
les progres realises depuis dix ans n'auraient pu, sans cet instrument, eussent etc 
impossibles. 
Enfin, le probleme de l'articulation entre menages et families s'orientait vers 
une solution. Dans la theorie, Ryder montrait comment se complexifiait progressi-
vement l'unitc clementaire, de l'individu au couple. du couple a la famille et de la 
famille au menage 1. En mcme temps, dans la realite, on assistait a une progressive 
simplification de la structure des unites elementaires dans les pays industriels. Les 
menages a deux families devenaient marginaux ; ceux ou etait accueilli un hate 
permanent, rares . II semblait done possible de s'entendre sur une typologie som-
maire mais qui pouvait servir de base a d'utiles comparaisons. 
Figure 1 Une typologie des menages (Overton et Ermisch) 
Menages simples Menages complexes 
Mena~es sans famille l oersonne Plusieurs personnes 
Menages avec famille 
Couples avec enfant(s) sans aucun hote permanent avec hate(s) permanent(s) 
Couples sans enfant sans aucun hote permanent avec hote(s) permanent(s) 
Un parent + enfant(s) sans aucun hate permanent avec hote(s) permanent(s ) 
dont meres sans aucun hote permanent avec hote(s) permanent(s ) 
dont peres sans aucun hote permanent avec hote(s) oermanent(s) 
Source E. Overton et J. Ermisch, Minimal households units, Population Trends, 
Printemps 1984. 
Le terme "simple" signifie que le menage est compose uniquement par les 
membres de la famille ; "complcxc", symetriquemcnt, indique qu'un hate , appa-
rcntc ou non. en fait panic. 
A partir de cette typologie, des comparaisons clcmentaires sont possibles. 
l N. Ryder, Recents developpements in the formal demography of the family, International 
Population Conference, Florence, 1985. Vol. 3, IUSSP, 1985, pp.207-220. 
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Figure 2 Evolution de la distribution des menages 
(1960-1982) 
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Source L. Roussel, Evolution recente de la structure des menages dans 
quelques pays industriels, Population, 6, 1986. 
Que pouvait-on attend re de tels tableaux ? Peu d 'informations en real ite, et 
davantage de questions que de reponses. On y lira certain es grandes tendances, 
com me la diminution des menages composes d'un couple avec en fan ts, et encore la 
progression rapide des menages d'une personne. De simples constats , done , et 
sommaires puisque la compos ition des menages d'une personne, d'un Etat a un 
autre, varie considerablement suivant la repanition en sexe, age et statut matri -
monial. A plus fone raison , ne pouvait-on attendre de ces observations des projec-
tions serieuses pour l'avenir. 11 est bien difficile en effet de "projeter" cc dont on 
ignore les mecanismes de formation et de dissolution. Comment decider dans ces 
conditions si une tendance observee depuis 1965 allait ou non se prolonger ? 
Des perspectives furent pounant tentees suivant la methode dite des "taux de 
chefs de menage". LA, on comparait groupe d'ige par groupe d'age, et d'un rccen -
sement A l'autre, les pourccntages de chefs de menage (ou de personnes de refe-
rence) dans l'ensemble d~ la population. On obtenait. en prolongeant les tcn-
dances, des proportions de chefs de menages, done des menages. A ccheance par 
exemple de cinq ans. Des projections suivant le statut matrimonial et la presence 
d'enfants permettaient d'obtenir ensuite une projection des menages suivant lcur 
composition. Tel est par exemple, le type de travail realise par Louvot et cite plus 
haut. 
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Enfin, l'idee de cycle de vie familiale parut alors utilisable pour mieux com-
prendre , et eventuellement calculer plus precisement, !es projections. A un ins-
tant donne, Jes menages se repanissaient, en somme, en fonction de la phase at-
teinte dans le cycle : ici couple encore sans cnfant; a l'autre extremite "nid vide" . 
Ne pouvait-on pas faire "vieillir" de cinq ou dix ans ces menages et voir quelle se-
rait !cur distribution apres ce delai ? Telle ctait du moins l'idee generale. On quit-
tait ainsi le simple constat de tendance ; on cntrait dans la coherence d'une his-
toirc, d'un cycle regle a la fois par la biologic et !es institutions. Ne s'approchait-
on pas ainsi d'une intelligibilite des changements ? 
Le malheur fut que l'idce de cycle familial devint obsolete avant d 'avoir 
vraiment cte appliquee. Plus prccisement, son application n'apparut pertinente 
quc pour comprendre une situation depasscc, celle ou un modele unique reglait 
l'evolution des menages. On comprend aisement que, dans une telle situation, la di-
versite des menages tenait avant tout au fait qu'a un meme moment, ceux-ci 
ctaicnt a des phases differentes. Si l'on prend un modele regle par un certain ca-
lendrier de mariage, par l 'indissolubilitc des unions, par une fecondite non 
controlee, par le remariage rapide des hommes jeunes en cas de veuvage, par la 
cohabitation de l'aine marie avec scs parents, par le depart du cadet marie, on ob-
tient une image approximative de la distribution des menages et, en paniculier, on 
peut expliquer par U, au moins en partie, la juxtaposition de menages a deux fa-
milies ct de menages constitues par une famillc nuclcaire. 
Impossible pourtant d'appliquer cc modele des lors que les separations ne 
sont plus rcglees seulement par le calendrier relativement stable de la mortalite , 
mais par des decisions volontaires dont la frequence est difficilement previsible. 
L'unitc clcmentairc permanente cesse alors d'etre le menage , mais se reduit a 
l'individu. Cclui-ci, scul, dcvicnt un support durable de probabilitcs. Le recul de la 
mortalitc avant 60 ans ct le caracterc exccptionnel du divorce avaient , un temps, 
confcrc au cycle familial une consistancc suffisante pour que le concept puisse 
scrvir de cadre l des projections. Mais cette conception thcorique avail a peine cte 
claborcc qu'cllc cessait de correspondre l la rcalitc. C'cst cc que soulignait avec 
humour Le Bras dans un article intitulc : "Le cycle de la vie familialc : une nou-
vcautc deja pcrimce ?" 1 
H. Le Bras, Le cycle de la vie familiale : une nouveaute deja perimee, Dialogue n°72, 1981. 
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A ce propos aussi, Heeren cite unc phrase de Birg, elle aussi un peu provo-
cante : "The family cycle is in fact less cyclic than before" 1. En meme temps . ii 
devenait evident que Jes biographies individueJles SC diversifiaient de plus en 
plus. Dans la generation 1930 en France, 85% environ des individus avaicnt suivi 
l'itineraire classique : mariage , enfants, "nid vide" ,veuvage. Cette homogeneite 
avait cesse et ccla non seulement en raison d'une distinction entre ceux qui divor-
~aient et ceux qui ne le faisaient pas . En effet, les evenements non legaux multi-
pliaicnt soudain lcs cas de figure : unc vie commune pouvait commencer par une 
simple cohabitation ; un cnfant pouvait naitre dans cette situation ; Jes conjoints 
pouvaient, apres ou sans mariage, sc separer sans divorce. Une seconde union de-
venait moins probable, du moins sous la forme d'un mariage. Enfin la cohabitation 
effective n'etait plus la seule forme de couple : parmi les jeunes, non maries et non 
cohabitants, un tiers , en France, auraient unc relation stable sans co-residence 
Mais aussi, ct cc n'etait pas a un handicap leger, il etait devenu evident que 
depuis 1965, on avait quitte une zone d'eaux calmes et que les turbulences ren -
daient plus difficile encore une prevision des evolutions prochaines. Allait-on 
vers un apaisement de ces mouvements ou vers une poursuite ? Et sur quels cri-
teres fonder son choix ? Pouvait-on oublier Jes renversements de situation de 1945 
l 1965 ? La mode des "communautes" s'etait dissipee, mais par contre la frequence 
des cohabitations paraissait correspondre l un changement durable . L'evidence de 
ces difficultes devait pounant ceder devant la necessite, en depit de ces incerti-
tudes, de foumir des projections. 
II Les routes ouvertes 
Les tentatives de projections realisees depuis trois ans sont tres nom breuses. 
Cenaines adoptent encore la methode des "taux des pcrsonnes de references" . Ces 
anciens chefs de menages. Elles ne sont pas sans presenter une cenaine utilite . 
Les plus recentes. celles de Louvot 2, Kono 3 ct Linke 4, sont, dans leur genre, tres 
au point. 
1 H. Birg, A biographic theory of aging and fertility, Sopron 1986. Cit~ par Heeren, op.cit. 
p.8. 
2 C. Louvot, Projection du nombre des m~nages l l'horizon 2010 collection de l'INSEE, S~rie 
D, 129, F~vrier 1988. 
3 S. Kono, The hcadshit rate method for projecting households, in J. Bongaans and alii, op. 
cit. p.287-308, 1987. 
4 W. Linke, The headship rate approcb in modeling housecholds : the case of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, in : N. Keilman ct alii, op. cit p.108-112. 
8 
Elles semblent pourtant les expressions ultimes d'une conception aujourd'h ui 
depassee. Elles sont considerees en effet comme "statjgyes " parce qu 'elles se bor-
nent a observer des changements de stock a stock. On observe des distribu tions 
successives des menages, mais les flux ne sont pas analyses . Dans ces conditions, 
on constate, on ne comprend pas. Les methodes aujourd'hui preconisees et de plus 
en plus souvent pratiquees doivent etre "dynamjgues" c'est-a-dire montrer les me-
canismes qui expliquent le passage d'une observation transversale a to a une autre 
l to+x. 
C'etait deja ta, !'ambition des recherches de Festy 1 et de Rallu 2 . II ne 
s'agissait de rien de moins que de faire le point d'une situation a une autre a partir 
des evenemcnts enregistres dans I'intervalle. On se proposait done de marier l'etat 
civil et les recensements, Jes sequences d'evenements individuels et la structure 
des donnees collectives. On s 'effor~ait en somme de "desenclaver" !'anal yse des 
menages, de reintroduire lcur etude dans une demographic unifiee. Les types de 
menages etaient finalement consideres comme des sous-populations auxquelles on 
appliquait des "tables d'evenements multiples" . Bien entendu, ii fall ait ic i aussi 
choisir des parametres, qui pcrmettaicnt de projeter les tendances observees. Mais 
l partir d'informations classiqucs, on proposait des modeles coherents ou etait pris 
en comptc l'cnsemble des donnees disponibles. 
Aussi bien, la remarque de Fcsty parait-clle justifiee : "Ces projections, ec rit-
il, n 'apparaissent done pas comme un sous-produit de la demographic, mais comme 
un lieu privilegie ou sc rcnouvcllc sans ccssc le stock des methodes et ou celles-ci 
demontrcnt lcur feconditc" 3 . 
La faiblesse de cette mcthodc tient a son propos meme. II s'agissait de faire le 
pont entre deux types de donnces rcgulicrement enregistrees. Mais qu 'advient- il 
quand se dcveloppe le monde flou et difficilcment mesurable des componements 
"hors-la-loi" ? Tant quc les menages induits demeurent marginaux, d'une propor-
tion inferieure a 10% par excmple, on pcut bien proceder a des ajustements ap-
proximatifs. Mais peut-on considerer qu'il en est encore ainsi ? II n'est pas rare 
dans la tranche d'!ge 20-24 ans quc les couples non maries representent le tie rs 
1 Patrick Festy et Jean-Louis Rallu, Construction et reconstitution des familles fran~aise s. 
Etat-civil et recensements de 1968 et 1975 Population l, 1981, p.63-92. 
2 Jean-Louis Rallu, Projection des familles aux 1-1 -1990 et 1-1-1995 , Population, 3/1986, 
p.511-532. 
3 P. Festy, La projection des sous-populations principes et illustrations, Actes du 
Colloque de Grenoble, op. cit., p.202. 
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des unions. Recemment, une enquete de l'INED montrait a la fois la difficulte 
d'evaluer les situations atypiques et !'importance de certaines sous-populat ions 
generalement negligees ainsi Jes enfants de parents separes sans avoir ete ma-
ries representaient 40% de l'eff ectif des enfants de parents maries et divorces 1 . 
Le modele construit par Bongaarts et son equipe differe assez peu de celui de 
Festy et Rallu. On en trouvera un expose dans le rapport que Bongaarts a etabli 
avec Burch et Watcher sur lcs travaux du premier comite sur la famille de l'IUSSP 
ct qui a etc cite plus haul. 
Des lors, les modeles se multiplient. II scrait fastidieux de presenter ici, meme 
Jes principaux 2 On trouvera, repetons le, d'excellents resumes dans le livre tou t 
recent de Keilman, Kuijsten ct Vossen. Disons que tous ces essais se proposent 
d 'etre "dynamiques', c'est-a-dire qu'ils ne travaillent pas seulement sur les stocks, 
mais sur les flux ; qu'ils ne se contentent pas de projeter des situations, mais qu 'ils 
cntendent bien comprendre !es mecanismes d'evolutions . 
Cela ne signifie pas quc tous ces modeles soient identiques ou rnemes proches. 
Les uns retienncnt Jc menage comme unite elementaire, Jes autres l'individu 3. Les 
uns utilisent une stimulation stocbastjgue, Jes autres veulent suivre des methodes 
plus determinjstes. II est difficile, pour !'instant, de debattre objectivement de 
leurs merites respectifs. D'abord parce qu'il est encore difficile de comparer leur 
perspicacite ; mais aussi parcc que le choix des chercheurs est souvent dete rm ine 
par Jes donnecs disponiblcs. Du point de vuc de la banque des donnees, ii y a auss i 
des pays riches ct des pays pauvres. 
Tous ces travaux augurcnt bicn du devcloppcment de cette branche, deso r-
mais integree, de la demographic. On voudrait pourtant dans une derniere partie 
signaler quelques uncs des difficultes qui restent a vaincrc et quelques uns des 
ccueils qu'il faut continuer l eviter. 
III Les difficultes des parcours 
1 H. Leridon et C. Villeneuve-Gokalp, Les nouveaux couples : nombre, caract~ristiques et 
attitude, Population, 2, 1988, p.331-374 . 
2 Citons nfanmoins ceux qui paraissent les plus ~labor~s pour !'instant en Europe : le 
mod~le su~dois de Harsman, le mod~le allemand (ISP) de MOiler, enfin celui mis au point 
par le NIDI au Pays-Bas (LIPRO) . 
3 Sur Jes avantages et inconv~nient de l'une et l'autre solution, voir le chapitre de N. 
Keilman et N. Keyfitz, Recurrent issues in household modeling, in Keilman et alii, op. cit. 
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La premiere remarque, malgre son apparence, n'est pas moralisante, mais 
methodologique. Le demographe , ici plus que dans Jes autres domaines, risque de 
ceder a une illusion sur la fiabilite des resultats qu'il presente. II est investi de la 
confiance de responsables administratifs de haut niveau. Les estimations qu'il cal-
cule leur sont indispensables. 11 est la seule competence et l'ultime recours. On ne 
Jui menage pas Jes moyens. 11 entre dans les conseils de planification. Les legisla-
teurs le consultent. 11 ne lui faut pourtant pas perdre son sens critique ; ii doit 
aussi avoir parfois le courage de deccvoir les attentes et de rappeler les limites de 
sa competence. Est-ii besoin de rappeler que nous avons cte pris de court par les 
changements de 1965, que nous n'avons pas prevu la multiplication des cohabita-
tions sans mariages. et que tout recemment encore nous avons etc surpris par la 
soudaine augmentation des naissances hors mariage. Ces nouvelles methodes de 
projections, nous savons bien qu'clles nc sont pas encore au point. Bartlema et 
Vossen ont raison de nous le rappeler. Us presentent pour le mettrc en evidence 
Jes ccarts. sur cinq ans, entrc les donnees prevues ct celles qui ont ete observees 
aux Pays-Bas 1. 
Les differences sont negligcables en cc qui concerne la mortalite ; elles de-
passent 15% pour Jes mariages ct Jes divorces , autrement dit pour des compon e-
ments qui sont decisifs en matiere de projections de menages. La distorsion atteint 
d'ailleurs 40%, dans la periode quinquennale precedente pour la nuptialite. Ce qui 
suggere que nous devrions ici ne presenter qu'avec de fortes reserves les projec-
tions qui depasscnt !'horizon de cinq ans. Pour comprendre ces insuffisances et 
mieux mesurer cc qu'clles ont d'incompressible, exarninons rapidement Jes obs-
tacles qui, aux differentes phases des calculs prospectifs, entravent encore la re-
cherche dans ce secteur. 
Le premier, on l'a deja signale, est que le demographe nc dispose pas toujours 
de donnees de base qui soient l la fois fiablcs, rccentes ct precises. L'cnquete de 
l'INED sur les situations familiales a perrnis de mesurcr une sous-estimation des 
menages de cohabitants non maries faite a partir de l'enquetc Emploi : elle l'a es-
timee a 30%. II faudrait pouvoir disposer de bonncs informations a la fois sur Jes 
situations de depart et sur les "probabilites de transition". Cela signific en realite 
quc les sources traditionncllcs des donnecs sont desorrnais insuffisantes ct que Jes 
cnquetes lourdes sont dcvcnues, non plus un complement intercssant, mais des 
instruments indispensables pour unc connaissancc objective de la situation et des 
1 J. Bartlema et A. Vossen, op. cit. p.245. 
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mouvements qui la transforment. Cette difficulte, a notre avis, est provisoire : deja, 
aux Etats-Unis et en Europe, de telles enquetes existent, se multiplient , et 
s'ameliorent sans cesse. 
Faut-il attribuer les insuffisances des demarches actuelles a la mediocrite des 
modeles de simulation ? Que font ceux-ci, sinon mettre en oeuvre une sone de 
logique inteme des phenomenes demograpbiques, qui mesure !'incidence des 
comportements individuels sur la distribution domestique de la population ? II 
s'agit la de montages sophistiques qui pcuvent sans doute etre encore ameliores . 
On a rappone plus haut Jes hesitations actuclles des chercheurs entre l'approche 
stochastique et les mcthodes deterministes. Sans doutc s'oriente-t-on, ici aussi, 
comme le prevoient Keilman ct Kofitz vers une convergence des deux conceptions. 
Pour revenir a la situation actuelle, lcs risques d 'crreurs tiennent-ils vrai -
ment a cette demographic formelle, c 'est-a-dire au modele mathematique retenu ? 
L'opinion de Banlema et Vossen semble convaincante : ii n'est pas certain que !'on 
puisse attendre de grands progres d'une sophistication formelle plus poussee 1 
Probablement , les ecarts cntre le calcule ct l'observe s'expliquent-ils plutot 
par les parametres dont ii faut bien nourrir le modele formel. Comment decider de 
ces "probabilites de transition", et finalement de l'evolution a mo yen terme des 
mouvements qui retentissent sur la distribution des menages ? II n'est guere pos-
sible d'eviter que Jes projections sur les menages soient le carrefour des hypo-
theses et des incertitudes. II est vrai quc les choix du demographe ne sont pas ar-
bitraires : ii s'agit simplcment de decider de combien varieront dans l'avenir les 
indices observes au cours des recentes annees. Les ecarts d 'une annee sur J'autre 
sent done rclativement modestcs. 11 n'cn rcstc pas moins qu'il est necessaire de 
choisir ccttc ampleur ct d'abord la probabilite d'unc evcntucllc inversion de la 
tendance. Sur qucllc base prendre de tellcs decisions ? 
Le systeme des paramctrcs rctenus est en realite decide en fonction d'un sce-
nario general, plus ou moins explicitc, par exemple la stabilite generate des ten-
danccs, avcc legcr ralentissement de la divortialite et accroissement sensible des 
naissances dans les unions hors mariage. C'cst l partir d'un scenario central de ce 
type que les paramctres soot, d'annee en annee, ou pour une pcriode de cinq ans . 
fixes. 
J. Bartlema et A. Vassen, op. cit., p.246. 
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La distribution doit done etre clairement faite entre la modelisation qui 
etablit les repercussions d'un evenement individuel possible sur la structure 
domestique de la population et les hypotheses relatives a la frequence des 
cvenements probables, hypotheses qui ne font qu'expliciter et preciser le 
scenario adopte. II faut en conclure qu'il n'y a pas de modele economique, mais 
sculemcnt des modeles demographiques ou Jes variables economiques sont 
introduites dans le scenario ct considerees commc determinantes. II y a bien ici 
dcux taches distinctes, l'unc et l'autre indispensables pour les projections de 
menages comme pour toutcs Jes autrcs projections : l'une ou le demographe est 
scul maitre du jeu. unc autrc ou la decision finale lui revient mais dont 
!'elaboration cxige des competences qu'il n'a pas toujours. 
En matiere de familles et de menages, on voit qu'interviennent des donnees 
cxternes A la demographic formclle, et tres complexes : le pare des logements , le 
niveau des revenus, mais aussi les attitudes a l'egard de la famille, la transforma-
tion des relations entre hommes et femmes dans la societe. C'est tout cela, cet eche-
veau de motivations qui decidcra des comportements demographiques a venir. Est-
H besoin, de plus, de rappeler que nous sommcs dans une societe culturellement et 
economiquement hCterogene et quc le scenario doit etre en realite lui aussi plura-
liste ? 
Sur le principe et la nccessite d'un scenario , sur son importance dans le choix 
des parametrcs, tout le mondc, en principc, serait d'accord. Mais ccrtains demo-
graphes, en pratiquc, cstimcnt qu'ils sont competents pour choisir le scenario le 
plus probable, comme d'ailleurs certains economistes s'estiment statistiquement 
assez armes pour construire le modcle demographique auquel ils appliqueront 
leur scenario. 
Une distinction plus nettement affirmee entrc ces deux moments des projec-
tions, une attention cgale dans l'un et dans l'autre moments, une collaboration 
plus systematiquc cntre les specialistes, telle est scmblc-t-il la condition 
principale pour quc des progrcs soient enrcgistres. qui soient a la mesure des 
investissements. des besoins et des espoirs. II nc s'agit pas d'autre chose quc de 
faire plus deliberemcnt et plus systematiqucment cc qui, des maintenant, 
s'articulc spontanement, mais dans une cenaine confusion 1 
1 Que l'on nc disc pas que Jes simulations stochastiques pcrmettraient de faire l'economie 
du scenario : cllcs supposcnt clles aussi un schema general de l'avenir, en fonction duquel 
sont choisies Jes probabilites qui affcctent chaquc individu. 
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Une autre question se pose dont la solution pourrait bien etre benefiqu e. La 
probabilite d'un evenement depend d'un certain nombre de variables genera le -
ment evaluees a partir de la situation de l'individu a un moment donne . Mais ne se-
rait-il pas interessant de moduler !es probabilites en fonction de toute J'histoire 
domestique anterieure. On pourrait, par exemple, calculer des probabil ites diffe-
rentielles de divorce ou de recondite suivant qu'une personne a contracte d 'abord 
un mariage ou d'abord une simple cohabitation, suivant qu'elle a eu ou non un en-
fant hors mariage. suivant qu'elle a rompu sa cohabitation avec son premier 
conjoint OU qu'elle a finalement epouse son partenaire. On pourrait etabli r ainsi 
des series de probabiJites differentes suivant Jes deux OU trois evenements du debut 
de la biographie. Le schema suivant de Hohm et Hohm montre que ces departs sont 
tres diversifies . Evidemment, cette differenciation exigerait des enquetes longitu-
dinales sur des echantillons lourds. Mais, de toutes manieres, on l'a vu, la demo-
graphie sera de plus en plus amenee a recourir a cette source de donnees. 
Figure 3 
dissolution 
: Statuses and transitions leading up 
for women who have not entered 
before first union formation 
to first union 
motherhood 
Legend : Read chart from top down in terms of sequential life transitions 
(events), and think of chart as continuing beyond its lower row of states. 
Abbrevations : CH = child/children ; MAR = married ; DIS = first union dissolved 
Source : Britta Hoem et Jan Hoem, Dissolution in Sweden. Stockholm. Research 
reports in Demography n°45. 
Enfin, on peut observer qu'il est parfois utile de calculer non ce qui arrivera 
dans dix ans mais ce qui arriverait a ccttc echeance sous ccrtaines conditions ra i-
sonnables comme la poursuite des tendances actuelles. Schwarz. par exemple , pre-
sente un modele tres simple pour estimer le pourcentage d'enfants de divorces 
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vers lequel tend une population a partir de la frequence des divorces, du nombre 
moyen d'enfants au moment du divorce, et de la descendance finale . 
Dans une cohorte de mariage, oil 40% des unions finiraient par un divorce, ou 
les menages auraient en moyenne un enfant au moment du divorce et ou la des-
cendance finale serait de deux en fan ts, il est man if este que le pourcentage serait 
de 20%. Une telle procedure permet de mettre en evidence la situation vers la-
quelle on tend et la precision de ces perspectives est peut-etre suffisante pour de-
cider les responsables politiques a une action corrective ou a !'elaboration d'un 
programme de mesures sociales adaptees a I'evolution probable. 
Conclusion 
Les progres qui ont ete faits recemment dans l'analyse de !'evolution des dis-
tributions de menages et dans la projection de ces distributions resultent de la 
conjonction de deux evenements. D'une part, et l'on n'insistera jamais assez sur cc 
point, la possibilite de faire, grace a l'ordinateur, des calculs autrement impos-
sibles d 'autre part, un changement dans la conception meme de la place de 
l'analyse des menages en demographic. On a abandonne une dichotomie sterili -
sante pour considerer les menages comme des haltes, plus ou moins longues, dans 
la combinaison des biographies personnelles. On a renonce a l'idee, desormais 
non pertinente, des menages ou des families qui suivraient un cycle unique , regle 
a la fois par les institutions et la biologic. 
On a admis au contraire que l'individu est le seul support permanent de pro-
babili tes et que Jes rencontres de biographies comme les situations solitaires peu-
vent se succeder suivant des itineraires complexes et varies . Le pluralisme des 
types de menages tient desonnais au pluralisme des biographies. Mettre en evi-
dence une typologie des biographies n'est certes pas une entreprise aisee. Mais 
peut-etre, comme on l'a dit, y parviendrait-on en adoptant comme critcre discri-
minant Jes differentes manicres de former un menage. Ce serait la une typologie 
fondee sur des critcres internes A la demographic. Quoi qu'il en soit, le modele ge-
neral est dcsormais celui d'un ensemble d'unites qu'un metabolisme, complexe et 
rapide, rcunit puis scpare. 
Ces mouvements affectent en particulier les jeunes adultes de 20 a 35 ans . 
C'est pour Jes personnes de cc groupe d'age que les difficultes de projection sont 
Jes plus grandes, parce que les passages d'un ctat a un autre, d'un menage a un 
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autre y sont Jes plus frequents. Ces transitions sont devenues en meme temps, plus 
rapides, plus nombreuses et, pour certaines, moins visibles. 
Rien d'etonnant dans ces conditions que Jes resultats acquis puissent paraitre 
parfois decevants. Nous n'en sommes sur cc terrain, repetons-le, qu'a une phase 
cxploratoirc. Cette constatation ne doit pas etre interpretee comme un echec, mais 
plutot comme une appreciation objective pour le present et une promesse pour 
l'avenir. 
- 1 ! /Cvffc;_ 
Name: Jacques Legare, Nicole Marcil-Gratton 
Title of Paper: Human network surrounding future older peop le: 
What may we expect from kinship support? 
Summary: The acceleration of population aging in developed countries will 
without any doubt create tremendous pressure, in terms of sheer numbers. on 
the numerous services that societies must provide for their elderly. The 
fear does exist that such pressure may extend to the family network. and 
that thus the future old will not be able to rely on the offspring t hey 
chose not to have. Shall we expect that this relative lack of children 
will lead to a growing proportion of older people living alone and 
isolated, without the daily support that can be more easily sought from a 
larger family? Shall we rather witness the transfer of such support from 
the children to a network of collaterals, ma y they be siblings. other kins 
or friends? Part of the answer may be found in examining how present-day 
elderly with a demographic profile similar to that of a great man y future 
old cope with the prospect of isolation. Using Canadian data collected 
from a sample of 3150 persons aged 65 and over living in private 
households, we tested the hypothesis that a transfer does exist from 
offspring support to collaterals. and that isolation in old-age is not 
necessarily linked to previous fertile behavior (see graph ) . Overall. the 
proportion of elderly Canadians without spouses that have no daily contac t 
with either their off springs or col laterals does not vary significantl y 
whether they have many. 
little, or no children at 
all; greater support is 
offered by the children 
when there are many, but 
in all cases contacts 
with collaterals do com-
pensate for the lack of 
intergenerational links. 
That may reflect a gene-
ral tendency in our 
societies to steer away 
from famil y life and 
responsibilities; we may 
then expect the future 
old, as the former old 
did before them, to live 
through their twilight 
years as they did in 
their zenith. 
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Andrej Boo zin 
DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF CONSANGUINEOUS 
MARRIAGES IN SMALL POPULATIONS 
Some etochastical models of demography of monoga-
mous population with nonoverlapping generations are consi-
dered. Random numbers of sibe'and cousine'marriages are 
investigated. Their distributions are near to Poisson, but 
the average values are smaller then the olassical estima-
tions by O.Frota-Pessoa or A.Jacquard (e.g. the later for 
.... -· 
the number of cousins'maniages is 4.5; our estimation is 3.5). 
The demographic consequences of marriages between near 
relatives follow from the fact, that the number of offeprings 
depends on the kinship coefficient of parents. This effect 
being irregular and insignifficant for a distinct genera-
tion becomes apparent on evolutionary time intervals. 
Suppoused that the number of consanguineous marriages 
may by substituted with stationary stochastical processes with 
Poisson distributions, the demography of population is descri-
bed as some marcovian process. Further simplification takes 
into account the deviation of population rate caused by the 
random sex disproportion (this deviation is of order 1/\f?f; 
where N is the number of marriages in previous generation). 
The simplified model is marcovian process, which 
transition probabilities may be easy calculated. In parti-
cular, while consanguineous marriages are prohibited (incest-
taboo) we have Galton-watson branching process. Some estimation 
of "characteristic selection time" of population with incest-
taboo are discussed. 
Name: 
Title of Paper: 
Summary: 
Appl~inl I 
th• futur• 
holds. 
micrc1imul1ticn mcd1l ta prcJ1ot 
•tructur• of +'•mili•• •nd hou1•-
One of the most prominent societal features of this 
century is the lon2lostin2 and continuous tendency of 
individualization . This has, omon2 others, been reflec-
ted in the way people live to2ether and form and dis -
solve household units . In this respect modern societies 
con be characterized as highly pluriform. As o conse-
quence , this pluriformotion hos mode it for more diffi-
cult to make accurate forecasts of the future household 
composition. In more traditional models , household 
composition is determined by means of headshiprates . 
Consistency with the assumed trends in fertility and 
family formation is in this case, howe v er, hard t o 
2uarantee. Microsimulation approach has solved t h is 
kind of consistency problems. 
In our paper we present household forecasts for The 
Netherlands (2010) produced by o microsimu l ation mode l 
( TYLOYMAS) . 
After introducing the paper in short , the main 
principles of the microsimulation model ore e x plained 
for those who are less familiar wit h the subject. 
Thereafter - in a rather simplified way - two context 
scenarios are constructed, functioning as alternati ve 
societal 'environments' of the household system i n t h e 
year 2010 . Next - as a substitute of real household 
theory - some hypotheses ore formulated, relating the 
main elements of the context s c enarios wit h proc esse s 
of household formation and dissolution . After some 
general considerations, the conceptualization of t h e 
household system requires our attention, followed b y 
the formulation of the assumptions regarding t h e future 
state of the key parameters of the household model, as 
'logically' to be deducted from the combinatio n of the 
context scenarios and household 'theory'. Finally the 
simulation results ore presented end commented on. 
Name: Viviana Egidi and Alvaro Tomassetti 
Title of Paper: A method for project i ng families. Some 
con9equenc•~ of actual demographic behaviour on famjl y dynamics 
in Italy. 
Summary: This paper provides some of the preliminary findings o f 
an ongoing research project on Italian family features a n d tren ds 
and the repercussions on the social security syste m o f 
demographic behaviour affecting the formation and break-up o f the 
family. The definition of the family used for the research 
comprises married couples with children (nuclear families ) or 
without children (conjugal units), one-parent families wi t h 
children, and one-person families. 
The approach adopted considers that changes in family s i ze 
and structure are strictly related to the life history of t h e 
family members and to the history of the relationships be t ween 
the members. The reconstruction gr the simulat.inn of the life 
histories of individuals related to the same family un i t is used 
to describe the group dynamics and predict possible future 
developments. Of all the many events that may characterize the 
life history of each individual , only the those which direc tly 
influence the processes of fami 1 y for mat ion, break-up and 
structural features. More specifically, only the events rela ting 
to the three different careers are considered for each 
individual : survival career, marital career and fertility career . 
For the children, in addition Lu 1,;011~idering the possibility ot 
departure from the original family unit for marriage, t h e 
research also considers departure to form a one-person family 
comprising a single unmarried male or female. The new fami ly 
units formed by the departure of the ch i ldren from the i r parents ' 
family are examined independently. 
Each event experienced by any family member a f fects his l ife 
history , modifying his status and the status of the other members 
of the family, and hence the size and features o f the fam i ~ y 
unit, through the relationships between family members. 
A stochastic m1crodemographic model was elaborated t o 
simulate indiv i dual life histories and their relationships i n t he 
family groups. The basic unit selected to develop the model is 
the family unit, whose dynamics are viewed as an outcome of 
several interrelated stochastic processes , and are monitored year 
by year through the events experienced by each of its members. 
Although the model works on a discrete time basis, it does no t 
share the drawbacks of the traditional discrete models, in t h a t 
this model provides for the occurrence cf multiple events to the 
same individual during an elementary time interval in a 
hierarchical causal order, which varies from one individual to 
another , even within the same elementary time interval ( one 
year). The kinship relations in the family uni t are expressed in 
terms of a conventional family head, whose sex, age and mari t al 
status are al&o used to classify the family units. 
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Name: Magdolna Csernak and Kalman Szabo 
Title of Paper: CHANGES OF FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION IN HUNGAR Y 
Summary: 
Since the end of the Second World War social, political and 
cultural conditions in Hungary have changed radically. Changes 
occured in a very short period of time and they affected both 
functions and demographic features of the families. 
One of the most important demographic changes observed in 
the past few decades was the decrease of average size of families. 
By 1984 the average size of families fell below three persons. 
There was a significant decline in the average household 
we 11 • 
size as 
The main processes contributing to the changes are the 
fol lowing: 
1. the decline of fertility and mortalit y 
perspective 
in a lon9 term 
2. the nuclear family, reduced to parents and children, 
becoming dominant 
3. the single-parent families spreading 
4 . the high rate of persons living alone. 
Amon9 the social factors in the background the housing 
conditions have got a great impact on the changing of families and 
households. Besides both parents and married children tend to live 
separatel y and the demand for independent life for others is 
increasing, too. 
Since the seventies the high frequency of divorce and 
decreasing propensity for remarriage have played an important role 
in the formation of incomplete families and one-person households. 
Nowadays after ten years of marriage already 20 p.c. of all 
marriages are dissoluted and only about every second person 
marries again. 
Since the mid-seventies the rates of first marriages 
also been declining. It is possible that men and women de net 
postpone their first marriage but an increasing part cf 
ramains ultimately single. 
have 
only 
them 
In spite cf these phenomena it is expected 
continue to give a framework to family life. It 
supposed that the structure and ether demographic 
families in the future change to a lesser extent 
experienced in the previous decades. 
that marriage 
may also be 
features ot 
than it was 
Name: 
Title of Paper: 
Summary: 
Dr . Klaus-Peter Moller 
SIMULATION MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMEN T OF 
FAMILY STRUCTURES 
A computer model for the simulation of fa mily 
future structures in a country with uneve n age 
structure 
Institute 
(West Germany) is developed at the 
for App 1 i e d Systems An a 1 y sis and PI' o g nos is 
in Hannover. 
T h e pr e s e n t a t i o n g i v e s a n o v er 1 o o k o n t h e d e 111 o g r a -
phic premisses (fertility mortality and imigratio n) 
for the basic population model, a descriptio n of th e 
model structures to simulate family relati ons 
between children (by sequence number 
and their parents and the results of 
for the time up to the year 2000. 
of birth ) 
the simulation 
Computer outprints and plots of 
Formation in the different age 
the future 
groups are 
fa mily 
s ho~rn. 
STRUCTURE AND 
GERMANY IN 
AGE 
WEST 
FAMILY FORMATION 
THE YEAR 2000 
IN 
J3c_j 
Name: Robert A. Horvath 
Title of paper: Future structures of families and households - the 
point of view of a population economist 
The fact that the theory of population growth is not 
sufficiently integrated with the theory of econonic growth was last 
I' time stressed by SPENGLER and is felt more since population policy ~ecame more., gener.al p,ci~pted either on political or moral grounds. 
i • Howevet, · the emphasis was laid more on pure demographic 
j factors, than on economic ones, even if their effects were 
: considered on household formation and economic well-being of 
'. families as recently in a paper of KINGSLEY DAVIS. His theory of 
! the replacement of the agrarian "household economy system'' by the 
; industrial and urbanized "breadwinner system" as a consequence of 
· the Industrial Revolution is insisting only on demographic factors 
by the changing feature of the division of labour through the 
increasing employment of women by altering the family size and its 
composition. This theory remarkable from the pure and applied 
demographic point of view - does not include the contribution of 
population economics in absence of which no comprehensive synthesis 
may be possible for the social scientist in the broader sense. 
The economic theory of "population optimum" has already 
demonstrated the rising costs of population growth within the 
conditions of industrialized and urbanized societies and has also 
shown that a considerable part of them is due to losses arizing 
from technological, economic and environnemental changes, anal ysed 
the first time thoroughly by KUZNETS, among them also those 
ensueing from the change in skill, know-how, education and general 
culture. Even if not well documented yet, many researches are 
indicating that these costs are increasing in stagnating and e ven 
in decreasing developed populations and within them the share of 
the procreating and raising of children. Parallel to it, there is a 
considerable shift of these costs to others than the family because 
of the consequences of the breadwinner system and the ageing of the 
population,having a redistribution effect on individual incomes and 
social funds, a question nearly retaining exclusively the 
attention of population policy makers . 
. The present author is insisting on the need of the revision 
; of the theories of welfare economics on the basis of detailed cost 
!Calculations of the involved sub-populations in a macro-economic 
isystem, i.e. the costs of the replacement of population and within 
. it the share of the female population not only as a part of "human 
I' capital 
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, but as the core of family ·and household as a "birthplace" 
.of children. Only by measuring the impact of these social costs and 
i their alternatives in monetary as well as in material terms 
: compared to GNP and NI the future trend of a satisfactory level of 
l life-cultural, moral and even aesthetic requirements included - ma y 
~ be assessed an planned. 
NAME: Michael Bracncr and Gigi Sant0w 
TI ru: OF p APER: Chansing of family composition fn.im li!e history d<tta 
SUMMARY: 
Australia has undergone fundamental demographic change this century 
entailing fertility decline, increased longevity and, over recent decades, 
an increased incidence of marital dissolution. This h.l.s hac .an immediate 
effect on patterns of co-residence, most obviously on household size and 
more subtly on household composition. Such demographic change is not unique 
to Australia and our !indings are broadly applicable also to other 
industrialized countries. 
In 1986 the Australian Family Project screened a nationally representativE 
probability sample of slightly more than five thousand private dwellings. 
Face-to-f ~ce interviews were conducted with all women aged between 20 and 59 
years who were 'l.u;;ual residents and agreed to poirticipate. The collection 
throu~1 these interviews of detailed event histories of residence and 
housing, msrital unions, childbearing and co-residence of each child enables 
us to chart who each respondent was living with, month by month, throughout 
her life. This in turn allows us to put together a dynamic picture of 
family composition, from childhood until the time of interview, from the 
point of view of a referent woman, in contrast with the static picture 
obtained from cross-sectional or census data, The analysis relie~ heavily 
on graphical representations of age-cohort allocation of exposure in 
diff~rent stat~~. 
Women now in their fifties, who were born over the decade spanning the 
Great Depression, were the latest to leave their childhood homes, and women 
in their early thirties the earliest. Linking the time of leaving home t o 
marriage, and then to childbearing, demonstrates the increasing importance 
of a number of ~ey states. First, women are now less likely sin1ply to 
exch3nge one familial •ituation for another by moving from home to marry or, 
more recently, to live with a boyfriend, Nevertheless. the interm~diate 
state has not assumed the 1ignificance implied by a comparison of leaving 
home and first ~arry1nG because much of the exposure in the never-married 
atate of the younsest women is now being spent in consensual unions. 
Secondly, because of profound changes in patterns of childbearing women are 
now •pending more t'itne with a spouse but no children. Another state to 
gain in import•nce i• that of being with neither apouse nor children; 
another is that of lone parent. 
Civen the upper aae limit of 60 years the survey provides an incomplete 
picture of changing co-residence patterns beyond middle age. But at 
younger ages the picture is detailed and clear. Consensual unions 
partially compensate for later marriage, and the conjugal state has there-
fore not become as unpopular as recent marriage statistics would suggest. 
It is neverthe.leas true that increasingly fewer women move straight from 
the parental home to e•tablish their own family unit, and that more live 
alone or in shared accommodation with friends. When they do move into a 
1Darital union it is far more likely to be informal, perhaps leading to 
marriage but perhaps not, 4nd their middle years are spent with fewer 
children. Youne women are more likely than their mothers to spend time out 
of union, and to spend time as lone parents. 
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Title of Paper: LI VING ARRANGEMENTS OF AI SAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Summary: 
The rapid growth of Asian population in the United States 
during the past two decades has received increased attention. In 
1978, Asia overtook North and Central America as the largest 
source of U.S. immigrants and it has maintained its predominance 
ever since. Of these Asian immigrants, the six largest subgroups 
include the Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Asian Indian, Korean, 
and Vietnamese . The present paper examines differentials in 
living arrangements patterns among these Asian ethnics. 
Specifically, the research aims at investigating the residential 
choices of living in extended families versus nonfamily 
households among the unattached individuals. The data were drawn 
from 1980 Census Public-use Microdata, one-percent sample of 
foreign born population. 
The results of the analysis indicate cultural variations in 
residential choices among Asian immigrants. The paper 
additionally demonstrates that the hypothesized factors such as 
life cycle and gender have significant relationships with 
household patterns . For all Asian ethnics , the tendency for the 
unattached individuals to liv e in nonfami l y increases with age 
and then declines in the older age groups. Moreover, it is found 
that the extent of nonfamily living varies with gender. In most 
cases, men are more prone than women to form one-person 
households or reside with nonrelatives . Holding the effects of 
age and sex constant, the data reveal that Japanese and Asian 
Indian immigrants have the highest proportion of untied 
individuals reporting as living alone or as nonrelative of 
household head. 
The choice of family extension is also prevalent among Asians 
in the United States. There is convincing evidence that this 
type of living arrangement appears to be negatively related to 
duration of residence in American society. The inclusion of 
other relatives in the household may be a strategy which recent 
arrivals adopted to make economic adjustment to the new 
environment. Lastly, the data confirm that variation in cultural 
preferences regarding family extension clearly exist among these 
Asian minority groups. Filipino immigrants are most likely to 
establish extended households as compared with other Asian 
counterparts. 
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The future of mortality in industrialized countries 
The purpose of this paper is to give a background 
for the sessions on the future of mortality. The paper is 
divided into five sections. The first one is a review of 
the recent trends in mortality in industrialized countries. 
It is partly based on an earlier review prepared by Bour-
geois-Pichat (1984). The second section deals with the 
assumptions about the trends in mortality made in some 
recent population projections and discusses the effects of 
alternative mortality assumptions. Methods for preparing 
mortality projections are discussed in the third section. 
The fourth section summarizes the discussions on the ef-
fects of eliminating certain causes of death and also 
considers the related question concerning the assumed 
biological limit to life. The final part of the paper 
attempts to identify the main open questions in the future 
of mortality . I raise four such questions and hope that the 
papers and discussions in the conference will contribute to 
answering them. 
1. Recent mortality trends and proiections 
Bourgeois-Pichat has recently ( 1984) presented an 
excellent review of mortality trends in industrialized 
countries. The review covers the period 1960-1981 . Below I 
summarize some of the main findings in the review and 
complement these with additional data. 
Figure 1 shows the development of life expectancy at 
age one in Japan, the USSR, Eastern Europe and the other 
I am indebted to Pekka Martikainen and Raili Tynkkynen for 
their assistance in the preparation of this paper and t o 
Seppo Koskinen and Tuija Martelin for their helpful com-
ments. 
I '-I { 
2 
industrialized countries from 1960 to 1981. The four curves 
show very disparate trends. All the countries or groups of 
countries were at similar levels in about 1965 but after 
that the four curves form a fan which opens wider with 
time. At the bottom is the USSR, then comes Eastern Europe, 
where the levels have changed little. In contrast to the 
USSR and Eastern Europe are the capitalist countries in 
which heal th is improving continuously. Japan, however, 
beats all records for improvement. 
Bourgeois-Pichat (1984, 194) shows that the Eastern 
European countries form a fairly homogenous group, whereas 
the variation within the industrialized capitalist 
countries is larger. On the basis of data on life expectan-
cy in 1980, Bourgeois-Pichat distinguishes between a group 
of "vanguard" and "rearguard" countries. The vanguard 
countries include Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland (life expectancy at age one 75-77 years); 
the rearguard countries are Malta, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland, Portugal and Yugoslavia (life expectancy at age 
one 70-71 years) . The remainder may be called average 
capitalist countries. This classification is used in Tables 
1 and 2, which present data on life expectancy at birth 
according to sex for individual countries for five-years 
periods between 1960-84 and for the latest single year, the 
data for which were obtained from the 1987 World Heal th 
Statistics Annual. The same data for groups of countries 
are presented in Figure 2. 
The female life expectancies in the vanguard, aver-
age, and rearguard capitalist countries followed broadly 
parallel and rising trends from 1961 to 1984, the intervals 
between groups remaining about the same. For the males in 
these countries there was, on the average, only little 
improvement in the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's. 
In fact, male life expectancy declined temporarily in 
several industrialized countries. During the last 10-15 
years male life expectancy has again increased in most of 
these countries. For the vanguard countries the gains have 
been smaller than for the others and the gap in male life-
expectancy between the vanguard and rearguard countries 
has diminished from six to four years . 
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The pace of the increase of life expectancy for both 
sexes has been spectacular in Japan: the gain from 1960-64 
to 1986 was about 10 years for females and 9 years for 
males. There was no stagnation in the rise of male life 
expectancy in the 1960's and the latest (1986) figure of 
75. 5 years is two years higher than the average for the 
vanguard countries. 
At the beginning of the 1960' s the average life 
expectancy of the rearguard countries was below Eastern 
Europe, but the difference diminished with time, and disap-
peared by the end of the 1970's for both males and females . 
The average male life expectancy in Eastern Europe is 
currently only slightly higher than at the beginning of 
the 1960 ' s. The female life expectancy in Eastern Europe 
has risen by about two years. The development has thus been 
better than among males but not as good as among the 
females in the industrialized capitalist countries . 
The World Health Statistics Annual, which was used 
as the source for the data on life expectancies, does not 
include data for the Soviet Union . The source for the 
figures presented in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2 is an 
article by Blum and Pressat ( 1984), which is based on 
Soviet statistics. Since the data do not cover all years 
estimates for the five-year periods were made by graphic 
extrapolation. 
If the data are correct, male life expectancy at 
birth declined from 66.3 years in 1964-65 to 62.5 years in 
1978-79. During the first half of the 1980's life expectan-
cy was almost unchanged, but the figure for 1986 (65.0) 
shows a clear improvement . 
Female life expectancy remained stable at about 74 
years from 1964 to 1972 but thereafter declined to 72. 6 
years in 1978-79. The recent rise in female life expectancy 
is smaller than that of male life expectancy. The 
difference between female and male life expectancy has, 
therefore, diminished from 10.4 years in 1978-79 to 8.6 
years in 1986. 
To obtain a more detailed picture of the trends in 
mortality the average annual changes in mortality for 10-
year age-groups from 1970 to 1984 were calculated for 
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selected countries representing the sub-groups used above 
(Figure 3). The decline of mortality has been rapid in ages 
0-14 in all countries with the exception of the Soviet 
Union. The development of mortality in these age-groups 
and among young adults is, however, unimportant for the 
development of life expectancy in countries, where low 
levels of mortality have already been reached . The dif-
ferences in the trends of life expectancy are mainly due to 
the differences in developments for the middle-aged and 
elderly population. 
In Japan, where the rise of life expectancy has been 
most rapid, the decline has been marked in almost all age-
groups. In Norway, death rates have also diminished in all 
age-groups for both sexes, but much less than in Japan . 
The unfavourable development in Hungary seems to have 
stenuned from an increase in mortality among both males and 
females of working-age. Similar increases are also seen 
among males in other Eastern European countries. The 
decline of life expectancy in the Soviet Union is partly 
due to the exceptional increase of infant mortality. 
It is interesting to note that the relative decline 
in mortality is generally almost as rapid in the old female 
age-groups as in the younger age-groups. This observation 
is relevant to the question of the possible biological 
limit to life expectancy, which will be discussed later in 
this paper. 
An analysis of the trends in mortality by cause of 
death would also illuminate the differences in the develop-
ment of life expectancy, but such an analysis is beyond the 
space limitations of this paper. Some results from the 
review by Bourgeois-Pichat (1984), may be mentioned, 
however. He distinguished between only two broad groups of 
causes of death - cardiovascular diseases and other dis-
eases (Bourgeois-Pichat 1984, 205-216). Bourgeois-Pichat 
concluded that male mortality from cardiovascular diseases 
had been rising in many countries, including those in 
Eastern Europe, until about 1965. In the Eastern European 
countries male mortality has continued to rise, whereas it 
has tended to decline in the other European countries. 
Trends in other diseases than cardiovascular reveal no 
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obvious differences between Eastern Europe and other 
countries, although the level of mortality is higher in 
Eastern Europe. Cardiovascular diseases thus play an impor-
tant role in the deterioration of male heal th in Eastern 
Europe . 
There was almost no change in female cardiovascular 
mortality in Eastern Europe from 1969 to 1977. In the rest 
of Europe and in Japan cardiovascular mortality has 
declined continuously since the Second World War. 
2. Assumptions about the future of mortality and its effect 
on projected demographic development 
In addition to past trends, Tables 1 and 2 and 
Figure 2 also include the projected life expectancies for 
the future according to the World Population Prospects as 
Assessed in 1984 published by the United Nations. The 
mortality assumptions in the United Nations projection are 
in the form of life expectancies at birth and age and sex 
patterns of probabilities of surviving, which correspond to 
different levels of life expectancies at birth . The assump-
tions for the more developed countries are presented and 
expressed very briefly: "For those countries in which life 
expectancy at birth has reached a high level, the maximum 
assumed level of life expectancy at birth was assumed to be 
75 years for males and 82.5 years for females" (United 
Nations 1987, 9). This assumption is the same as in the 
1982 assessment, but lower life expectancies were used in 
the 1980 assessment, namely 73.5 years for males and 80 
years for females. The change was made "in accordance with 
current demographic records in several developed countries" 
(United Nations 1985, 10). 
According to the UN projection the maximum female 
life expectancy ( 82. 5 years) will not be reached in any 
country by the year 2025. On the basis of Figure 2 it can 
be estimated that female life expectancy would reach the 
limit of 82.5 only in the late 2040's. The assumptions 
about the development of female life expectancy seem rather 
cautious, at least for the industrialized capitalist coun-
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tries. Japan has already reached the projected 2020-25 
level and Switzerland the projected 2000-05 level. In each 
of the three sub-groups of the capitalist countries the 
average latest life expectancy is higher than what would 
have been expected based on the UN projection . For Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union the UN projection for females 
is· possibly too optimistic, at least in the near future. 
The gap between Eastern Europe and the rest of the coun-
tries appears not to be narrowing in the way anticipated. 
The United Nations projections about male life 
expectancy seem even more questionable than those for 
females. The assumed maximum life expectancy for males is 
7 5 years. Japan and Iceland have already exceeded this 
limit. The UN projection assumes that the rise of male life 
expectancy will end in Japan in the late 1990's, and in the 
vanguard capitalist countries by 2025. This implies that 
the life expectancy for females will continue to rise for 
25-50 years longer than that for males. 
The UN projection assumes that, similarly to female 
life expectancies, male life expectancies for all countries 
will converge and the differences between groups of 
countries diminish. Actual developments in the 1970's and 
1980's, however, show a widening of the mortality gap both 
between Japan and the rest of the capitalist countries and 
the capitalist countries and the socialist countries. 
It is interesting to compare the UN assumptions with 
those made by national experts on population. Table 3 
compares the assumptions about the development of life 
expectancy in selected national population projections with 
those of the UN projection. All the countries included in 
the table are vanguard or average capitalist countries, in 
which mortality is declining and the assumptions of earlier 
projections have recently been corrected towards higher 
life expectancies. 
Most of the projections are relatively similar to 
the UN projections. The Danish projection is, however, more 
pessimistic than the UN projection; it assumes that the 
male life expectancy will remain at the 1983-84 level and 
the maximum female life expectancy will be as low as 79 
years. The projections for Norway, Sweden and the Nether-
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lands are based on the explicit assumption that the rise of 
life expectancy will not continue beyond the year 2000 . 
The "trend" projection for French females is clearly 
more optimistic than the UN projection, whereas the projec-
tion for males is in line with the UN projection. The "low" 
mortality alternative for France is based on the assumption 
that the increase of life expectancy is twofold to that in 
the· trend projection. This assumption leads to clearly 
higher life expectancies than the maximum life expectancies 
in the UN projection. 
The projection for the United States covers a much 
longer period than the other projections. It assumes that 
the decline of mortality will continue until the year 2080. 
The maximum projected life expectancies are, therefore, 
higher than those for the other countries. The projected 
life expectancy in the year 2000 is 7 2. 9 years for males 
and 80. 5 years for females. These life expectancies are 
almost the same as those projected by the United Nations. 
Mortality is usually considered the least problem-
atic component of population projections, since the errors 
in the projected total populations caused by wrong mor-
tality assumptions are small when compared to the errors 
caused by wrong fertility or migration assumptions. Mor-
tality is not, however, totally unproblematic, since the 
sizes of the oldest age-groups depend almost solely on the 
development of mortality. The population projection pub-
lishhed by the Central Statistical Office of Finland in 
1969 (Hartman 1969) serves as an example of the signif-
icance of mortality assumptions . According to this projec-
tion the population aged 75 and over should have been 
180 000 in 1985, when actually it was 250 000, an error of 
40 per cent . The projection was based on the assumption of 
constant mortality, and the error was caused by a rapid and 
unanticipated decline of mortality which followed the 
unfavourable development in the 1960 's. According to the 
latest projection ( 1985) the over 75 population will be 
about 80 per cent larger in the year 2000 than was project-
ed in 1969. Large errors in the projected sizes of the 
elderly population have a harmful effect particularly on 
plans and decisions in health and social policy. 
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A more systematic picture of the demographic in-
fluence of varying mortality assumptions can be obtained 
by comparing results of projections based on different 
assumptions of the development of mortality. As an example 
of such a comparison I shall use the rather realistic 
calculations presented by Benjamin and Overton (1981). More 
speculative long-term calculations have been presented by 
Vaupel and Gowan (1986). 
Benjamin and Overton constructed three projections 
of death rates for England and Wales from 1978 to 2018. The 
first (medium) projection assumes continuation of present 
trend; the second assumes that there is no improvement in 
mortality rates of persons over the age of 30; and the 
third is an optimistic projection which assumes inter alia 
that most cancers are eliminated and that the deaths from 
most diseases would occur ten years later than they do now. 
According to the medium projection the male and female life 
expectancies at birth are 7 4. 4 years and 8 0. 4 years, ac-
cording to the pessimistic projection 71. 3 and 77. 3 and 
according to the optimistic projection 81.3 and 87.1, 
respectively. 
The population projections, which differed from each 
other only with respect to the mortality assumptions , 
resulted in the following populations for selected age-
groups for the year 2018: 
Total popul . (million) 
Econ. active ages* 
Pensioners 
Medium 
53.5 
32 . 9 
10.0 
(*Men aged 15 to 64 and women aged 15-59.) 
Pessi-
mistic 
51. 9 
32.5 
8.7 
Opti-
mistic 
57.6 
33.2 
13.8 
The figures show, that mortality assumptions in-
fluence only slightly the sizes of the projected working 
age-population for the year 2018. For the younger age-
groups the difference would be even smaller. On the other 
hand the sizes of the old age-groups will depend heavily on 
the development of mortality, and this will also hav e 
consequences for the size of the total population . The 
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influence of mortality assumptions is, of course, much more 
marked for the oldest age-groups of pensioners than for all 
pensioners. 
3. Comments on the methods of mortality projection 
Methods of mortality projection have been described 
and discussed earlier by e.g. A.H. Pollard (1949), Pressat 
(1974) and Preston (1974) and recently by J.H. Pollard 
(1988). I shall, therefore, only make some general comments 
about them. 
Assumptions about future mortality are for the most 
part based on the extrapolation of past trends of age-
specif ic death rates. The extrapolation may be graphical, 
in which case qualitative aspects and expert opinions can 
be taken into account. Mathematical extrapolation is a 
common and less subjective method. The improved objectivity 
of mathematical extrapolation is, however, questionable, 
because the projected results depend on the length of the 
period on which the calculation is based and on the formula 
used . 
One way of trying to improve the understanding of 
the past and the projection of future development is to use 
cohort analysis (see e.g. Osmond 1985 and Hamajima and Aoki 
1984). This is done by using data on age- and period- spe-
cific death rates and by applying a statistical model which 
includes parameters describing the effects of age, cohort 
and period. As Hobcraft and Gilks (1984) emphasize, there 
are problems in the identification of such a model, but 
users of this approach have not always been aware of them. 
A basic choice made in the preparation of mortality 
projections is that between using data on total (all-cause) 
mortality or using data on mortality by cause of death. In 
most cases mortality assumptions for national population 
projections are based on an analysis of the trends in total 
mortality. There are exceptions, however, for example the 
population projection for the United States (U.S . Bureau of 
the Census 1984) and for the elderly in England and Wales 
(Alderson and Ashwood 1985) being examples. Cause-specific 
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analyses of the changes and future prospects of mortality 
are more common in studies oriented more towards heal th 
policy planning than to population forecasting (e.g., 
Valkonen 1986, Hamajima and Aoki 1984) . 
Factors affecting mortality from different causes of 
death differ and the trends and rates of change may vary. 
The analysis of cause-specific death rates is a better 
basis for understanding the past trends and for projecting 
the future than an analysis of total mortality. More work 
in the cause-specific analysis of mortality trends is, 
therefore, needed. 
The methods described above are based on the utili-
zation of data on past mortality trends only. In addition, 
outside information is often used. The most common type of 
outside information considered is the mortality experience 
of "more advanced" populations in which the life 
expectancies have reached high levels. For example, the 
mortality projections for Finland have been based on the 
assumption that the Finnish death rates will reach the 
recorded levels of Swedish death rates after a certain time 
lag. 
Information on "advanced" populations might be used 
more than what has been the case thus for. An analysis of 
mortality trends in regions with 
tality within countries with the 
(e.g. Japan, Norway and Sweden) 
exceptionally low mor-
highest life expectancy 
would be particularly 
interesting from this point of view. Studies in several 
countries have shown large differences in mortality between 
socio-economic groups and educational categories (see e.g. 
Valkonen 1987). Persons with high socio-economic status and 
a high level of education may be taken as an "advanced" 
population and data on their mortality patterns could be 
utilized in making mortality assumptions for national 
populations. 
Another kind of outside information used in making 
mortality assumptions concerns the effects of non-demo-
graphic factors on mortality, such as advances in medical 
techniques or changes in the prevalence of risk factors of 
diseases. A most obvious factor affecting mortality is 
cigarette smoking, and the effects of possible changes in 
11 
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smoking habits have been estimated in several studies (e . g. 
Martelin 1985; Benjamin and Overton 1981) . Manton ( 1986) 
has presented an ambitious model-based method through which 
the effects of the simultaneous dimishing of the exposure 
to several risk factors of diseases can be evaluated. 
4. Cause-elimination calculations and the problem of the 
biological limit to life 
A well known method for evaluating possibilities for 
mortality decline is to calculate how much the elimination 
of a certain cause of death would increase the life expec-
tancy of a population . These kind of calculations have 
been quite common (see e.g. Pres sat 1974, 531; Preston, 
Keyfitz and Schoen 1972; Keyfitz 1977). They are usually 
not used directly in making assumptions for population 
projections, but are rather prepared mainly to aid in 
setting up health goals, allocating resources and evaluat-
ing health programmes. 
An example of a study on the effects of a reduction 
of mortality in leading causes of death is the article by 
Tsai, Lee and Hardy ( 1978), which examines the potential 
gains in expectation of life among the United States 
population when the three leading causes of death are 
totally or partially eliminated. The calculations are based 
on data for 1967-71. The authors conclude that the impres-
sive gains theoretically achieved by a total elimination of 
certain diseases do not hold up under the more realistic 
assumption of a partial elimination. The number of years 
gained by a new-born child, under a condition of a 30 per 
cent reduction in major cardiovascular diseases would be 
approximately two years, whereas the total elimination 
would give 12 years. A 30 per cent reduction in cancer 
mortality would raise life expectancy at birth by only 0.7 
years. 
A more optimistic view of the potential gains in 
life expectancy is presented by Schatzkin (1980), who 
believes that it is possible to reach nine or perhaps ten 
decades of vigorous and heal thy life by eliminating such 
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social determinants of premature death as smoking, excess-
ive animal fat consumption, hypertension and alcohol con-
sumption. These are common risk factors for the major 
causes of death. Schatzkin argues that their simultaneous 
elimination would result in greater gains in life expectan-
cy than the single-cause elimination on which the results 
presented by Tsai, Lee and Hardy were based. Schatzkin does 
not, however, present exact calculations to support his 
arguments. 
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The studies on the effects of eliminating or di-
minishing certain causes of death are closely related to 
the discussion of the hypothesis of a biological limit to 
life expectancy. According to this hypothesis, the increase 
of life expectancy for populations cannot continue in-
definitely because of the unavoidable restrictions caused 
by the biology of the human species. Several researchers 
have made calculations to determine this biologically 
determined maximimum life expectancy. For example, Bour-
geois-Pichat presented estimates about the "temporary" 
limit on mortality decline already in 1952. This limit was 
assumed to be determined by the so called "endogenous" 
deaths. "Exogenous" deaths, which are avoidable, included 
infective and parasitic diseases, diseases of the respira-
tory system and accidents, poisonings and violence . Using 
data from Norway, Bourgeois-Pichat estimated that the 
biological limit for life expectancy at birth was 78.2 and 
76.2 years for females and males, respectively. In 1978 he 
revised his calculations and gave new estimates: 80.3 years 
for females and 73.8 for males (Bourgeois-Pichat 1978). 
The idea of a biological limit of life expectancy 
has more recently been presented as the theory of the 
"rectangularization" or " squaring" of the survival curve 
(Fries 1980, Fries 1983). According to Fries there is a 
finite life span, which appears to be approximately 85 
years. The life expectancy can rise toward, but cannot 
exceed the life span. The increase of life expectancy is 
due to the increasing share of the population who die a 
"natural death", that is, from general frailty caused by 
the aging of the organism. As premature deaths due to 
diseases are eliminated, more and more people achieve the 
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fixed life span and the survival curve becomes "rectan-
gularized". 
Myers and Manton (1984) have noted that relatively 
little empirical work has been undertaken to assess the 
existence of rectangularization. They examined several 
aspects of the issue using data from the United States 
during the twentieth century and specificially during the 
period 1962-79. They conclude that there is no evidence 
that rectangularization has had a significant effect on the 
population and mortality dynamics of the elderly, at least 
through 1979. According to them there is little direct 
evidence to suggest that the U.S. population is currently 
near a biological limit of life span that is constraining 
increases in life ecpectancy, even at advanced ages. 
Fries (1984) disagrees with the conclusions presen-
ted by Myers and Manton and argues that their analysis 
contains several fallacies (flaws). Manton and Soldo (1985, 
221-223) have continued the debate by carrying out certain 
additional calculations suggested by Fries. The results of 
the calculations suggest that the effects of retangulariza-
tion have been minimal. 
Olshansky and Ault ( 1986) interprete the implica-
tions of the recent decline of mortality in the United 
States in a way that is closer to the view of Myers and 
Manton than that of Fries. They use the term "fourth stage 
of the epiderniologic transition" to summarize their view. 
According to the older "theory of the epiderniologic transi-
tion" presented by Omran (1971) there are three stages in 
the epidemiologic history of mankind. These stages have 
been characterized generally by a substitution of degenera-
tive diseases for infectious diseases. 
On the basis of their analysis of mortality data 
Olshansky and Ault conclude (1986) that the United States 
appears to have recently entered a fourth stage in the 
epidemiologic transition - a stage characterized by rapid 
mortality declines in advanced ages caused by a postpone-
ment of the age at which degenerative diseases tend to 
kill. They refer to this redistribution of degenerative 
diseases as The Age of Delayed Degenerative Diseases - "a 
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stage that will propel life expectancy into and perhaps 
beyond eight decades". 
A combination of several factors is responsible for 
this new era in the epidemiologic history. These factors 
include reductions in some major risk factors for degenera-
tive diseases such as declines in smoking, more exercise 
and improved dietary habits and advances in medical tech-
nology and public health measures that favor the old over 
the young. During the fourth stage of the transition the 
major degenerative causes of death remain the major kill-
ers, but the risk of dying from these diseases is postponed 
until older ages (Olshansky and Ault 1986). 
According to Olshansky ( 198 7, 364) we do not know 
enough about the precise nature of the new era of delayed 
mortality to judge how long it will continue . In any case 
the era will end sooner or later when the inevitable aver-
age limit to life is reached. "If the era is long lived, we 
face unknown constraints imposed by an average biological 
limit to life that is beyond current estimates of 100 years 
of life." 
The arguments concerning the "rectangularization 
hypothesis" and on the "fourth stage of the epidemiologic 
transition" are interesting and highly relevant to the 
projection of future mortality. It should be noted, 
however, that the discussion has been based mainly on 
empirical data from the United States. It would be inter-
esting to discuss these concepts in the light of data from 
several other countries. Martelin (1988) and Kannisto 
(1988) have recently presented relevant data on mortality 
at old age for the Nordic countries. Martelin will sum-
marize the results of these studies in her paper at the 
Sopron conference. 
5. Open questions in the future of mortality 
In the previous sections I have discussed several 
aspects connected with the future of mortality in in-
dustrialized countries. I shall not try to summarize these 
aspects here. Instead, I should like to distinguish the 
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following specific questions to be discussed in the ses-
sions on the basis of the contributed papers: 
The future of female mortality. In all industrial-
ized countries females have higher life expectancy than 
males. Females are thus the vanguard who should be the 
first to show the limit of the possible decline in mor-
tality. In the light of the material presented above the 
decline of female mortality is likely to continue even in 
those countries where female life expectancy already is the 
highest. A most important question is how far this decline 
can continue. Is there a fixed or changing limit to lon-
gevity? If a limit exists, is it closer to 80, 90 or 100 
years and how long does it take to reach it? 
The future of excess male mortality . The difference 
between female and male life expectancy has, in general, 
increased in industrialized countries. We do not know to 
what extent excess mortality and the increasing gap between 
female and male life expectancy is determined by biological 
factors and to what extent by socio-cultural factors. Is it 
possible for men to reach the same high life expectancy as 
women? If not, what is the likely minimum excess mortality 
of men? 
High mortality countries. There is considerable 
variation in the levels of mortality among the industrial-
ized countries . There seems to be no necessary reason why 
mortality in Eastern Europe should remain permanently 
higher than in Western Europe, although the trend has been 
moving towards a widening gap. A problem for research is to 
reveal the factors that prevent the currently high mor-
tality countries from reaching lower levels. 
Medical breakthroughs, catastrophes and other 
unanticipated factors. It is possible and even likely that 
new factors, not taken into account in our current projec-
tions, influence the future of mortality. There may be 
breakthroughs in medicine, which help to prevent or cure 
cancer, heart diseases or other major causes of death . On 
the other hand, wars, ecological or economic catastrophes 
or epidemics may cause an unexpected increase of mortality. 
It is not possible to estimate the influence of these kinds 
of factors, and we tend to ignore them in our mortality 
16 I {O 
projections. There is, however, one relevant factor which 
we already know, namely the epidemic of AIDS. I have there-
fore invited Dr Heilig to prepare a paper on the influence 
of AIDS on the future mortality in industrialized countries 
for the mortality session at the Sopron conference. 
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l•ble I. Actual 1ale exoectation of life it birth in industrialized countries fro1 19&0 to 1985 or to 
the latest year available ind projected expect1tion of life fro• 1985 to 2025 (projected by UNI 
llHO Actual Projected by UN 
COUNTRY 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1995 1980-85 2000-05 2020-25 
JAPAN 66.6 68.8 70.6 72.8 7U 75.51 74.3 75.0 75.0 
YAN6UARD CAP ITAL IST COUNTRIES 
ICELAND 71. 3 71.1 71 . 2 73. 7 74.0 75.1 73.6 74.8 75. ') 
NETHERLANDS 71.3 71.1 71.1 71. 9 72.B 7l.1 72. 7 73. 9 75.0 
NOR NAY 71.1 71.2 71.3 72. l 72. 7 72.6 72.6 73.B 75.0 
SllEDEN 71. 5 71.B 72.2 72.4 73.4 7l.B 73.4 74.b 75.0 
Siil TZERLAND 68.7 69. 7 70.7 71. 9 72.B 73.B;. 72.B 74.0 75.0 
llEAN 70.8 71. 0 71.l 72.4 73.l 73. 7 73.0 74.2 75.0 
AY£RA6E CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 
CANADA 68.4 68.9 69.4 70.5 72.2 73.0 72.3 73.7 74. 9 
UNITED STATES 66.8 66.8 67.6 69.5 70.6' 71.36 70.6 72. 9 74.1 
AUSTRIA 66. 2 66.6 66.9 68.3 69.4 71.h 69.5 72.5 73 .7 
IEL61U" 67.3 67.6 68.2 69.l 70.l 70.8" 70.2 72.8 74. 0 
D£11mK 70.4 70.5 70.9 71.5 71.S 71. 7 71.5 73.0 74. 2 
FINLAND 65.5 65.7 66.5 69.1 69.9 70.h 69.8 72.6 73.B 
FRANCE 67.7 68.1 69.2 70.1 71.2 71.8 70.6 72. 9 74.1 
FR6 67.1 67.S 67.7 68.9 70.5 71.h 70.4 72.8 74.0 
6REECE 70.l 70.6 72.0 72.6 73.4 73.5 72.1 73.S 74.7 
IRELAND 68.2 68.5 68.7 69.3 70.l 70.8" 70.4 72.B 74.1 
ISRAEL n.a. n. a. n.a. 71. 3 72.8 73.6 72.B 74. 0 75.0 
ITALY 67.0 67.8 69.0 70.4 71.4' 71. 3 s 71. 2 73.2 74.3 
LUIE!1BOUR6 n.a. 66. 7 66.9 68.2 69.4 70.6 J, 67.9 71. 4 73. 3 
SPAIN 69.0 69.I 70.2 71.1 72.61 n.a. 71. 3 73.2 74.4 
EN6LAND • WALES 68.1 68.6 69.1 70.0 71.3 71.9 70.ii 72. q 1 74.11 
AUSTRALIA 67.8 67.7 68. 0 69 .9 71. 7 72.2 71. 6 73. 4 7U 
llEll ZEALAND 68.5 68. 2 68.b 69.l 70.6 71.0 70.7 73.0 1•.2 
"EAN 67.9 68. l 68.7 69.9 71.1 67.5 70.8 73.0 74.2 
REARGUARD CAPITALIST COUllTRIES 
"ALTA 67.1 68.1 68.5 68.2 69.4 72.3 "lo 69. 4 72. 4 73. 7 
PORTUGAL 61.6 63.0 64.6 66. l 69.7 70.2 1 69.4 71.7 73.4 
NORTHERN IRELAND 67.7 68.1 67.2 67.8 69.S 70.3 n.a. !72.511 !73. 8) l 
SCOTLAND 66.3 67.0 67.3 68.0 69.3 10.1,. n.a. m.:~ m .611 
TU60SLAYIA 63.0 65.1 66.0 67.5 67.8 I 67.15 68. 0 71. 4 73.2 
llEAN 65. l 66.3 66.7 67.5 68.9 70.0 68.6 72. l 73 .5 
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
IUL6ARIA 68.4 68.9 68.8 68.6 68.5 68.3 69.0 72.1 73.S 
CZECHOSLOYAKIA 67.6 67.0 66.6 67.0 67.0 67.3 67.5 71.1 73.1 
6RD 67.3 68.1 68.6 68.B 69.1 69.5 69.3 72.4 n.a 
HU116ARY 66.4 66. 9 66.5 66.3 65.3 65.3; 66.9 70.5 72.8 
POLAND 65. l 66.7 67. 1 66.9 66.9 66.7 l 67.3 71. l 73.0 
RO"ANIA n.a. n. a. 66.6 67.3 66.9 67. l, 67.9 71.0 73.2 
llEAN 67.0 67.5 67.4 67.5 67.3 67.4 68. 0 71.4 73.2 
USSR 3 65.6 65.6 64.3 63.0 62.5 65.0 66.5 70.7 73.0 
SOURCES: Actu1l lifr e1orct1ncy: Norld He1lth St1tistics Annu1l 1986 1nd 1987 INHOJ 
Projrctions: Norld Popul1tion Prospects, Esti11tts 1nd Projections as Assrssed in 1984 (UNl 
1. United r.ingdo1 4. 1981 
2. Esti11ted on thr basis of tht projection for "1It1 5. 1983 
3. Sauret: Tht lift e1ptct1ncits for tht 5-yeir prriods for the Soviet Union 6. 1984 
1rt ttti11tts based on inttrpol1tian fra1 tht d1t1 prtstnted by 7. 1986 
Blu1 1nd Prtss1t (1987, Tablt II. Tht lift txptct1ncy for 1986 B. 1980-82 
is frat tht s11t source 9. 1980-83 
n.a.=not 1v1ilablt 
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Table 2. Actual fe1al@ exoectation of life at birth in industrialized countri es fro• 1960 to 1985 or to 
the latest availab l! year and projected expectat ion of lif e fro1 1985 to 2025 !oroJected by UNl 
llHO Actual Projected by UN 
COUNTRY 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985 19BO-B5 2000-os 2020-25 
JAPAN 71.7 74.1 75.9 78.1 80.0 Bl. 6 '1 79.7 B0.7 81.5 
VAN6UARD CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 
ICELAND 76.4 76.5 77 .3 79.6 80.3 79. 4 80.3 Bl. O 81. 9 
NETHERLANDS 75.9 76.4 77.1 7B.5 79.7 79.9 7U 80.7 81.5 
NORWAY 75.9 n.B 77.7 7B.6 79.6 79.6 79.S 80.7 81. 5 
SNEDEN 75.S 76.5 77. 7 78.5 79.6 79.9 79.4 BO. 7 BU 
Sii ITZERLAND 74.S 75.S 76. 9 78.6 79.6 80. 61 79.7 80.7 81. 5 
"EAN 75.6 76.3 77. 3 78.8 79.8 79.9 79.7 BO.S 81. 6 
AVERA6E CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 
CANADA H.4 75.S 76. 7 78. 1 79.4 80.0 79.3 80.6 81. 4 
UNITED STATES 7l.5 74.l 75.3 77.4 79.1 , 78 .5 .. 78.1 80.3 81. I 
AUSTRIA 72.7 7l.3 74.1 75. 4 76 .& 77. 8~ 76.7 79.7 B0.7 
BEL61Ull 73.3 73.9 74. 7 75.9 77.1 n .e .. 77 .0 80.0 80.B 
DENPIARK 74. s 75.3 76.4 77. 4 77. 7 77. 7 77.6 80.2 81. 0 
FINLAND 72. 5 73.3 75.0 77.0 78.5 78. 9., 78.0 80.3 81.1 
FRANCE 74. 6 75.6 77.0 78.3 79.4 BO. I 7B.7 80.5 Bl. 3 
FR6 72. 7 73.5 74.1 75.6 77. 3 78. 51 77.2 80 . ~ BO.B 
6REECE 73.6 74.5 76.3 77.2 78.0 78.5 76.0 79 .3 80. 7 
I REL AND 72.0 72. 9 73. 6 74.6 75.8 76.3. 75 .7 79 .0 80.6 
ISRAEL n.a. n.a. n.a. 74. 9 76.2 77.0 76. 2 7U eo.o 
ITALY 72. 4 73.6 75.1 76.9 78. 0' 77. 95 78 ,\) 80.2 81.0 
LUIE11BOUR6 n.a. 73. 2 74.1 75.5 76.2 78. 21 74.0 77. 9 80 .~ 
SPAIN 72. 7 74.3 75.7 77. 0 78. 8 'I n.a. 77 .5 BO. I 80.9 
EN6LAND ' llALES 74. ! 74.9 75.4 76.1 77. 3 77.b 76. 9, 79. q 1 B<J.9 1 
AUSTRALIA 74.2 74.3 74.8 77 ,\) 78.7 78.7 7U 80.4 e1 .2 
NEii ZEALAND 74.0 74.4 74.8 75.8 76.9 76.9 77.0 80. :) 80.9 
PIEAN 73.4 74.2 75.2 76.5 77 .6 73.6 77 . 2 79. 9 80 .9 
REAR6UARD CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 
PIALTA 70.8 71. 8 72. 7 72. 7 73.9 75. 81- 74.Z 78.2 BO.! 
PORTU6AL 67.2 69.3 71.0 73.3 75.7 77.1, 75. 2 79.2 BU 
NORTHERN IRELAND 72.6 73 .4 73.6 74.2 75.9 76.5 n.a. (i9. 312 (80. /) i. 
SCOTLAND 72. 2 73.1 73.7 74. 4 75.5 76. 3 ~ n. a. 179 . ll2. (80. Sil. 
YU60SLAVIA 66.4 69 .1 70.9 72. 7 73.'' 73. 0 5 73. 5 77.8 so .: 
PIEAN 69.8 71.3 72 .4 73.5 74 .9 75.7 7U 78.7 80.5 
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
BULGARIA 72.1 73.0 73.4 73.7 74. 2 7U 74. ~ 78.2 eo.: 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 73.3 73.5 73.6 74.2 74.4 74.8 74. i i8.: 80.4 
6DR 72.2 73.2 73. 9 74.6 75. ! 75. 4 75. 1 78.6 80.5 
HUN6ARY 70. 9 72.0 72.4 72. B 73.1 73. 3 1- 73 .B 77.8 eo.;: 
POLAND 71. 2 73.1 74.1 74. 9 75.1 75.1 .. 75 .3 78. q 81), 4 
ROPIANIA n.a. n.a. 71.1 72.0 72.4 72. 7 lo 72.7 i7.3 90 .2 
PIEAN 71. 9 73.0 73.1 73.7 74.1 74.3 74. j 78.2 80,j 
USSR 3 73.1 74. 2 73.4 72.8 72. 7 73.6 75. 4 78.9 80.5 
SOURCES: Actual lif! !XD!ctancy: World H!alth Statistics Annual 1986 and 1987 (~HOl 
Projections: llorld Pooulation Proso!cts, Esti1ates ~nd Pro j!ctions as Assessed in 1984 (UNl 
I. United n ngdo1 4, 1981 
2. Esti1at!d on the basis of the project ion for ~a l ta 5. 1m 
3. Sourc!: The lif! txoectanci!s for the S-y!ar periods for the Soviet Union 6. 1984 
ar! esti1at!s b1sed on interoolation fro• the data ores!nted by 7. 1986 
Blu1 and Pr!ssat 11987. Table tl . The life !xoectancy for 1986 8. 1990-92 
is fro1 th! sa1r source q. 1980-83 
n.a.=not available 
Table 3. Life expectancy at birth (eo) by sex in 1985 and 
the highest projected life expectancy according to selected 
national population projections compared to the UN 
projections 
Country and period of 
projection 
Finland Norway 
1984- 1985-
Sweden 
1986-
2025 
Denmark Austria U.K. 
1986- 1985- 1983-
France 
1985-
2040 
Nether-
! ands 
1986-
2035 
USA 
1983-2000 
(middle) 
MALES 
Life expectancy in 1985 
Time t when the highest 
eo is projected to be 
Projected highest eo 
UN projection eo for time t 
UN projection eo for 2020-25 
FEMALES 
Life expectancy in 1985 
Time t when the highest eo 
is projected to be reached 
Projected highest eo 
UN projection eo for time t 
UN proj ection eo for 2025 
ll England and Wales 
2010 2050 
70.1 
2010 
73 . 5 
73 . 1 
73.8 
78.5 
2010 
79.5 
80.6 
81.1 
72 . 6 
2000 
74.76 
73 .7 
75.0 
79.6 
2000 
81 . 16 
80.6 
81. 5 
2) On the basis of the trends of death rates 
3) On the basis of rap id decline of morta lity 
73.8 
2000 
74.9 
74.5 
75.0 
79.9 
2000 
81.3 
80.6 
81.5 
4) According to the "lo w" alternative 0.5 years 
less and according to the "high" alternative 
0.5 years mo re 
2015 2015 2023 
71. 7 
1983-
84 
71.5 
71.5 
74.2 
77.7 
1996 
79.0 
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Abstract 
This paper summarizes available information concerning the impact of AIDS-
related deaths on future mortality. To understand the potential demographic impact of 
the Acquired Immunodefici~ncy Syndrome (AIDS), four characteristics of this disease 
need to be taken into account. 
o First, it must be realized that AIDS is just the tenninal stage of an infectious disease, 
which is caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).1 It is therefore the 
spread of this virus, and not the still relatively low number of AIDS cases and 
deaths, which is the crucial factor. It is the incredible speed with which the HIV 
epidemic has brought the virus to 150 countries in only a few years that will 
substantially affect future trends of mortality. 
o Second, the natural course of an HIV infection is characterized by a very long 
asymptomatic incubation period, during which the seemingly "healthy" carrier can 
transmit the virus both sexually and through blood contact. Since the average 
incubation period is estimated at some 8 to 10 years, the present number of AIDS 
cases and deaths is just the tip of the iceberg: it represents the epidemiological 
situation at the end of the 1970s and during the first few years of the 1980s. For 
every AIDS case diagnosed today, there might be another 10 to 50 cases of HIV 
infection. 
o Third, if no cure is found in the near future, it must be reckoned that some 50 % of 
all those presently infected with HIV will develop AIDS and die during the next 10 
to 12 years. Indeed, the possibility cannot be dismissed that all HIV carriers might 
progress to AIDS. Since the average period of survival following the development 
of AIDS has been found to be only one to two years, a rapid increase in deaths 
throug AIDS must be expected during the 1990s. 
o Fourth, compared to the victims of other causes of death, AIDS patients die young. In 
the United Kingdom, the present average age at death from AIDS is 37 years. The 
premature deaths of AIDS patients will soon add up to a massive loss of years of 
potential life. In the United States of America, AIDS is already the 5th leading cause 
of death, if measured in terms of years of potential life lost before age 65. 
After discussing these basic characteristics of the HIV infection, the paper reviews 
studies analyzing the impact of AIDS on mortality. It documents the increases in 
premature mortality attributable to this disease in high prevalence areas, such as New 
York, San Francisco or East Africa. Finally, the paper argues that the further spread of 
HIV infection in Africa south of the Sahara and the Caribbean will result in a 
substantial decrease in overall life expectancy within these regions. 
1 Infection with another retrc>viN$, called HIV-2, h.u ruently appeared in West Africa, and seems to be spreading among the same 
iUk grouP' as HIV. Genetically, HIV-2 bu a higher similarity to an animal retrovil\1.$ (the Simian T-Ccll Leukemia Virus Typ m 
(Sll.V-lll)), than to the Human Immunodeficiency Vin.L$ (HIV). Apparently HIV-2 also causes (a less serious fonn of ?) AIDS. 
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1. Introduction: The natural history of HIV infection and AIDS 
To appreciate the possible impact of AIDS on future trends of mortality, it is 
necessary to understand some medical aspects of HIV infection. The natural course of 
this disease consists of several distinctive stages: 
(0) Infection: The disease starts when Human Immunodeficiency Viruses (abbreviated 
HIV) invade certain human cells (T-Helper-Cells and Macrophages) and write 
their genetic information into the genome of these "host cells". As far as we know 
today, the inevitable consequence of this is a life-long infection with this retrovirus. 
There is probably no way of eliminating the viral information from inside the cells, 
because the virus bas written its genetic code at some unknown location into the 
DNA sequence of the human "host cell". 
(1) Initial lymphatic reaction: A short time after infection, some patients (10-15%) 
suffer from a temporary glandular fever-like illness, comparable to influenza. Very 
often, however, these symptoms are passing by unrecognized. As a result of 
infection, the human immune defence system is stimulated to produce antibodies 
which should destroy the invading virus. This antibody reaction of the human 
immune defence is the basis of contemporary HIV tests (ELISA, Western Blot), 
which measure the existence of IDV-specific antibodies in the blood serum of the 
patient. If these antibodies are found, the test is said to be "sero-positive". The time 
span between initial infection and seroconversion is unknown. Until recently it was 
thought that some 4 to 6 weeks should be accepted as a "diagnostic window", during 
which a HIV infection could not be detected by an antibody test. More recent 
studies, however, have demonstrated that some patients were actually infected 
several month before an HIV-antibody test detected the virus.2 
(2) Asymptomatic latency period: Most important for any understanding of this 
disease is the latency period between initial infection and the development of 
AIDS, which can be of considerable duration.3 During this period many IDV-
infected persons feel more or less healthy. Nevertheless, these asymptomatic HIV 
carriers can transmit the virus sexually or via blood contact und thus add to the 
further spread of the epidemic. A substantial proportion of IIlV infected persons 
remain in this symptomless stage for a very long time or develop only a mild form 
of persistent generalized lympbadenopatby (swelling of lymph nodes). 
(3) AIDS-related complex (ARC): This stage of the disease is usually reached after 
several years of asymptomatic HIV infection. Some patients, however, quickly 
progress to this stage after infection. It is characterized by symptoms such as fever, 
2 Ranlci, A / Krohn, M. / Allain, J.P. / Franchini, G. / Valle, S.L. / Antoncn, J. / Leuthcrcr, M. / Krohn, KJ.E. (1987): Long 
latency precedes OY"Cn SCl"OCOflVCJ$iOn in sexually transmitted Human Immunodeficiency Vil'\IS infection. In: The Lancet. Vol. 
U/1987, September 12, 4~, 589-593 
3 Alvaro Mun°' ct al. have rcponcd results of a follow up study of 127 HN infected hom06CX1.1&l men, participating in the 
Multiccntcr AIDS Cohon Study in the United Statc.s of America. According to their data, AIDS is very unlikely to develop before 
12 month after infection. Approximately 80% of HIV infected arc AIDS-free after 60 months. Between 30 and 60 months. 
however, a significant incrcase in incidence ratc.s of AIDS was observed. Sec: Munos. A / Wang. M.C. / Good, S. I Dete ls. R. / 
Ginzburg. H. /Kingsley, L. /Phair, J. /Polk, B.F. (1988): Estimation of the AIDS-free timc.s after HIV-1 scroconversion. In: rv. 
International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Swt:dcn, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts, Book l, Final Program. 292. 
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weight loss or diarrhoea, severe opporturusuc infections and pathological 
laboratory parameters of the immune system. ARC patients have a high probability 
of progressing to AIDS. 
(4) Full blown AIDS: Strictly speeking, this is only a tenninal stage of this infectious 
disease - and not, as many people tend to believe, the disease itself.4 The definition 
of AIDS is based upon ~ertain clinical manifestations that are indicative of the 
acquired immunodeficiency. AIDS is the most severe consequence of HIV 
infection, but there are other equally fatal manifestations. Clinical research bas 
demonstrated that the virus not only affects the human immune system, but is also 
responsible for a diversity of neurological syndroms including progressive 
dementia. These fatal symptoms appear to be due to the direct effects of the virus 
itself. In most cases, the neurological symptoms can be found in patients with 
AIDS; some other patients, however, develop these neurological manifestations in 
the apparent absence of an immune deficiency.5 Since the latency for neurological 
symptoms of the HIV infection may be longer on average than for the development 
of an immunodeficiency, the long term morbidity of HIV infection caused by 
neurological diseases may be substantial. 
Fig. 1: The natural history of HIV infection 
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Source: Pinching, A.J. /Weiss, R.A. /Miller, D. (1988): AIDS and HIV infection: New perspectives . 
Jn: British Medicel Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1·19 (13) 
4 The clinical definitioo of AIDS wu po by the Ccnten of Disease Control. Sec: Ccnten for Disease Control. (1987): Revision 
of the CDC case definition for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome. In: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Vol. 36 
(suppl), lS.; Kirn, D. / Peipl, D.W. /Edison, R. /Lemp, G. / Abrams, DJ. (1988): Revised center for disease control AIDS~ 
definition: Impact on case reporting. In: IV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, June 12-16. 1988. Abstracts. 
Book 1, Fl.Dal Prognm, 210.; Editorial (AIDS..Forscbung) (1986): WHO-Definition fur AIDS. In: AlDS..Forschung. Jg. 1, Heft 12. 
642~. 
S DesJarlais, D.C. / Sotheran, J. /Stoneburner, R. /Friedman, S. / Marmor, M. / Maslanslcy, R. / ct al. (1988): HIV-I is associated 
with Cata! infectious disc.asc.s other than AIDS among intravenous drug users. In: IV. International Conference on AIDS. 
Stockholm, s-den, June 12-16, 1988. Ab5tracts, Book l , F"lnal Program, 314. 
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2. Data 
The most obvious way to study the demographic impact of AIDS would be to 
analyze mortality rates by cause of death. As was argued above, however, this would 
only lead to an underestimation of the real problem. It is not the 110,000 cases of 
AIDS presently reported to the World Health Organization, that will substantially 
affect mortality, but the estimated 10 to 20 million HIV-infected persons worldwide. 
AIDS-related mortality has to be analyzed in conjunction with all stages of this fatal 
disease, including the asymptomatic mv infection. 
2.1 HIV Infection 
Since the causative agent of AIDS is the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, it is 
essential that we study its spread to estimate the future trends of AIDS-related 
mortality. Unfortunately the prevalence of HIV infection among the general 
population can only be estimated indirectly from limited surveys, the majority of which 
have been conducted among high-risk groups, such as homosexual men, i.v. drug 
abusers, haemophiliacs or prostitutes.6 The prevalence rates found in these surveys 
vary substantially from country to country and region to region. The highest rates of 
HIV infection are among prostitutes in the urban areas of East and Central Africa and 
the Caribbean. Several studies (in Nairobi, Mombassa, Kinshasa, Kampala) have 
documented infection rates of some 50 to 90%. Very high prevalence rates of HIV 
infection are also found among homosexual men and i.v. drug addicts in the urban 
areas of developed countries, especially in the United States of America. Studies in 
San Francisco, New York7, Paris, Zurich, Berlin or Frankfurt have demonstrated HIV 
prevalence rates among these high-risk groups of up to 70%8 (see Fig. 1). 
While there is certainly a worldwide spread of HIV among social groups \vi th high-
risk behavior, the prevalence rate of the general population is still under debate. Some 
quantitative information on this subject can be found in surveys among certain "low 
risk" populations, such as pregnant women,9 military personnel and applicants, or 
representative samples of the sexually active population. 
6 Battjes, RJ. / Pickens, R. (1988): HIV infection among intravenous drug abusers (IVDAs) in five U.S. cities. In: IV. Interna tional 
Conference on AIDS, Stoclcholm, Sweden, June l:Z..16, 1988. Abstracu, Book 1, Final Program, 292. 
7 Ciiaaon, MA/ Ufson, AR./ Stoneburner, R.L. /Ewing. W. /Hildebrandt, D. /Jaffe, H.W. (1988): HIV-1 scroprcvalence in 
male and female prostitutes in New York City. In: IV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, June 12-16. 1988. 
. Abstracts, Book 1, Final Program, 288. 
8 Brown, L.S. /Lu, H. /Cerney, M. /Allain, J.P. / Qiu, A / Foster, K. (1988): l-ril..V-1 and HJV-1 infection in intravenous drug 
abusers (ivdas). In: IV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts, Book 1, Fina l 
Program, 190. 
9 Hoff, R. /Berardi, V.P. / Weiblen, BJ. / Mahoney-Trout, B.S. / Mitchell, M.L / Grady, G.F. (1988): Seroprcvalence of Human 
Immunodeficiency Yir\1$ among childbearing women. In: The New England Journal Medcine, Vol. 318. No. 9, March 3, 526-530. 
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Fig. 2: Proportion of HIV infected persons by selected high ·risk groups and geograph ical location 
according to var ious surveys . 
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(a) Child-bearing women: 
The New York State Department of Health in Albany, New York, for instance, 
conducted a study, to determine the prevalence of HIV infection in pregnant women 
and their children.10 Blood specimens were taken from 25,804 newborn infants in the 
State of New York. 215 (0.83%) tested positive in both standard HIV ELISA and 
Western Blot. Seropositivity varied substantially between the regions of New York 
10 Novick, LP. /Berns, D. / Stricof, R. /Stevens, R. (1988): HIV ieroprevaleDce in Dewbom infants in New Yorlc. State. In: IV. 
International Confen:nce OD AIDS, Stoclc.holm, s-den, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts, Book 1, Final Program, 433. Sec also: 
AraDeta, M.R /Thomas, PA./ Cedeno, S. /Ramirez, LL/ Ruiz. A./ Schultt, S. (1988): Scroprevalence of HIV·l among 
pn:gnant 'lllOmeD at time of binh and abonioa in N.Y.C.-1987. In: IV. International Conference OD AIDS, Stoclc.holm. Sweden. 
June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts, Book 1, F111al Program, 269.; Archibald, D.W. / Witt, DJ. / Craven, DJ. / Vogt, M.W. / Hmch. 
M.S. / Essex, M. (1987): Antibodies to Human Immunodeficiency Virus in cervical secretion from women at risk for AIDS. In: 
Journal of lnfectio\15 Diseases, Vol. 1.56, No. 1, ~241.; Armson, BA / Mennuti, M.T. / Talbot, G.H. (1988) 
Scroprcvalence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in an obstetric population. lo: IV. International Conference on AIDS. 
Stoclc.holm, Sweden, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracu, Book 1, Final Program. 218. 
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State: the lowest prevalence rate was found in upstate New York (0.19 %), the highest 
rate among neonates in the Bronx (2.29%) and in Brooklyn (1.56%). From this data 
can be concluded that substantial rates of IDV infection among women of childbearing 
age can be found in certain areas of New York City. The number of HIV positive 
newborn infants in 1988 will be approximately 2,241. Since at least some 40% of these 
children will be HIV infected, some 900 HIV infected infants will be born in the state 
of New York. According to the authors of this study, "this figure far exceeds the number 
of previously reported or projected cases for 1988". 
However, this very high prevalence of HIV infection among females of 
childbearing age in New York, does not seem to be typical for other urban areas in the 
developed world. A similar study was conducted in Paris, where 15,465 pregnant 
women were screened between February 1987 and October 1987.11 Only 99 women 
were found to be HIV-positive (0,64 %); 54 of the HIV infected pregnant women were 
i.v. drug abusers or transfusion patients; 32 had partners with well defined risk factors. 
Only 3 women might have been infected through random partners. This indicates that 
heterosexual transmission through random partners appeares (still) to be a rare event 
in 1987 in Paris. 
(b) Military Personnel: 
Civillian applicants to the US army and regular-duty soldiers certainly represent a 
much better cross-section of the population in the USA than the high-risk groups of 
homosexuals, drug addicts or prostitutes. Since October 1985, the U.S. Department of 
Defense bas routinely tested both new applicants and active-duty soldiers for HIV. The 
findings are of great significance in estimating the extent of potential AIDS morbidity 
and mortality. 
According to a report of the Centers for Disease Control, 789,578 civillian applicants 
for military service were IDV tested between October 1985 and December 1986. Of 
these, 1,186 (0.15%) were confirmed as carriers of the AIDS virus.12 There was a great 
variation of prevalence rates according to age, se~ race and geographical region (see 
Tab. 1). 
11 Brossard, Y. / Goudeau, A / LarJ. / Schwartt, D. (1988): A sero-epidemiological study of HIV in 15 465 pregnant women 
screened in Paris area bcrw.:en Feb. 1987 and Oct. 1987. In: IV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden. June 12· 
16, 1988. Abstracts, Book 1, final Program, 219. 
12 Centers for Disease Control (1987): Trends in Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Among Civilian Applicants for Military 
Service - United Statei, October 1985 - December 1986. In: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Repon. Vol. 36. No. 18. 273-276 
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Tab. 1: Prevalence of HIV antibody among c ivi l i an applicants for military service, by age group 
and region of res i dence . No. of Tests: 789,578. 
HIV 
sero·positive --... - Age Groups ............. 
per 1000 Region 17-20 21-25 >= 26 All Ages 
---------- -----------·------ --------------------------- ··- ---·----· -· -- -- -- --
Total (1,186) 1.5 New England 0 . 4 1.0 3 . 8 0.9 
----------------------------
Middle Atlantic 0.7 4.6 10 . 0 2 . 9 
Age 17-20 0.6 EN Central 0 .4 1.8 1.9 0.9 
Age 21 - 25 2.5 llN Central 0.2 1. 0 1.8 0.6 
Age >= 26 4.1 South Atlantic 0.9 3.4 5.4 2.1 
--------------------- -------
ES Central 0.4 1.9 1.3 0.9 
Males 1.6 ws Central 0.6 2 .7 3.0 1.6 
Females 0.6 Mouitain 0.3 1.5 1.9 0 . 9 
------------------------ -- --
Pacific 0.8 1.5 4 . 0 1.5 
Whites 0.8 us Territories 1.6 6.3 12.3 5.8 
Blacks 4.1 
--------------- ---- ---------------·-------·------
Hispanics 2.3 All Regions 0 .6 2.5 4.1 1.5 
Source : Centers for Disease Control (1987): Trends in Hunan lrrrrt.1nodeficiency Virus Infection Among 
Civilian Applicants for Military Service - United States, October 1985 - Oeceni:>er 1986. 
In: Morbidity and Morta li ty Weekly Report, Vol . 36, Mo. 18, 273 · 276 
At the 4th World AIDS congress in Stockholm this year, several papers gave 
updates of the results of this military screening program.13 Michael Stek and his co-
authors presented data from the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, according to which the 
testing of 760.000 soldiers yielded an overall prevalence rate of 0.25% HIV for the 
Navy and 0.1 % for the Marine Corps. Patrick Kelley et al. reponed on the HN 
infection rates of all active duty U .S. Army soldiers screened between 1985 and 1987. 
Their report covered 555,900 soldiers, of whom 1,154 (0.21 %) were diagnosed as 
carriers of the AIDS virus. 
The most recent information available are results from the U.S. Department of 
Defense screening program of all active-duty military personnel. A total of 1,752,191 
persons who remained on active duty as of April 24, 1988, were tested. mv infection 
was confirmed in 2,232 (1,3 per 1000) of these persons.14 While the overall prevalence 
rate of HIV infection among active-duty soldiers seem to be relatively low, quite hight 
rates were found in certain social and ethnic groups and geographical regions (see 
Tab. 2). 
13 Bunin, J .R. / McNeil, J. / Renzullo, P. / Brundage, J. (1988): The epidemiology of HIV infection in active duty army women. In: 
IV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, ~en, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts, Book 1, final Program, 275.; Burke. 
D .S./ Brundage, J.F. /Herbold, J.R. /Bernier, W. /Gardner, LI. / Gunzenhauser, JD./ Voskovitcb, J. / Redfield, R.R. (1987): 
HIV infections among civilian applicants for US military service, October 1985 to March 1986. In: The New England Journal of 
Medicine, Vol. 317, July 16, 131-136.; Burke, D.S. / Brundage, J.F. / Bernier, W. / Gerdner, LI. / Redfield, R.R. / 
GunzcnhaUKr, J . / V06kovitcb, J. / Herbold, J.R. (1987): Demography of HIV infections among civilian applicants for military 
service in four counties in New York. In: New York State Journal of Medicine, Vol. 87, No. 5, 262-264.; Cowan, D.K / Brundage. 
J.P. (1988): P~lencc and demographic determinants of HIV infection among U.S. army reserve personnel. In: IV. Internationa l 
Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, S911Cden, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts, Book l, final Program, 222. 
14 Centers for Disease Control (1988): Prevalence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus antibody in U.S. active-duty military 
personnel, April 1988. In: Morbidity and Monality Weekly Repon. Volo. 37, 461-463 
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Tab. 2: Prevalence of HIV antibody among active·duty military personnel, by age, ethnic group, sex, 
marital status end r ank 
No. No. Sffoprwalence Serop,....... le nc. 
Group lltsted poaltlve (!*' 1,000) m• rwtlo (95% Cl) 
Total 1,7$2, 191 2.232 1.3 
Age group ()'MI'S)" 
..,,40 ~.~ 87 0.9 6.6 (• .5.9.3) 
35-39 165.740 22• 1.• 9.7 (6.9.13 .1) 
30-34 23-4.267 .SS 1.9 13.9 (10.2. 18.6) 
25-29 366,156 759 2. 1 1• .9 (10.9,19.8) 
20-2• 568,920 662 1.2 8.3 (6 .1,11.1 ) 
17-19 322.506 .s 0.1 1.0 
Race/Etnnidty 
Black 337.300 988 2.9 3.6 (3.3.3 .9) 
Hispanoc: 71 ,917 144 2.0 2.5 (2.1.2.9) 
O!Mr 79.603 n 0.9 1.1 (0 .9,1.• J 
Whire 1,263.371 1.028 0.8 1.0 
s.x· 
Male 1,571 ,912 2.166 1.• 3.8 (2.9,4.8) 
Female 180,278 66 O.• 1.0 
Manta! status 
O!hert 44,732 102 2.3 2.6 (2 .1.3.2) 
N_,married 690,738 1.255 1.8 2. 1 (1.9.2.3 ) 
Mamed 1.0 16,721 875 0.9 1.0 
Rank" 
Enlis ted 1.515,659 2,061 1.• 1.9 (1.6.2.2 ) 
Ollieer 235.521 171 0.7 1.0 
"AQ• unknOwn lor 259 pe~ Ml unknown lor 1 peTSOI\ rank unltnOwn lor 1,011 pe~s: all were seron99a~. 
t1nc:1uoes dM)l'ced, W>dawed, seoarated. and unocnown. 
Source : Centers for Disease Control (1988> : Prevalence of Hunan lnrrunodeficiency Virus ant ibody in 
U. S. ective·duty military personnel, Apri l 1988. In: Morbidi t y and Mor tal i t y ~eekly Report, 
Vol. 37, 461·463 (taken from: JAMA, Vol. 260, No. 9, 1205> 
(c) Sexually Active Population: 
Margaret Fischl et al. have analyzed a sample of 346 sexually active individuals, 
predominantly representative for the inner city population of Miami, USA 15 Students 
from several college campuses and visitors of health centers and clinics for sexually 
transmitted diseases dominated in this sample. Homosexual men, i.v. drug users and 
prostitutes were excluded from the sample. The only potential risk factor identified 
was multiple heterosexual contact. The results were alarming: 5% (!) of persons tested 
positive for IIlV. According to the authors, this points to the fact that the heterosexual 
transmission of mv is already occurring among sexually active inner city populations 
in the U.SA. 
Probably the most seriously affected geographical areas are Africa16 and the 
Caribbean. In several African countries south of the Sahara a substantial proportion of 
the general (urban) population seems to be IDV-infected: prevalence rates have been 
of between 0.5 and 20% among truck drivers, those attending SID clinics, medical 
15 F'ISChl, M. / Trapido, E. / Stevens, R. / Fayne, T . /Flanagan, S. / Resnick, L / l.aVoie, L (1988): Scroprevalencc of HIV 
antibody in a sexually actM hetero5exual population. In: IV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, June 12-16. 
1988. Abstracts, Book l, Fine! Program, 276. 
16 Heilig. G. (1987): Dcmographischc 11nd gcscll5Chaftliche Aspekte dcr AIDS-Pandemic in Afri1'a siidlich dcr Sahara. In: Afri1'a-
Spcktnlm, Jg. 22, Nr. 1, 23-45. 
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personnel and pregnant women.17 At the 4th International Conference on AIDS in 
Stockholm this year N'Galy (from the Department of Public Health in Zaire) reported 
recent HIV contamination rates for various population groups and areas in Africa. 
According to his figures the HIV prevalence among pregnant women in Kinshasa was 
7% at the beginning of 1988. In Kigali (Uganda) and Lusaka (Zambia) HIV testing of 
blood donors uncovered HIV prevalence rates of up to 18%.18 Heterosexual activity is 
the major mode of HIV transmission in Africa and the Caribbean; prostitution19 and 
promiscuity20 are playing a central role in the spread of the epidemic. 
Estimates of the total number of HIV infected persons not infrequently vary by 
several hundred per cent: For the U.SA the Centers of Disease Control calculated 
that 1 to 1.5 million people could be infected with HIV. In Europe, another 300,000 to 
500,000 people might be carriers of the AIDS virus. The total number of HIV carriers 
in Africa and the Caribbean can only be the subject of speculation: if results of sample 
surveys were to be applied generally, then one would have to reckon with several 
millions being infected with HIV. According to estimates of experts, some 10 to 20 
Million people in 150 countries worldwide might be HIV infected.21 This certainly is a 
vast potential for future AIDS mortality. 
2.2 Progression to AIDS 
Only a few years ago many experts were convinced that just a small fraction of 
those infected with HIV would develop AIDS. In the Federal Republic of Germany for 
instance millions of Deutschmarks were spent by the Federal Ministry of Health in 
informing the public that a mere 5 to 16% of those infected ran the risk of developing 
the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome. Today it is obvious that this was a tragic 
misconception of the natural history of this disease. Now there is overwhelming 
evidence that at least 50% of those infected with HIV will develop AIDS in the course 
of the next 10 years. 
The progression to AIDS seems to be only a matter of time. While only a small 
fraction ( < 5%) of HIV-infected persons develops AIDS during the first 12 months 
after contamination, 20 to 25% reach the fatal stage of the disease within 5 years. The 
asymptomatic latency period after initial infection with HIV seems to be not a stable 
state. Several studies among seemingly "healthy" HIV infected homosexuals in the 
United States of America have demonstrated that the immune system of these patients 
17 Oumeck, N. / R.obcn-Guroff, M. /Van de Perre, P. /Jennings, A. / Sibomann, J. / Demol, P. / Cran, S. / Gallo, RC. (1985): 
Seroepidemiological studies of Hil.. V -m antibody p~lenc:e among selected groups of heteroscX\lal Africans. In: Journal of the 
American Medical Asiociation, Vol. 2S4, 2599-2602. 
18 N'Galy, B. (1988): Epidemiology of HIV infection in Africa. In: IV. lllternational Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden. June 
U-16, Abstracts, Book l, Final Prop-amm, 106 
19 D'Ca;ta, LI. / Plummer, P.A. / Bowmer, I. / ct al. (1985): ProstiMes arc major reservoir of sexually transmitted disease in 
Nairobi, Kenya. In: SeX\lal Transmitted Disease, 12, 64-67. 
20 Oumeck, N. / Van de Perre, P. / Caracl, M. / Rouvroy, D. / Nzaramba, D. (1985): HeteroscX\lal promiscuity among African 
patients with AIDS. In: The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 313, No. 3, 182-183. 
21 Koch, M.G. (1988): AIDS· die maligne Pandemic. In: Vcrdauungsmnkheiten, Jg. 6, Nr. 3, 89-105 
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gradually deteriorates.22 Today, the majority of AIDS researchers are convinced that 
all HIV infected persons will develop AIDS if they are given enough time. Of course 
some HIV patients might die of other causes than AIDS (such as from another disease, 
or through an accident or suicide) before they reach the final stage of their HIV 
related disease. 
2.3 Survival Rate of AIDS Cases 
There is still some debate whether the immune defense system might not 
eventually neutralize the virus in a certain proportion of unsymptomatic HIV carriers 
and thus save them from AIDS. As the average latency period after HIV infection 
seems to be some 10 years there bas not yet been enough time to prove this hypothesis 
of "natural immunity to HIV' right or wrong. The progression of HIV infection to 
AIDS has been under study only for some 6 to 7 years. During the next decade, 
however, we will definitively learn what proportion of HIV carriers is deve loping 
AIDS. 
Whereas there might be a small, theoretical, chance for an HIV infected person to 
avoid the development of AIDS, there is certainly not much hope for an AIDS patient. 
AIDS is the tenninal stage of this infectious disease; and we find evidence for the thesis 
that all AIDS patients will die within only a few years. Up to the present no the rapy 
has been able to eliminate HIV, the causal agent of AIDS, once it bad invaded its host 
cells. Those AIDS drugs which have so far been tested (AZT) merely suppress the 
replication of the virus and thus stabilize the condition of the AIDS patients for a few 
months or years. 
Depending upon risk group and primary manifestation, the average life expectancy 
of AIDS patients varies between 1 and 2 years after diagnosis. George F. Lemp and his 
co-authors evaluated the survival of 3,661 AIDS patients in San Francisco between 
July 1981 and August 1987. They found a median survival period of only 12.1 months, 
with a three-year survival rate of just 11 %.23 Almost identical results were reported by 
Hwa-Gan Chang et al., who conducted a study of 934 adult AIDS cases, reported as 
residents of upper New York State.24 Based on an analysis of 337 cases of AIDS in 
Lousiana, USA, Susan E. Hassig found that the overall period of survival was even less 
than one year. 73% of these AIDS cases, diagnosed between January 1984 and 
December 1986, were dead at the time of analysis (1987 /88).~ 
22 Ediion, R. / Fc:ipl, D.W. / Kim, D. / Abnims, DA (1988): Progression of laboratory values, AIDS morbidity, aod AIDS 
monality in a ~year cobon with PGL In: IV. lntcmatiooal Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden. June 12-16, 1988. 
Ab5tracu, Book 1, rLDal Program, 296. 
23 Lemp, G.F. / Bamhart, J.L / Rutbc:rford, G.W. / Temc:lso, T. / Neal, D.P. / Werdegar, D. (1988): Trends in tlle length of 
survival for AIDS c:asc:s in San Franci5Co. In: IV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, June 12-16. 1988. 
Abstracts, Book 2, Final Program, 208. 
24 Chang. H.G. I Mikl, J. I Morse:, D. I Kain, s. I Putman, D. I TNman, B. (1988): Survival experience or UtJ61ate 1'ew York's 
adult Acquired lmmunoc:leficic:ncy Syndrome Cl.$CS. In: IV. Intc:mational Conference on AIDS, Stockholm. Sweden. June 12-16. 
1988. Absttacts, Book 1, Final Program, 209. 
~ Hassig. S.E. / Atkinson, W.L / Rice, J. / McFarland, L (1988): Survival in AIDS cases, Louisiana. 19&5-1986. In: IV. 
International ConCc:rence on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts. Book 2, Final Program. 208. 
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This high lethality of AIDS can also be demonstrated by means of epidemiological 
data. Table 1 gives the number of AIDS cases and case-fatality rates by half-year of 
diagnosis for the United States of America: 
Tab. 3: USA : Cases of AIDS and case-fatality rates by half year of diagnosis 26 
·---------· New Diagnoses ····-···---- ••• •••• •• ••• C1.iTJ.Jlative Total ...................... 
Year of Niirber of Niirber of Case-fatality c~. No. of c~. No. of C~. Case-
Diagnosis Cases known Deaths Rate Cases known Deaths fata l ity Rate 
----·-------------------------·-------------------- ---------------·---- -- --------------------
< 1981 82 71 87'X 82 71 87'X 
1981/1 95 87 92X 177 158 89X 
1981/2 197 181 92X 374 339 91X 
1982/1 386 342 89X 760 681 90X 
1982/2 667 592 89X 1427 1273 89X 
1983/1 1264 1143 90X 2691 2416 90X 
1983/2 1619 1440 89X 4310 3856 89X 
1984/1 2517 2096 83X 6827 5952 87'X 
1984/2 3285 2728 83X 10112 8680 86X 
1985/1 4638 3742 81X 14750 12422 84X 
1985/2 5967 4613 77'X 20717 17035 82X 
1986/1 7611 5402 71X 28328 22437 7'9X 
1986/2 9049 5491 61X 37377 27928 7SX 
1987/1 11009 5547 SOX 48386 33475 69X 
1987/2 11718 4209 36X 60104 37684 63X 
1988/1 10170 2176 21X 70274 39860 57'X 
1988/Aug.15 428 38 9X 70702 39898 56X 
---------------------------------------------------
····-------------- ------------------------
Total 70702 39898 56X 
During the second half-year of 1981, 197 AIDS cases were diagnosed in the USA; 
181 (or 92%) of these patients have already died of AIDS in the meantime. From all 
the 37,377 cases of AIDS which were diagnosed between 1981 and 1985, some 75% 
bad already been killed by this infectious disease by August 1988. This very high 
lethality of AIDS can best be seen from the mortality rate of AIDS cases most recently 
diagnosed. By August 15, 1988, 21 % of the AIDS cases diagnosed between 1 January 
and 30 June 1988 had died of AIDS; so one AIDS patient out of five was killed by the 
disease during the first 6 months (!) after diagnosis. 
2.4 AIDS-related Mortality 
Several studies have tried to estimate AIDS-related mortality. R Aubert and co-
authors have analyzed multiple cause-of-death data for California and found an 85% 
increase of deaths among sufferers from AIDS-related illnesses between 1980 and 
1984. As the authors conclude, this supports the hypothesis, that the AIDS epidemic in 
California became apparent in mortality statistics after 1981.27 
While the overall mortality rate or life expectancy for the total population in 
Europe has not (yet) been affected by AIDS-related deaths, significant effects can be 
26 Source: Center of Disease Control (1988): AIDS Weekly Surveillance Report - United States AIDS Program. Center for 
Infectious Diseases, Ccntel"5 for Diieasc Control. August 15, 1988. 
27 Aubert, R / Maldonado, YA / Perkins, C. (1988): Use of multiple cause-of-death data to estimate AIDS-related mortality in 
California. In: IV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts. Book I, Final Program. 
204. 
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demonstrated for certain groups of the population. Massimo Galli and his co-authors 
have evaluated the causes of death among 3,127 i.v. drug abusers in Italy between 1980 
and 1987: during the last year, AIDS became the leading cause of death and is 
responsible for a substantial increase of mortality in this sample population.28 
2.4 Years of Potential Life Lost due to AIDS 
The HN epidemic will have a significant effect on average life expectancy in the 
future, not only because of the rapidly increasing number of AIDS deaths, but even 
more because of the age structure of the victims. Since AIDS patients die young, they 
lose many years of potential life.29 The following table gives the official CDC list of the 
leading causes of death in the United States of America for 1985. Measured in years of 
potential life lost before age 65, AIDS was the 11th leading cause of death. At this 
time just some 17,000 patients had died from AIDS in the course of the epidemic. 
Today, in August 1988, the American death toll from AIDS has risen to some 40,000 
cases. It can thus be seen that AIDS is among the first 5 or 6 leading causes of death in 
the United States of America. 
Tab. 4: U. S.A.,1985: Esti11111ted years of potential life lost (YPLL> before age 65 and cause speci fic 
1110rtality, by cause of death 
Rank Cause of mortality30 
Years of Potential 
Life lost 
Cause·specif ic 
Mortal ity Rate 
··-------------------------- ------------- ---------------- ----- -- ---------
1 Unintentional lnjuries 31 
2 Malignant Neoplasms 
3 Diseases of the Heart 
4 Suicide, Homicide 
5 Congenital Anomalies 
6 Prematurity 
7 Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 
8 Cerebrovascular Disease 
9 Chronic Liver Disease 
10 Pneunc>flia and Influenza 
11 AIDS 
12 Chronic Obstructive 
PulaK>nary diseases 
13 Diabeti Mellitus 
2,235,064 38.6 
1 ,813,245 191. 7 
1,600,265 325.0 
1,241,688 20. 1 
694,715 5.5 
444,931 2.9 
319,386 2.0 
253,044 64.0 
235,629 11.2 
168,949 27.9 
152,595 2.3 
129,815 31 .2 
128,229 16.2 
Source: Centers for Disease Control (1987): Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report, Vol . 36, No. 15, April 1987, 235 
28 Galli, M. / Carito, M. / CNCCU, V. / Zampini, L / Ciaa:i, D. /Villa, A / Pacini, S. / Zaini, G . / Corsi, L I Codini, G. / Saracco. 
A / Lazl.arin, A (1988): C..usu of deatb5 in i.v. dnig abU5Crs (IVDAs): A retrospective Sll~Y on 4883 Sllbjecu. In: IV. 
International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, Jllne 12--16, 1988. AbstnctS, Book 2, Final Program, 191 . 
. · 29 Stevens, AJ.H. / Searle, E.5. / Winyard, G.P A. (1987): AIDS and life yuri lost: One district's challenge. ln: British Medical 
Jollmal, Vol. 294, No. 6571, Febn&ar)' 28, 512-573. 
30 According to the Ninth Revision of JCD. The disease categories are equivalent to the following ICD-codcs: (1) E800-E949; (2) 
t40-2()l; (3) 39G-398, 402, 404-429; (4) E9SO-E978; (5) 740-759; (6) 765,769; (7) 798; (8) 430-438; (9) 571; (10) 480-487; (11) 
Renecu CDC sllnoeillance data. No ICD code has been iwigned for AIDS. (12) 490-496; (13) 250 
31 E.quivalent to accidenu and adverse effects. 
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This, however, is only the "status quo". There can be no doubt that the number of 
AIDS cases and deaths will increase dramatically in the course of the next decade. 
Even if health education were able to stop the further spread of the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus immediately, we would experience a further rapid increase of 
AIDS cases. This is the result of a momentum effect which is built into the long latency 
period of the HIV infection. Most AIDS cases which we will see during the 1990s will 
be only the terminal stage of HIV infections contracted in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. 
2.4 Projections 
It is difficult to project AIDS morbidity and mortality on a worldwide basis, since 
our knowledge of the present state of the HIV epidemic is considerably limitted.32 In 
particular, we do not know how far the virus has already spread in the less developed 
countries of Black Africa and the Caribbean. Furthermore, it is impossible to tell 
whether there will be a cure and a vaccine in the future which would slow down or stop 
the epidemic.33 
In the short run, however, there can be hardly any doubt that the number of AIDS 
patients and deaths will increase dramatically. For June 1993, George F. Lemp and his 
co-authors have predicted 12,349 to 17,022 cumulative cases of AIDS in San Francisco. 
This would be an increase of 107 to 185% compared to the present (August 1988) 
5,965 AIDS cases. According to this projection, the number of cumulative deaths from 
AIDS would be 9,966 to 12,767 in 1993.34 
P. Flandre and A .-J. Valleron have used a regression analysis to evaluate the 
expected decrease of life expectancy due to AIDS in France between 1988 and 1990.35 
Compared with the major causes of death in 1988, AIDS mortality will have a 
substantial demographic effect due to the young age distribution of AIDS patients (see 
Table 5). 
32 Bailey, N.TJ. (1988): The modelling and prediction of HN /AIDS. In: Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 151; Koch. 
M.G. / L'agc-Stchr, J. (1987): Moglichkcitcn dcr Progn05C im Rahmen dcr AIDS.Epidcmiologie. In: AIDS.Forschung, Jg. 2. Heft 
2, 94-99. 
33 Brundage, J.P. / Burke, D. / Gardner, L / McNeil, J . / ct al. (1988): Estimating the dynamics of the HIV infection epidemic 
from serial seroprevalence data. In: IV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts, Book 
1, Final Program, 222. 
34 Lemp, G.P. /Hes.sol, N.A. /Rutherford, G.W. /Payne, S.F. /Chen, R.T. / Winkclstcin, W. / Wiley, J.A. I Moss, AR. / Fcigal. 
D . / Wcrdegar, D. (1988): Projections of AIDS morbidity and monality in San Francisco using epidemic models. In: TV. 
International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts, Book 1, Final Program, 232. 
3S Aandrc, P. / Valleron, A.J. (1988): Dccrcasc of life expectancy from AJDS in France between 1988 and 1990 compared to other 
major causes of death. In: TV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, Sweden, June 12-16, 1988. Abstracts, Book 2. Final 
Program, 204. 
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Tab. 5: France: Projected decrease of life expectancy and loss of potentia l years of act ive li fe 
due to AIDS 
Cause 
AIDS 
Motor vehicle crashes 
Cancer 
Suicide 
Heart diseses 
Loss of general life Loss of active l i fe 
expectancy (in years) expectancy (in years) 
1988 1989 1990 1990 
0.74 
3.85 
0.57 
2.26 
0.33 0,67 0.38 
0.42 
0.54 
0.25 
0.27 
Source: Flandre, P. / Valleron, A.-J. (1988) : Decrease of life expectancy 
frOlll AIDS in France between 1988 and 1990 c~ared to other major 
causes of death. In: IV. International Conference on AIDS, Stockholm, 
Sweden, J1..ne 12-16, 1988. Abstracts, Book 1, Fina l Program, 204. 
3. Conclusion 
The basic characteristics of the worldwide spread of the HIV virus can be seen 
from the studies mentioned above: in short, the "AIDS epidemic" is actually the result 
of three successive epidemics. The first, most vigorous, happened among homosexual 
and bisexual men in highly developed countries and among heterosexual urban 
populations with high-risk behavior (such as promiscuity and prostitution) in East and 
Central Africa and the Caribbean.36 A substantial proportion of these persons are IDV 
infected today. Many of them became contaminated with the virus even before they 
knew of its existence. Behavioral changes, to avoid high-risk behavior, came too late in 
these groups to stop the spread of the virus. The second wave of the epidemic is now 
under way among i.v. drug abusers in several industrialized countries. Transmission of 
the virus happens through contact with infected blood ("needle sharing") and sexual 
activity. While the "first epidemic" was "male" (some 90% of the cases were 
homosexual or bisexual men), the second is "feminized". Among HIV infected drug 
addicts, some 50% are females. Heterosexual transmission of the virus (to the partners 
of drug abusers or bisexual men) is the most rapidly growing mode of infection in the 
USA This heterosexual transmission could trigger a third wave of the HIV epidemic 
in developed countries, one which would affect very sexually active groups of the 
population, especially in urban areas. 
The dynamics of these three epidemics are overlapping. In the light of the long 
incubation period of the disease, we are confronted at present with the HIV epidemic 
among homosexual and bisexual men from the early 1980s who now are developing 
AIDS. During the 1990s we will witness increasing numbers of female AIDS patients 
who are presently contracting the virus as drug addicts or their partners. As a result of 
36 The HIV infection5 of haemophiliacs and transfusion patients resulted from contaminaced blood (clotcing factor). given 10 them 
in the counc of therapy. In the developed countries their 'contribution' to the epidemic is neglectible, since all blood donated for 
medical treatment is now screened for HIV. In less developed countries (especially in Africa). however. this is sciU a source of 
spreading the virus. 
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AIDS prevention campaigns, the spread among the heterosexual population in 
developed countries will certainly be much slower, than among homosexuals or drug 
abusers. Due to the disease's long incubation period, however, it is unlikely that the 
epidemic will "dry out" by itself. One has only to bear in mind the fact, that with an 
average (more or less) infectious incubation period of 10 years the probability of 
transmitting the virus to at least one other person is rather high. 
It would be a gross misunderstanding to estimate the demographic impact of the 
HIV epidemic on the basis of the relatively "small" number of AIDS cases that are 
presently registered by the World Health Organization. No captain steering his ship, 
would ignore the unseen body of an iceberg. At a time when mortality statistics are 
beginning to register a significant increase in mortality due to AIDS, it is already too 
late. 
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Titleof Paper: On Future Potentials of Extend i ng lhe Human 
Life Span 
Summary: 
In the future, mortality is still expected to decrease in most 
countries. This decrease can be attributed to the reduction of 
several very different causes of death, each of which varies in 
incidence and target age groups. Thus, the effect on life expectancy 
may be very different. 
First, the impacts of any reduction of various causes of death on 
life expectancy and on survival funktions are analyzed in this paper 
with respect to F.R.G. current mortality data as well as to the post-
war period of 1950-85. Among other causes of death, the so-called 
"avoidable" deaths, for which future reductions might be considered 
most likely, are treated separately in this context. The 
computations are based on the widely accepted method developed 
by Preston , Keyfitz and Schoen in the early 70 ies and modified 
sl ightly by the F.R.G. Federal Institute for Population Research . 
Second, the paper gives some general considerations on the future 
of life expectancy and on the possible human life span. Essentially, 
these considerations refer (1) to the impacts of slowing the rate of 
ag ing versus reducing vulnerablil ity, (2) to the impacts of 
heterogeneity and (3) to the possible bias of period life tables as 
opposed to cohort life tables . 
To summarize, the German data suggest that, in terms of life 
expectancy, a gain of serveral years could be achieved by reducing 
specific causes of death, whereas the maximum human life span 
seems relatively stable. However, the evaluation of future 
potentials for life extension should consider that individual life 
expectancy is very unlikely to coinside with the official life table , 
but might be lower as well as higher, depending on the relative 
importance of heterogeneity versus the long-term mortality 
variation . 
Name: L.H. 
Title of Paper: 
Day, Dept. of Demography, Auatrali&n National University, 
Ce.nberra, A.C.T. 2b0l, Auatralia 
Upper-age Lon~vity in Low-mortality Countries: 
A Diaaenting View 
Summary: Increased concentration in the upper age categories among 
European populations <both in Europe and overseas> has led, in some 
quarters, to considerable unease. Two assumptions underlie this 
unease: (i) that old age is essentially synonymous with ill-health, 
disability, mental deterioration, and uselessness, and (ii) that old 
age entails particularly high financial costs. Neither of these 
assumptions is more than part ially true. Moreover, defining old age in 
terms of longevity rather than chronological age lessens somewhat the 
extent of ageing to be anticipated. 
Current forecasts are unanimously of further increases in 
longevity among European populations, particularly at the uppermost 
ages. These are based on one or the other of three assumptions: < i) an 
almost mechanistic continuation of current downward trends in 
mortality, (ii) improvements in the prevention of disease and trauma, 
and <iii) improvements in therapy. These assumptions are, in turn, 
predicated on: (i) further development in science and its application, 
(ii) improved access to services and care, and (iii) changes in 
1 i festyl e. 
Not all of these can necessarily be relied upon to take place to 
the extent anticipated by those who forecast continued improvement. 
Moreover, those who make such forecasts are leaving out of account 
certain elements in the equation that could have a counterbalancing 
effect, e.g.: <i> the possibility of heightened virultnce in some 
disease organisms, (ii) the possibility of new diseases, (iii) worsened 
environmental conditions, <iv> increastd stress. 
Contrary to expectations, mortality among the elderly in European 
populations may well stop declining and cOfm'lence increasing within 
another decade or two - partly because of differences between the 
current generation of old people and those who will succeed them, and 
partly because of the allocation of social resources. In contrast to 
those who will follow, today's elderly: (i) are biological survivors of 
periods of higher mortality, <ii> are emotional survivors of two world 
wars, depression, massive social change, (iii> have had less exposure 
to certain deleterious environmental conditions the unhealthful conse-
quences of which take a long time to manifest themselves, <iv> have 
benefitted from the allocation of social resources in ways unlikely to 
be continued when old people become a higher proportion of the total. 
Neither the ageing of European populations nor their decrease in 
numbers is likely to be as extreme as is COfm'lonly projected. Nor are 
these societies' general conditions of 1 ife 1 ikely to be adversely 
affected by e i ther the nunbers of elderly or their share of the total 
population. Far greater inportance can be expected to attach to: (i) 
the physical and mental condition of the elderly themselves, and <ii> 
the political, economic, environmental, and social conditions in the 
societies of which they are a part. 
.... - ! 
Name: Josi anne Duchene and Gui 11 aume l~unsch 
Title of Paper: Population Aging and the Limits to Human Life 
Summary: 
Demographers and actuaries have not found a satisfactory answer con-
cerning the maximum longev i ty of the human species or its l imit life table. 
After a brief overview of the demographic and actuarial literature concerninc 
mortality "laws" and limit life tables, we present results from the biolo-
gical literature on aging and senescence. 
Longevity and senescence are prograrrrned into our genes; even if we 
were able to eliminate all diseases and acci dents, death wou ld still occur. 
According to present evidence, the maximum lifespan of the human species 
would be+ 115 years, and the average age at "natural" death would be 
between 8~ and 100 years of age. This l imit mortality would vary by age 
according to a Gompertz or, more probably, a Weibull distribution. 
On the basis of the biological evidence available, we have constructed 
a hypothetical limit life table common to both sexes. This table leads to 
a mean length of life of 91.6 years, the age-specific force of mortaiity 
following a Weibull distribution. 
Various demographic consequences of this limit life table on future 
population aging are derived in the final section of the paper, ta king 
Japan as an example of a low mortality country . Combined with the present 
fertility schedule, the limit life table would ultimately yield an age 
structure where more than 1/ 3 of the population would be over 65, and one 
person out of five would be over 75 . Even if fertility rea ched replacement 
level, the percentage of persons over 65 would still increase from the 
present level of + 12 % to nearly 30 ~ . 
Na.me: Tuij a Martelin 
Title of Paper: Tr end s in e ld erly mortality in t he Nor di c c ountr i es 
Summary: 
This study describes the development of elderly mortality in the Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) during this century. 
Long-term trends in total mortality are examined on the basis of life table statistics. 
More recent trends (from the 1950s onwards) are described by means of annual 
mortality rates according to a rough classification of causes of death. The series of 
vital statistics h"ve heen utili1.ed as the data source for the long-term trends. and the 
original data for annual trends have been obtained from the mortality data bank 
files of the WHO. Marked improvements were observed in survival at advanced ages 
in the Nord ic countries. However, the development has not been stable as in recent 
decades the elderly mortality rate has Ouctuated, roughly comparable to the nuctu-
ations in mortality among the younger age groups. The fact that the rate of recent 
improvement has been greatest in Finland where there, traditionally, is a high mor-
tality level, and low in Norway and Sweden, where mortality levels are low, is in 
accordance with the idea of approaching a certain biological lower limit to mortality. 
However, certain characteristics seem to suggest that further advances are possible. 
Marked improvements have taken place recently in Iceland even though its mortality 
level at the end of the 1960s was already low. In addition, ·a large proportion of 
the differences in mortality rates between the Nordic countries may be due to external 
factors related to living conditions or life-style. Recent trends in mortality from 
several causes of death may also be primarily linked to such factors. Further research 
focusing particularly on a more detailed classification of causes of death and socio-
demographic differentials within the national elderly populations is suggested. 
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Name: MAR EK KUPI SZEWSKI 
Title of Paper: 
Summary: 
Spatial aspects of past and future changes of life dura t ion in 
the light of single- and multiregional life tables: 
A case study of Poland 1977-1995 
For the purpose of analysing the past and the future of mortality patterns 
in Poland single- and multiregional life tables were computed , based on data 
from 1977, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1984 and 1985. Methodology and computer 
program published by Willekens and Rogers (1978 ) were used . Spatial division 
adopted in the investigation was identical with one used by Oziewonski and 
Korcelli (1981 ) for multiregional demographic analysis. 
Over the last decade we witnessed in Poland an increase in the death 
number and death rates . It is easy to asses the phenomena mentioned in the 
scale of the whole country, but its spatial aspects are neglected. The aim of 
the paper is twofold : (1) an assessment of the changes in spatial patterns of 
mortality during the 1977- 1985 period ; (2) an attempt t o create hypothetical 
life tables for 1990 and 1995. 
In the first part of the paper an analysis of the stabili ty of parameters 
of the life tables is presented. The main stress was put on the e (O) values 
in different regions and for data sets referring to different years. The 
analysi s gives an insight into the problem of changes of mortality patterns in 
the regions over time and additionally allows to assess to what ext ent changes 
in migration patterns influence mortality . 
In the second part of the paper an attempt to project age-dependent 
migration and death rates for 1990 and 1995 is m2de, and based on thi s 
projection a hypothetical single- and multiregional life tables are computed . 
The life tables could serve as a simple forecast of the changes in the 
mortality patterns over time. A comparison of observed life tables (based on 
the 1985 data ) and two hypothetical life tables (for 1990 and 1995) is 
presented. 
Willekens F., Rogers A., 1978. Spatial Population Analysis: Methods and 
Computer Programs , RR-78-18 , IIASA, Laxenburg. 
Oziewonski K., Korcelli P., 1981 . Migration and Settlement: 11 . Poland. 
RR-81- 20 , IIASA , Laxenburg. 
Name: Eta Dar6czi - Emil Valkovics 
Title of Paper: Checking the Stability of Spatial Variations in Mor-
tality for Estimating Future Trends of Mortality in Hungar y 
Summary: 
A possible approach for estimating future changes in mortality 
levels is based on the hypothesis that the relationship between 
the legit 1 values of the individual regional life tables and 
x 
those of the national life tables would remain unchanged on the 
short run. (This approach was used to estimate regional life 
tables for intercensal periods in other countries.) It is, how-
ever, a question whether this hypothesis holds true in a period 
of increasing mo rtality. 
In Hungary the Jife expectancy at birth of the male population 
decreased from ~ 6 .52 to 65.04 years and that of the female po-
pulation change d from 72.38 to 73.13 years between 1974 and 
1984. As a firs t step, abridged national life tables of each 
sex were decornpo sed into 21 'spatial units': Budapest, 1 9 
counties and others (unknown re::sidence or abroad) f o r 1 97 4 and 
1984. As a second step, life table s of these individual countie 
were reintegrated to result the initial national life table. 
The method of d c".ible standardization was used f o r isolating the 
effects of the varying structure of the deceased population by 
place of residence from the impact of changing mortality levels 
in various parts of the country. Testing the hypothesis of 
stable spatial variations in mortality is based on the above 
calculations. 
Some other variations in mortality (e.g. the variations of the 
level and structure of mortality by causes) will be also taken 
into account for estimating future trends of mortality in 
Hungary. 
Name: Otto Andersen, Danmarks Statistik, Sejn'.?gade 11, 21 00 Copenha gen 
Denmark 
Title of Paper: Reduction of mo rt a 1 i ty among the occ upat i ona 1 acti ve popu 1 at ion 
in the Nordic countries: effect on life expectancy and number of 
Summary: deaths 
The data used in this study are from the registers on morta l ity and 
occupation established in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Ice land, 
Norway and Sweden ). The study covers all individuals who were aged 20-64 
years on the first of January, 1971. That is more than 12 mi lli on peop le, 
whose mortality was followed during exactly 10 years, i.e. until the end 
of 1980. During this period approximately 775,000 deaths were recorded. 
In the basic study mortality and occupation is analysed by indirect 
standardization, calculating the SMR (Standard Mortal ity Rati o} , showi ng 
the excess mortality as an index figure. The standardpopulation is chosen 
as all economically active males or females in the Nordic count ries. 
The study clearly shows that there are considerable mortality different ia l s 
between the individual countries and within each country t here are consi der-
able mortality differentials between the individual occupational groups . 
For the economically active men mortality is by far t he highest amo ng 
Finnish men - index is 133. For the economically active women mortali t y is 
hi ghest among the Danish women - index is 120. 
Among the 37 occupational groups for men mortality is lowe st among teachers 
and highest among deck and engine room crew. Among the 14 occupationa l 
groups for women mortality is lowest among teachers and highest amo ng 
workers in food industry. 
The analysis of causes of death shows that the excess mortal i t y of Finn ish 
men is mainly due t o diseases of the circulatory system. For Da ni sh women 
malignant neoplasms is the cause of death responsible f or a large part of 
the excess mortality. 
One of the main conclusions is that occupations with low overall mortal ity 
have low mortality from most causes of death, and that occupati ons with 
high overall mortality have high mortality from most causes of death. 
In order to evaluate the concequences of a future reduction in morta l ity 
two kinds of calculations nave been made. 
Firstly.the life expectancy has been calculated showing the average number 
of years lived between age 22.5 and age 72.5. Thus, the max imum number of 
years lived is 50 years, and the difference between 50 years and the actua l 
number of years, is the number of years lost. As example, teachers i 
Sweden lose 3.22 years, while deck and engine room crew in Denmark lose 
8.84 years. 
Secondly, it has been calculated the number of deaths that could have been 
avoided if all occupational groups had had the same low mortality as 
teachers. For the economically active population of ma les, the number of 
deaths is as high as approx. 100,000 out of approx. 375,000 deaths . For 
the female economically active population the number is approx. 16,000 
out of approx. 96,000 deaths. The calculations have been ca r ried through 
for each country and each cause of death. 
. . -1 
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Name: Dhruva ~agnur 
Title of Paper: Cause-delete d Entropies and Future Course o: Cause -
specific Hor tali ty in Canada 
Summary: 
I : / """' 
The study examines the time series of cause-deleted 
entropies (H s) derived from the cause-deleted life tables for 
Canada for the past six decad es. It discusses the shifts in 
the cause-pattern of canadian mortality during the past sixty 
years and the impact of these shifts on the l i fe expectancy and 
surv i vors hip to older ages . The impact of reducti ons in 
mortal ity by cause on the future life expectancy gains is 
qua~i tati vely assessed in terms of the cause-specific en tropies 
( H s) . 
The i mpo rta nc e of t he two disease categories 
cardi ovascular diseases and neoplasms , in determining the 
future gains i n life expe c tancy is stressed as als o the 
importance of taking into c ons i derations the epidemiologic 
shifts in future mortality projecti ons. Th e significance c: 
the index H i n the assessment of epidemiol ogic shifts in t i me 
series perspect i ve as wel l a s in disaggregating the total 
effect by cause is briefly stud i ed with respect to Canadian 
mortality data for the past sixty years. 
Name: Aslak Herva 
Title of Paper: Future !-1ortali t y of Finland's North Karelia Province 
Summary: 
The Province of North Karelia is wellknown for its high 
incidence of cardiovascular diseases and the related mortality. 
After an effective and efficient health policy programme 
the risk curves are now lower than before. But a big question 
remains. Why is the difference of life expectancies between 
the sexes now 9.6 years at birth? This may be the highest in 
the world. 
The most common causes of death are still cardiovascular, and 
cancer is relatively as common as in most of the developed 
countries. However, special types of neoplasmata, especially o f 
the lung, differ remarkably between the sexes. Smoking habits 
are clearly the main reason for this. Women in North Karelia 
do not smoke as much as other Finnish women. This is because 
of the culture and passive contact network compared with 
more densely populated areas. (There are only 10 inhabitants 
per square kilometre.) The raw winter weather may also have 
something to do with the morbidity. The temperature may often 
reach minus 40 degrees Centigade. Another noticeable risk 
factor is nutrition. The everyday diet, especially earlier, 
contained a lot of fat and men's drinking habits were 
"classical Russian." 
In this study a special emphasis will be put on carcinogen ic 
mortality development because of the expanding number of 
work environment exposures to carcinogens and potential 
health policy measures. It is true that the life expectancy 
difference is wide, but as such the year-values are not so 
bad. In 1984 for 0-years female babies life expectancy was 
78.0 years and for males 68.6 years. The total population 
was only 177,642, so the numbers are subject to quite a lot 
of random variation from year to year. On the other hand, 
the quality of demographic statistics in Finland is high, 
so the effect is not magnified by lack of information . 
Name: Peter Findl 
Title of Paper: A Cohort Model for Mortality Proj ectioD in Aus t ria 
Summary: 
In the context of the 1987 population projection of the Austria~ 
Central Statistical Off ice an extrapolation of age-specific 
trends in period mortality was conducted. For males the base 
period 1971-1986 showed the best fit to the data. The on l y age 
group where no mortality reduction could be measured over the 
period was 50-55. On the other hand mortality declined 
substantially in the age group 60-65. For this reason a simp l e 
trend extrapolation resulted in a strange future age-pattern of 
death probabilities: 65 year old men would have a l ower morta l ity 
risk than those aged 55. 
Next. possible cohort effects were studied by the means of a 
multiple regression with dummy-variables for age, period ( 1951-
86). and cohort and the log of the death probability as dependent 
variable. The results show a favorable effect for the cohort born 
1911-20 and an unfavorable effect for those born 1926-35 . This 
regression model was also used to extrapolate the probabilities 
of death into the future. However, because of the pres~~ed low 
prognostic quality of (mainly exogenously determined ) morta l ity 
of children and young adults. this cohort model will not give 
valid results for the very long run. 
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The Puture of Regional Differentials in Growth and 
the composition of the Population 
An overview and introduction 
by 
Antonio Golini and Frank Heins 
Istituto di Ricerche sulla Popolazione, Rome, Italy 
o. Poreword 
The topic of this session is closely linked to those of 
other sessions i.e. the future of demographic change . However, in 
this session we particularly focus on the regional aspect . Need-
less to say the findings and results of the other sessions wi ll 
also be given consideration here. 
We will approach the subject by looking back to recent de-
velopments to find indications for the future. This leads us to 
the discussion of the political implications of regiona l dif-
ferentials in demographic change. 
The first section of the paper is an outline of the basic 
methodology of the subject. 
The measurement of regional differentials as ratios or as 
absolute differences is considered in the second section. 
The third section discusses the possible effects of regional 
differences in the actual population structure , fertility, migra-
tion and mortality on the future regional growth of the popula-
tion. 
This is followed by a discussion of the basic political 
responses to these future differentials. Can a goal, like zero 
population growth for example, be formulated and implemented at a 
regional level? 
To conclude we summarize the findings regarding future 
regional differentials in population growth. 
1. Some basic thoughts on the subject 
Regional differentials of demographic change consist of two 
aspects, the spatial and the demographic. Any observation of 
these two aspects depends on the approach. The more approximate 
the measure and the smaller the scale the less likely it is that 
regional diversities will be pronounced. Regional diversjty wjJ J 
be increased if the sea le is enlarged and finer measures are 
used. 
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How can we define a region or a regional perspective? We can 
give a wide range of regional divisions: a Continent - Nations-
Regions - Provinces - Cities or Communities. As demographers our 
main concern will be with administrative regional divisions, as 
political authorities usually provide data and will be able to 
give policy responses to findings. 
We should be aware that the size of the region being looked 
at influences the observation of patterns of past growth and 
future development. The larger the region the less homogenous 
ceteris paribus the behavior in this region. Therefore our task 
should also be to perform an intra-regional analysis aimed at 
identifying differentials in sub-regional homogeneous areas in 
which policy action could be more urgent and/or effective. 
How should demographic differentials be measured? Increasing 
the detail of the measures used will increase the observable 
diversity. The problem is to find adequate, standardized and 
comparable indices. Synthetic indicators, like the total fer-
tility rate, might give us clear trends at a regional level. 
This clarity could vanish if we increase the detail of observa-
tion, for example, by using age and birth order specific fer-
tility rates. 
What do we understand by growth of the population and its 
composition? In the first place we have to take into accoun t all 
demographic characteristics such as population size, sex and age 
structure and marital status. Family and household structure are 
relevant, too. In addition social, economic, ethnic and racial 
aspects also define the composition of a population. In general , 
these are all aspects of economic, social, cultural and political 
importance. Often these are data which are collected during a 
population census, where the census reflects the official and/ or 
public interest in these population groups. No doubt, interest in 
subpopulations or in the composition of populations will certain-
ly increase in the near future. 
With the above remarks we tried to recall some basic con-
siderations. It appears impossible to define a single approach 
to the study of regional differentials of population change. Each 
study depends on the definition of the research goal and the 
special interest or approach of the individual researcher or 
research group. 
In any case there is an advantage to a regional approach. 
Such an approach might add to the quality of our studies and 
policy recommendations, because the number of observations made 
increases. The national population is the sum of regional popula-
tions. With a better demographic knowledge at a regional level 
our understanding at a national level will thereby improve. 
Therefore the preparation of regional population projection~ . for 
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example, becomes a very fruitful exercise. By using the latter we 
can expect to improve national population projections. 
2. Ratios versus absolute differences in regional demographic 
indicators 
With regards to regional differentials the relative approach 
seems to be more appropriate and indeed is the more used . To 
measure the relative differentials we standardize the regional 
values by setting the national value to 100, for example . The 
national value would be the denominator for index numbers or 
standardized indicators. But also here a word of caution: the 
smaller the value of the indicators the higher the relative 
differences. 
This becomes obvious in the cas~ of mortality/ survivorship. 
If the age specific probabilities of dying, or of surviving , are 
not close to 0.5, which is usually the case, we will observe very 
different results regarding which of the two probabilities we 
chose to calculate the standardized indicator. The same absolute 
difference, 0.05 for example, is very different in relative terms 
if we cons id er it either from the point of view of mortality 
(0.10 versus 0.15 for example) or from the point of view of sur -
vivorship (0.90 versus 0.85). 
In any case, if we only look at the ratio between regiona l 
values and not at their absolute differences, this is demographi-
cally misleading, as the effects on population size and structure 
of regional differentials are functions of ranges and not ratios . 
The permanence or the increase in the relative distance 
between the demographic indicators is certainly a sign of the 
permanence of social and biological differences regarding demo-
graphic behavior. This also signals the failure of policies aimed 
at eliminating differentials and inequalities between disadvan-
taged regions and the other regions. 
By looking at the demographic consequences of regiona l 
differentials in demographic behavior we find that in many cases 
the range or the absolute difference, is the appropriate way to 
measure these differentials. This is true for instance for regio-
nal differentials in the growth rate and in demographic rates , 
like the mortality rates, as shown in table 1 and table 2 for two 
hypothetical situations. In both cases the absolute differences 
are the decisive indicator for the demographic consequences of 
regional differentials. We observe the apparent paradox that the 
situations with mark~d relative regional differentials in demo-
graphic behavior have resulting demographic situations with fewer 
differentials. 
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Table 1: Effect of regional differentials in growth rates. 
(Comparison of two theoretical situations) 
Region Population at t•O Growth rate Population at t=lOO 
abs. 
' 
r total•lOO abs. 
' 
Situation 1 (growth rates - ratio: 2 to 1 difference : 1.5 ) 
A 100 50.0 3.00 120.0 1922 81. 3 
B 100 50.0 1. 50 60.0 443 18 . 7 
Total 200 100 . 0 2.50 100.0 2365 100 . 0 
Situation 2 (growth rates - ratio: 4 to 1 difference: 0 . 3 ) 
A 100 50.0 0.40 153.8 149 57.3 
B 100 50.0 0.10 38.5 111 42.7 
Total 200 100.0 0.26 100.0 260 100.0 
Table 2: Effect of regional differentials in rates on the 
population composition. 
(Comparison of two theoretical situations ) 
Region Live births IMR ('. ) Population age 0-1 
abs. 
' 
rate total•lOO abs. 
' 
Situation 1 (rates - ratio: 2 to 1 ; difference: 50.0) 
A 100 50.0 100.0 133.3 90.0 48.6 
B 100 &O.O 50.0 66.7 95.0 51.4 
Total 200 100.0 75.0 100.0 185.0 100.0 
Situation 2 (rates - ratio: 4 to 1 ; difference: 15.0) 
A 100 &O.O 20.0 160.0 98.0 49.6 
B 100 &0.0 &.O 40.0 99.5 50.4 
Total 200 100.0 12.5 100.0 197.5 100.0 
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3. Components of the regional differentials in population change 
Today it seems more and more inadequate to consider only a 
growing population. We are reaching a situation in which popula-
tion change can be zero (stagnation), or show an increase or a 
decrease . Consequently we prefer to talk about population change 
instead of population growth or to make at least clear that we 
should allow for a negative growth. 
What are the main demographic factors influencing future 
differentials in the growth and composition of the population? 
Besides, future demographic behavior, including family or house-
hold formation, fertility, migration and mortality, the existing 
structure and composition of the population are important com-
ponents. 
Using recent Italian data we can add some data to the more 
general discussion of factors which may determine future regional 
differentials . The Italian data we present relate to the regional 
level of the 'regione'. Italy is divided into 20 'regione' . This 
number is reduced to 18 regional divisions , because data for 
Val le d' Aosta are presented with Piemonte and the regions of 
Abruzz i and Mol ise are shown together. Al 1 data are by actual 
place of residence and by calendar year. 
Differentials in the inertia of the population 
The first factor is the inertia of the existing struc t u re 
and composition of a population . 
From a political point of view it is very important to 
understand and to get policy makers to understand how large and 
how long the population momentum is . As a consequence of its 
structure the Liguria population (with a current TFR of 0.9) will 
continue to decrease for at least 50 years (the time span of the 
projection) even if its fertility increases over the next 10 
years to replacement level. On the other hand, the Campania 
population (with a current TFR of 1.8) will increase for not 
less than 15 years even if its fertility continues to decline. 
Aga 1 n, from a pol 1 t ical point of view (strict 1 y speaking) 
the number of members of parliament from Liguria could strongly 
decline over next decades : the ratio between Campania and Liguria 
population in 1971 was 2.73 and could reach in 2038 (with con-
stant fertility) 7.14. 
In social terms we must consider that, according to this 
hypothesis, in 2038 the percentage of people aged 65 and over 
w i 11 be 2 2 % in Campania and 4 2 % in Ligur ia. In this latter 
region we will observe in 2033-2038 a 6 to 7 times higher number 
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of deaths than of births. 
At this point of demographic behavior and trends we can ask 
ourselves if there do exist regions or areas with such a low 
fertility and pronounced aging process that they are reaching a 
point of no-return regarding population decline. A recent Italian 
study found two simple demographic indicators which are a sure 
and clear sign of a vicious circle between low fertility, aging 
and population decline [Golini, 1987]. 
When a population shows a child-woman ratio of under 20 per 
cent and the percentage of people 60 year old and over reaches a 
value of 30 % we can expect a natural decrease of at least 1 % in 
the next decade. After 10 years the percentage of people aged 60 
and over will reach 35 % and the natural decrease in the follow-
ing decade will be 1.5 % to 2.0 % and so on. 
The study of these relationships will be very important for 
the European population at a regional level in the next century. 
Fertility differentials 
Fertility depends on the decision of the individual or 
couple. Depending on trends in favor of diversification or homog-
enization in behavior we will observe more/less regional dif-
ferentials. 
We can observe regional differences in intensity and timing, 
based on the total fertility rate, mean age of mother at child 
birth and age and birth order specific fertility rates. 
Figure 1 and 2 show trends for selected Italian regions 
from 1952 to 1985 (see also table 3). The most striking problem 
is the amazingly low level of fertility reached in some regions 
(TFR less than 1.0). How low might the TFR drop in the future 
making 'realistic' assumptions? 
Migration differentials 
Migration depends on personal decisions or decisions at the 
household level. Different types of migration and its motivation 
have various effects on population structure. 
In some countries of Europe the intensity of migration has 
decreased recently. However, typical migration schedules, as dis-
cussed by Castro and Rogers and in Bonaguidi, are still to be 
observed. How large will both international and interregional 
migration flows be in the future? Will the age-profile of migra-
tion be the same, or will some regions attract just migration of 
specific subpopulations like the elderly, for example? Will there 
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be a replacement of births through immigration? A recent con-
tribution of Blanchet [1988) sheds some doubt on this possibili-
ty. 
Mortality differentials 
Mortality depends on a wide range of factors, usually not 
in the reach of personal decision. 
Life expect at ion measures both aspects (intensity and ti-
ming) of mortality. Age specific mortality rates or probabilities 
might give additional detail regarding regional mortality dif-
ferentials. 
Table 4 and 5 show trends of the regional mortality dif -
ferentials in Italy. And again the most important question is 
what could be the levels of life expectancy at birth and espe-
cially at older ages in the near future? How large will the 
spatial differentials remain? 
With regard to the composition of the population there are 
further aspects to be discussed : marital status differentials; 
nuptiality or socioeconomic composition of the population ; labor 
force participation or economic activity. 
4. Policy implications of regional differentials in population 
change 
After discussing the possible alternatives with regard to 
regional differentials in population change we have to turn now 
to the political implications . In recent years this aspect of 
our profession - policy consulting - has become more and more 
important. After clarifying the aspects involved in observing 
regional differentials of demographic development we now discuss 
the political assessment of these changes. 
The actual economic and social structure of a region is 
usually adapted to a specific population size and composition, if 
not we observe frictions in social and economic development . 
Regional differentials in population growth and its composition 
imply regional differences in this adaptation process . A balanced 
regional population change is one condition for a balanced regio-
nal development. 
However, regional and national situations and policy goals 
are of ten divergent. The difference in demographic development 
between regions and in regions can lead to changes in the politi-
cal system or balance of a nation. How different and effective 
can economic and social regional policies be to tackle and come 
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to grips with strong regional demographic differentials? Or ho~ 
can we make flexible policies to tackle differentials at a local 
level? 
What can be considered positive? What is considered nega-
tive? Are there criteria to assess regional population changes? 
These questions are certainly linked to the controversial problem 
of population optimum . Can we define a dynamic optimum population 
of a region or a nation? Knowing that the optimum population is 
not a simple function of one factor but interrelates with a 
variety of socioeconomic and other factors we refrain from dis-
cussing this further . Can we at least individuate regional demo-
graphic paths or scenarios to be avoided? 
However the question of balanced regional demographic devel-
opment also depends on the regional division under examination. 
It seems very likely that there are conflicts of interest between 
the national level and regions or regional subdivisions . 
For example a balanced demographic development among regions 
of a nation might be in the interest of national policy. The goal 
would be to avoid the growing importance of a large regional 
variability based on a feedback action, as described above. The 
share of a region with positive demographic indicators (higher 
than national fertility, lower than national mortality and a 
positive migration balance) tends to increase. National policy 
usually favors the convergence of regional demographic changes. 
In addition, national policy might aim at an age structure which 
provides a more balanced revenue/expenditure situation for the 
social security system. 
A balanced demographic development in the regions would try 
to balance the socioeconomic structure and development with 
regional demographic changes. Balanced demographic change can 
have different implications at different regional levels. At the 
community level housing might be an issue. Smaller regions might 
see a functioning labor market as a prime target. Larger regions 
would give greater consideration to the overall economic , social 
and political development. 
Balanced demographic change might be defined by a path close 
to zero population growth (with a more or less wide range). Like 
shown above we have to account for regional differentials and we 
cannot expect a unique 'optimum' demographic growth path in all 
regions. 
&. Summary and conclusions 
Whither regional differentials of population growth? No 
doubt, regional differences will continue to exist. 
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An increased awareness regarding regional differentials 
might lead to more data and more studies in this field of inter-
est. The proliferation of studies on regional mortality differen-
tials over the last years might be an indication. An increased 
sensibility regarding regional differentials will lead more and 
more countries to try to measure these differentials. 
But recent socioeconomic developments in various countries 
indicate a tendency in favor of the homogenization of values and 
attitudes or behaviors . This would lead to a convergence of 
regional variations. 
We are st i 11 far from formulating policies to influence 
regional differentials of demographic change . However, their 
objective should be a balanced demographic development, which 
might be found in more or less close range of zero population 
growth . 
Some population policies are implemented, but their formu-
lation is usually not concerned with regional differentials in 
population growth . Indeed the nation-state is no longer able of 
tackling regional problems because in many cases it is to big 
for "small 11 problems . The nation-state becomes increasingly 
unresponsive to the variety and diversity of local needs. On the 
other hand 1oca1 pol it i ca 1 centers of ten lose the ability to 
effectively control resources and make their own decisions. 
Demographers can provide information to help to devise 
policies in this area. Thanks to early information and discussion 
we might be able to provide enough time to allow for adaptation 
to demographic changes and variations. Regional population pro-
jections seem to us a very important tool in this regard. 
We think that the political responsibilities of the demo-
grapher has to be stressed in undertaking studies, in 
establishing population projections and in making known find-
ings. 
In the introduction we spoke of caution regarding a hasty 
judgment about the future of regional differentials in growth 
and the composition of the population. We tried to clarify some 
basic concepts and we discussed possible policies regarding 
regional demographic changes. The following invited and contribu-
ted papers will provide us with more information, further method-
ological discussion, several case studies and more empirical 
examples. 
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Table 3: Total fertility rate, Italy 1954, 1964, 1974 and 1984. 
1954 1964 1974 1984 
Maximum 3.79 3.50 2.94 2 . 03 
Sardegna Campania Campania Campania 
Minimum 1. 32 2.00 1. 82 1 . 01 
Liguria Umbria Liguria Liguria 
Italia 2 . 32 2 . 64 2.32 1.46 
Max/Min 
ratio 2 . 87 1 . 75 1. 62 2 . 01 
Min/Max 
differenc e. 2.47 1. 50 1.12 1. 02 
Sources : 1954 - [Rallu, 1983] 
1964-1984 - ISTAT, various Demographic Yearbooks 
11 
211 
Table 4: Life expectancy at birth of men, Italy 1920/22 , 
1950/52, 1960/62, 1970/72 and 1979/ 83. 
1920/22 1950/52 1960/62 1970/72 1979/ 83 
Maximum 52.8 67.0 69.5 71. 4 73.0 
Toscana Umbria Sardegna Calabria Marc he 
Abruzzi e Molise 
Minimum 44.1 61.0 64.9 67.2 69 . 3 
Puglia Basilicata Trentino- Friuli- Fr iul 1-
Alto Adige Venezia G. Venezia G. 
Italia 49.3 63.9 66.9 69 . 0 71.0 
Max/ Min 
ratio 1 . 20 1 . 10 1. 07 1 .06 1 . 05 
Min / Max 
difference 8 . 7 6 . 0 4.6 4. 2 3 . 7 
Table 5 : Life expectancy at birth of women, Italy 1920/22, 
1950/52, 1960/62, 1970/72 and 1979/83. 
1920/22 1950/52 1960/62 1970/72 
Maximum 55 . 2 70 . 8 74.2 76.8 
Liguria Liguria Toscana Toscana 
Minimum 44.8 61 . 7 69.9 72.9 
Puglia Basilica ta Campania Campania 
Italia 49.3 63 . 9 66.9 69 . 0 
Max/Min 
ratio 1. 23 1 . 15 1.06 1. 05 
Min/Max 
difference 10.4 9 . 1 4 . 3 3.9 
Sources: 1920/22 - [Di Comite, 1974] 
1950/ 52 , 1960/62, 1970/72 - [Golini , 1977] 
1979/83 - [!STAT , 1987] 
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The impact on births, deaths and migrations 
of demographic rates and population 
size and composition 
An introduction to exposure analysis 
Frans Willekens 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The size and composition of a population change due to 
demographic events that occur to people. People migrate, 
reproduce and die. The rate at which an event occurs, the 
event rate, depends on the personal attributes of people 
as well as on contextual factors. The personal 
attributes of a person determine the population category 
or subpopulation to which he belongs. The number of 
events (births, deaths, migrations) during a given period 
changes because the composition of the population changes. 
In addition, the rate associated with a given 
subpopulation may change. To differentiate the effects of 
compositional changes from the effects of changes in 
rates, standardization techniques are traditionally used 
in demography. Standardization is however not directly 
applicable if the occurrence of one event depends on the 
(non-)occurrence of another event. This is however the 
case if we wish to investigate how fertility, mortality 
and migration interact to generate changes in the size and 
the composition of a population. 
In this paper, another method is presented to disentangle 
the effects of each of the components of change on the 
growth path of a population. The basic idea of the method 
is to project simultaneously the population and the 
exposure of members of the population to the risk of 
experiencing the demographic events. The length of time 
during which a person may experience a particular event 
will be referred to as the exposure function. The unit of 
• 
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exposure is a person-year. The exposure function depends 
of course on the attributes of the person and on the event 
rate, associated with the set of attributes. All persons 
with the same set of attributes are said to occupy the 
same state and experience a given event at the same rate. 
Unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be absent. The 
exposure function will be estimated for a given time 
interval from t to t+h, where h denotes the length of the 
interval. A change in attribute during the interval 
results in a change of state and generally implies an 
exposure at a different rate. The exposure function 
represents the fraction of the interval that one lives in 
each state and is exposed to an event at a given rate. It 
is equivalent to what is known in demography as Chiang's 
"a" (Chiang, 1984, pp. 142 ff). 
The exposure function is particularly easy to estimate if 
the events are uniformly distributed over the interval. 
The assumption of uniform distribution of events is 
generally used in demographic projection models. 
Section 2 presents the method for simultaneously 
projecting the number of people and the exposure function 
of an aggregate population. Several of the issues that 
arise in the design of projection models of complex 
populations, consisting of several interacting 
subpopulations, also arise in the construction of models 
of aggregate populations which are not divided in 
subpopulations. To emphasize the issues, we first derive 
a projection model of an aggregate population. In section 
3, a model is presented for the projection of the number 
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of people and the exposure function of a population 
categorized by region of residence. 
2. 
4 
EXPOSURE ANALYSIS IN AN AGGREGATE POPULATION 
The purpose of this section is to show how the number of 
people in a population and the person-years lived during a 
unit interval by the people is determined by an initial 
population and by a set of birth, death and migration 
rates. We also show how the numbers of events of 
different types are interrelated. The number of deaths 
depends on the number of births and migration, even if the 
rates of birth, death and migration are independent. A 
change in the migration rate or the birth rate may not 
affect the death rate, but it does affect the number of 
deaths that occur during a given period because of its 
impact on the person-years lived (total duration of 
exposure} during the period. In order to differentiate 
the effect on the event count of an exogenous change in 
the population size from the effects of changes in the 
demographic rates, we must show the exposure time is 
affected by .these changes. In Section 2.1, a model is 
proposed to analyze changes in exposure times. The model 
is directly related to a population projection model. 
Section 2.2 presents a numerical illustration. 
2.1 The model 
Let K(t) denote the size of the population at time t. 
The population changes due to births, deaths, migration 
and immigration. Let B(t,t+h) denote the number of births 
during the interval from t to t+h, with h the length of 
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the interval; D(t,t+h), E(t,t+h) and I(t,t+h) represent 
the number of deaths, emigrations and immigrations, 
respectively. The projection model of the number of 
people and the person-years lived is derived in 4 steps. 
First, an accounting equation is established relating the 
number of people at time t+h to the number of people at t 
and the demographic events during the period from t to 
t+h. Second, the event rates are defined. Third, the 
person-years lived are approximated by introducing 
appropriate assumptions. This results in a model of the 
exposure time. Finally, the population projection model 
is obtained. 
The population size at t+l is given by the accounting 
equation: 
K(t+h) = K(t) + B(t,t+h) - D(t,t+h) -
E(t,t+h) + I(t,t+h) (1) 
To translate the accounting equation into a projection 
model, the numbers of events must be expressed in terms of 
the population and the parameters of the projection model. 
The parameters are occurrence-exposure rates. An 
occurrence-exposure rate is the ratio between the number 
of events during a time interval and the total duration of 
exposure during the interval by those at risk of 
experiencing the event. The duration of exposure is 
denoted by L(t,t+h). The occurrence-exposure rates are 
given by the rate equations: 
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- birth rate: 
b(t,t+h) = B(t,t+h)/L(t,t+h) 
- death rate: 
d(t,t+h) = D(t,t+h)/L(t,t+h) 
- emigration rate: 
e(t,t+h) = E(t,t+h)/L(t,t+h) 
The population at risk of immigration is the population of 
the rest of the world. Instead of estimating an 
emigration rate for the rest of the world, the number of 
immigrants are included in the model as count. 
The estimation of the occurrence-exposure rates requires 
information on the duration of exposure L(t,t+h). 
Suppose the available data consist of the initial 
population K(t) and the number of events during the 
(t,t+h)-interval. The end of period population K(t+h) is 
therefore also known. Assume that the events are 
uniformly distributed over the interval of length h. The 
exposure function is then: 
L{t,t+h) = ~h(K{t) + K(t+h)] 
and, substituting (1) for K(t+h): 
L(t,t+h) = ~h[K{t) + K{t) + B{t,t+h) -
O(t,t+h) - E(t,t+h) + I(t,t+h)] 
= h K(t) - \h[-b(t,t+h) + d(t,t+h) + 
e(t,t+h)]L(t,t+h) - ~hI(t,t+h) 
(2) 
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h ~h 
L(t,t+h) = K(t) + I(t,t+h) 
1 + ~hm(t,t+h) 1 + ~hm(t,t+h) 
h 
= [K(t) + ~I(t,t+h)] ( 3) 
1 + \hm(t,t+h) 
where 
m(t,t+h) = d(t,t+h) + e(t,t+h) - b(t,t+h) (4) 
Since the events are uniformly distributed over the 
interval, the exposure function is also equal to the 
product of the mid-period population, K(t+ ~h), and the 
length of the period, h: 
L(t,t+h) = h K(t+~h). 
From (3), we observe that 
1 
K(t+\h) = [K(t) + ~I(t,t+h)] (5) 
1 + \ hm(t,t+h) 
The number of events during the (t,t+h)-period may easily 
be obtained once the exposure function is known. For 
instance, the number of births is: 
bN(t,t+h) = b(t,t+h) L(t,t+h) 
and the number of deaths is 
dN(t,t+h) = d(t,t+h) L(t,t+h), 
which is equal to 
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d(t,t+h) 
[K(t) + \I(t,t+h)] 
1 + \hm(t,t+h) 
The number of deaths in the absence of migration is 
d(t,t+h) 
K(t) 
1 + \h[d(t,t+h) - b(t,t+h)] 
The difference between this number on dN(t,t+h) is due to 
deaths of migrants. The number of deaths in the absence 
of fertility and migration is 
d(t,t+h) 
K (t) . 
1 + \hd(t,t+h) 
It excludes the deaths to children born during the year 
under study. 
Substitution of the rate equations and the exposure 
function {l) into the accounting equation (1) results in 
the projection model: 
K(t+h) = K(t) - ~hm(t,t+h) [K(t) + K(t+h)] + I(t,t+h) 
[l + ~hm(t,t+h)]K(t+h) = [l - ~hm(t,t+h)JK(t) + I(t,t+h) 
1 - ~hm(t,t+h) 
K(t+h) = K(t) 
1 + ~hm(t,t+h) 
1 
+ I(t,t+h) 
1 + ~hm(t,t+h) 
2?( 
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or 
K(t+h) = S(t,t+h)K(t) + *S(t,t+h)I(t,t+h) (6) 
with 
.s(t,t+h) = 1/[1 + ~hm(t,t+h)J (7) 
S(t,t+h) = [1 - ~hm(t,t+h)]*S(t,t+h) (8) 
.s(t,t+h) is the population growth ratio over half a 
period. S(t,t+h) is the population growth ratio over a 
whole period. Notice that 
S(t,t+h) ~ [•S(t,t+h)J 2 (9) 
Since the events are assumed to be uniformly distributed 
over the period, the birth, death and emigration rates are 
not constant during the interval, but follow a hyperbolic 
distribution. Consequently, the growth ratio is not the 
same at each point of time in the interval. For (9) to 
hold requires the assumption of constant intensities 
instead of the assumption of constant probability 
densities (for a discussion in the context of life table 
analysis, see Willekens, 1988). 
The coefficient of I(t,t+h) is .s(t,t+h) in (6). The 
immigrations are uniformly distributed over the entire 
interval. On average, immigration occurs at t + ~h and 
immigrants are exposed to fertility, mortality and 
emigration for half a period only. The growth equation 
) · ~ L 
.__ L 
10 
(6) assumes that all immigrations take plac e in the middle 
of the period . The uniform distribution of i mmigrations 
may also be interpreted as follows: half of the immigra-
tions take place at the start of the interval and half at 
the end of the interval. The model becomes: 
K(t+h) - \I(t,t+h) = [K(t) + \I(t,t+h)] 
- \hm[K(t) + \ I(t,t+h) - K(t+h) -
\ I(t,t+h)] 
1-\ hm 
K(t+h) [K(t) + \ I(t,t+h)] + \ I(t , t +h ) 
1+\ hm 
= (1 - \hm)K(t + \ h) + \ I(t,t+h) 
The coefficient (1 - \ hm) is the growth ratio over the 
second half of the period for those present at the 
beginning of the period. 
(10) 
Equations (5) and (10) may be generalized to the popula-
tion size at any point of time t+rh of the interval from t 
to t+h, where r is a fraction of h . The accounting 
equation is 
K(t+rh) = K(t) + rB(t,t+h) - rD(t,t+h) -
rE(t,t+h) + rI(t,t+h) . 
The generalized projection model is derived from this 
equation and is: 
z. 2 3 
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1-(rh-~h)m 
K(t+rh) = [K(t) + ~rI(t,t+h)] + ~ rI(t,t+h) 
l+~m 
The survival function is 
1-(rh-~h)*m 
*S(t,t+rh) = 
l+~h*m 
where *m = d(t,t+h) + e(t,t+h). 
The survival function may also be written as 
*S(t,t+rh) = 1 - r(l-*S(t,t+h) ]. 
(11) 
(12) 
( 13 ) 
To show this, note that the probability of not surviving 
the interval is 
= 1-*S(t,t+h). 
l+~h*m 
From the survival function at t+rh and the assumption of 
constant probability density, we may estimate the 
instantaneous rate of attrition at any time point within 
the interval. It is the ratio of the probability density 
and the survival function: 
1-*S(t,t+h) 
µ(t+rh) = 0 s f s 1 (14) 
1-r[1-.s(t,t+h)J 
The instantaneous rate is a hyperbolic function of time. 
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The duration of exposure between t and t+rh is 
L(t,t+rh) = r\h[l+.s(t,t+rh)] K(t) 
= r~h[2-r[l-*S(t,t+h)]] K(t). 
= [hr-~r 2 (1-.s(t,t+h)]] K(t). 
The exposure function is quadratic in r. 
The duration of exposure between r and 17 (ry>r) by the 
population at t is 
17-r 
L(t+1,t+17) = (*S(t,t+rh) + *S{t,t+17h)] K{t) 
2 
h*m 
= (17-r) (1-~ {17+1) J K (t) , 
1+\h*m 
(15) 
where the expression between brackets is the probability 
of surviving from t to t+~{ry+r)h. The duration of exposure 
may also be written as a quadratic function of the (1,ry)-
interval: 
L{t+1,t+17) ---] K(t) 
l+~h*m 
where q is the probability of attrition within the 
interval of length h. 
2.2. Numerical illustration 
{16) 
A numerical illustration may clarify the points raised in 
this section. First, we assume the presence of mortality 
only. Fertility will be introduced next. Consider an 
initial population of 10,000 persons, 100 of which die 
within a year. The probability of dying within a year is 
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therefore 10 per thousand. The uniform distribution of 
events implies that 50 deaths occur the first 6 months and 
50 deaths the second half of the year. 
An average of 8.33 persons die each month (8.33 = 100/ 12 ) . 
The probability of dying during the first six months is 
50/10,000 = 5 per thousand; the probability that a person 
who survives the first six months dies before the end of 
the year is 50/9,950 = 5.025 per thousand. The probabi-
lity of dying during a given sub-interval therefore 
increases when the deaths are uniformly distributed . The 
reason is an increase in the instantaneous death rate, as 
will be shown shortly. The average occurrence exposure 
rate is 
d(t,t+h) = D(t,t+h)/ ~ [K(t) + K(t+h)] 
= 100/~[10,000 + 9,900) 
= 10.05 per thousand 
with h = 1. 
During the first month (January), the death rate is 
12 * 8.33/\(10,000 + 9,991.67] = 10.003 per thousand 
The death rate during the last month (December) is 
12 * 8.33/\(9,908.33 + 9,900] = 10.093 per thousand. 
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The death rate is 10.0251 per thousand during the first 
half of the year and 10.0756 per thousand during the 
second half. 
At mid-year, the death rate is 
12 * 8.33/9,950 = 10.050 per thousand. 
The average death rate is equal to the "instantaneous" 
death rate at mid-year only. 
The probability of surviving the first half of the year 
is: 
1 1 
= = 99.500 percent 
1 + ~d(t,t+h) 1 + ~ 0.01005 
The probability that someone, who survives mid-y ear, 
survives the complete year is 
1 - ~d(t,t+h) = 1 - ~0.01005 = 99.4975 percent 
which is smaller since the instantaneous death rates get 
larger after six months. The assumption of uniform 
distribution of deaths over the period, or constant 
probability density, is incompatible with the assumption 
of a constant instantaneous death rate. 
The duration of exposure by the population during the 
entire year is 
~[K(t+l) + K(t)] = ~[10,000 + 9,900] = 9,950 person-
years 
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or, equivalently, 
1 
K(t) = 0.995 * 10,000 = 9,950 person-years. 
1 +\d(t,t+h) 
Once the exposure function is known, the number of events 
(deaths) may easily be estimated: 
D(t,t+h) = d(t,t+h)L(t,t+h) 
= 0.01005 * 9,950 = 100. 
The number of survivors at the end of the year is 
1-\hd(t,t+h) 
K(t+h) = K(t) 
l+\hd(t,t+h) 
= 0.99000 K(t). 
(17) 
The probability of surviving one year is 99 percent. The 
probability of dying is 1 percent. The probability of 
surviving the first half of the year is 
1-0.5 * 0.01 = 0.995. 
The probability of surviving the second half, given 
survival at mid year is 
0.99/0.995 = 0.994975, or 99.50 percent 
which is the same figure as the one obtained earlier using 
a different appraoch. 
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Suppose 200 children are born during the year [B(t,t+h) = 
200] and that they die at the same rate as the general 
population. Since births are uniformly distributed over 
the year, the probability that a child survives to the end 
of the year is: 
l l 
S(OO;t,t+h) = = = 0.995 (18) 
1 + \hd(t,t+h) l + \h0.01005 
Consequently, 199 children survive. Each of the surviving 
children is exposed to the risk of dying for half a 
period. Infants who die are exposed for half the time. The 
total duration of exposure is therefore 
L(OO;t,t+h) = 199 * 0.50 + 1 * 0.25 = 99.75 person-years. 
This amount may also be obtained by the usual formula: 
L(OO;t,t+h) = ~h[B(t,t+h) + K(t)] 
= ~[200 + 199) = 99.75 
The death rate of newly-born children is therefore 
d(OO;t,t+h) = d(OO;t,t+h) I L(OO;t,t+h) 
= 1/99.75 
= 0.010025, 
which is different from the average death rate during the 
period (0.01005). The difference is due to the changing 
instantaneous death rate, associated with the assumption 
of constant probability density or uniform distribution of 
events. This assumption implies that the rate at which 
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children born in the (t,t+h)-period die in that period is 
equal to the rate at which members of the general 
population die during the first half of the (t,t+h)-
period. This rate was calculated earlier by dividing the 
number of deaths during the (t,t+\h)-period by the person-
years lived during that period. The rate may also be 
obtained by applying equation (14): 
0.01 
d(t,t+\h) = µ(t+\h) = = 0.010025 
1-0.25 * 0.01 
Given that the average death rate of newly-born children 
is d(t,t+~h), the survival probability may also be 
expressed as 
1-\hd(t,t+~h) 
S(OO;t,t+h) = ~~~~~~-
1+\hd(t,t+~h) 
1-0.25 * 0.010025 
l+0.25 * 0.010025 
= 0.995, 
which is the value obtained by applying equation (13). 
Note that the person-years lived by a child before the end 
of the period is 
1 
= 0.9975 person-years. 
l+0.25 * 0.010025 
In order to determine the birth rate, we must determine 
who is at risk of childbearing and for how long. If 
/ ., --
L .) l 
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everyone is at risk of childbearing, even the newly-born 
children, then the exposure function is 
L = L(t,t+h) + L(OO;t,t+h) 
= 9950 + 99.75 
= 10,049.75 
and the birth rate is 
b(t,t+h) = B(t,t+h)/L = 200/10,049.75 
= 0.019901. 
If, on the other hand, only the persons present at the 
beginning of the period are at risk of childbearing, then 
the exposure function is L(t,t+h) = 9,950 and the birth 
rate is 200/9,950 = 0.020101. Which birth rate does model 
(6) imply? It is the first one. To show this, we project 
the population one year ahead using model (6) with a death 
rate of 0.010050 and a birth rate of 0.019901 and without 
external migration: 
1 - ~h[d{t,t+h) - b{t,t+h)] 
K{t+h) = K{t) 
1 + ~h[d(t,t+h) - b(t,t+h)] 
1 + ~0.009851 
= 10,000 
1 ~0.009851 
= 1.00990 * 10,000 
= 10,099, {19) 
which is equal to the sum of the 9,900 survivors of the 
initial population and the 199 surviving children. Notice 
that the same number may be obtained by the model: 
2-3'! 
K(t+h) = (1 
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\m)L(t,t+h) 
= (1 + \0.00985) 10,049.75 
The number of events may easily be recovered . The number 
of births is 0.019901 * 10,049.75 = 200 and the number of 
deaths is 0.01005 * 10049.75 = 101 . 
The 200 births during the period can be attributed in 
part to the population alive at the beginning of the 
period and in part to the newly-born children . The 
initial population accounts for 
b(t,t+h) * L(t,t+h) = 0.019901 * 9950 = 198.015 births. 
The newly-born account for the remaining 1.985 births. It 
is a peculiarity of the model of the aggregate population 
that everyone alive is at risk of childbearing. The 
population decomposition by age removes this peculiarity. 
Suppose that the death rate and birth rate remain 
constant. The population grows then at a constant 
geometric growth rate of 9.90 per thousand (equation 17 ). 
This growth rate is not equal to the difference between 
the birth rate and death rate (9.851 per thousand), a 
result of the varying rates within the time intervals and 
hence of the constant probability density assumption . 
Equality only holds if the instantaneous rates do not 
change within the period. The population projection for 
the first 10 years is shown in Table 1. The duration of 
exposure in a year grows at the same constant rate as the 
population, as do the numbers of deaths and births (Table 
1). The exposure is 1.00495 K(t). The number of deaths is 
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0.01005 * 1.00495 * K(t) = O.OlOlK(t) 
and the number of births is 
0.019901 * 1.00495 * K(t) = 0.02000K(t) 
If fertility is absent, the population grows at a rate of 
-10.0 per thousand (equation 17). If on the other hand, 
mortality is removed, then the growth rate is 20.1 per 
thousand: 
1 - \[-b(t,t+h)] 1 + \0.019901 
= = 1.02010 
1 + \[-b(t,t+h)] 1 - \0.019901 
Table 1. Projection of population, exposure, births and 
deaths 
Period Population Exposure Deaths Births 
t at t (t,t+l) (t,t+l) (t,t+l) 
0 10,000 10,049.5 101. 0 200.0 
1 10,099 10,149.0 102.0 201. 0 
2 10,199 10,249.5 103.0 202.0 
3 10,300 10, 351. 0 104.0 204.0 
4 10,402 10,453.4 105.1 206.0 
5 10,505 10,556.9 106.1 208.0 
6 10,609 10,661.4 107.1 210.l 
7 10,714 10,767.0 108.2 212.2 
8 10,820 10,873.6 109.3 214.3 
9 10,927 10,981.2 110.4 216.4 
10 11,035 
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3. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS IN A POPULATION CATEGORIZED BY REGION OF 
RESIDENCE 
In this section, we repeat some of the discussion of the 
previous section but add a new dimension; namely, region 
of residence. 
3.1. The model 
Let Ki(t) denote the number of people in region i at time 
t. The number of births, deaths, emigrants and 
immigrants of region i are denoted by Bi, Di, Ei and Ii, 
respectively. The time-argument is dropped for 
convenience. It is understood that the events ref er to 
the period from t to t + h. A new variable o .. is l.J 
introduced to denote the number of migrations from i to j 
during the (t,t+h)-period. 
The number of people in region i at time t + 1 is given by 
the accounting equation: 
Ki(t+h) 
(20) 
The duration of exposure in region i by all residents is 
(21) 
given that the events are uniformly distributed over the 
(t,t+h}-period. 
2 -~ c7· 
_/ 
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The rate equations are: 
b · l. = B·/L· l. l. 
d· l. = D· /L · l. l. 
e · l. = E · /L· l. l. 
o .. = O •. /Li l.J l. J 
Introduction of the rate equations and the exposure 
functions in the accounting equation gives: 
Ki(t+h) 
Ki(t+h)] 
+~Oki ~[Kk(t) + Kk(t+h)] 
Writing the equation for all i and expressing the set of 
equations in matrix terms yields the projection model: 
K(t+h) = [I + ~hMJ-1 [I - ~hM]K(t) 
+ [I + ~hM]-l 0 1 
= SK(t) + *s0 1, 
where 0 1 is a vector of number of immigrants by region 
during the (t,t+h)-period, I is the identity matrix and M 
is: 
M = 
) ) - .-
' \ 
'- _, -I 
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with N the number of regions and 
The matrix M may be expressed as 
with 
dM a diagonal matrix of regional death rates, 
eM a diagonal matrix of emigration rates, 
bM a diagonal matrix of birth rates, and 
0 M a matrix of minus the outmigration rates as off-
diagonal elements and with the sum of the outmigration 
rates in the diagonal. 
The matrices [I + ~hM] and [I - ~hM] are commutative, 
meaning that 
[I+ ~hM]- 1 [1 - ~hM) = [I - ~hM][I + ~hM]-l 
This property is used to estimate the exposure function. 
The duration of exposure by a member of the initial 
population is 
where 
An element L . . 
1) of L represents the average duration of 
exposure (person-years lived) in region j between t and 
t+h by a resident of region i at time t. An immigrant and 
a newly-born child are exposed for a duration of 
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on average. 
The growth equation may be expressed in terms of the 
person-years lived in each region. 
K(t+h) = [I - ~hM]l/h LK(t) + 2/h LoI, (24) 
where L is the matrix of person-years lived in each region 
associated with an initial resident in each of the two 
regions: 
L = h[I + ~hM]-l (25) 
The population distribution at time t+rh is given by 
K(t+rh) = S(t,t+rh) [K(t) + ~fI(t,t+h)] + ~ TI(t,t+h) (26) 
where 
S(t,t+rh) =I - r(I - S(t,t+h)] (27) 
Expression (26) is a generalization of (11). 
The instantaneous rates of transition are given by the 
generalization of (14): 
µ(t+rh) = [I - S(t,t+h)][S(t,t+rh)]-l (28) 
At mid-period, the instantaneous rates are equal to the 
average occurrence-exposure rates: 
Z~ f 
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µ(t+ ~ h) = M(t,t+h) = (2/h) [I - S(t , t+h)][I + S(t,t+h))-l 
( 2 9) 
This formula may be used to estimate the occurrence-
exposure rate from census and survey data on transition 
probabilies. 
3.2. Numerical illustration 
By way of illustration, consider an initial population of 
10,000 persons, 5,000 living in region 1 and 5,000 living 
in region 2 . In each region, 50 persons die and 100 
children are born. Region 1 has 1,000 inmigrations and 
500 outmigrations, resulting in a net inmigration of 500 
persons . The inmigrants come from regi on 2 and the 
outmigrants go to 2. 
The person-years lived in region 1 during the year is 
\ (5,000 + 5,550) = 5,275 
and in region 2 is 
\(5,000 + 4,550) = 4,775. 
The total person-years is 10,050. The occurrence-exposure 
rates are given in Table 2 
Table 2. Occurrence-exposure rates 
region 1 region 2 average 
death rate 0.009479 0.010471 0.009950 
7 ' () 
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Table 2. Occurrence-exposure rates 
region 1 region 2 average 
death rate 0.009479 0.010471 0.009950 
birth rate 0.018957 0.020942 0.019900 
outmig. rate 0.094787 0.209424 
The duration of exposure in each region per resident at 
time t s given by equation (25) (with h = 1): 
[ 1.042555 -0.104712 J -1 = 
-0.047394 1.099476 
[ 0.96326 0.09174 J = 0.04152 0.91348 
The results are shown in Table 3. 
The total duration of exposure by the initial population 
and the newly-born children is 10,050 person- years. The 
person-years lived in region 1 is 5,275, 8.70 percent of 
which are attributed to people residing in region 2 at the 
start of the year . The initial population of region 1 
contributes only 4.34 percent of the person-years lived in 
region 2. 
An initial resident contributes on average 1.005 person-
years, in part through his offspring. An initial resident 
in region 2 contributes more than average (1.00522 years), 
due to the higher fertility in region 2 . About 9.13 
percent of his contribution goes to region 1 . 
The durations of exposure shown in Table 3 include the 
exposure of the offspring. The duration o f exposure in 
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each region by the initial population is 
Table 3. Duration of exposure in each region during 
interval from t to t+l 
A. Total 
Region of residence at t 
1 2 Total 
Region of 1 4816.3 458.7 5275.0 
residence in 
(t,t+l)-interval 2 207.6 4567.4 4775.0 
Total 5023.9 5026.l 10050.0 
B. Per resident in each region at t 
Region of residence at t 
1 2 
Region of 1 0.96326 0.09174 
residence 
in (t,t+l) 2 0.04152 0.91348 
Total 1. 004 78 1. 00522 
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Tabel 4. Duration of exposure in each region by initial 
population, in the absence of fertility 
A. Total 
Region of residence at t 
1 2 Total 
Region of 1 4772.6 450.3 5222.8 
residence in 
(t,t+l)-interval 2 203.8 4523.9 4727.7 
Total 4976.4 4974.2 9950.6 
B. Per resident in each region at t 
Region of residence at t 
1 2 
Region of 1 0.95451 0.9005 
residence 
in (t,t+l) 2 0.04076 0.90479 
Total 0.99527 0.99484 
where M = dM + 0 M. The durations are shown in Tabel 4. 
The total number of person-years lived during the year is 
9,950.6. It is slightly higher than the 9,950 person-
years estimated previously, since the 100 deaths include 
the deaths to newly-born children and its effect on the 
average death rate. The person-years lived in region 1 is 
5,223, 8.62 percent of which is contributed by the persons 
initially residing in region 2. The person-years lived in 
region 1 is less than one expects from the accounting 
equation excluding births 
[~(5,000 - 50 + 500 + 5,000)) = 5,225. 
The reason is that some of the deaths and migrations are 
to the children born during the period. By excluding 
'J U I 
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fertility, the number of deaths and migrations will be 
less. The number of events is obtained by multiplying the 
duration of exposure with the occurrence-exposure rates. 
The number of deaths in region 1 is 
0.009479 * 5,222.9 = 49.51, 
the number of out-migrations is 
0.094787 * 5,222.9 = 495.1 
and the number of inmigrations is 
0.209424 * 4,727.7 = 990.1 
Hence, the births account for 0.49 deaths and 4.9 
migrations in region 1 on average. The correct accounting 
equation for region 1 is therefore 
5,000 - 49.51 - 495.1 + 990.1 = 5,445.5, 
which is the end-of-year population. The duration of 
exposure is the mid-period population times the interval 
length (1 year): 
\(5,000 + 5,445.3) = 5,222.8, 
which is the value shown in Table 4 and obtained by 
inverting (I+ \*M]. 
A resident of region 1 at time t lives on average 0.995 
years before reaching t+l, 95.9 percent is spent in region 
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1 and 4.1 percent in region 2. An initial resident of 
region 2 lives less time because of the higher mortality. 
If mortality is excluded, and migration is the only 
remaining component of demographic change, then the total 
duration of exposure is 10,000 person-years. The duration 
of exposure in each region per resident of each region at 
time t is: 
The results are shown in Table 5. The person-years lived 
in region 1 is 5248.8 years and in region 2 4751.2. The 
number of out-migrations is 
0.094787 * 5248.8 = 497.5 
Tabel 5. Duration of exposure in each region by initial 
population in presence of migration only 
A. Total 
Region of residence at t 
1 2 Total 
Region of 1 4794.3 454.5 5248.8 
residence in 
(t,t+l)-interval 2 205.7 4545.5 4751.2 
Total 5000.0 5000.0 5000.0 
B. Per resident in each region at t 
Region of residence at t 
1 2 
Region of 1 0.95886 0.09089 
residence 
in (t,t+l) 2 0.04114 0.90911 
Total 1.00000 1.00000 
for region 1 and 
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0.209424 * 4751.2 = 995.0 
for region 2. The accounting equation for region 1 is 
5,000 - 497.5 + 995.0 = 5497.5 
The end-of-year population in region 1 is 5,498 persons 
and the person-years lived in that region during the year 
is 
~[5,000 + 5,497.5] = 5,248.8, 
which is the value shown in Table 5. 
A comparison of the number of person-years in the absence 
of mortality with the number in the presence of mortality, 
indicates the person-years foregone due to mortality, 
given the migration pattern and the regional differential 
mortality. It is 26.0 (5248.8 - 5222.8) person-years for 
region 1 and 23.5 (4751.2 4727.7) person-years for 
region 2. Region 1 loses more person-years although its 
mortality is the lowest of the two regions. The in-
migrants foregone due to the mortality in region 2 account 
for the difference. 
Let us turn to projection and suppose that 
birth, death and migration remain constant. 
first year the population grows at a geometric 
the rates of 
During the 
rate of 10 
per thousand. The difference between the birth rate and 
the death is 9.95 per thousand (see Table 2): 
1+~ 0.00995 
1.010 = 
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The combination of initial population, births, deaths and 
migration results in an end-of-year population of 5,550 in 
region 1 and 4,550 in region 2. The figures are obtained 
by applying growth model (22) or, equivalently, (24). The 
growth matrix is 
[1-0.04265 0.10471] [0.96326 o. 09174] 
s = 
0.04739 1-0.09976 0.04152 0.91348 
[0.92652 0.18348] 
s = 
0.08304 0.82696 
The growth matrix applies to the population as well as to 
the duration of exposure. The population is 
K(t+h) = SK(t) 
and the exposure times are 
L(t+h,t+2h) = SL(t,t+h). 
The projected population and exposure times are shown in 
Table 6. The number of events by region is 
N(t+h,t+2h) = cM L(t+h,t+2h), 
where cM is a diagonal matrix of event rates. The growth 
matrix cannot be used to project the number of events 
since cM and S are not commutative, i.e. 
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The projected number of migrations are shown in Table 7. 
Table 6. Projection of population and exposure by region 
Population at t Exposure in (t,t+l) 
Period 1 1 2 Total 1 2 Total 
0 (a) 5000 5000 10000 5275 4775 10050 
(b) 5000 5000 10000 5223 4728 9950 
(C) 5000 5000 10000 5249 4751 10000 
1 (a) 5550 4550 10100 5764 4387 10150 
(b) 5446 4455 9901 5599 4253 9852 
(c) 5498 4505 10000 5681 4319 10000 
5 (a) 6799 3708 10507 6889 3669 10558 
(b) 6171 3347 9518 6192 3279 9471 
(c) 6477 3523 10000 6531 3469 10000 
10 (a) 7492 3543 11035 7542 3548 11089 
(b) 6166 2897 9062 6146 2872 9018 
(c) 6796 3204 10000 6808 3192 10000 
15 (a) 7948 3641 11589 7990 3656 11646 
(b) 5930 2699 8629 5904 2684 8587 
(c) 6865 3135 10000 6868 3132 10000 
(a) With fertility, mortality and migration 
(b) With mortality and migration (no fertility) 
(c) Migration only (no fertility nor mortality) 
z '7-? 
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Tabel 7. Projection of number of outmigrations 
Period t Region 1 Region 2 Total 
0 (a) 500 1000 1500 
(b) 495 990 1485 
(c) 498 995 1493 
1 (a) 546 919 1465 
(b) 531 891 1421 
(c) 538 905 1443 
5 (a) 653 768 1421 
(b) 587 687 1274 
(c) 619 726 1346 
10 (a) 715 743 1458 
(b) 583 602 1184 
(c) 645 668 1314 
15 (a) 757 766 1523 
(b) 560 562 1122 
(c) 651 656 1307 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Exposure analysis is the investigation of the variation in 
the duration of exposure to the risk of a given event due 
to changes in the population at risk and in the vital 
rates. The exposure function measures the lenght of time 
during which an individual with a given set of attributes 
may experience a particular event. 
To evaluate the impact of vital rates and a population 
stock on the numbers of vital events, exposure analysis 
may be useful. 
The paper reviews exposure analysis in case the vital 
events occur at constant probability densities or, 
equivalently, the events are uniformly distributed in the 
observation interval. The survival function is linear and 
the exposure function is quadratic in the interval length. 
The presentation may easily be extended to the case of 
piecewise constant probability densities, which is 
generally assumed in demographic projection models. 
A main advantage of this type of analysis is that the 
effect of vital rates on the total duration of exposure 
and on the number of events in a given interval is easily 
separated from the effect of the initial population. A 
further advantage is the ease with which the varying 
instantaneous rates at each point of the interval can be 
estimated. 
36 
REFERENCES 
Chiang, C.L. (1984) 
The life table and its applications. R.E . Krieger 
Publ. Co., Malabar, Florida. 
Willekens. F.J. (1988) 
Life course analysis. Stochastic process models. NIDI, 
The Hague (manuscript) 
zc;c 
Name: Robert 1'hlirmer 
Title of Paper: h geographically based populati0n projection mncel 
Summary: As eerly es 1980 WILLEKENS stated t hat " ••• in the 
second phase ••• socioecnnomic factor s will be intro-
duced to explain the values taken by the mndel para-
meters." Consequently, we tested to see if a two-stage( 
geographic approach would be superior to the one-stage 
demographic approaches previously used. 
The geographic orientatinn is marked by the following 
features · 
- taking into consideration a set of territorial con-
ditions in its influence on demographic processes, 
- elaborating projectinns for smaller territorial 
units (Bezirke, Kreise , towns), 
- paying special attention to the explenatinn given 
fnr migration. 
The mode l allows us tn explain the modificetinns of 
demographic procesees, e.g. migrEtinn , birth ret€s, 
death rates by means of regres8ion equati nn8 ex-
pressing the influence nf territorial conditions nr. 
thnse processes (e . g . tntal nf nevly built fl ats , de -
gree nf industrializatinn, quality nf natural envi -
ron::nent). 
In a second step the results nf thn se prn jectinns are 
mndified by taking int n cnnsideretion the peculiari -
ties nf the territorial unit investigated . 1'hese pe-
culiarities have been derived from the differences 
between the real and the projected changes of t he po-
pulati on in the past. 
Consequently , the results of nur prnjectinns cnnsi8t~ 
nf tY~ cnmp nnents: nne expressing general regulariti es 
and the nther expressing the peculiarities of the 
territorial unit. 
Using our mndel y·e obtained results v·i t h a diminished 
errnr nf estimation by more than 50% compared with 
the results obtained by traditional demographic 
approaches. 
It was also possible to simulate the effect nf chang~ 
ing territorial conditions on change s of population. 
Name: Janez 1.1.ALACIC, Ph. D. 
Title of Paper: PO?ULATI01: AGE ST.:rJ CTTJR3 -~~;D T1~E DS: :,) .~~-~ P:: I C ::-~A:- :; J -
TJQI; O? TfiE PJ?-UL.4TIQJ; o·:~ A :J 'l.'OI~o: :Ot;S r 10-n" -: ::: YOSC.110 
Summary: 
Today, the po?ulation of AP Kosovo is the fastest ~ro~ing po~u­
lation i!l Europe. The average annual growt h r a te for the perio :l 
1981-86 was 2,5 percent. Such a population explosion is t~e con 
sequence of a high natural increase and slightly negative net 
migration rate. The PO?Ulation of AP Kosovo is nationally mixed 
In 1981, the majority were Albanians, 77,4 %, o~ t he second pl s 
ce were Serbs, 13,2 %, followed by Uoslems, Ro~any po~ulation. 
Montenegrins and others. 
The population reproduction pattern in AP Kosovo is much ~o­
re similar to that in Alban ia than to t he re ,J r ')di lction ps t terns 
in other parts of Yugoslavia. Si:nilarit i es are th P. co~se 1ue~ce 
of the dominance of ethnic Alba~ians i ~ t he nat i '):ia l structur r 
of the po~ulation of A? ¥.~sovo. ~itb the po Julat ion of Alb~:rii 3 
t~ey shar e a co:nmon ethnic ori gin , la~~ua~e , cultural terit ~ ~e . 
similar farr!ilv for:ngtion patterns, econo :iic back·v~!'1>:.ess B.:ri'.3. 
until recently comnon law and reli gi~n. 
The Albanian ~O?Ulation of Albania 3nd Yugosl~via is the 
po~ulation with the last de~o~raph ic tr3nsition i~ Bur ope . It 3 
de~o r,raphic char~cte ristics are muct more si ~ilsr t o t h e d e~0-
grap!:ic situation i'1 less develo ped ps rt of the wor ld t !~ e. ""l t o 
the demo graphic situation in 3urope. I ~ AP Ko s ovo , t he ) r Jc es ~ 
of de~o ~ra?tic transition st3rted i ~1 the middle o: the 1 ~ 2os 
wit!; the decline of de ~ th r3te under 3o per l')OO po?ul~t ion . 
On the other side, tLe crude birtt r ate decre a sed U"lier 4o 
per 1000 po?ulation i n tte middle of the 136os . 1'1 19q S , t h e 
crud e birt i-1 ra.te was Jo,l and the cr:.d e destr, r a te ·'::.s 7 , 5 
~er 1000 populstion. 
Slo~ ~ace of t ~ e fertility tra.nsition i n A? Kosovo ~as t~e 
~ain cause of the pr ocess of juvenilization durin~ t~e 1 ~60~ 
and the 137os. Th e shsre of t h e ~o~ulation above t tE a ~e o ~ 
6 ~ t d t 4 I' r' . i g ,- 1 4 ·5 c' . lq71 ' • ,- r' . 1 ")n -J amoun e o , o .:i in _ o , , .-; in ,,, . an :~ '.;- , ") Q 1 ~1 - 7~'.l . 
This period will be followed by a very sloN agin~ pr ocess due 
to the relatively slow fertility decline. In 2ool , however , 
the share of the population above the a ge of 65 will be s l i~h t­
ly over 5 %, only. 
The need for faster fertility decline and f or the a~tin~t q ­
list po pulation policy in AP Y.osovo i s more tha:i evi dent . ":-!O"'-
ever, professional, political and other public opini ons i~ A? 
~osovo still oppose strongly to t he antinatalist po?ulgtion 
policy. 
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Title of Paper: 
Summary: 
\.:. \.:ard Kingkade 
"Differential Fertility and t he Future Ethnic 
Composition of the Soviet Union" 
This report presents projections of the population of the USSR by age 
and sex in 20 nationality groups from 1979 to 2050. The groups include all 
15 union republic nationalities , the four largest non-union republic 
nationalities as of 1979 and a residual comprising the remainder of the 
population . 
Our principal results are : 
- Russians, currently comprising a bare majority (51%) of the Soviet 
population, will become a minority by the turn of the century. They will 
remain a minority even under an unlikely scenario of substantially rising 
fertility among European nationalities coupled with sharply declining 
fertility among non-European nationalities . 
- Russians will remain the largest Soviet nationality well into the 
future, comprising upwards of 45 percent of total population as late as 2010 
and more than 30 percent in 2050. 
- Central Asians, who comprise only 11- 12 percent of the current 
population, will contribute a disproportionate share of total population 
growth in the USSR: roughly half of all growth though 2010 and nearly two 
thirds of growth through 2050. Nevertheless, the Central Asian share of the 
population will become substantial only after 2000, reaching about a quarter 
in 2050. 
- The European nationalities currently enjoy age distributions favorable 
to the economy, with about 4 working age members for every 3 non-working age 
members . This fortunate situation will dissipate as the working and non-
working shares among these nationalities will become more equal . 
The findings on which these results are based include : 
- Fertlity in European republics has risen after the adoption of a set 
of incentives by the 26th party congress in 1981 to levels high enough to 
ensure zero population growth in the longrun . 
- The high fertility of Central Asian nationalities, implying 5-6 
children per mother, has begun to decline . 
- Mortality, which rose slightly during the 1970s, has begun to decline 
in the 1980s . 
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Title of Paper: 
Summary: 
Alexander Hanika 
Projected population structure of Vienna as compared to other 
Austrian provinces 
In the past decades a convergence in fertility levels between 
Vienna and the rest of Austria could be observed. In 1934 the 
TFR in Vienna had been only 0,6 which was 38% of the 
Austrian level of that time (i.e. 1,6). In 1987 Vienna with a TFR 
of 1.35 had reached 94% of the Austrian fertility level. Our 
projection model shows that on the basis of this positive fertility 
trend Vienna may expect to experience rather stable annual se-
ries of births in the future. In contrast to that the population 
under age 15 in the predominantly agricultural province of 
Burgenland will decrease to half of its current size. Aside from 
low fertility levels out-migration of young adults from 
Burgenland and in-migration of such families into Vienna plays 
a major role in these differentials. 
Vienna today has still the oldest age structure of all Austrian 
provinces, but it has past the maximum of its population aging. 
In 2030 Vienna will have the lowest proportion above age 60 of 
all Austrian proYinces. Vorarlberg which has the youngest pop-
ulation today \\'ill then be slightly older then Vienna. 
Name : L. Eichperger, W. Relou, A. Op 't Veld 
Title of paper : Future regional differences in growth and 
of the population of the Netherlands. 
Sununary: 
In this paper a exploration has been made of the future regional 
population-growth in the Netherlands according to different 
hypotheses of demografic, economic and social influences. 
An improved version of the IIASA multi-regional demog raphi c mode l 
has been used in combination with an explanatory migration model. 
Map 1 shows the regional population growth which may be expe cted 
if present trends continue . The majority of the 44 regions show a 
slight decrease in population size in the period 1987 - 2000. A 
limited number of regions are confronted with population growth 
which in some cases even assumes considerable proportions . Thes e 
regions are mainly in the north-east, the east, the centre , the 
west and the south-east of the country and the new province of 
Flevoland (reclaimed land from the former Zuiderzee ). The growth 
of the regions in the north-east is partly brought about by 
internal migration to attractive residential areas , partl y by 
natural increase resulting from the high level of fertilit y. 
Growth in the west and centre of the country is mainly the result 
of the inflow of foreigners. Many foreigners congregate in the 
large cities in the west of the country. Growth in the east and 
south-east is mainly the result of internal migration . 
Concentration or dispersal of economic growth and related changes 
in internal migration exert a clear influence on population 
development . Concentration of economic growth in the regions in 
the west of the country would imply a more marked decline of the 
population in the regions in the north-east of the country than 
was foreseen if present trends should continue ( see map 2 ) . If 
economic growth should be fairly evenly distributed ove r the 
country , this would mean a less marked reduction of the popula -
tion of the regions in the north-east than is expe c ted if 
present trends continue. 
The regions in the south of the country benefit most from a more 
even distribution of economic growth over the country . In these 
regions this would mean heavier population growth than pres en t 
trends indicate . The reason for this is the proximity of these 
regions to the west of the country . Increased economic growth in 
these regions would exert a greater pull on migrants from the 
west than would economic growth in more peripheral regions ( see 
map 3). 
With the present combination of the multiregional populati on 
model and the migration simulation model, it is not yet poss ible 
to calculate the effects of the various scenarios on the age 
structure of the regional populations. At the moment the model s 
are being improved in order to make this possible. 
Name: 
Title of Paper: 
Summary: 
Sergei Scherbov and Wolfgang Lutz 
Impacts of Fertility Trends on Regional 
Population Distributions: Scenarios to 205 0. 
This paper has essentially two parts. In the first part we 
discuss recent trends in age-specific fertility rates in the 
republics of the Soviet Union. By visual analysis of the trends 
and quantitative assessment of the extent of family limitation in 
the republics we are able to classify the repub lics according to 
their standing in the process of fertility transition. As a next 
step we try to assess the demographic consequences of future 
trends in fertility and mortality in the repub li cs of the Soviet 
Union. For this purpose we define 3 alternative scenarios 
representing 3 different lines of future demograph ic development: 
A: Continued diversity (fertility and morta lity remain at current 
levels); B: Continued diversity in fertility Clif e expectancy 
converges to 75 years in all republics by 2 020) : C: Convergence 
in fertility and mortality (fertility also converges to 
replacement level in all republi cs by 2020). 
The different scenarios have great impact on the fut~re 
population composition of the Union . In al l cases the Asian 
republics will increase to a greater share of the Soviet 
population than the have today. but in the case of continued 
diversity the change in weights will be most dramatic. But the 
scenarios do not only affect the proportions of people in the 
various republics. they a lso influence the extent and the speed 
of population aging and the differences in aging between the 
republics. The figures bel ow illustrate the changes in the 
population age structures in Uzbekistan 1970-2050 according t o 
scenarios A and C. 
Population structure of Uzbekistan Population structure of Uzbekislau 
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INFERRING THR PROFILE OF INTERCOHORT INCREASE 
2 What Can Be Done With Census-Type Data 
Given censuses at five year intervals from 1950 onward, what 
can we infer about past fertility and mo~tality? Without other 
inputs of data or assumptions it is impossible to identify fer-
tility and mortality separately from such limited data, but we 
can infer a certain combination that I will call intercohort 
increase. 
In fact we do not have censuses at five year intervals for 
the postwar period for more than a very few countries, but there 
are some censuses nearly everywhere, and the United Nations has 
used these to establish a quasi official set of estimates at five 
year intervals, 1950, 1955, etc., that will here be treated as 
though they are actual counts. Errors in these estimates will 
appear as noise in the calculations to be made below, of the same 
character as irregular accurately recorded fluctuations in census 
age distributions, due for example to epidemics or migration. 
The theory will be for a population closed to migration, and the 
technique is such that variation arising from migration and other 
kinds of error clearly reveals itself. 
... 
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2.1 Formal Representation of the Intercohort Difference 
In terms of the five-year interval as the unit, call P • . 1 
the population aged a at last birthday at time t. This is the 
data, and the entity to be inferred is some combination of B,_. 
the births at time t-a, B, •• and the survivorship L •.•.• ; we will be 
able to infer sums of the products of two such elements. 
We start with the intercohort increase, a simple function of 
the population data: 
L1tPa,t a:: Pa,t+l - Pa.ti 
This is the increase of a given age over one time period and 
constitutes the basic data of this .paper. The usefulness of the 
simple age by age increase has been noted by Preston and Coale 
... 
(1985) and others. Since 5 years is made the unit of time and 
age, 5 will not appear in the formulas. 
The population aged a is here taken to mean the people 
recorded in a census at time t from exact age a to exact age 
a • I (or a • 5 if expressed in single years). In symbols, with 
the continuous form of the functions indicated by parentheses, 
1 
p(a,t)- J B(t~a-6)l(a+6)d6, 
0 
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if the life table survivorship l(a•e)is unchanging through the 
7 /. /.) 
._. (.;.. (.... , 
3 
relevant time interval . In the usual approximation the integral 
of the product is assumed equal to the product of the separate 
integrals, or 
p(a,t) == B,_ala, 
L. being the integral of l(a•6) over the ages a to a• I, and B, .• 
the births from time t-a-1 to t-a. (The quantity L. is defined 
as one fifth the usual life table L 
II • 
). With mortality changing over time as well as by age we 
need to indicate which life table ls referred to, that will 
require a second subscript on L.. The symbol L • .••• is surviv or-
ship of the cohort born at time t-a. 
In terms of the entities we are seeking to infer, then, the 
increase at age ? from time r to time t•l is 
( 1 ) 
supposing a closed population . Now adding and subtracting the 
quantity s, .• L •. 1• 1 • • , we obtain 
(2) 
or alternatively, by adding and subtracting B, ___ ,L •. ,-•• 
(3) 
Of the two terms in (2) or (3), the first is the survivors 
among the increase over a 5-year period of the absolute number of 
• 
2 CI 
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births that took place t-a periods earlier, and the second is the 
improvement of survivorship over a 5-year time period multiplied 
by the births. 
2.2 The Two Terms 
For purposes of examining the relative sizes of the two terms 
of (2) divide by B, •• L •. , •• to obtain the quantity 
LltPa,t = (LJtBt-a)(La,t+l-a)+ Lltla,t-a' 
Pa.t Bi-a La,t-a La,t-a 
(4) 
or expanding the second factor of the first term as a Taylo r 
series, and neglecting second differences, we have approximately 
L1 P a,t 
t Pa,t 
(5) 
The first term of (5) is the relative change of births from 
one 5-year interval to the next and the second the relative 
change of the probability of surviving, both referring to a time 
a periods before the present time th~t is designated as t . One 
can imagine circumstances where the first term dominates, and 
other circumstances where the second does. 
When births are changing rapidly they might rise or fall by 5 
percent over a .5-year period, and when mortality is improving 
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rapidly survivorship might go up by 5 percent during a 5-year 
period, and if this is so the two terms are of similar magn itude . 
Survivorship keeps rising in the populations with which we are 
concerned, so the second term is positive; the first term can be 
positive or negative depending on whether births are in a rising 
or falling phase. 
3 Constancy of Intercohort Differences 
The usefulness of the method here proposed depends on the 
invariance among estimates of any given intercohort difference. 
Indonesia is a large population for which this constancy can be 
determined . It had censuses taken in 1961, 1971 and 1980, on the 
basis of which the UN has calculated numbers at five year inter-
vals from 1950 to 2020. With interpolation between the censuses 
and extrapolation beyond them we cannot say that each 5 year 
point is completely independent of the others, and yet there must 
be a measure of independence in the errors . 
Table 1 is an extract from the current estimate (UN 1986) 
• provided by the United Nations for Indonesia along with 190 other 
populations . 
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TABLE 1. INDONESIA: EXTRACT FROH ORIGINAL UNITED NATIONS (1 986) 
POPULATION NUMBERS IN FIVE-YEAR AGE INTERVALS FROM AGE 0 
TO 29, 1950 TO 1985, (HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PERSONS ) 
Age 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
0-4 114 136 162 175 199 222 224 226 
5-9 101 103 124 150 163 187 211 212 
10-14 96 98 100 121 146 160 184 207 
15-19 86 94 95 98 118 144 157 181 
20-24 74 82 90 92 95 115 l40 154 
25-29 59 70 79 86 89 92 112 136 
TABLE 2. INDONESIA : INTERCOHORT DIFFERENCES (EXCESS OF EACH 
COHORT OVER PREVIOUS COHORT) AS ESTIMATED FROM DATA 
SIMILAR TO THAT OF TABLE 1, AT DIFFERENT TIMES AND AGES 
(HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PERSONS) 
Cohort born in five years starting with the year 
Age 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 
0 22 26 13 24 23 
5 2 21 26 13 24 24 
10 2 2 21 25 13 24 22 
15 . 8 2 2 21 25 13 24 22 
20 9 8 2 3 · 20 25 14 24 22 
25 11 9 8 2 3 20 25 14 24 22 
30 10 9 8 3 3 20 24 14 24 23 
35 10 9 8 3 4 20 24 14 24 23 
40 10 8 8 3 4 20 24 14 24 23 
45 10 8 8 4 4 19 24 14 24 23 
50 9 9 8 4 4 19 23 14 23 22 
55 9 8 8 4 4 18 22 14 23 
60 9 8 8 4 4 17 21 13 
.. 65 8 7 7 4 4 16 20 
70 7 7 6 4 4 14 
From Table 1, in units of 100,000, the survivors to 1950 of 
the births of 1945-50 are 114, and the survivors to 1955 of the 
1950-55 births are 136, a difference of 22 . This last is the 
increase at age 0 to 4 from 1950 to 1955, the figure shown at the 
top of the column under 1950 in Table 2, that gives the differ -
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ence over time of given age groups as shown in (1) and subsequent 
formulas. Similarly, the number at the top of the column headed 
1970, 23 when expressed in hundred thousands, is the difference 
between the children 0-4 in 1970 (199) and the number 0-4 in 1975 
( 222). 
One can well be surprised at the near constancy in each 
column of the inferred intercohort differences of Table 2 . One 
would not expect absolute constancy, since there is some migra-
tion, the several estimates of the cohorts are based on censuses 
that suffer differently from errors of enumeration and tabula-
tion. That is in addition to the multiplication of B, •• by a 
diminishing survivorship L •.••• , which also contributes some varia-
tion to the columns of Table 2 . 
Some of the ~olumns of Table 2 gently increase, some gently 
decrease. Decreases will be shown where the first term of (2) or 
(3) dominates, with what may be called the survivorship effect; 
increases will appear where the second term (what we may call the 
survivorship improvement effect) is important enough to overcome 
the survivorship effect. Improving survivorship shows in the 
1940· and 1945 cohorts, while the 1930 cohort declines. 
In short, the first term of (2) or (3) includes a factor of 
survivorship that multiplied by the essentially constant s~. 
causes a decrease in the counts as one estimates the same in-
crease from older and older cohorts, while the second is a func-
tion of improving survivorship that causes a rise in the overall 
• 
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value of (2) or (3) and offsets or more than offsets the change 
in the first term. On the whole the first term dominates, but 
during the middle ages of life the two are more or less in 
balance. 
4 Reconstruction of the Age-Time Table. 
8 
The closeness to constancy of the differences within columns 
of Table 2 means redundancy in Table 1, the original age-time 
data. Hence we should be able to average numbers in each col oumn 
of Table 2, and reconstruct Table 1 without loss of information . 
The result of such averaging is the profile of intercohort dif-
ferences over historical time until about 1970. We hesitate to 
go beyond 1970 because most of the numbers subsequent to that are 
projections, and for our present method merely reads out the 
assumptions made in calculating the projections . And though in 
principle the method provides information back as far as the ages 
of the oldest group of people living in 1950, yet one is disin-
clined to use the information for any group in which the number 
of persons alive is not large, and for which enumeration is 
notoriously inaccurate . . Hence the method is mainly useful in 
telling about the first half or two thirds of the 20th century . 
For Indonesia the averages of the intercohort differences of 
Table 2 are given by Table 3. Thus the average of the column 
headed 1950 in Table 2 is in the row for 1950 in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3. AVERAGE OF THE COLUHNS OF TABLE 2 SHOWING 
THE AMOUNT BY WHICH EACH COHORT IS LARGER 
THAN THE PRECEDING (HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS 
OF PERSONS) 
Cohort 
five years 
beginning Cases Total Average 
1895 4 1 0 
1900 5 15 3 
1905 6 25 4 
1910 7 21 3 
1915 8 11 1 
1920 9 46 5 
1925 10 93 9 
1930 11 90 8 
1935 12 92 8 
1940 13 40 3 
1945 14 47 3 
1950 15 289 19 
1955 14 334 24 
1960 13 177 14 
1965 12 286 24 
1970 11 250 23 
The averages.of Table 3 can be expressed in general form in 
terms of births and the life table. Suppose we average from a 
periods of 5 years back to JJ-1 periods ago, JJ-l>a. If the 
entity to be averaged is (3), we have as the mean intercohort 
difference 
{3-a +Bi-a•• {3-a 
(6) 
The coefficient of ~.s~ .• the average of the survivorships to age 
.. 
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u, is much less than unity in a high-mortality population . The 
coefficient of B, • •• , is the average increase of the L • .••• as mortal-
i ty improved over time f rem r - fl to r - e1 . 
On the right hand side of (6) the usual convention 
'1,ft=ft+l-ft 
has been followed. But for the left side it seemed better to 
step back one period. That corresponds to the way that Table 3 
and the corresponding figures have been set up . Thus 0 1.., is the 
amount by wh ich the 1945-50 cohort is greater than its predeces -
sor 1940-45, etc . 
Figure 1 shows the numbers of Table 3 as the middle of the 
three bars for each year. The left-hand bar for each year is the 
lowest of the values in each column of Table 2; the right-hand 
bar is the highest . The profile of intercohort increase is much 
the same for the low, average , and high values . 
5 Demographic Significance 
Table 3 and Fig.1 (expressed in hundreds of thousands of 
persons) show the cohort of 1915-20 larger than that of 1910-15 
by only 0 . 1 million, while the cohort of 1920-25 is larger than 
that of 1915-20 by 0.5 million, and this is followed by an in-
crease of 0 . 9 million; thi~ latter jump is much more than any 
preceding five-year period shown . Similarly the 1950-55 cohort is 
larger than the 1945-50 by 1.9 million persons, a further large 
step over the preceding history. 
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FIG . 1 
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6 Reconstruction of the age-period table 
From the averages of Table 3 (the middle bars of Fig . 1) we 
can reconstruct the original Table 1 using relatively little 
data . Aside from what is contained in Table 3 for the average 
intercohort difference, we need only the age distribution of one 
cohort as a starting point . If the reconstitution comes close to 
the original we can say that the original age-period table con-
tains a corresponding degree of redundancy. 
::_ (. 3 
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TABLE 4. RECONSTRUCTION OF TABLE 1: POPULATION IN FIVE-YEAR 
AGE GROUPS (HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PERSONS) 
Age 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
0-4 114 133 157 171 194 217 220 225 
5-9 100 103 122 146 160 184 206 209 
10-14 94 97 100 119 143 157 181 203 
15-19 84 91 94 98 117 141 154 178 
20-24 72 81 88 91 95 114 138 151 
25-29 60 69 78 85 88 92 111 135 
· 7 Redundancy 
The sense in which the usual age-period table is redundant is 
seen by comparing the extract shown as Table 1 with the recon-
struction of Table 4 . The central cohort of Table 4 is copied 
from Table 1: 114, 103, 100, 98, etc. The part of Table 4 for 
the more recent cohorts is made by adding the intercohort differ-
ences of Table 3 to the central cohort. Thus the 133 at the top 
of the 1955 column is equal to 114 plus the 19 given opposite 
1950 in Table 3.· The part of Table 4 for cohorts preceding that 
born 1945-50 is made by subtracting the intercohort differences 
from the 1945-50 cohort . 
.. 
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FIG.2 Age distributions, 1950- 1975 
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Table 1 contains t x a items, where t is the number 
of its columns (points of time) and a the number of its rows 
.. 
(age groups) . Table 4 has been made by the t items of Table 
3 plus the a items of the first main diagonal of Table 1. 
The degree of redundancy in Table 1 is thus the difference be-
tween t x a and t + a. 
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FIG . 3 Reconstruction of age-time distribution 
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Compare Fig. 2, which shows the original numbers provided by 
the United Nations for 1950-75, and Fig. 3, which shows the 
reconstruction using intercohort differences. In all essentials 
the two sets of curves are identical . Both show the same two 
bends, one after each of the World Wars, and have otherwise 
similar configurations. This way of compacting the age-time 
table is useful for comparing populations in respect of their 
acceleration after World War II and other features . 
Expressed in symbols, the reconstruction consists in taking 
the central cohort, say P .••••• and adding to it or substracting 
from it the quantities expressed as the riiht hand side of (6). 
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That is the reconstructed population, say P:~., is 
. t 
p a,t-a = p a.-a + L Du-a 
v-1 
when we go forward in time, and similarly, with minus rather 
than plus, when we go back. 
7 Other populations 
15 
Fig. 4 is made up of pairs of charts corresponding to Fig . 1 
2 ll 
and Fig. 2 for Malaysia, Burma and India. Visual comparison shows 
how the profiles of intercohort differences correspond to age 
distributions. The three sets of profiles are placed alongside 
charts of the data on which they are based; the age distributions 
turned left to right help to understand the respective profiles. 
Corresponding to each sharp bend on the left there is a sharp · 
rise in the bars on the right . 
... 
Evidantly the change from slow to rapid growth took pla~e 
earlier for Burma than for India. Malaysia shows considerable 
growth for the cohorts of the late 1930s, that resumed after a 
short interruption in the late 1940s . 
FIG. 4 
profil e DRAFT 16 
Age di s tr i butions , 1950- 1975 Intercohort increase !685- 90 t o 1950-55 
..... , ... HO 
... ,.,., . 
.. 
IJ 
... 
HO 
..• 
... JOO 
... : 
... ! ISO 1.1 . ?i 
.. : ... 
... . .. . 
... it . . 
., 
-! •• 
... i 
..• • 
... 
LI 
--· 
.. , 
... 
- 100 
• .. .. .... .. .. .. .. &921 lt)S ..., 
• " 
.. • .. • .. II 
.... ., ,., ., •• ....,.w ......... au.rt er rn• r••r ua1 ••ttn•• 
Age dlstrlbu tlon s , 1950- 1975 Intercoh ort Increase 1885- 90 t o 1950-55 ,., .. 
.... ... 
..• 
100 
u 
. HO • 
. ~ 
:i . 
.. : toO 
" I ' . ii . . 
2 ••• 
I .I 
• 
... 
. ... 
•••• .. .. .... . ... .. ,, 
.,,, 1941 
• .. .. • .. .. .. II •l.9r1 er rt~e r•u U•I laUH •1 
...... , .. ~ .................. 
profile DRAFT 17 
Age distributions. 1950-1975 Intercohort Increase 1885-90 to 1950-55 
• 
..... 
.. .. • .. • .. .. 
... ., ,_" "'...,., ......... 
.. 
.. 
" : 
• !; • 
.. ?i :i 
II i' •. 
ii =~ 
.. ~.. =-j 
.. 
.. 
.. 
telS llfS lfOI ltlS U21 ltJI lt4S 
1a..11 •r rue •••t uae ••&a•••• 
Looking at the age distribution for Halaysia on the .upper 
left of Fig . 4, we can see by the vertical distance between the 
bottom curves that there is a large increase between 1950 and 
1955 in the 0-4 age group, as well as in the 5-9, but the 10-14 
group increases little if at all. That is to say that the biiths 
... 
less deaths of 1945-50 must have been much greater than those of 
1940-45, while the births less deaths of 1940 - 45 must have been 
about the same as those of 1935 - 40 . 
Corresponding to all this, still for Malaysia, we have on the 
right han~ sid_e low bars for the year 1940. which means a low 
increase ~or the cohort born 1940-45, i.e . the cohort 1940-45 was 
not much greater than that of 1935-40; but on the other hand 
there was a large increase up to the cohort born 1945-50, i . e. it 
was much greater than the 1940-45 cohort. 
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8 A Three Dimensional Portrayal 
A three dimensional portrayal makes clearer what the algebra 
and the numbers given above tell us . In Fig. 5 we can think of 
years as the t-axis, ages as the a-axis, and the number o f indi-
viduals as ~he p(a,t) axis . This is a graphical repres~tati on 
in s~ac e of the familiar age-time distribution of Table 1. 
The diagonal vertical section from the nearest corner , at th e 
middle of the diagram, identified by age 0-4 and year 1950, is 
what has above been called the central cohort of Table 1. Other 
cohorts are planes parallel to this one. 
On the other hand the diagonal plane at right angles to this 
main one, connecting the extreme left and the extreme right of 
the diagram, i . e. connecting age 70-74 in 1950 with 0-4 in 2020, 
is the profile shown in Table 3 and Fig . 1 and represented alge-
braically in (6). The shape of the surface is such that we can 
reconstruct the whole of it once we know these two diagonals . 
Any of the sections parallel to the main diagonal, along with any 
of the sections at right angles to this main diagonal, in prin-
ciple allow at least a part of the top surface to b~ reconstruct-
ed. 
For a country in which the fluctuations of births have been 
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more irregular, the point comes out even more strikingly. Con-
sider the three dimensional diagram for Canada shown as Fig. 6. 
Once again we can construct the whole solid figure knowing on ly a 
pair of diagonals at right angles to one another, say as before 
(1) a vertical plane drawn through the points in the base age 0-4 
in 1950 and age 70-74 in 2020, and (2) the plane at right angles 
to this one through the point in the base 70-74 in 1950 and 0-4 
in 2020. The baby boom after each of the two world wars stands 
out conspicuously, as does the echo of the peak in the 1960s that 
is now starting to appear. 
As throughout this paper the source of the numerical data 
used is the estimates of population by age at five year intervals 
provided by the United Nations in 1986 on the basis of data up to 
1984 . It is left to another place to comment on the quality of 
that data, and especially on the projections included in it. 
Z 1( 
Fig. 5. Age-ti.Ire diagram, showing three di.Jrensions of age (a), ti.Ire (t) 
and nur:ber of persons P(a ,t) 
40-44 
(H 
1950 
1970 
Indonesia. 1950-2020 
1990 
) 1-
21 .'..... I 
Fig. 6. Age-tl.nE diagram, shO\ving three dimensions of age (a) , tl.nE (t) 
and nurrber of persons P( a, t) 
i 
70-74 1 
60-64 
40-44 1990 
canada 1950-2020 
Zl S 
22 
Name: Alicia M. Bercovich 
Title of Paper: Age-Sex Structure ln Brazi 1 : Apparent Contradictions 
Sumznary: Analysis of the results of the 1980 Demographic Census in Brazil 
shows that the age structure presented a peculiar configuration: the concavity 
of the sides of the population pyramid, both nationally and for most of the 
states that make up the country, changes direction twice . In the 1970 pyramid 
the concavity changes once, while in 1960 the sides of the pyramid were 
approximately concaves. 
This change observed in 1980 bad been predictable in the period 
between 1976 and 1979 from the results of nationwide sample surveys. 
The phenomenon can be characterized as urban, since a separate 
analysis of the urban age structure shows that the sides of the pyramid fold 
inwa1ds foI th~ 5- 14 age bracket, wbe1eas no such occurrence is observed for 
the rural population. 
The characteristics mentioned occur most conspicuously for the 
economically most developed states of Brazil. ln ' some of these, even when the 
effects of migration are removed, the 5-9 and 10-14 brackets are smaller than 
the 0-4 and 15-19 brackets. 
The thesis put forward in this paper is that the Brazilian age 
structure in 1980 is a result of the combined effects of an intensification 
in the drop in mortality in the 1950s and, with a time lag, an accelerating 
drop in fertility starting in the second half of the 1960s. 
Thus the widening of the base of the 1980 pyramid can be seen as 
caused by the existence of children born to a large proportion of women of 
childbearing age, in turn the result of a drop in mortality and consequent 
population increase in the 1950s, but not by an increase in fertility. 
On the other band, the shrinking width of the 5-14 age bracket ls 
a reflection of the drop in fertility and a natural consequence of the 
evolution of the 1970 structure. 
, i' ~· 
Since the decline in fertility and mortality occurred with greater 
intensity in the economically aore developed states and in the urban zones, 
the characteristics underscored above ln the age-sex structure were naturally 
more intense in these s..e areas. 
For the same reason, the age structures for several subgroups 
also presented differences in accordance with the intensity and the period in 
wich the drop in mortality and fertility occurred in each group.~The effects 
of these differences on the population pyramids for whites and nonwbites, and 
for varying levels of the bead of family's schooling and socio-occupational 
category, are analyzed in the paper. 
It should be stressed that in spite of the widening of the base 
of the pyramid, groups between 0 and 14 years of age increased less than the 
population as a whole; this was a natural consequence of the drop in fertility 
a drop which bas continued through the 1980s. For this reason the relative 
weight of the under-15 group bas been diminishing since 1960, when it bad 
considerable weight because of the population increase of the 1950s. 
· , Name : Jean BOURGEOIS-PICHAT, Chairman of CICRED 
Title of Paper The age distribution of the world as a whol e (1950- 2025) 
SUllllla ry : 
If the age distribution of the population of the world as a whole 
published by the UN Population Division every five years from 1950 to 2025 
is rearranged by group of cohorts, it is possible to calculate the diffe-
rences in the size of two succesive groups at different ages. This has been 
done by Nathan Keyfitz in his working paper (IIASA WP 87-92). When morta-
lity remains constant the difference is following the survival curve and 
diminishes with age. But as mortality is declining, instead of a diminuti on 
of the differences, Keyfitz has found a slight increase. He made the average 
of these differences for each group of cohorts and looked at the variation 
of the average through time . Then he was able to detect what he called the 
discontinuity of the 1940's. 
The average of Keyfitz for a given group of cohorts is ve ry close t o 
the difference of the same group of cohorts at 0-4 years . This age is very 
close to birth and the difference at birth differs from the difference at 
0-4 years only by the effect of mortality during the first five years of 
life. We can expect therefore that the difference at birth will tell us the 
same story as the average of Keyfitz. 
By using various estimates made in the past by the UN Population 
Division, it is possible to reconstruct the trend of births by quinquenn.ual 
periods for the world as a whole from 1850 to 1950. After 1950 the births 
are given in the UN publications. Graph . (1) shows that the difference at 
birth permits to detect the discontinuity of the 1940's as well as the 
average of Keyfitz. 
Having the size of each group of cohorts at birth, it is possible to 
calculate for each group a part of its survival curve . Graph. (2) shows the 
result. It gives a vivid illustration of the decline of mortality which 
occurred in the world as a whole during the last 100 years. Graph. (3) 
presents the same result in a different way. It shows the rapid decrease of 
mortality which took place after the second world war, a decrease which has 
been followed by a stagnation. 
If the absolute difference between two successive cohorts remains 
constant or even increases slightly, the relative difference is increasing 
with age. Graph. (4 and 5) permit to quantify the phenomenon. In the older 
cohorts, this penomenon has a very strong effect : cohorts having slight 
relative difference at birth find themselves with relative big differences 
at old age. The semi-stable population model can be used to understand the 
underlaying phenomenon. 
Name: Roberto HAM-CHANDE 
TitleofPaper: Age structure and other differentials 
at the US-Mexico border region 
Summary: 
The United States and Mexico share a common border 
3,300 kilometers long which divides twc• cc•untries with sharp 
differences in their degree of socioeconomic development. 
These differences have an impact on each nation's respective 
population sizes and demographic structures. With a median 
age of 30.0 years the age composition of the US population 
reveals that it is close to high levels of aging, while 
Mexico's median age of 17.6 indicates that this nation will 
be considered young for still some time to come. The differ-
ences between the two societies, populations, and their age 
structures is not as clearly defined as the political bound -
ary, in view of a high degree of interrelatedness ac r oss the 
border. 
Inside the big ethnic mosaic that is the US population, 
the Hispanic group, in which a majority are of Mex ican ori-
gin, is gaining importance not only in numbers but also as a 
socioeconomic and political force. The relevancy of Hisp 8 -
nics is particularly high in the states of the southwest, 
where they compose 20 % of the population, and their pres-
ence is even more significant in the region that border s 
Mex ico where they make up more than half of the inhabitan ts. 
including subregions of the border where they constitute 
more than 90 % of the population. Hispanics and Mex ican-
Amer icans in the US have younger demographic st r uctures that 
resemble those of Mexico and contrast with non-Hispanics, 
composed m~inly by anglos, who show higher aging indexes. 
The vast region of the US-Mex ico border is a trul y 
binational zone with strong commercial, social, cultural, 
family and demographic interrelations, creating a socioeco-
nomic and political environment that is unique in the world. 
This gives rise to problems and opportunities in the devel -
opment for the region and for both countries. 
The population of the border, on both sides, has g rown 
at rates several times higher than the national levels. This 
remarkable growth has a determinating migration input. On 
the Mexican side of the border immigrans come from the rest 
of Mexico; on the border of the US side a great part of the 
immigration also comes from Mexico, particularly from the 
Mex ican border zone. 
The transborder demographic dynamics and the differ-
ences in ethnic composition and age structures of the border 
populations have economic, social and politic consequences 
not only for the border region but also for each country, 
creating the need for binational involvement, commitment and 
solutions. 
Name: Shiro Horiuchi 
Title of Paper: Measurement and analysis of changes in cohort size 
SUIIlIIlary: This paper focuses on two measures t hat are useful in the 
analys is of cohort size changes. The first measure is the standardized 
cohort size , which is obtained by reverse-surviving to birth the current 
cohort size using the current life table. Characteristics of t he measure 
is discussed in relation to the stationary age distribution , population 
projection, and age-specific growth rates. The second measu r e is the 
growth rate of the number of births. Its usefulness in studying c~hort 
size changes due to LDC's fertility decline in the 1970s is demonstrated . 
Name: Karol J. Krotki 
Title of Paper: QUASI-STABILITY IS STILL VALID FOR LDC-S 
Summary: An attempt is made to assess the meaning behind the statement 
made by the organizers of some sessions at this conference focusing on 
"discontinuities in population growth ... and the resulting large youth 
cohort" . 
The less developed countries are divided into those with a change in 
the proportion at young ages since the mid-1950s and without such a change. 
There was a change in numbers at young ages in all less developed 
countries, but not much change can be expected in the proportions. Such 
change in proportions as took place c~nnot always be traced back to the 
most appropriate cause: change in fertility, usually decline; change in 
mortality, usually improvement; methodological adjustments of cens us 
enumeration, usually upward for young ages. 
In fact, such changes as can be identified are well within the 
limits indicated by departures from stability to quasi-stability by Demeny 
1962. Thus, there is no marked change in the relative position of age 
groups to each other. The well-known argument is used, that there is no 
waste due to morta 1 i ty at young ages before they join the labour force. 
The burden is in the dependency ratio; thus, once more the period 
argument wins and the cohort argument loses. Contrary to the finding of 
Krotki jr 1987 it is shown that it is premature to worry about the 
proportions at older ages and the increasing burden they exert on the 
younger age groups. 
The real changes that take place are in the few countries where 
declines in fertility can be observed, but otherwise all is well with 
quasi-stability in less developed countries!! 
Demeny, Paul 
1965 "Estimation of vital rates for populations in the process of 
destabilization." Demography 2:516-530. 
Krotki, 
1987 
Karol J., jr 
"Is it too early to study the elderly in the Third ~Jorld? " Pp. 
781-803 in volume II of Contributions to demography: 
methodological and substantive. Edmonton, Canada: Department 
of Sociology, the University of Alberta, vi (+ 567) + 1011 pp. 
1988.08.19 
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Name: Zenji Nanjo and Kazumasa Kobayashi 
Title of Paper: 
A Method of Measurinq Demographic Discontinuity 
Summary: 
As a study on the discontinuity in aqe-specific arowth 
patterns of population we tried a few ways of measurinq 
discontinuity, that is, by use of differences, curvature and 
some others. We used, in the present study, age-time data 
for World total, China, Indonesia, Japan, Phi 1 i ppines and 
Thailand taken from the United Nations population estimates 
(as assessed in 1984). The UN data are given by five-year 
age group at five-year time intervals from 1950. 
1. Let the five-year interval and the five-year aqe qroup 
be the ·unit, respectively. The population aged a years at 
last birthday at time t is denoted by P t· We calculated 
a, 
differences by the following formulae for certain ranqes of 
age and time period we thought necessary. 
First differences: 6tPa,t = Pa,t Pa,t-l 
Pa+ 1 t 6. apa,t = Pa,t 
2 Second differences: /J. tpa,t = P + P ~ 1 - 2P a,t-1 a,_+ a.t 
( 1 l 
( 2) 
( 3 l 
" 2 p 
L.:1 a a, t = pa - 1,t + Pa+l,t - 2Pa,t <4 l 
For a fixed t, there may exist 
of difference given by (1) to (4) 
aqes at which the values 
change suddenly as aae a 
advances. We denote them by a 0 ,a 1 , ... in the curve of aoe 
distrib~tion at time t. 
The SP.cond differences are more useful here than the 
first differences. The measure /J. 2P t' in particular , is 
a a, 
usable even when age distributions are available only at a 
few points in time. 
2. The formulae (1) to (4) have the same properties as 
shown in 1 above, with P~,t = logePa,t in place of Pa,t· 
We obtained several relations among formulae (1) to <4l with 
P~,t . The measure A! P~.t is expressed in the form of a 
sum of fP.rtili~y and mortality components . We explained each 
term of the expression numerically usina the UN data. 
3. As a more qeneral way of measuring discontinuity, we 
used curvature and others, which correspond to the second 
difference A 2 P t' We, thus, discussed how to estimate a a, 
ages at which sharp bends occur in the age curve (based on 
single-year of age interpolations) at five-year interval of 
time. 
4. We also calculated backward estimates of populati on 
under one year of age (in place of the number of births) on 
an annual basis from 1935 to 1950. 
• 
Name: FENG SHAN 
Title of Paper: Age Distribution Changes in China - Magnitude a nd 
Economic Effect 
Summ&ry: 
In the last few decades, China experienced two 
baby booms. Each of them produced a significant demographic 
bulge in the 1982 Census Age-Sex Pyramid, and counts for 16.4 % 
(age 25-34 cohorts) and 36.7% (age 5-19 cohorts) of the total 
population. Between the bulges is the valley cohort (age 
20-24) and the size ratio of the largest and smallest cohort 
is 2.54. These distinctive features of the existing age 
structure will primarily determine China's prospective 
demographic evolution under any specific set of assumptions 
about fertility and mortality. It will also affect the need 
for age-related goods and services and create shortages and 
surpluses in human and material resources that can add to the 
costs of economic development. 
This paper demonstrates the common population trend 
resulting from the two series of projections A and B, which 
have the same mortality assumptions and different famil y 
planning schedules aimed to a stable population size of 1.44 
and 1.20 billion respectively. The trend shows that from 
the year 2010 onward will be an era of rapid population aging, 
next to the successive periods of rapid growing school-age 
children, youth and working-age population, since the late 
1960's up to the turn of this century. And no makeshift 
arrangement is likely to be very satisfactory in coping with 
the problems caused. 
As it can be observed, demographic hetrogeneities 
were enlarged by the implementation of a strict family planning 
policy and the most difficult to assess of its long-run 
consequences are those that lie in the political and social 
sphere. Neither is really calculable. If the effects 
prove more adverse than anticipated, there may be little that 
can be done to overcome them, when the policies have been 
sustained for a long period. Although the projections 
foreshadow an era of hard choices, they offer the authorities 
with an overall view of the problem to improve their decision 
making. 
Selected data from the two series of projections are tabulated 
Year TPOP 10 6 percentage of age group ratios over 15-64 
A2002 1. 288 
A2022 1. 440 
A2042 1. 470 
B2002 1. 210 
B2022 1. 318 
B2042 1. 230 
0-14 15-64 65+ 0-14 65+ both 
25.0 68.2 6.8 36.6 10.0 46.6 
20.3 65.6 14.1 31. 0 21. 4 52.4 
19.6 62.5 18.0 31. 2 28.8 60.0 
21.10 71. 7 7.2 29.4 10.6 39.4 
18.90 65.6 15.5 28.8 23.6 52.5 
16.20 62.4 21. 36 25.6 34.2 60.2 
.... -I 
Tiilt of Paper: The Changina P&ttun of Aae Structure in Tdwan 
Summary: 
In les5 than !:f?Vtmt.y ye.c.11'$ !;t~rt.i.ng around 19;~(1, T~tiw.:in 
ur1r.lerwe.r1 t. the d1::~111r.1m· aph ic tr.:tnsi t.l.on f n1m h i(~h bi ~-th rd t:es .:lnd 
death rates to low birth and deoth rates. This paper deals mainly 
with issues on meosurement ~nd projections relevant to aae-
$truetural changes in Taiwan, as well as the de~omposition of the 
chang~s into fertility and mortality effect$. It aJrns to Cl) 
exllmine. th.:~ t.t·Emds and p1:tt.tenls of dwnograph.i.c: r.~ hanges, t:tnd (;:!) 
assess their effects on aye structur~ in pre- Qnd post-w~r 
Ta.iw~1n . 
Thi?. r~sul t5 of @.mpid. c~J .:tna.lysP.s revea.1 thctt. 1.he ~1ge'd 
dependency hes been rather low in T~iwan. Except fQr 1940, the 
number of those aged 65+ per 100 working aQe popul~tion dld not 
exceed S until the 1960's, after which it has be&n steadily 
increasing. The index reached e.o in 1986 and is expected to 
f:?xc:eed lU .in this ce1"1 t.ury. The~· yo1.tng d~1::u:.mdenr.:y iric:li:1x l<Jas 
.i.tll' t"et,sing befcwe. ~pproac:hing H hi~1h level c:if 13::;_ 1 per·sons aged 
0-14 per 100 productlve-ag~ po~ulation in 1940. It dacreased 
sc1m1:.•wh<tt and then sc>an arrived at the peak of 8t{.:3. The index 
dropped sharply aft~rwerds and appeared at the level of 44.l in 
1986. These statistics reflected T~iw~n's changes ir1 vital r~tes 
frorn high t.1J low 11101-telity (en;p, infant and childhood mort;;..ility) 
with .:1 delayed but acc:eh!t·at.e~d cfor.:Jine in fertility within ~ 
rather short pe1· iod of time. 
The demc1gn\Phic c: hangr:~s: t"lavE-1 r1Jsr.1 been din.:.•c:t.ly reflect~d in 
changr:.is .in the index of agir1t~ ( thos;e agr:d 6S+ to those 6Q6'd o-
14). It show~d ~generally downward trend before 19~1, ~lthough 
there were several minor fluctuations. Afte1· reaching its lowest 
volue of 5.43 persons aged 65+ per 100 young population in 1961, 
the index shows a clearly continuous ris~. Moreov~r. it took 15 
years for thls index to inrreas~ by 5 percentage points from its 
tro1.1gh, but it t'equit·ed only ll tii:llf l?f tht':' time to inc:reas1? by · 
another 5 p~rcentege points. These results imply that the 
population of Taiwan started it$ ~ging process around 1961, and 
that the speed of this process ~ccelerat~d in recent ye6rs. 
Fet· ti 1 it y reduct i.<:>r• inducc,.s •'3 rf?.l~ ti ve de.crease in the 
number of young pftrsons, t .h1..1s account.in{.~ fot· "M~ing from the 
base.." On the c.;ontrary, in1prr.1vr!ment.s in irtfar1t and childhood 
mot·t1;1lity contribute tea popul~ticm r~)juvenation, while those! in 
older ag$ groups contribute to population aging. Comp~risons of 
project.ions with diffenmt fertility/mortality ass1..1mpticins 
indic~ta that declines in fertility were the principal propellant 
for Taiwan's popul~tion ~ging $t~rting from 1961. Although 
improved mortality affect~d the aging process to a lesser extent, 
t.he magrrit.ude of its effect hes been -inc:rec1sing in r·er::ent YEH:irs, 
~nrl i~ Pxn•~~ed to continue thi~ trPnrl tn thP future. 
Name: Yeun-chung Yu 
Title of Paper: The Estimation of Past Age Distributions Using Age-Specific 
Growth Rates 
SUDlDlary: Sharp rises and declines of fertility and mortality in a 
population tend to generate successive birth cohorts that are quite 
different from each other, showing certain discontinuity in the age 
distribution. However, inter-cohort differences have a highly regular 
age pattern and on the basis of which the age-specific growth rates for 
past cohorts may be reasonably estimates and past age distributions 
may be reconstructed. The paper demonstrates that there was a demographic 
discontinuity in the 1970s in the population of the world and the less 
developed countries. Based on estimated age-specific growth rates for 
1930-35 to 1940-45, age distributions of 1930-1945 for the world, the 
more developed countries and the less developed countries were reconstructed. 
Name: J - P Gonnot 
Title of Paper: The Demographic Discontinuity in Southern Europe 
Summary: 
This paper is aimed at documenting the post - war 
path of population growth in Southern Europe by applying 
the intercohort differences reconstruction method developed 
by Keyfitz . The case of Southern European countries is of 
special interest because it of fers a pattern of evolution 
which d i ffers from those observed in both developed and 
devel op i ng countries: limited or no baby- boom and high 
international migration . 
Calculations and comparative analysis are carried 
out for four countries : Bulgaria , Greece , Italy and 
Spain. In additi on , the impact of migration and mortality 
changes on average intercohort growth ra tes is estimated 
using projection techniques and serves as a basis for 
assessing the validity of the method in a context of 
high migraton . Finally, the issue of the demographic 
discontinuity vis - a - vis the growth of the overall 
population is addressed . 
SESSION 7 
Economic, Social, and Political Consquences the 
Youth Cohort has had and will have on Societies: 
Country Case Studies and General Considerations 
Organizer: Nathan Keyfitz 
Invited paper: 
Page 
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YOUTH COHORTS, POPULATION CHANGE AND POLITICS: 
FIVE INTERVENING VARIABLES 
Paper prepared for a Conference on 
Future Changes in Population Age Structure 
Sopron, Hungary; 18-21 October, 1988 
w. Hovard Wriggins 
Columbia University 
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ABSTRACT: 
POPULATION CHANGE, EXPANDED YOUTH COHORTS AND POLITICS: 
INTERVENING VARIABLES 
Successive larger youth cohorts impose additional fiscal and 
organizational "loads" on governments. These loads change from 
simple dependency as the larger cohorts move up the population 
pyramid. If youths are absorbed into the work force or public or 
military service, they can add to a polity's net capabilities. 
Their affect on political stability will depend upon five 
variables: 
Cl) The "loads/capabilities" equation which depends upon the 
size and abruptness of the increased loads and the economic 
performance of the polity. The latter depends in turn upon the 
natural resources, the capital, technology, the general 
organizational capability of the polity and the impact of the 
international economy upon it. 
(2) The "employment/unemployment ratio" profoundly affects 
life's chances for successive youth cohorts. If large proportions 
find few opportunities, competition becomes m4N:e severe, 
intensifying class, ethnic and tribal rivalries, complicating 
political processes and adding public order loads as well. 
(3) The "expectation/reality" contrast affects the youth 
cohorts' response to (2). It will be shaped by the gap between 
(a) the "expectations" they have acquired from their families and 
communities, their educational experience and the polity itself, 
and (b) the opportunities or lack of opportunities they perceive 
to be within their reach. 
(4) The character of the political system - it's ideology, 
its structures, its accommodative processes and the political 
mobilization it permits or inhibits also affect expectations and 
the way the youth cohorts act out their grievances. 
(5) The qualities of political leadership and the policies 
governments pursue vill also affect the perceived size of the gap 
between expectations and available opportunities, the targets 
youth cohorts vill choose for their agitation and the vigor with 
vhich they vill express their resentments in politically 
consequential vays. 
Qualifications to the model include the numerous 
differentiations of interest and ascription and the group 
rivalries vhich can divide particular age cohorts, diverting 
their resentments from the government to one another. 
Admittedly, to operationalize such variables for research 
purposes vill not be easy. They are, however, the variables that 
political leaders take into account and earnestly seek to 
influence . 
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My task today is to consider possible connections betveen 
the rapid expansion in the youth cohort and political outcomes . 
How do the phenomena we will be discussing today - changes i n t he 
size of the youth cohort, those under 25 - affect the political 
life of nations? 
Hy interest in this subject dates back to over 15 years ago 
when some 15,000 Sri Lankan young people sought thr o ugh a one-
night rising, to seize leading political figures, capture police 
stations and take over the government of Sri Lanka. There were 
many factors at vork, as careful analysis shoved. 1 Obeysekera ). 
It was a romantic, "Left-ving infantile" enterprise. But it 
surely vas not mere coincidence that some 25 years earlier Sr i 
Lanka's youth cohorts had begun to grow very rapidly (leek 9t ' 
~yfitz artici-e--), and that the overvhelming bulk of the act i vists 
arrested or killed had all been betveen the ages of 15 and 25. 
Similarly, could it be entirely coincidence that the dramatic and 
militant support for secession of Tamil areas came some 10 years 
later, as the more tardy grovth of Tamil youth coh~ ts came to 
1 Wriggins and C.H.S. Jayevardene, "Youth Protest in Sr i 
Lanka (Ceylon)" in Wriggins and Guyot, Population, Politics and 
the Future of Southern Asia (Columbia University Press, 1973 ) ; 
see also Nathan Keyfitz, "The Youth Cohort Revisited" Cin 
Indonesia), ibid. 
' . 
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its peak? 
It is almost conventional in historical analysis that where 
there is political upheaval, usually youthful militants have been 
at the forefront of events. One is reminded of the role of young 
activists in the Cuban revolution, in the anti-Marcos movement in 
the Philippines . In Korea, student protests sparked such riots 
that the old Syngman Rhee stepped down sooner than he wished. 
More recently their successors challenged a strong police state 
until its leaders reluctantly conceded elections. In Turkey, the 
end of the dramatic rule of Adnan Henderes began with student 
riots joined by thousands in the streets. In my own country, the 
peak of the first baby boom coincided with riots and political 
eruption in many American cities and shortly thereafter on 
American campuses. 
No doubt, others of you have encountered instances where 
sharply increased youth cohorts have affected political life, 
sometimes in dramatic ways. 
To explore such connections is no easy matter . 
Firstly, I take it for granted that the connections we will 
be exploring are "complex", not simple . There are few one-to-one 
connections between demographic phenomena and political outcomes. 
Such multiple interactions and positive and negative feedback 
loops are difficult to be precise about. As will be seen, each of 
the intervening variables I identify in themselves are the result 
of highly intricate phenomena. Their roles as connectors change 
over time, often rather abruptly. Each has a dynamic of its own, 
I 
- , 
and their interactions are hard to capture. 2 
Secondly, most of these intervening variables are difficult 
to state in quantitative terms, since in political life, many of 
them relate to people's perceptions, expectations, fears and 
identities. Quantitative measures can accurately report head 
counts, but in themselves they may tell us little about the 
political significance of the quantitative measure. 
Thirdly, since I have only lived within open, democratic 
systems, with a good deal of political contention, in which 
ruling elites are periodically challenged at election time, a nd 
often under rather constant if fluctuating challenge, my "model" 
may assign more of a role to a legitimate "counter-elite" than 
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may be useful in considering other types of governmental regimes, 
where institutionalized opposition are strange iNieed . It may 
also give too much stress to the psychological dynamics of 
individuals than may be appropriate where individuation is less 
pronounced than in these polities. 3 
Fourthly, at one level of abstraction, all political 
systems face a similar problem . As Harold Laswell put it, 
2 For early discussions of these problems, see Myron Weiner, 
"Political Demography: An Inquiry into the Political Consequences 
of Population Change", in Roger Ravell, ed. Rapid Population 
Growth Vol 2; (National Academy of Sciences/Johns Hopkins Press, 
1971), pp.576-581; Nell Chamberlain, Beyond Malthus: Population 
and Pover (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1970); Nazli 
Choucri, Population Dynamics and International Violence 
(Lexington, Hass.,' Lexington Books, 1974); Nazll Choucri (ed ) 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Population a.d Conflict 
(Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1984); 
3 See for example, Adda Bozeman, "The International Order in 
a Multicultural World,"ln Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The 
Expansion of International Society (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1984),Ch . 26 . 
_,; 
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politics is the study of "who gets what when and how;" there is 
never enough of what people want to go around. A viable political 
system has evolved arrangements for handling the distribution of 
scarcities and of what people value. Some individuals and groups 
receive more of what ls wanted than others; and in well-
established political systems, the government is responsible for 
seeing that those arrangements persist; or put more exactly, that 
they are not frivolously upset. It is also responsible for 
supplying channels through which inevitable differences of 
interest and of values can be argued about. Successful 
governments also facilitate the resolution of such differences -
through legal, mediatory, or other politically acceptable modes 
of debate and compromise. Where mutual accommodation proves 
impossible, the government needs to be able to set limits to 
disputes and to define what is to be for now, the official, 
authoritative resolution of these differences. 
With these introductory comments, I now turn more directly 
to connections between successively larger youth cohorts and 
politics, an exploration which takes us quickly into the realm of 
personal and group aspirations, economic opportunity and 
political institutions and processes. 
II - YOUTH COHORTS AND POLITICAL OUTCOMES: So•e Variables: 
A) THE DEMOGRAPHIC CIRCUMSTANCE: 
As our discussions here have shown, demographic problems 
posed by the larger youth cohorts are very many . But for our 
purposes, I want to state the matter simply to begin with . 
When successive youth cohorts are larger than their 
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predecessors, demographics first adds "loads" onto the political 
system as numbers in specific cohorts increase and age group 
proportions change. These added loads at the outset derive from 
dependency during the years before the more numerous young enter 
the work force. Later, as the larger cohorts move beyond the 
years of dependency, they may become politically more 
consequential by asserting their own interests, making claims 
upon the politico-economic system, perhaps even seeking to affect 
public affairs in other ways. Their increased numbers may 
intensify competition between individuals and groups, affecting 
the polity in still other ways. To be sure, increased numbers of 
the elderly may also add dependency loads, but at least in many 
Less Developed Countries (LDC's), most of such loads in practice 
are at first taken up by families willing to care for their 
elderly members. 
These and other demographic phenomena are linked to 
political outcomes through a number of intervening variables . 
B) INTERVENING VARIABLES: 
1) The "loads/capabilities" equation 
These additional loads that a system must be able to bear 
in operational practice are weighed against a government's or 
political system's capabilities for carrying these loads. 
Ideally, the system should be able to supply these additional 
goods and services that are required during the years of 
dependency. It should also provide the openings and opportunities 
that alone can ease the transition to productive adulthood when 
they reach an age to begin to contribute to a government's 
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capability. 
For instance, during the first years of the "youth surge", 
child care facilities, medical care for infants and nursing 
mothers and other forms of help for mothers may be necessary. As 
these larger cohorts enter school years, a rapid expansion of the 
school system may be necessary, with implications for government 
budgets, probably requiring a change in allocations perhaps at 
the expense of other national purposes or others in the society. 
Hopefully, governments can organize means for moderating those 
conflicts that are likely to arise. 
These are the years for acquiring life skills that can turn 
the dependent into a potentially productive member of society, 
able to find a satisfying place for him or herself in adult 
roles. Such years are "loads", but how these are dealt with can 
have an affect on the problems posed to the society by the larger 
youth cohorts as they mature. 
In an ideally informed world, there would be for our 
purposes some equation that could reflect the loads/capabilities 
balance in relation to any particular cohort at a particular 
time. Our expanded "youth cohort" affects the terms of that 
equation. In the real world of insufficient data, we can only 
hypothesize such an equation. We can be sure, however, that as 
the larger youth cohorts proceed up the population pyramid, they 
add successively different loads to the system; and after a 
certain age, if favorable conditions prevail, they ultimately 
make a net contribution to capabilities. 
Capabilities depend upon two distinguishable but related 
variables. One concerns economic performance; the other, 
political organizational considerations. 
a) Economic performance hinges upon the relation between 
resources, organization and technology within a sufficient 
political order. 
A stagnating economy has difficulty carrying these 
additional loads; an expanding economy can meet them easily. 
Where resources are plentiful, meeting these additional 
elementary loads is not difficult, depending a good deal on the 
capital and other resources that can be brought to bear. In 
agricultural areas there may be a finite amount of land, but 
where capital, know how and a minimum of water exist, irrigation 
and agricultural technology may make a great deal of difference 
to the productivity of that land. Technology, organizational 
skills and capital can make every pair of hands far more 
productive in industrial enterprises. 
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b) Secondly, a sufficient political order p~esupposes a 
degree of reliable public order and predictable governmental 
authority. There must also be means for resolving unavoidable 
differences over public policy. And all this with a minimum 
misuse of individual positions in the public domain for private 
gain. There is a wider range of political structures within which 
these requirements can be found than we used to think; but they 
are difficult to establish and to sustain. 
c) Thirdly, the international political economy may ease 
the tasks of both the economic and political orders. More likely, 
it can gravely complicate governments' efforts to deal with both, 
becoming a source of highly consequential influences. 
For some systems, meeting these basic needs of the growing 
youth cohorts poses few difficulties; for others even meeting 
minimum food requirements can be uncertain, as was seen in 
Ethiopia prior to the overthrow of the archaic Halie Selassie 
regime. 
2) The "employment/unemployment ratio": Jobs for young 
adults 
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It is no accident that the next "load" or requirement for 
political stability most frequently cited as the larger cohorts 
proceed up the population pyramid, is the need to provide 
remunerative and appropriate job opportunities for those now 
ready to enter adulthood. Before, when the youth cohorts grew 
only slowly, it was not so difficult to absorb the young in 
useful and satisfying occupations. They often continued to do 
what their fathers had done. But when for a period, success i ve 
cohorts are each larger than their predecessors, cumulatively, 
other things being equal, it becomes very difficult to provide 
worthwhile employment to a significant proportion of the now much 
more numerous young. 
Moreover, competition among the young is likely to 
intensify. Competition in the upper schools and universities may 
become more severe. Hore individuals contend for what may be a 
limited number of places on the land, for urban jobs, for 
housing. Youths who earlier were tolerant and mutually accepting 
can become antagonistic protagonists contending to better their 
ovn life's chances. Under such circumstances, families, 
neighbors, clans, tribes, castes and ethnic communities may 
become more aware of their distinctness from one another. When 
such social identifications become associated with demographic 
numbers, often deep primordial fears become more salient. 
Individuals vho before vere seen simply as individuals, perhaps 
even friends, often become transformed into representatives of 
the "other" ethnic community or tribe. As suspicion displaces 
friendship, a "load" of sustaining public order may be added to 
the debit side of the load/capability equation. 
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Political stability can be upset by large numbers of un- or 
under employed youths if they remain unabsorbed into the 
political-economy. Put simply, young people without employment 
are easily led to be politically disruptive. Understandably, they 
resent having to postpone forming a new family; they can be 
bitter as they see others ahead of them already established . They 
lack the life shaping discipline that regular employment - rural 
or urban - provides. They have little to lose; they are prone to 
take risks. Youth enjoys the thought of quick transformations; by 
a bold stroke, the world can be made much better. Having had 
little experience of the complexity of these affairs, they are 
often overconfident that they have all the answers. All the more 
reason then, that unemployed youth should have a propensity to 
political disruption. 4 In contrast, people who can meet their own 
needs may be challenged by the work that also serves their own 
interests; they may be tired after their dally labors; they are 
less likely to risk their small stake in life's chances by 
engaging in significant political protest; they are more likely 
to avoid violence. Those who find their vay into constructive 
participation, by their very youth can contribute their energy, 
4 Nell Chamberlain, op.cit.,p.55. 
;-
their flexibility and a readiness to innovate that their less 
flexible elders may have long since lost. 
Nazli Choukri neatly synthesizes these factors in the 
following proposition: 
"The higher the proportion of youthful population and 
the greater the unemployment, the greater the 
possibilitres of dissatisfaction, instabilities and 
violence . " 
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However, in itself these are insufficient to "explain" 
links between these demographic phenomena and major politica l 
developments, because of a number of other considerations . 
3) The gap between Expectations and youth cohorts' reality 
experience: "satisfaction/resentment" equation. 
The real magnitude of the loads imposed upon the community 
and government by the expanded youth cohorts, depends also upon 
highly subjective variables. These magnitudes are shaped in part 
by expectations among the young, subjective realities that define 
for the energetic, restless young people what they can 
legitimately anticipate, at whatever age they leave educational 
and family institutions to enter the adult world. 
If expectations are low, if individuals expect little from 
their circumstances, if they assume that life as it is is the 
natural order of things, then an increase in the size of the 
youth cohort will not make much difference beyond the practical 
pressures and strains already noted. But should the increased 
S Choucri, Population Dynamics, p.72. 
-_ ·, / 
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numbers have among them individuals whose expectations about the 
future are for something considerably better than the reality 
obviously within their reach, then added numbers can be a source 
of political restlessness and perhaps disruption. Cohorts with 
vaulting expectations can be an added burden, a severe challenge. 
Expectations are shaped by many aspects of their life. 
Observing their parents' life experience in their local 
communities or the experience of those who are just ahead of 
them, how they perceive their own experience as they mature; 
above all, what they learn from one another, and if they go that 
far, from their school and university communities which together 
help shape the values and aspirations they make their own along 
the way, out of all this they fashion an image of what it is 
reasonable to expect. What political leaders - or counter-elites 
- publicly promise or allege; what the media stress or downplay 
also have their unpredictable effects on expectations. 
Regardless of the character of the political system, such 
"expectations" take shape; they represent the alert or lethargic 
individual's reaction to what he or she sees, hears, experiences 
and argues and comes to look forward to. To the extent that their 
"real" world comes close to their expectations, it ls likely, 
other things being equal, that these successive cohorts will move 
forward without politically disruptive resentments. But should 
there be a marked gap between expectations and reality, between 
goals and plausible achievement, one can expect unrest, 
resentment and possibly politically disruptive behavior. 6 
' Ted Gurr's discussion of "relative deprivation", where 
optimistic hopes of improvement are shattered by a reality that 
is worse than expected, with little hope of improvement, is a 
-;> 
' '":' - J 
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In a number of the Less Developed Countries, there is a 
notable and pernicious form of the generation gap. In many of the 
states that gained independence shortly after World War II, there 
vas a sudden burgeoning of opportunity for those with high school 
and college education to move into highly responsible 
governmental positions, replacing the colonial officials who for 
the most part went back to the metropoles. Those who graduated 
from colleges and university soon thereafter easily entered into 
lesser bureaucratic positions that also carried high status, 
career security and numerous opportunities to supplement public 
service pay with various forms of "speed money." Unless the 
economies were rapidly expanding and public service positions 
growing with them, at some point within the next two decades 
governmental positions became fully staffed and such 
opportunities became more scarce just as the successive maturing 
cohorts became more heavily populated. For the thousands who came 
later, it would be a long vait before these recruits would retire 
and make room for those who arrived later on the scene. 
4) Character of the Political System: 
It takes little imagination to propose that the political 
side effects in any specific polity of rapid growth in the youth 
cohorts vill also depend significantly upon the political system 
in that country. 
Given the variety of political systems represented here 
today it is unnecessary to stress that mankind has created many 
structures, processes and ideologies to justify, explain and help 
particular form of this gap. See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men 
Rebel.(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970). 
~ -/ 
/ -
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sustain that variety. And I do not propose here to attempt a 
typology, a favorite pastime of many political science 
colleagues. I vill venture, hovever, that a polemical tvo-variant 
typology - capitalist-socialist or dictatorship-democracy is far 
too simple-minded and undiscriminating to be useful for our - and 
most other - purposes. But it is obvious that distinctions among 
political systems are relevant for us on several counts. 
a) In the first place, political ideologies and theories 
prevalent in any one political system have an affect on 
expectations - they may stress equality of opportunity, the duty 
of all citizens to do as they are told, or the legitimacy of 
vertical ascribed distinctions as preference is given to 
participants in great events like war or those who formed the 
cadres of a revolution. They may underline the government's 
responsibility to see that all are taken care of somehov or 
emphasize the individual's responsibility to shape his or her ovn 
fate. They may argue that most of life's important chances should 
(or they may in fact) depend upon an individual's relationship 
with officialdom; in contrast, they may hold (or in practice 
demonstrate) that government may have little affect upon a 
person's opportunities or difficulties. 
b) Political systems as well as ideologies usually have 
opportunity implications and are likely to have an affect on 
individuals' life chances, and how these are distributed. Thus, 
a political system that promotes equal distribution of what is 
available may meet at least minimum needs for all, even providing 
jobs. But it may not leave much room for individual choice. 
Systems with more individual choice may be less successful at 
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assuring jobs under all circumstances. Where the virtues of the 
market are stressed, an individual's skills and effort may be 
rewarded more than in an allocative system which seeks to avoid 
some of the more obvious "vagaries" and injustices of the market. 
Where families or tribal links are paramount, whole sectors of a 
society may be excluded from access to the governmental system 
and its many fruits. How these variables affect the expectations 
and behavior of the expanded youth cohorts is difficult to say ~ 
priori. But these considerations will affect how these expanded 
youth cohorts assess their life chances, and the extent to which 
they perceive them as favorable or unfavorable under given 
conditions. 
c) Political systems also differ in their hospitality to the 
public expression of dissatisfaction and the organization of 
interests to influence public policy. It makes a difference 
whether the political system leaves room for these expanding 
cohorts to articulate their peculiar needs. Some provide more 
opportunities for rapidly expanded youth cohorts to have their 
interests organized and their grievances publicly aired than 
others. Some, however, allow a recognized political "opposition" 
to organize; they are the most likely to find unemployed youth 
being mobilized to bring pressure to bear as they try to change 
in their favor the allocation of what ls desired. Elections are 
the occasions in such systems, when dissatisfactions are 
articulated and often exaggerated in efforts to change leaders 
and alter allocations. As civilian politicians compete against 
·each other, typically, each feels impelled to promise more than 
his opponent, inflating expectations in the process. By contrast, 
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some systems may be highly effective in discouraging such 
activities. By strict constraints, they may deter complaint and 
dampen hope of change except by extreme methods. 
Where such regular occasions as elections are not provided 
in less competitive systems, changes in leadership generations 
will have to be provided for within official structures, which is 
not always easy. Otherwise, the restless young may despair of 
improving their life chances. coups d'etat by younger officers 
are the more typical route for accelerated generational changes 
where civilian structures are not well established or cannot 
accommodate to changing political pressures from below. 
Where interests can be organized, political mobilization 
contributes to activating those who as yet are uncommitted or 
passive in the political system. Political mobilization may 
serve to enlist the emerging youth cohorts into governmental 
enterprises, particularly if internal or external enemies are 
targets, or in time of public crisis, such as in war. But within 
most systems, the young tend to reject the pretensions of the 
"establishment". They forget the challenges their predecessors 
overcame; they take for granted what the preceding generation may 
have considered great accomplishments. 
How that mobilization affects their political orientations 
and activities will reflect in part their "expectations". It will 
also reflect the orga~lzational structures that give shape and 
coherence to these activities. Successful mobilization for the 
most part requires organizational structures of some kind - youth 
organizations, political parties of many possible types, 
factional structures, religious zealotry groups, para-military 
political bodies, civil rights movements, etc. The kind of 
political mobilization and the direction of their activities, 
therefore, will depend in addition upon the organizat i onal 
structures through which that mobilization is organized. 
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In almost all political systems, there will be individuals 
and factions who see in the younger cohorts a possible political 
constituency that if properly inspired by ideological 
conviction, religious zeal, xenophobic or communal chauvinism can 
become politically mobilized to form an important political asset 
in the pulling and hauling of domestic pol itical rivalry. Through 
this and other mobilizational activities, youth cohorts may gain 
a sense of their own numbers and no doubt of their distinctness 
from those who have come before. Once they become aware of 
themselves as a numerically significant element in the polity 
they are likely to see themselves as rightf ully deser v ing more 
influence. 
Of importance therefore are the organizations and the 
tactics used to promote political awareness and shape the 
political activity of the younger cohorts as they come forward to 
adulthood. 
5) Leadership and Policy: 
The four variables we have identified are themselves 
affected by both leadership and policy. 
An inspiring leader, one who evokes loyalty, enthusiasm and 
energy focused on national tasks, can materially alter the 
capability of a political system to respond to the demands and 
grievances of youth cohorts. Even where there are many jobless 
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and expectations have been profoundly contradicted by a harsh 
reality, resentment can be assuaged by a Franklin Roosevelt who 
can induce hope in the despairing and energize a lethargic 
bureaucracy into innovative ways of tackling unprecedented 
problems. Conrad Adenauer for a critical period, could represent 
the deeper sources of a defeated people's self-respect and hopes. 
A Tito can inspire a diverse population and draw its youths 
forward in collaborative activities. 
To touch the springs of loyalty in the disaffected young 
requires special skills, and these will change with time. What 
calls forth a response in one g-eneration of youth cohorts leaves 
subsequent cohorts unmoved, or positively repelled. Leaders who 
stay in place too long usually discover that formulae that worked 
at the beginning of their terms fall flat and set up a distance 
between them and the new young people who take the place of those 
who cheered them when they first came to power . 
Where competition is intensified by growing numbers and a 
parallel contraction of individual and group opportunity,, there 
may be individuals who find it p~litically useful to stress the 
contrast between one group's advantages and another's 
disadvantages. Such invidious comparisons incidentally intensify 
group rivalries and mutual bitterness . In this way, as young men 
of differing affiliations may gain in group self-consciousness, 
they may also come to blame other ethnic groups or tribes for 
their present difficulties. In both India and Sri Lanka, at 
least, these ethnically-based youth cohorts become politically 
mobilized personnel available virtually on-call for regional or 
local leaders. They contribute to communal hostilities. When 
attacks on speclf lc groups or more general riots are being 
organized, or when they erupt virtually spontaneously in New 
Delhi, Colombo, Rangoon or elsewhere, these young men are quick 
to participate with zeal, greatly eomplicating the "load" on 
governments to maintain public order and to protect minorities. 
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The policies a government chooses - or may be 'forced' - to 
follow will also make a major difference. These are the least 
predictable. Understandably, policies toward expanding 
educational opportunities, toward university entrance, toward 
examinations, graduation and job assignment afterwards are 
particularly sensitive. But youth cohorts do not care only about 
their own particular interests. As po inted out above, pol i t ica l 
ideologies and notions of appropriate political tactics can als o 
become issues of importance. Persisting authoritarian practices 
that have lost their public legitimacy can intensify resentment . 
Government policies appearing to contradict cherished traditi onal 
political practices that may have been temporarily eclipsed can 
trigger the ire of youth cohorts. A government that negotiates 
agreements to bring disorders to an end and then does not 
implement what they agreed to can provoke igorous antagonism . 
Policies that encourage the migration of one ethnic group into 
lands that another considers its traditional territory can turn 
whole communities against a government. The egregious misuse of 
police power beyond what is thought in that society to be 
legitimate or the assassination of a popular opposition leader 
can be the trigger for political upheaval. 
It ls not necessary for the young themselves to be the ones 
vho invariably define the issue and set the strategy, nor is it 
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only the unassimilated youth cohorts vho make up the protesters. 
But vhere numbers villing to run severe risk are needed, 
typically it is the cohorts of unassimilated young who staff the 
challenge that governments find difficult to overcome. We only 
need be reminded of the pressures young South Koreans, Filipinos, 
Burmese, Assamese, Punjabis or Tamils ~ave brought to bear 
against their governments to recognize that leadership policy 
choices can make a profound difference to the way expanded youth 
cohorts can affect the political stability of established 
regimes. 
Moreover, government policies that appear to lead forvard 
to a better future encourage youth cohorts to acquiesce to 
current leadership. On the other hand, vhere government policies 
are videly believed to lead novhere; vhere stalemate and 
stagnation are perceived as the likely results of continuing the 
current course; where no nev leaders seem to be able to come 
forward under present institutions, the unassimilated youth 
cohorts are among the most likely to act against the regime. 
Leadership and policy thus can affect the other variables, 
contributing to either continuing stability or increasing chances 
of eruption. 
These are among the important intervening variables that 
stand between the fundamental demographics we are here to explore 
and probable political results. No wonder the political side 
effects of larger youth cohorts are difficult to predict. 
C) TO SUMMARIZE THE ARGUMENT: 
We have identified the abruptness and magnitude of the 
changes in the cohort size as a primary condition, imposing new 
"loads" on the politico-economic system. 
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The following intervening variables link these conditions to 
political outcomes: (1) the "loads/capabilities" equation, is 
affected by (a) the size and abruptness of the new loads and (b) 
the economic performance of the polity which in turn is dependent 
upon (c) the natural resources, (d) the capital, (e) technology 
and (f) the general organizational capability of the polity 
brought to bear upon coping with th~ nev "loads" (g) the way the 
international political economy affects capabilities . 
(2) Of critical importance is the availability or lack of 
remunerative job opportunities (or equivalent life chances) 
summarized in the "employment/unemployment ratio". Where large 
percentages find few opportunities, competition becomes more 
severe, intensifying class, ethnic and tribal rivalries. 
(3) Expectations induced in any cohort by experience, 
education, and public discourse as they relate to the 
opportunities that are in fact available, does much to shape the 
"satisfaction/resentment" equation. 
(4) The character of the political system, its ideology, its 
structures and political mobilization, accommodative processes 
all influence the vay particular age cohorts affect the polity . 
(5) Finally, the qualities of leadership and the policies 
governments pursue also affect the way youth cohorts contribute 
to stability or to political upheaval. 
It hardly needs saying that each of these variables has a 
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quasi-independent dynamic of its own, that there will be much 
"randomness" in the responses of large numbers of human beings to 
the circumstances they face. The "sport" of skilled or short-
sighted leadership, the unpredictability of public passions, and 
the affects of uncontrollable external events make these matters 
difficult to predict and equally difficult to manage. 
For those of you used to the relatively "hard" data of 
demographic research, and who like to make firm reliability 
"tests" of your propositions, moving into such ambiguous terrain 
as I have touched upon may leave you deeply uncomfortable. I 
would argue, however, that despite our best endeavors, political 
history is full of surprises; the unpredictable has to be 
expected. If one is to speculate about how large numbers of 
people will respond in a future that canno\ be known with 
precision, we have no choice but to move into such ambiguous 
realms. 
III - ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: 
There are some additional observations that ought to be 
made. 
1. While age cohorts do form an analytically distinguishable 
category of people identifiable by the year of their birth, 
within any one cohort there are likely to be differentiations 
that will affect their political behavior. Peasant youths with 
little education but with jobs to do in the countryside will 
respond differently than those with GCE "O"level credential who 
hoped for a white collar job and after two years of waiting have 
found nothing. Youths in the mountains of the Northwest Frontier 
have different aspirations for themselves than townsmen on the 
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Indian plains. 
2. Particularly in South Asia and Africa, each cohort is 
segmented by ascriptive affiliations. Ethnic differentiations 
lead Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, or Sikhs, Hindus, 
Muslims, Tamils, Malayalams, Assamese or Bengalis in India to 
look on their own shared interests in particularistic ways. In 
parts of Africa, tribal affiliations are politically far more 
consequential than the year of one's birth. In many instances, 
these exclusivist identifications are more important than age o r 
socio-economic class differentiations. 
3. The model has generally assumed that the youth cohort 
directs its resentments and bitterness against "the government . " 
However, in both South Asia and Africa political resentments and 
grievances are as often directed against competing ethnic or 
tribal groups as they are against the government per se . To be 
sure, in many states, the government has come under the control 
of one ethnic group or one tribe, and ~inorities are at a 
permanent, structural disadvantage. Or they may perceive 
themselves to be systematically discriminated against. In such 
cases, ethnic resentments become focused against a government 
which is seen as an embodiment of the competing ethnic group's 
unfair privileges. Moreover, where ethnic or tribal groups are 
regionally concentrated, a desire for greater freedom from 
central government control can take the form of secessionist 
movements, sometimes adopted originally as threats for bargaining 
purposes which then gain a life of their own, as can be seen in 
India's Punjab or Sri Lanka's northern province. 
(4) It would be incorrect to assert that expanded youth 
? • J 
25 
cohorts are the principal source of regionalist, secessionist 
movements. These have different, more complex sources. But the 
large numbers, often un- or under employed, provide enthusiastic, 
often zealous lieutenants and foot soldiers, so to speak, for 
political leaders seeking secession or threatening it as a 
bargaining ploy. Before a movement turns violent, the unabsorbed 
youths can be activists mobilizing opinions in favor of stronger 
opposition to central governmental rule. Should the movement go 
further to symbolic riots or beyond that to guerilla resista nce, 
large numbers of young zealots enhance the military power of the 
secessionist movement. 
(5) National traditions also can affect the role of 
successive youth cohorts. In India, student participation in the 
independence struggle against Great Britain established 
conventions which persist to this day. For many, students ought 
to participate in protest riots at some time in their career if 
they are to gain self-respect in their own eyes . This tradition 
has carried forward to make it easier for leaders of ethnic 
groups to call out students and other youths to protest the 
privileges granted to other ethnic groups or to seek correction 
of their grievances by direct action in the streets. In some 
polities, as in South Korea, students have claimed the role of 
public critics, defining vhen a regime has gone "too far". 
Unfortunately for those of us who like our analytical 
problems neat, these observations offer little promise . Each of 
the "variables" I have identified cannot be captured by a tidy 
reductionist simplification. They are sufficiently complex and 
ambiguous so that quantification is difficult and few observers 
would derive the same implications from observing any one of 
them. Nor should you construe my remarks to suggest that 
political disorders from time to time are not necessary. 
Sometimes only a real riot will lead deaf rulers to get the 
message. And the right of revolution has a long and honorable 
pedigree. 
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My remarks have been directed to a rather narrow but 
important problem: how do markedly enlarged youth cohorts affect 
political life? You will have gathered my underlying assumption: 
they are likely to produce political instabilities of various 
kinds. I hope these thoughts will have opened a broad field for 
discussion. 
Fortunately, Nathan Keyfitz has asked a number of my fe ll ow 
speakers to address particular cases in greater detail than I 
have in these rather sketchy observations. We can then see by 
observations whether these are the variables that matter, or 
whether there are other, more critical variables to observe and 
measure. 
Thank you. 
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only: "Tan1il&" refer& to Dry Zone only. 
At a Depart11ment o:f State conference on .. Dellogrop9io 
Pre&&ure and In&tability""• July 1986. 
Name: Dallas F.S. Fernando 
Title of Paper: Economic, social and political consequences the you th 
cohort has had and will have on societies: t he case of Sri Lanka 
, 
I 
Summary:This paper attempts to document the enormous problems the 
youth of a~e 15-24 have created for society by its size,growth and 
misfortunes during 1960-82. It uses data from the postwar censuses of 
1946,1953 ,1963 ,197 1 and 1981. Due to the introduction of Free Education 
from the kindergarten to the University in 1945, the achievement of 
Independence in 1948,and the implementation of progressive programmes 
and policies by successive Governments in the areas of health,education 
and general welfare; the··you tbs who were 15-24 at the 1963 , 1971 and 1981 
censuses grew up with tremendous optimism as to their future economic 
well-being. To appreciate their problems in proper perspective, their 
size and growth must be studied in the context of the severe and 
persistent economic crisis the island suffered between 1960 and 1982 . 
By the latter year,she had only attained a GNP per capita of 320 U.S. ) 
and had grown at the average annual rate of only 2.6% between these year • 
It is assumed that the 15- 24 age group approximately represents those 
entering the working ages. Annual additions to the numbers of potential 
young workers doubled between intercensal 1953- 63 in relation to 1 9~c - 5:­
Tbe doubling process was again repeated between 19G3-71 in relation to 
1953- 63 . Between 1946 and 1953, those of a s e 15-24 grew at 1.5~ ,this 
rose to 2.5% between 1953 and 1963 and then rocketed to 3 .9% between 
1963 and 1971. However, it abated to 1. 8~'.; between 197 1 and 1981. Arn oni:: 
the 15-19 olds,tbe unemployment rate catapulted from 19 .7 5n 1963 to 
40.4 and 43.4S in 1971 and 1981 respectively. For those of a ge 20- 24, it 
shot up dramatically from 16.5 in 1963 to 35. 3 in 1971 and then fell 
slightly to 34.&~ in 1981. The frustrations suffered by youth in their 
job hunting ventures compounded with political interference in securinr, 
suitable jobs demoralized their family meobers,relatives and friends 
and naturally spread to society at large. !be intensity of youth 
frustration was so pronounced that it found political expression. The 
youth insurrection of 1971 - an uprising triggered off largely by 
unemployed youth - had an adverse impact on society and hindered to a 
great extent the sluggishly moving economy. The new market-oriented 
and liberalized economy initiated by the new Government in 1977 has 
given rise to accelerating inflation during 1978-82 and resulted in t he 
perpetuation and accentuation of poverty. Among the 15-24 olds,the 
suicide rate rose steeply between 1963 and 1981. The severity of the 
impact youth misfortunes in the areas of unemployment, political 
interference in securing suitable jobs, drug addiction, crime and 
suicide has had on society could hardly be overstressed. In the light 
of growing economic, social and political instability, the impact youth 
problems will have on society is expected to worsen in the future. 
Census Youth of Age % of Total Annu~l Changes in Average Annual 
Year (15 - 24) Population Absolute Numbers Growth Rate (~ ) 
1946 1,322,185 19.9 
1953 1,471,316 18.2 
1963 1,907, 213 18. 0 
1971 2,630,652 20 .7 
1981 3,129,650 21.1 
21,304 
43,590 
87 , 690 
52,916 
• 
Name: Henk J. Heeren, University of Utrecht 
Title of Paper: Youth Co horts in the Netherlands : 
Cohorts or Generations? 
Summary: 
1.Figures on Five Year Birth Cohorts in the Netherlands ove r 
the period 1945-1985 do not show irregularities, except the 
1945 baby boom. The decline sets in after 1965, reaches a 
low level with a TFR of 1.5 in 1980 and stays on that level. 
Projections made in 1987 show a slight increase, indicating 
that we may have reached a plateau. Conclusion : there is no 
spec ific large or small birth cohort in any year. 
2. Some sociologists prefer to study generations instead of 
birth cohorts. Generations are clusters of birth c ohorts, 
encompassing between 10 to 15 cohorts. They are united by 
common experiences as they move through time. The generation 
concept originated in Art History, has been elaborated 
sociologically by Karl Mannheim, and been reintroduced 
recently by Henk Becker. It has some interesting aspects for 
demographers, because it avoids the narrowness of the cohort 
approach. which is based on one- year age groups only. 
3. The demographic question thus arises: can differences 
between generations be explained by demographic causes ? 
For instance, does the difference in size between a large 
and a small birth cohort offer some explanation for its 
experiences and encounters later in life ? Norman Ryder has 
discussed this issue and has offered evidence that large 
cohorts have at different times entered a s c hool system that 
was not prepared to receive them. The result: insufficient 
attention to individuals, lowering of educational standards, 
the precipitate construction of new universities, and the 
expansion of the educational system in general . With the 
smaller cohorts, entering the universities in the 80's, the 
reverse is the case, and the educational system is in for 
shrinking operations . 
4. Easterlin has advanced a hypothesis on the basis of 
cohort size:small generations entering the labour market in 
the late 80's were supposed to have better c hances than the 
large ones that entered that labour market in the 60's and 
early seventies. This hypothesis does not hold for the 
Netherlands.This means that the difference in size between 
cohorts does not sufficiently explain the subsequent 
experiences of these cohorts on the labour market . 
The Becker thesis i n its essential form states that the 
differences between generations have become more pronounced, 
and social inequalities between these generations have 
increased. Each young cohort entering the labour market has 
more difficulty in finding employment than its pre-
decessor. Hence the Lost Generation . 
Name: GORAN PENEV 
Title of Paper: SOCIJ\L Mm ECONOMIC CO!lSE')UEtlCES OF DEMOGPJ\PllIC 
EXPLOSION IN KOSOVO (Y UGOSLAVIA) 
Summary: 
The Yugoslav province of Kosovo (1.9 million of inlrnbitonts) hos 
the h!~hest population growth (in 1987 the rate stood at 2,5%) and the 
youngest age structure in Europe (52t of the population is belo~ the age 
of 2o and only 6 . 4% above the• age of 60) . Kosovo is the least developed 
part of Yugoslavia and due to its unfavourable econQmic structure and a 
stron pressure of the generations of the working age entering the labour 
market it has high unemployment. The unemployment stands at 35% while the 
economic activity, in particular of women, is very low (in 1981 the ovcroll 
activity rate was 23.9% and female activity rate was 7.6%). According to 
the population projections it is anticipated that during the 1986-2001 . 
period aroud 465 thousand people will seek jobs in the non-acricultural 
sector of economy in •addition to the 125 thousand currently unemployed . 
At the same time it is exprectcd that only loo thousand persons will cease 
to be active. 'l'he economy of Kosovo will not be able to provide over 4 50 
thousand jobs in the forthcoming decade and consequently the unemployment 
problem will become increasingly acute. Solutions will be difficult to 
find at the national Yugoslav level due to the overall economic crisis 
and the low degree of spacial mobility of the Kosovo~s population. 
Numerous, unfavourable social and economic consequences of the 
demographic explosion in Kosovo (severe social and economic prob lems of 
the youth, low status of women and slo~ae~n in the economic growth and 
the standard of life of the whole population) give rise also to political 
problems in the province and in Yugoslavia. This in particular due to the 
fact that higlt population growth in Kosovo is characteristic only f or 
the ethnic Alban ians resuting thus in ethnic homogenization of the provin-
ce (the share of Albanians has increased from 65% to 80% ower a 4o year 
period). The re is also in increase in the lagging behind of this largest 
ethnic minurity group the Albanians in respect to the economic development 
of the rest of the Yugoslav population resulting thus is further intensi-
fication of ethnic conflicts in the ccuntry. 
Name: P. Ramachandran & (Mrs) .D. Usha Rani 
Title of Paper: SOCIO-ECCNOMIC AtID DEMOG!'--AFHIC IMPLIC?'_TIO!'-~S OF 
YOUTH IN INDIA 
Summ&ry: Youth constitute a suhstantial an c gro..,.: inq pro-
portion of the Indian Po~ul~tion. It is e~timate~ th2 t 
the largest addition to the youth po~ulation (ag~n 1 5-24) 
will be during 1981-91 (44 million), whil~ in the l?.st 
decade of this century the net a0dition will b e r~lntiv~ly 
small <1e million). The size of youth po~ul~tion will ~ e 
190 million in 20~1. In the years to come it is estiMatef. 
that mortality cHfferentials by s~x may narrow r!own anc 
keep the sex ratio of y outhfnl ao~s in re.::>sonah le liMi~s. 
In India, mortality among youth is the lowes t ?.nf f~rn ~ l~s 
had higher mortality relative to m~le~. Over t h e y~~r~, 
the age at Marria ge of youth w2s increasing. 'lh~ lit:,.ra cy 
ra t e amon~- the adol esc~nts Caged 15-19) increased Lron 37 
to 55 per c~nt relativ ~ to ~ ? to 52 p er cent amo~~ the 
young adults (agec 20-24) during 1961-1~81. In ?rsolu~~ 
size t h e illit~rate vouth we re 21.2 million male s anr ?5 
million females in 1981. The work fore~ ~artici~c tion 
rate (WFPR) have been dt'!clining in genera l. The results 
of the case study in South Central An~hra Pradesh in In~ia 
are mor~ or les~ consistent witr. th~socio-econoMic and 
demograrh ic orof il~ o~ youth based on c~nsus d c ta. !tie 
analysis implicat:~s that ure!""lploym~nt, ava ilah i l it,· o f 
suitah le johs for tke er.ucat~a ~n~ spre~d o f univ*rsal 
education are t~~ mos t crucial problems fac~d by Incian 
youth. Incian Pla nners not only hav~ to ~n~ur~ h ; oh~r 
employment opportuniti~s for youth but also hav~ to im-
prov~ the quality of education which profoun~ly influ~nc~ 
various socio-economic a~a psychological ~<"l ctors,.·i th 
demogra ~hic import. 
Name: Mesba.h-us-Saleheen, A.H.M. Raihan Sharif,& S.M. Monzurul Bug 
Title of Paper: The Present Trends of Youth Cohort and its Socio-economic 
Consequences in :Bangladesh 
Summary: 
Bangladesh is one of the underdevelop countries which have 
overvhellling youth population. About 71.10 per cent of the population 
-.. , 
or lle.ngladesh belong to 10-29 1ears of age group. Thia characteristics 
of population exert impacts on the socio-economic condition or the 
country, which are manifested as ~loJ1Dent problem, education problem 
rural to urban migration and various other socio-economic and cultural 
problems. 'l'hese problema jeoperd.ize the total socio-economic environment 
of the country. 
The present study ~ aims to analyse the urban youth 
cohort, its trend vis a vis anal7sing the social and economic environmen 
-tal problems originated by the population within this cohort in 
:Bangladesh. 'J.'he study observes that the present socio-economic problems 
of the urban areas in l3angladesh are very much related to the 
demographic structure of the population, which is comprised mainly of 
youth population. 
This study has tvo 11a.jor implications, (1) determinicg the 
nature of the youth cohort in l:l&ngladesh and (2) t he effects of this 
cohort on the socio-economic system, vhich will in turn help to 
formulate proper planning to alleviate the problems of the urban areas 
in :Bangladesh. 
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